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[H.A.S.C. No. 107–26]







JULY 19, 2001


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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Internet: Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250
Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001


One Hundred Seventh Congress

BOB STUMP, Arizona, Chairman

FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
HOWARD P. ''BUCK'' McKEON, California
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma
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WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
BOB RILEY, Alabama
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
ED SCHROCK, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
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VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
David Trachtenberg, Professional Staff Member
Jarrod Tisdell, Research Assistant

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    Thursday, July 19, 2001, Missile Defense Programs and Policy


    Thursday, July 19, 2001



    Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services

    Stump, Hon. Bob, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services


    Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

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    Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense


Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T.

Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul

Skelton, Hon. Ike

Stump, Hon. Bob

[There were no Documents submitted.]

[The Questions and Answers can be viewed in the hard copy.]
Mr. Allen
Mr. Underwood


House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
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Washington, DC, Thursday, July 19, 2001.

    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bob Stump (chairman of the committee) presiding.


    The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order. Let me remind the members at least on the top row here that those microphones in front of you is—one microphone, at least, is always live. So when you are conversing with staff, try to hold it down a little.

    Today the committee is pleased to welcome the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to testify on the Administration's missile defense policy and programs. The fiscal year 2002 budget request represents a significant increase in funding for ballistic missile programs. For those of us who support a robust defense program, we welcome the more aggressive approach taken by this Administration, which I hope will hasten the day when all Americans are protected against the growing threat of ballistic missile attack.

    I commend the Administration for elevating the importance of this issue in the public debate. An essential part of any missile defense program is a strong testing regime. Again, I commend the Administration for seeking to strengthen the testing program, and I congratulate all of those who played a role in the successful missile intercept test that occurred last weekend.
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    While any test program will inevitably result in a share of failures and successes, the July 14th intercept demonstrated again that it is technologically possible to hit a bullet with a bullet. Missile defense is technologically feasible and our job is to figure out the best way to give them the right task.

    That said, there are significant policy and programmatic issues raised by the Administration's new missile defense approach. Importantly, the issue of the 30-year-old Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limits our ability to defend ourselves, must be confronted. The Administration has chosen, in Secretary Wolfowitz's words, to move beyond the treaty, and I believe this is a wise decision. We seek to do so cooperatively with the Russians, but unilaterally if necessary.

    An effective deterrent for the threats we will likely face and confront in the 21st century is one that balances offensive forces with defensive forces. For too long that balance has been skewed as we consciously chose to remain vulnerable to even a single ballistic missile launched in our direction. The Administration has now chosen to correct that imbalance, a decision that reflects a change in policy.

    As for funding, the fiscal year 2002 budget seeks to develop a layered defense against ballistic missile tests in various stages of their trajectory. It is designed to explore a range of technologies, and I believe it reflects a prudent response to an urgent threat. Clearly many of the issues associated with the Administration's missile defense approach are controversial. This morning, we hope to gain a clear understanding of why the Administration has chosen this course and what we can expect.
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    To discuss the issues, we have as our witnesses, the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Gentlemen, we welcome you. Before we begin, let me turn to Mr. Skelton, our ranking member, for any remarks he may wish to make.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Stump can be found in the Appendix.]


    Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. A special welcome to Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. We look forward to your testimony for your recommendations and advice, and we look forward not just on this issue, but on the other issues regarding national security, and we thank you for your service.

    Let me at the outset say, General Kadish, congratulations. I know that you and your team worked very hard to achieve the successful test that took place last Saturday night, and you show that the technology and the hard work and money can pay off, and I think all America was pleased to see the results of that test, and I was glad to see it succeed, mainly because I support missile defense. Many of us on the Democratic side, the Democratic colleagues do support missile defense. We have been behind you. But, you know, I have got to say, it is hard for us to stay behind you when you floor the accelerator and leave your supporters such as us behind in the dust, and I find several things to be concerned about. Let me share those with you and the Secretary, if I may.
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    This country lawyer has some real concerns, and in listening to the rhetoric and in reading the testimony, I kind of feel like Mark Twain when he once said, the more you explain it to me, the more I don't understand it. And so I do have some concerns maybe that can be explained to us today.

    I am concerned about labeling. The Administration wants to build two launch sites for ground-based interceptors. They are called test beds, but you can't even test from one of them. That sounds more like a deployment to me, and we haven't in this Congress approved a deployment.

    I am concerned about disregard of Congress. The Administration wants to start building sites in August, even though Congress did not authorize, did not appropriate, did not reprogram the 2001 funds for that purpose.

    I am concerned about just obeying the old-fashioned law. Some soft tests proposed do violate the ABM Treaty. The Constitution says that treaties are the supreme law of the land, and I want to know whether we are going to violate that supreme law.

    Remember, Mr. Secretary, and the General, this is a friend talking to you. You know that, and I want you to know that I have these deep concerns, and I hope you can address them today.

    I am concerned about the ability of this Congress to do its constitutional duty to propose to reorganize the program into six large funds that can kindly be called slush funds to decide how to spend the money internally. It is Congress' job to make sure public funds are spent wisely. Such funds are not a good idea, regardless of where one stands on missile defense. It is not a good precedent.
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    But most of all, I am concerned about the troops. I will say it again. I am concerned about the troops. I have introduced a bill to raise the pay by 7.3 percent. The Administration is asking for a 57 percent increase in this program. That seems out of proportion to me. Next year's proposed budget for this one program would pay every enlisted sailor in the United States Navy for a year, and just the increase would pay the entire enlisted Marine Corps.

    You know, Mr. Secretary, and General, I support you and I want to continue supporting you. It is hard to support a program that says let us buy everything and throw it against the wall and see what sticks, and that does concern me.

    Taken together, I am concerned that the Department has decided that ballistic missile defense might be exempt from the rules. And whether it is a financial accounting rule or a program rule or the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or even the Constitution rules, I don't think it should get a free pass, and these are deep concerns. And I hope you take me seriously in my concerns, because I hope we can get to the same place, the same regard for American protection. But I think that should be treated like other weapons systems. If we run, let us do it right, and when we have it right, we will all be very, very proud of the end result and the end product.

    So I again thank you for coming over here and testifying, and, again, General, to you and your entire team, congratulations on last Saturday.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix.]

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    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, General, your statements will be included in the record in their entirety. If you care to summarize, we appreciate it. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.


    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of this distinguished committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you. I will submit the longer statement for the record. Let me just try to summarize it, hopefully briefly.

    Let me ask you, though, to begin by imagining, if you will, the following scenario. A rogue state with a vastly inferior military, but armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction commits an act of aggression against the neighboring country. As President Bush sends U.S. forces into the theater to respond, the country's genocidal dictator threatens our allies and deployed forces with ballistic missile attack. Suddenly almost without warning, missiles rain down on our troops and pound into the densely populated residential neighborhoods of allied capitals. Panic breaks out. Sirens wail as rescue crews in protective gear race to search the rubble for bodies and rush the injured to hospitals. Reporters mumbling through their gas masks attempt to describe the destruction as pictures of the carnage are instantaneously broadcast around the world.

    Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee, the scene that I have just described is not science fiction. It is not a future conflict scenario dreamed up by those creative Pentagon planners. It is a description of events that took place 10 years ago during the Persian Gulf War. I have a particular vivid recollection of those events. When Saddam Hussein was launching SCUD missiles against Israel, I was there with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. We had been sent by President Bush to help persuade Israel not to get drawn further into the war as Saddam Hussein was seeking to do.
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    We saw children walking to school carrying gas masks in gaily decorated boxes, no doubt to try to distract them from the possibility of facing mass destruction. They were awfully young to be thinking about the unthinkable. With those missiles, Saddam Hussein terrorized a generation of Israeli citizens and almost succeeded in changing the entire strategic course of the Gulf War.

    But it wasn't only Israel that was threatened and attacked by those missiles. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the first U.S. combat casualties from hostile ballistic missile attack. In the waning days of Desert Storm, a single SCUD missile hit a U.S. military barracks in Dhahran, killing 28 of our soldiers and wounding 99. Thirteen of those killed came from a single small town in Pennsylvania called Greensburg. For American forces, it was the single worst engagement of the Gulf War. For 13 families in Greensburg, it must have been the worst day of their lives.

    Today, 10 years later, it is appropriate to ask how much better able are we to meet a threat that was already real and serious 10 years ago and has become even more so today. And the answer, sadly, is hardly better. Today our capacity to shoot down those primitive SCUD missiles is not yet much improved from 1991. We are still a year or two away from initial deployment of the PAC–3, and let me emphasize the PAC–3, our answer to the SCUD, will be an effective one. And we are many years away from full deployment. Today our forces in the Persian Gulf and Korea and the civilian populations they defend have almost no means of protection against North Korean ballistic missiles armed with both chemical or conventional warheads. With no missile defenses an attack by North Korea would result in tens or even hundreds of thousands of casualties.
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    To those who wonder why so many of the regimes hostile to the United States, many of them desperately poor, invest such enormous sums of money to acquire ballistic missiles, I would suggest this answer: They know we don't have any defenses. The Iraqi ballistic missile capability is the only Iraqi military capability that we underestimated in the Gulf War. It was worse than we thought and we never fully coped with it.

    We underestimated the ballistic missile threat 10 years ago, and today, a decade later, I fear we are underestimating it still.

    For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously enough the challenge of developing defenses against missiles. We have not adequately funded it. We have not believed in it, and we have given the ABM Treaty priority over it. That is not how America behaves when we are serious about a problem. It is not how we put a man on the Moon in just 10 years. It is not how we developed the Polaris program or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in even less time.

    Mr. Chairman, the time to get serious is long past. In 1972, we knew of a total of nine countries that had ballistic missiles. Today we know of 28, and in just the last 5 years, more than a thousand missiles of all ranges have been produced. If we do not build defenses against these weapons now, hostile powers may soon have or already have the ability to strike U.S. and allied cities with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and they might not even have to use the weapons to affect our behavior and achieve their ends.

    A policy of intentional vulnerability is not a strategy to deal with the dangers of the new century. Mr. Chairman, the Congress and the National Missile Defense Act and President Bush in his statements and in this request in the 2002 budget, President Bush has declared his intention to develop and deploy defenses capable of protecting the American people, our friends, our allies and our forces around the world from limited ballistic missile attack.
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    The 2002 amended budget requests $8.3 billion for missile defense. We intend to develop defenses capable of defending against limited missile attacks from a rogue state or from an accidental or an authorized launch. That requires more aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly those technologies that have been constrained in the past by the ABM Treaty. So we plan to build incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology is proven ready, and then adding new capabilities over time as they become mature.

    We must first broaden the search for effective technologies before we can move forward to deployment. But notwithstanding the delays of the past decade, there has been a significant effort, and the capability to defend America is within our grasp. The technology of 2001 is not the technology of 1981 or even that of 1991.

    Last Saturday, we conducted a successful test intercept of an intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean. General Kadish has a short film clip, and with your indulgence, I would like to be able to show it to you now.

    [Film clips shown.]

    General KADISH. The first activity you will see is the PATRIOT, again, short-range missiles and intercept in the atmosphere. The next intercept you will see of the theater high altitude air defense (THAAD) program on the edge of space against longer range missiles, and then the last two film clips will show the intercepts against long-range ICBM missiles that we just completed our last test on Saturday. And the idea here is that the hit-to-kill technology is maturing in a layered way and that we view this—even though we have had a lot of failures in this process—as a trend that we expect to continue in this very hard engineering problem.
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    The first thing you see is a launch of the target for PATRIOT, and then the PATRIOT launch itself, if it is working right. There you go. This is a PATRIOT launch itself. You will see it maneuver in the atmosphere, to get it in a position to intercept a short-range missile coming into its target. As it maneuvers, the radar and communications systems are telling it where the warhead ought to be and it is maneuvering to intercept it. And then you will see some puffs of white smoke in the final end game, as we call it—there it goes—to actually hit the incoming warhead. There is no explosives on that particular PAC–3 missile. It is all done by hit-to-kill, body-to-body impact.

    Now, this is the THAAD program a couple years ago, launching against the target. This is a longer range target, and it does an energy maneuver, because it has to stay on the range, and you can see it climb very rapidly to the edge of outer space in order to intercept the warhead. This is a picture of the warhead approaching the target, and you can see the maneuvering that goes on. And that in and of itself is, again, a hit-to-kill nonadministration.

    Now, this was done at an altitude such that you could see this intercept from White Sands, from Albuquerque, so it is quite high in the atmosphere. And this is another view, though more real-time. Nothing much left. And that is what you see from a longer distance.

    Now, in the end game, the next series of films will show you the last thing that particular kill vehicle saw before it intercepted. And it gives you a picture as it is zooming in and maneuvering in slow motion to give you an idea how accurately we think we can hit these particular weapons across the board.

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    Now against the long-range missile. This was the first test we did. Two have failed. Two now have succeeded, but this is a launch of the target out of Vandenberg, and 4,500 miles down range, we will attempt an interceptor from Kwajalein, and this is a picture of the interceptor. We have repeated this very same test on Saturday, but I wanted to show you the consistency between the two tests. The launch out of Marshall Islands in Kwajalein Atoll reaches into outer space, and this is a picture of the intercept from an airborne platform in the infrared. And this is another picture in visible range. You can see the kill vehicle approaching in slow motion, and then you will see the intercept.

    The same thing happened on Saturday. We did the same test in all respects, except that it was a more integrated test using all the different elements.

    And this is what happened on Saturday. You can see the similarities in the launch. That is the interceptor out of Marshall Islands in Kwajalein. As the interceptor reaches for altitude, it does a number of maneuvers, and this is a pretty spectacular view of the difficulty we have in actually getting it into outer space. We have enough energy in this particular booster to keep it on the range. There is a picture of the intercept and a radar track on the left and a visual track on the right of the intercept. So we have got pretty good confirmation across the board that we were successful in the intercept. And that is all we have for you from a technology standpoint.

    Again, a lot of failures on the way here, but when you start stringing the successes we have and show the different difficulty we have in engineering, we are building more and more confidence in our systems.

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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, that successful test is another step forward on the long road to developing and deploying effective defenses to protect the American people and our friends and allies and our troops abroad. It underscores the point that today ballistic missile defense is no longer a problem with invention. It is a challenge of engineering. It is a challenge that this country is up to.

    Let me address briefly the issue of the ABM Treaty, which is central in this discussion. To build on the success of this test, to begin testing the many promising technologies that were not pursued in the past, inevitably means that our testing and development program will eventually encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. We are seeking to build defenses to defend the American people.

    The ABM Treaty's very purpose is to prohibit us from developing such defenses. This Administration does not intend to violate the ABM Treaty, Mr. Chairman. We intend to move beyond it. We are working to do so on two parallel tracks. First, we are pursuing the accelerated research and development testing program that I have described, and second, we are engaged in discussions with Russia on a new security framework, a framework that reflects it is a fact that the Cold War is over and the U.S. and Russia are not enemies. We are moving forward on both of these tracks simultaneously, and we believe the prospects for success in both cases are promising. To succeed, we need your help and the help of the Congress in both areas. First, we need Congress' support to fund the President's budget request for further development and testing of missile defense. The ability to defend the American people from missile attack is clearly within our grasp, but we cannot do so unless the President has Congress' support.

    Second, we need your support for President Bush's efforts to achieve an understanding with Russia on ballistic missile defense. The President is working to build a new security relationship between the U.S. and Russia, one whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of mutual annihilation of our respective populations. That is not a healthy basis for U.S.-Russian relations in the 21st century. Our discussions with Russia are underway. President Bush will be continuing them shortly in Genoa with President Putin. Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld are engaged with their counterparts. We have no reason to believe that we will fail. The question of whether we will violate the ABM Treaty in 2002 presumes we will fail, but we think there is no reason to assume that. And if we succeed, the ABM Treaty will no longer be an obstacle to protecting ourselves from ballistic missile attack.
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    We hope and expect to have achieved an understanding with Russia by the time our development program encounters the constraints of the ABM Treaty. We would prefer a cooperative outcome, and we are optimistic that such an outcome is possible, but we must achieve release from the constraints of the treaty.

    Congress can have a significant impact on the outcome of our discussions. If Congress shows the same resolve as the President to proceed seriously with the development and testing of defenses, it will significantly enhance the prospects for a successful negotiation. Conversely, I would hope Congress would not give Russia the mistaken impression that they can somehow exercise a veto over our development of missile defenses. The unintended consequence of such an action would be, I fear, to rule out a cooperative solution and then leave the President no choice but to withdraw from the treaty unilaterally, an outcome that surely none of us wants.

    As I said, the current plan test program is not designed with the constraints of the ABM Treaty in mind, nor has it been designed for the purpose of exceeding those constraints. However, as we proceed, one or more events will encounter treaty restrictions and limitations. Such an event, in our view, is likely to happen in months rather than in years. The reason I have to say likely rather than certainly, is we are dealing with two uncertainties here, the technological uncertainty of a development program and the legal complexity of some of the most ambiguous treaty issues that I have encountered in almost 30 years of working in the arms control arena.

    The Department's ABM Compliance Review Group has been directed to identify ABM Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the plans for new development or treaty events. This new process will permit us to take those issues into account as early as possible as we pursue our negotiations with Russia on a new strategic framework. By the time a plan development activity does encounter ABM Treaty constraints, we fully hope and intend to have reached an understanding with Russia.
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    Mr. Chairman, if we agree that a cooperative outcome is preferable to unilateral withdrawal—and I think we would all agree on that—then we need Congress' support for missile defense research and testing. We look forward to working with the committee to build on this weekend's successful test and to ensure that we can defend the American people, our friends and allies and our deployed forces from limited ballistic missile attacks.

    Let me say a little few words, Mr. Chairman, about the new deterrence framework and what this program is not trying to do. The Cold War as we know is over. The Soviet Union is gone. Russia is not our enemy. Yet the ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War relationship that is no longer relevant to the 21st century. The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that, defenses. They will threaten no one. They will deter those who would threaten us with ballistic missile attack, but we do not consider Russia such a country. Americans do not lie awake at night worrying about a massive Russian first strike the way we did during the Cold War, during the Cuban missile crisis. Our missile defenses will be no threat to Russia. Their purpose will be to protect against limited missile attacks from an increasing number of possible sources, but not against the thousands of missiles in Russia's arsenal.

    And let me add, Mr. Chairman—it is not in my prepared testimony but I think it is important to make this point—we would like to see Russia with the ability to defend itself against limited missile attack. This point came up in one of our hearings on the other side of the Hill, where someone said, wouldn't we feel uncomfortable if the Russians had a limited missile defense capability? As a matter of fact, by the way, they do have a primitive nuclear arms limited missile capability around Moscow, and it has been a long time since I have ever heard anyone in the Defense Department worry about that.
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    But more importantly, if, heaven forbid, something went wrong—and I can't imagine it going wrong, but if we had an accident with one of our missiles and it was shooting—flying toward Russia—I would dearly hope that they could shoot it down. I cannot imagine circumstances in which it is in our interest for Russia to be vulnerable to limited missile attack, and I think that is a very important point. We are talking about a common interest here, and that is the reason why I am optimistic that at the end of the day we can achieve a cooperative outcome.

    These limited missile defenses are just one part of the larger 21st century deterrence framework that we are working to build. We need a strategy of layered deterrence in which we develop the mission of capabilities, both offensive and defensive, military and also diplomatic. Just as America's overwhelming naval power discourages potential adversaries from investing in building competing navies, we should develop a range of new capabilities that by their very existence dissuade and discourage potential adversaries from investing in other hostile capabilities, and, again, I would repeat, I do not believe it is an accident that the reason we see these hostile countries investing so much of their scarce resources in ballistic missiles is because they see that as an area of our vulnerability.

    Let me also briefly say, Mr. Chairman, what this program is not. It is not an effort to build an impenetrable shield around the United States. It is not Star Wars, and I would urge both sides of this debate not to go back to the debates of the 1980s. It is not a threat to anyone. It will be a problem only for those rogue states that wish to threaten our people, our allies or our deployed forces.

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    It will not undermine arms control or spark an arms race. The Russians and the Chinese will be able to see very clearly that we are reducing our extensive nuclear forces substantially. There is absolutely no need for them to build up theirs.

    In this budget proposal alone, with Peacekeeper, Trident and B-1 reductions, we will be reducing our nuclear warheads by over a thousand. We plan to reduce our nuclear forces no matter what Russia decides to do, but we believe it is in their interest to follow the same path.

    It is not a scarecrow defense. It is a serious defense that will grow more and more effective over time. The more capable, the better, but defenses don't have to be perfect to save lives and reduce casualties. Will they be 100 percent effective? Mr. Chairman, no defense is 100 percent effective. Notwithstanding the billions we spend on counterterrorism and quite a few successes in that area, we failed to stop terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers, on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and on the World Trade Center, yet I know of no one who would suggest that we stop spending money on counterterrorism because our defenses are not perfect.

    It will not, Mr. Chairman, cost the taxpayer hundreds of billions of dollars. We are talking about substantial sums, but not astronomical sums. The money we propose to spend on missile defenses, it is comparable to other major defense programs.

    And finally, I do not believe it diverts attention and resources from other more pressing threats. Some have argued we should not spend money on missile defense because the real threat comes from terrorists using suitcase bombs. I agree that that is a serious problem. Both threats are real. But for the last decade, work on countering the terrorist threat has proceeded aggressively, while work on ballistic missile defenses has been hamstrung by an obsolete theory.
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    Mr. Chairman, let me conclude where I began. The threat is nonfictional. It is not limited. It is not remote. And it will not disappear simply if one or another troublesome regime disappears. Think about what kind of hearings we might be having 3 or 4 years from now if Iran demonstrates intermediate range capability to strike Israel or to strike U.S. troops deployed in the Gulf or if North Korea demonstrates the capability to strike the U.S. with long-range nuclear missiles. I for one don't want to have to come before this committee and explain why we ignored the coming threat or did not do everything we could to meet it. This is not a partisan issue. We do not know whether the President who first faces a crisis with a hostile country capable of striking Los Angeles, Detroit or New York with nuclear or chemical or biological weapons will be Republican or Democrat, but we do know that person will be an American. That is how we must proceed, not as Republicans or Democrats but as Americans. Let future generations who look back at us see not partisan argument but statesmen who rose above party to make sure that America and its allies and its deployed forces were protected against this real emerging threat.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    [The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz can be found in the Appendix.]

    The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That unfortunately is a vote on the floor. It is going to be necessary that we recess for hopefully no longer than 15 minutes and, General Kadish, we will start with you when we return. The committee will stand in recess at the sound of the gavel.
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    The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will please come to order. General Kadish.


    General KADISH. Morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to present our fiscal year 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense Program budget.

    The fundamental objective of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program is to develop the capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States, its allies and friends against all classes of ballistic missile threats.

    The Department will develop and deploy promising technologies and concepts in order to build and sustain an effective, reliable and affordable missile defense system. The research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) program is designed to enhance system effectiveness over time by developing layered defenses that employ complementary sensors and weapons to engage threats in the boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally.

    At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have developed a research, development and testing program that focuses on missile defense as a single integrated system, no longer differentiating between theater and national missile defense. This revised structure involves three basic thrusts. First, the new program will build on the technical progress we have made to date by providing the funding required to fully develop and test elements of the previous program.
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    Second, the new program will pursue a broad range of activities in order to aggressively evaluate and develop technologies for the integration of land, sea, air or space-based platforms to counter the ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight. The new program will not cut corners. Rather, it is designed to pursue parallel development paths, to improve the likelihood of achieving an effective layered missile defense.

    Third, the new testing program will incorporate a larger number of tests than in the past. They will employ more realistic scenarios and countermeasures, and this will allow us to achieve greater confidence in our planning and development. Through this robust testing activity, we may discover opportunities to accelerate elements of the program based on their performance and increase the overall capability and credibility of the BMD system. This approach is designed to enable contingency use of demonstrated BMD capabilities, if directed.

    The goal of the system is a layered defense that provides multiple engagement opportunities along the entire flight path of a ballistic missile. Over the next 3 to 5 years, we will pursue parallel technical paths to reduce schedule and cost risks in the individual efforts. We will explore and demonstrate kinetic and directed energy kill mechanisms for potential sea, ground, air and space-based operations to engage threat missiles in the boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight. In parallel, sensor suites and battle management and command and control will be developed to form the backbone of this system.

    Before I proceed to describe the new program, I would like to make clear what this program does not do. It does not define a specific architecture. It does not commit to a procurement program for a full, layered defense. There is no commitment to specific dates for production and deployment other than for the lower tiered terminal defense elements. It is not a rush to deploy untested systems. It is not a step backward to an unfocused research program, and it is not a minor change to our previous program. Rather, this program is a bold move to develop an effective integrated layered defense against ballistic missiles of all ranges.
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    The new program is a major change in our approach to developing ballistic missile defense. The previous National Missile Defense Program, for example, was a high risk production and deployment program dependent for its success on an RDT&E effort that was underfunded but charged with developing a system that would operate at the outset with near perfection and it was based on rigid military requirements. The new program is built around a fully funded rigorous RDT&E effort designed to demonstrate increasing capability over time through a robust, realistic testing program.

    The objective of the new program is a layered defense to protect the United States, allies, friends and deployed forces against ballistic missiles of all ranges. We will pursue this objective in the following way:

    First, we are recommending a broad, flexible approach to RDT&E that allows us to explore multiple development paths and to reinforce success based on the best technological approaches and the most advantageous basing modes. This will provide a hedge against the inherent uncertainty of the ballistic missile defense challenge.

    Second, we are recommending an acquisition approach that is evolutionary, one that would allow us to field systems incrementally once they are proven through realistic testing. Because of the uncertainties in the development program, the evolutionary approach is implemented through 2-year planning blocks. This allows us to adjust rapidly to change in development performance and allows us to build on our successes over time without the inherent difficulties of date-certain expectations.

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    And, third, rather than committing to a single architecture as we have done in the past, we will deploy over time different combinations of sensors and weapons, consistent with our national strategic objectives.

    We have designed the program so that in an emergency and if directed, we might quickly deploy test assets to defend against a rapidly emerging threat. This has been done before with military capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. But barring such an emergency, as the Deputy Secretary has stated, we do not intend to deploy test assets until they are ready, because such emergency deployments are disruptive and can set back normal development programs by years.

    The technical and operational challenges of intercepting ballistic missiles are unprecedented. While these challenges are significant, our testing program accomplishments today, as I have showed you in these films, tell us that they are not insurmountable. Given the threats we expect to face, they raise a premium on fielding a highly reliable and effective military system.

    Mr. Chairman, we have an aggressive RDT&E program designed to enhance system effectiveness over time by developing layered defenses that employ complementary sensors and weapons to gauge threat targets in the boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally. Along the way, there will be successes, and there will be failures. But we will learn from both and make significant progress in developing the ballistic missile defense system.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and in view of the time, I cut my remarks short.
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    [The prepared statement of General Kadish can be found in the Appendix.]

    The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. The Chair recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Skelton.

    Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, there are a good number of folks that have questions, and at this time I will reserve any questions until later.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

    Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning. Thank you both for excellent statements.

    Mr. Secretary, you concluded your opening remarks with an optimistic statement to the effect that you hope that all members of this body will rise above partisan politics and do what the Constitution tells us to do, and that is especially on this committee to provide for the security of this country. And, you know, we have lots of partisan fights up here, and you have witnessed a few of them. On the other hand, we have some good moments when we do rise to the occasion. I think you have made a good case that this is the occasion. I know I have good colleagues who are concerned that we could spend this money in other areas, and certainly there are other areas that need attention in the defense budget. But if we had an attack by tanks, by planes, by ships, by any other method of conventional warfare, I think it would be fair to say we have a strong defense against almost any threat. But if a ballistic missile was launched at an American city today, could we shoot down a single ballistic missile, incoming to an American city?
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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You know and I know, Congressman, but I think most of the American people don't realize it, we have no capability whatsoever.

    Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you for that answer, and that is the answer that I have been asking and members of Democrat and Republican administrations have been having to give at that same table you sat at for the past many years, because that is a fact. This is one place where we have an immense vulnerability, and it is only appropriate that we focus on this vulnerability.

    My good friend, Mr. Skelton, talked about quality of life, and he has got some initiatives to increase quality of life, and one way to do that is to pay our good troops more money, and the implication, of course, is that some of this money could come out of the Missile Defense Program and we could use that for pay. But I would observe that one aspect of quality of life for your troops is keeping them alive. And I think it is absolutely appropriate that you pointed out to us that we got this wakeup call over 10 years ago when American troops lost their lives, because we didn't have a full-up robust capability against Saddam Hussein's SCUD missiles and you made that point very clearly.

    Now, with respect to the ABM Treaty, we all now know the ABM Treaty is something arcane to most Americans, but we all know that the ABM Treaty is an agreement that will not defend ourselves against fast missiles. And we made that treaty with the then Soviet Union. Mr. Secretary, does North Korea or China or Iraq or Iran have any legal obligation under the treaty we have made with the Soviet Union not to kill either our troops or Americans in our cities with fast missiles? Are they obligated under the treaty?
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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In no way whatsoever.

    Mr. HUNTER. Are all those Nations developing fast missiles?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, and some of them have them already.

    Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Secretary, I think you have made a compelling statement.

    General Kadish, you have got the tougher job and that tougher job is to move from this preliminary success—and I think all of us acknowledge there is lots of challenges, lots of problems on the road ahead. This road map you have laid out for us still needs to be fleshed out for the Congress and you know that. We haven't gotten as much detail as we would like to have.

    Could you tell us very briefly what you think the major challenges are in this next test that we are going to be doing in the fall and the road ahead for the next five, six, seven months?

    General KADISH. Well, Mr. Hunter, we have another series of tests coming up here, both against long-range missiles and medium-ranged missiles from the sea and our Aegis intercept program. The one in October we are planning against a long-range missile, and it will be essentially a repeat of what we did on Saturday in order to build confidence in our hit to kill technology, because we need to test some of the elements a little bit better.
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    And then over time and in the next few months after that, certainly in the next 18 months as we do more of that class of test, we are going to add more complexity in order to gain more confidence in countermeasures, for instance. So that starts us on a road of a very aggressive test program for land-based long-range missile defense.

    In the area of the sea-based activity, we will be doing the Aegis Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP) intercept program, intercept tests against shorter range missiles with the hope to grow it longer against longer range. But the challenges in the next 3 to 5 years, again, in building a layered defense, are going to be one of integration and demonstration of key technologies. And we have a good start with the tests we have done so far, but there is a lot of work ahead that will be paved with both success and failure. But I am confident at this point, based on our performance in the hit to kill technology and the early indications in directed energy that we are up to that challenge now. And it is a tough engineering problem that faces us.

    Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt, is recognized.

    Mr. SPRATT. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. General Kadish, thank you for your testimony, and congratulations on Saturday's success.

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    Mr. Secretary, you have painted the picture of Dhahran and asked the question, are we any better off than we were in 1990 and I was surprised at your answer. You said—the answer said, sadly it is hardly any better, and yet the first video we saw was a video of a PAC–3, which has been brought to maturity and fruition. It has demonstrated its viability, and they would have had a far more robust effect, I think you would agree, than the PATRIOT missile had in the Persian Gulf War.

    In addition, in the year since then, we have brought to near operability that missile, which is a very effective system and could have made quite a difference in the Persian Gulf theater. In light of that, I find it puzzling that you would say we are hardly any better off after 10 years.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I tried to be precise, Congressman Spratt, and I will try to do better now. Today we are hardly any better off, but as I indicated, we have made substantial progress. PAC–3, as I said, which is a very effective answer, is a very effective answer, but it is two or three years away from initial deployment. One of the major increases in this budget, in fact, is for PAC–3 to accelerate the deployment and to deploy more PAC–3. There has been real progress—and I think I would like to say very quickly, I know you personally and members of this committee have pushed and funded development. We didn't get to those tests today by doing nothing. So I would like to be clear about that, but I do believe that in the 1950s and 1960s when we faced problems of this kind, we moved faster and more aggressively, and I think 10 years is a long time to deal with a threat like that. But I do in no way underestimate the progress that has been made or—.

    Mr. SPRATT. The PATRIOT, which was the apparent success story of the Persian Gulf War, was begun in 1967 as an air defense system. It went through several mutations over it lifetime. It really didn't become operational until about 1990, 23 years to bring it to fruition. And the history of these systems just tells you how daunting a problem this is. It is not easy technology, and it takes a long time, and sometimes money alone won't solve the problem. It just takes time to move it through development.
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    And with respect to money, though, just for the record let me make clear, in 1990 in constant year 2000, fiscal year 2000 dollars, 1990, we were spending $3.5 billion on ballistic missile defense, theater missile defense (TMD), national missile defense (NMD) and support technologies. This year we are spending $5.3 billion, current dollars. That is maybe not as much as a lot of people would like, but it is still a significant increment, and it is one reason that we have Saturday night's success.

    Indeed, the basis for that success was late in the last Administration. I have often said that one of the problems with BMD is not that we have lacked funding so much as we have lacked focus. And once we focused on a ground-based midcourse intercept system, we were able to bring it to the point that we witnessed Saturday, and it achieved a relative success.

    And my concern now that we are pumping—requested to pump another $3 billion into the system is that we are going off in pursuit of a lot of birds in the bush, while we don't yet quite have that bird in the hand, and we may be losing the focus that has accomplished the success that we saw Saturday night.

    Does that concern you? We are talking about sea-based boost phase missiles, sea-based midcourse missiles, airborne laser. We are talking about airborne lasers in the TMD mode and now in the NMD mode. Are you concerned about losing focus and throwing money at too many problems and not enough at—to do things that could really potentially succeed?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman, I think you made a fair point about the importance of keeping focus. And I think this is—General Kadish and his people have come up with a program that is designed to keep focus and also to go along branch points. As more promising—things that look more promising you invest in, and things that look like they are not, you invest less.
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    But I really do believe that we really do need to pursue a broader range of solutions than just a single solution for a number of reasons, including the fact that if you have multiple intercept points, you are going to have a more effective defense. But, also because I believe that for fairly basic technological reasons, in many circumstances boost-phase intercept will be the most successful and most promising. That is one of the areas that we have, I think, not had much focus on.

    Mr. SPRATT. You said in your testimony that your object with our former adversaries, the Russians, is a cooperative outcome. We have got cooperative programs, they are actually being cut in this particular budget. One is the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the other is Nunn-Lugar.

    Thus far with the cooperation of Russia we have, under these programs, deactivated 5,504 warheads, destroyed 423 ICBMs, 209 Sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), eliminated 384 ICBM silos, 352 SLBM launchers, 85 long-range bombers, 194 nuclear test tunnels, and we aren't even halfway yet in terms of eradicating the Russian arsenal.

    Are you concerned that maybe the fixation on missile defense might undercut this kind of cooperation which has already achieved a score card, an impressive score card on reducing the nuclear threats?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman Spratt, I have been a strong supporter for many years of the Nunn-Lugar program. I agree with you that it has achieved great results, and I think it is a demonstration of —.
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    Mr. SPRATT. But can we continue Nunn-Lugar? Can we do START-III if we abrogate the ABM Treaty?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are not talking about abrogating. We are talking about, if necessary, at the end of the day withdrawing. But our real purpose is to achieve a cooperative outcome. And one of the reasons—if I can go back briefly to an earlier comment. One of the reasons why I really do believe this is an issue on which we ought to be able to achieve a bipartisan consensus is because I know on both sides of the aisle, I know there is strong support for cooperative outcome.

    I think that we have broad agreement on the goals. And I think we have a way ahead to get there, because this is not the Soviet Union, this is a Russia that wants to cooperate with us, has enormous things to gain from cooperation, and the Nunn-Lugar program is one of those areas of cooperation. And I would hope—as I think you know, there are a few hiccups in there about which are necessary to make sure that that money goes to what it is supposed to go to and doesn't become—let's just say doesn't get misused by some of the recipients on the other end.But I think it is a terrific program and I support it very strongly.

    Mr. SPRATT. I would agree with you. My time is up. But I want just want to register my agreement, but say that we don't want to achieve one to the exclusion of the other. That is the trick. That is the challenge.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon.

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    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for coming in. And again, congratulations on the success. I would take minor exception with my colleague in saying that the basis for the success of the test this past weekend was laid by the previous Administration, unless we acknowledge that it was this committee and this Congress, with overwhelmingly bipartisan votes, that plussed-up additional funding for missile defense testing by a billion dollars in each of the last six years.

    I would hate to think of where we would have been this past Saturday night if we hadn't plussed up that extra $6 billion for the very testing that many of the opponents of missile defense say is so vitally needed.

    That was not done by the previous Administration. It was done by the leadership in this committee and in a bipartisan way, as well as in the Congress.

    But I want to focus on—there are so many issues here that opponents use, but I want to focus on one today. That is arms control. I don't think any of us are against arms control agreements. I am certainly not. But to have an effective arms control agreement, you need to have compliance by both parties, not just one.

    And when we talk about the ABM Treaty and the importance that that treaty has in terms of our relationship, I would acknowledge that.

    But, let me ask you a question, Secretary Wolfowitz. Has there ever been an instance where the Soviet Union violated the ABM Treaty?

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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There definitely was.

    Mr. WELDON. Do you remember when that was, Mr. Secretary?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It was the—well, the —one of the reasons it is a little hard to remember is there are many instances where—.

    Mr. WELDON. Starts with a K.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Krasnoyarsk radar.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That was an unequivocation. I think we even have now in their documentation from archives, clear acknowledgments that they were doing it. There was an awful lot of things that looked like violations as well.

    Mr. WELDON. That is my point, Mr. Secretary. For the newer members of this committee, as you hear our colleagues talking about the ABM Treaty, let's go back and look at some historical facts. Because my first amendment, as a freshman in 1987 in this committee, was Les Aspen allowing me to offer an amendment on the floor of the House that said the Soviet Union was in violation of the ABM Treaty.

    Now, in spite of the concern of those who opposed or wanted to adhere to the ABM Treaty, the amendment passed 418 to zero. No member of either party voted against it.
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    But then something unique happened. The Soviet Communist leadership invited three of my friends from the other party who were in favor of strict adherence to the ABM Treaty to go to Krasnoyarsk.

    No, they didn't ask me, even though I was the author of the amendment and had been to Russia already three times by that time. They didn't ask me to go to Krasnoyarsk. They asked three of our colleagues from the other side to go to Krasnoyarsk. These were the Communist leaders. And with the Soviet military they had a press conference standing next to the Krasnoyarsk radar site. Do you know what those three colleagues said? You see, it is just a big concrete structure, it has no relevance, it is only a trivial violation. In effect, they were apologizing for the Soviet Union's violation of the ABM Treaty.

    And you know what? For to some, they got away with it until three years later. The 18-year director of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, General Volintsev, died, and his daughter gave us access to his memoirs.

    Now, this wasn't spin by Members of Congress, this was the career leader of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. And what did he say in his memoirs? He said he had been ordered to put Krasnoyarsk where it was by General Argakov, who was ordered by the Politboro to deliberately defy the ABM Treaty and violate it to build a capability to break out of the treaty for battle management purposes.

    So we had a Soviet career general admitting—and for those who want an English version of that, buy the book, The Big Five, written by one of my good friends and top Russian security advisors, Sasha Savolyov. He is unquestioned in Russia, because he is an advisor of their Ministry of Defense.
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    What does he say in Chapter eight, called The Krasnoyarsk Affair? He says, that history has shown that the Soviet Union deliberately violated the ABM Treaty. Deliberately. It wasn't an accident, because their military was planning a breakout. Yet the arms control crowd in this country wants us to adhere to a treaty that in the minds of the Soviet military leaders has just been a tool to use from time to time to accomplish their objectives. Please hold up the sign on the Soviet unrest.

    Now, we see this kind of unrest in Russia on a regular basis. We saw this two years ago, throwing rocks at our embassy in Moscow, burning the American flag, 10,000 Russians burning the American flag, saying that America is the enemy. Was this because of missile defense? No. It was because of our policy of denying the theft of billions of dollars of International Monetary Fund (IMF) money, because of Clinton's enamored relationship with Yeltsin, it was because of the way we handled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, and it was because of the way we handled the Kosovo engagement.It had nothing do with the missile defense. This was two years ago.

    The real concern in our relationship with Russia in some cases is created by the very arms control groups in this country that want us to believe that they care about the Russian people.

    Hold up the natural resources defense poster. This is what appeared in Time magazine which one of my Russian friends brought in to me. He said, Curt—no, not that, the other one on missile defense.

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    He said, Curt, this is the problem. The head of the Kurchatov Institute, who is a good friend of mine, said to me, you know, Curt, I understand where you are going and I agree that we both should work on missile defense. But this is what the people in Russia see when you propose missile defense; because Time magazine put this chart, with a story on missile defense in Time magazine, which every Russian citizen gets copies of throughout their country.

    What is it a chart of? A map of us supposedly destroying Russia. The bottom line is, this is America's top secret plan to kill 20 million Russian people.

    So the point is that the very groups in this country that claim to be the advocates for peaceful relations or arms control groups, are the ones stirring up and fomenting the unrest in Russia to convince the Russian side that somehow we have an ulterior motive.

    The problem is not the ABM Treaty. The problem is the fervor of those who are so against defending ourselves that they will resort to any length to try to misinform those that we choose to work.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

    Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to my good friend, Congressman Spratt.

    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt is recognized for five minutes.

    Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, we were surprised to learn late last week that you had plans to begin a limited deployment, what is called a test bed, in Fort Greeley, Alaska. And we were surprised, partly because it is a significant move and we didn't have any consultation on it. But in addition, when we did find out the plans, they also were a surprise. It is our understanding that you are going to deploy just five interceptor missiles that will not be the objective system, because they will have a Minuteman booster. Of course, so did this test module the other night. But, nevertheless, it won't be the configuration that we are ultimately seeking.
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    There won't be any X-band radar, because it won't be completed at Shemya. Of course no Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Low, they are 10 years away. You say that one reason for putting it there is that we have not built missile silos in the permafrost before and we need to test the environment to see if it is compatible with something as complex as a missile silo.

    But, in fact, under the environmental impact statement (EIS), you acknowledge that we will not test out of Fort Greeley, because if you tested out of Fort Greeley you would have to drop stages and the boosters on populated areas in Alaska.

    So even though it is called a test bed, testing is precluded. As I said, only five missiles will be there. So this seems to me to be a kind of a tenuous and terribly thin deployment and yet it is probably a violation of the ABM Treaty.

    Now, you said a minute ago, we are not going to abrogate the treaty, we'll deliberately withdraw from it, we'll invoke the processes of the treaty and give notice of withdrawal. Doesn't this run the risk of being a near-term violation of the treaty for very little net gain to us?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. What we are trying to do with the deployment that you are talking about is to build a test bed that will be realistic, that will get us into a zone of realistic testing beyond what we have in Kwajalein. It is partly up at Fort Greely, partly out of Kodiak, partly using the Cobra-Dane Radar at Shemya.

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    Even if we don't actually test missiles out of Fort Greeley—and you are correct; at the moment there is an issue, that until we resolve safety issues we would not be testing missiles out of those silos. But we would be developing experience with those, with the kind of conductivity and kind of communications that you need with a dispersed missile program.

    I guess your fundamental question is are we moving too fast with respect to the ABM Treaty. This is a question that we have had a lot of discussion about.

    The actual construction of the site, which is the event that we think would first raise a serious issue—and let me come back in a minute, not necessarily a violation—that would first raise a serious issue would come sometime next spring or early summer.

    We are having our lawyers work very hard right now to make judgments about whether that would be a violation or not a violation. It is an ambiguous event because it can be argued to be a test facility and therefore permitted, or it can be argued to be a deployment and therefore not permitted.

    It is one of the main reasons why we have made this statement, we made it—I just made it again in the hearings today, that we think we are months and not years away from having—encountering the obstacles of the ABM Treaty. It would be our hope that by that time we would have come to some kind of cooperative outcome with the Russians and we could proceed. But it is—it was not designed, I must emphasize, to challenge the treaty.

    In fact, we had authority in the 2001 budget, if we wanted to make a treaty issue, to go and start conduction, as you know, of the X-Band radar at Shemya, which would have been a clear violation. We decided not to do that, not for treaty reasons, but because we thought this is a more methodical way to proceed with development, and that is what it is.
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    And I don't know if General Kadish wants to add more about the purpose of that site.

    General KADISH. I would like to add that we have always been concerned about having a realistic approach to testing, and it doesn't only include flight testing. It includes ground testing, because as I mentioned before, the integrated nature of this particular layered approach requires us to do a lot more than just do the intercept to make it work right.

    And we also have some limitations with fixed site development. If we are going to have a test bed that is realistic in as many respects as we can practically make it realistic, then it makes a lot of sense to put it where we would ordinarily operate the particular system that we were going to put in place. Otherwise, you build it twice: at some other location and then replicate it wherever you intend to build it.

    In addition to that, we are trying to do something simultaneously with the test bed, and that is have an emergency capability with this system, should it be necessary and should we have confidence in the system.

    So when you combine all of those activities, this seems to make the most sense from a testing standpoint. And it is not only flight testing, it is the ground testing and integration testing that is important to us.

    Mr. SPRATT. If I can just ask one thing for the record, Mr. Chairman. Can we have the outyear implications of the three billion dollar increase? What are the outyear implications for the programs that you intend to plus-up? If we are going to sustain those programs for the rest of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), what is it going to cost in the outyear for this year's funding levels—for next year's funding levels?
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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is intrinsically difficult, because we are talking about development. But General Kadish might want to add to that.

    General KADISH. Mr. Spratt, we will be giving you detail on the 2002 request. But the Department has asked us to wait until the 2003 submission a couple of months from now to show the level of outyear funding. Right now our approach is not to have procurement funding or Military Construction (MILCON) funding in the program until we deem it necessary to bring those things up. And so we are at a level funding approach. The level of that funding, however, in the outyears has not been decided. So we have—we may have to give you some other information for the record based on that.

    But right now, it is difficult with our submission to do that because of the 2003 programs that we face.

    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being with us today to share your thoughts with us.

    Secretary Wolfowitz, let me just try to emphasize something you said with the personal experience I had in very early 1991. Many on the committee know that I have had and still have a very close relationship with the Israeli Government.
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    And so in 1991 there were some folks here who thought that the message that you went to Israel to convey ought to be conveyed on the parliamentary level as well. And so Congressman Henry Waxman and I agreed to go to Israel on a weekend, and we arrived there early on a Sunday morning on our way to visit with Prime Minister Shamir and some of our friends in the Israeli Knesset, and of course the SCUD attacks were coming into Israel mostly on the Sabbath, which is, of course, Saturday.

    We arrived there on a Sunday morning after a SCUD attack had occurred, and when we landed at the Ben Gurion Airport, for Mr. Waxman and I to leave the airplane and be ushered into the airport terminal, to be handed a little square package which was a gas mask and antidotes in it to inject in your leg, to shove into your leg should a gas attack occur, made us sit up pretty straight.

    And the night before a SCUD had hit in Ramat-Gan and so we went to Ramat-Gan to meet with the mayor who had just been released from the hospital, with the stitches across his forehead which had occurred from the attack, and to view the neighborhood where frankly a relatively low-quality explosive had knocked some houses down and fortunately injured some people but not killed any.

    And then we went on to Jerusalem to stay in the hotel where our rooms were on the fifth floor. And on the way to the fifth floor, the gentleman who was escorting us said, I want to stop on the fourth floor first. And we didn't know why. We got to the fourth floor to find that it was the floor where—which had been encased in plastic. And that kind of a feeling, I think, is something that most Members of Congress haven't had the opportunity to experience. And that is why I wanted to relate it, because this was and is so real to me, perhaps because of that experience.
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    And just one other little side story about that trip. As we were talking to Prime Minister Shamir and some members of the Knesset, we also had the opportunity to visit some schools where gas masks were—lined little gas masks were lined against the wall, on shelves where little cribs had been encased in plastic in case of an attack.

    Pretty sobering thought. And, of course, our families in this country aren't immune from that kind of thing either, now, as today's technology has increased and with the capability of rogue states to attack us in such a way as this as well.

    So in the 1990s, we debated on this committee how to move forward and back, and our position was that we needed to develop a defense and that we ought to deploy it as soon as—I have forgotten exactly what the terms were—operationally feasible or as soon as technologically feasible.

    And our friends who didn't see this the same way we did said that, well, you can't deploy until we develop more and we test more. And so now your approach, which I think is what our friends, our opponent friends, advocated in the 1990s, is to develop something that will work perhaps on a limited basis, but move forward with a more robust testing system, begin a testing regime. And now the argument seems to be emerging that we can't afford to do this because we—our military folks deserve a bigger raise than the five percent the Administration has proposed.

    Now, I would just like to take a minute to remind our friend, who may be about to advance this argument, that we aren't where we are with pay raises because of this Administration. I had the numbers here in front of me yesterday, I don't have them today. But I don't think anyone can argue with the fact that over the last eight years or so, pay raises for our friends in the military have been 3 percent, 3.2 percent, 3.6 percent, 4.2 percent. Last year we worked real hard together on a bipartisan basis and got the pay raise up to 4.8 pay raise. So the five percent isn't bad. To use the argument that we should continue to develop at the pace that we have over the last decade to fix this pay raise problem is a bad argument. We shouldn't be making this argument.
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    If you want to make an argument, call the Administration and say plus-up our top numbers so we can give our guys a raise, so we can give them the seven percent that I hear is the number that is coming down. Call the Administration. Tell them, give us a plus-up so we can do that. But let's not play with this subject because it is too serious.I have experienced it firsthand. And I think we owe it to the people that we represent to recognize this is a real threat.

    So let me just ask very quickly—I know my time is up, I am sorry that I gave that speech, I was supposed to ask questions—let me just ask a question like I am supposed to. How many rogue countries are there that can do what Saddam Hussein was doing to Israel when I was there—not to Israel, but that can attack our troops as I saw Israel attacked.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think that I would have to go back—I am sorry. I believe my testimony—I mentioned 28 countries today that have ballistic missiles. I think to me the important fact is that in most of the theaters where we have current war plans and anticipate the most serious likelihood of conflict in the near future—that would be the Persian Gulf and Korea—the estimates are that in the event of a conflict in either of those places with Iraq, Iran or Korea, we just from conventional missiles alone, we and our allies would have several tens of thousands of potential casualties. It is a very real and serious problem.

    That number 28 tells you that it is growing. Syria has a huge ballistic missile capability. We can give you the full list of countries for the record, Mr. Congressman.
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    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]

    Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor, is recognized.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to adhere to the 5-minute rule.

    General Kadish, I got to tell you that some of those arguments I hear today remind me of the arguments made by the Air Force Association and the Retired Officers Association when they made the push for a B–2 a ways back. And I received, gee, maybe hundreds, if not thousands, of letters and telegrams from many of the retired pilots in my district saying we have got to have the B–2.

    And I wrote them back and included an analogy that we can get the B–2, but it means every time we buy one of them, that is 26 F–16s we can't buy, or this many F–18s we can't buy, or this many of this and that. It is not an idea that I can do anything that I want to do; it is that I have got to do this and that.

    And I was amazed that one by one they would respond and say, I never thought of it that way, I just never realized it was one or the other. Go ahead and buy the F–16s, buy the 18s, et cetera.
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    Mr. Wolfowitz, I say that because it is the same world now. It is not an ideal world. We do not have an unlimited defense budget. It is this or that.

    You say that we really haven't accomplished much since the Gulf War. I will take your word for it. But do you know that we have spent $36-1/2 billion on national missile defense since the Gulf War?

    So again, my question is, would we not have been better off building an additional 6 carriers or an additional 42 destroyers or replacing the 900-plus old Hueys out there? I mean, we can go down by different services and talk about all of the things that we could have done for the $36 billion 500 million that we spent since the Gulf War.

    I am going to read your quotes back to you: It is not an effort to build an impenetrable shield around the United States. It will have virtually no effect on Russia's capability, and China is already engaged in a rapid modernization of its missile capabilities and will continue this modernization whether or not we build this missile defense.

    So the question is, since just last week, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) couldn't reach an agreement on health care. I think health care—and since the Navy fleet is now the smallest it has been since the day our Secretary of Defense was born, and on a schedule to go down to a 150-ship Navy if we continue the current build rate. Since we apparently don't have money for all of those other pressing needs, since my friend Mr. Simmons who is an Army Reserve officer told us they use dummy rounds when they go to an annual training for lack of money, is this really money well spent? And aren't there more pressing needs? After all, the Cole was bombed by a small boat. Khobar Towers was an act of terrorism, not a missile; and we have actually lost as many people in the Gulf War to other incidents, but much lower technologies.
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    And I will take it a step further, General Kadish. You say this gives us very limited capability, and I will accept your words. So just how limited, since these rogue nations that you made reference to are building missiles? Does it stop 5 missiles? Does it stop 10? Does it stop 8? At what point do they have to build just one more missile than we have the capability to stop, and what does that cost us?

    Because, again, it is not an ideal world. And I really do have trouble telling all of the other services there is not enough money for your budget, but all of a sudden we have got $8 billion for this, another $8 billion.

    And I am not convinced that the $63 billion we have already spent has been well spent. And I am the guy that has got to go back and look the taxpayers in the eye and try to justify every dime that we spend. So help me with that justification.

    The CHAIRMAN. Would you tilt your microphone up just a little bit?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Okay. Congressman Taylor, I did not say that we didn't accomplish much. I said that we were as vulnerable today as we were ten years ago. We have accomplished a lot. That is why I tried to make clear my answer to Congressman Spratt. We have capability that is on the verge of deployment that will allow us to shoot down those kind of missiles that did such damage during the Gulf War. But, it is a year from the starting deployment under the old, and we are—fiscal year 2007 before we finish deployment.

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    Isn't the—one of the reasons of this budget increase, of the $3 billion increase that we are asking for, $857 million is to accelerate the PAC–3 deployment, $396 million is for Navy, the Navy area-wide system.

    These are systems that are absolutely essential if all of those aircraft and aircraft carriers and ships go into combat to protect themselves against missile attack. All of the investment we make in our other conventional capabilities would come to nothing if we don't have the capability to defend those forces against missile attacks.

    I mean, I am not sure how I would weigh these priorities. But I certainly think it is worth a lot of money to keep our troops alive, just as much as it is important to keep them paid well. And I think those families—I mean, I don't want to think back five years or six years from now if there is a war in Korea, and we said we didn't have PAC–3 there because we didn't spend enough money on it.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Does it stop the rounds coming out of the 11,000 pieces of artillery that can hit Seoul right now?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We have got to do something about the artillery. It is a very serious problem.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

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    Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and congratulations on your recent success.

    I think the general consensus is that we have got to have a ballistic missile defense system. The Russians, as you know, already have one. They pursued a different course, they use a nuclear device. It is pretty certain that you are going to take out the incoming weapon if you create a large enough fireball. We are pursuing a hit-to-kill. The time may come when we decide that, to get sufficient reliability, that we want to replace the front end of our interceptor with a nuclear device.

    And so I have a question which I would like you to answer for the record. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the Russian system as compared to ours? Would there be technical difficulties in replacing that chunk of steel in our interceptor with a nuclear device, should we decide that we need to do that in order to have a more reliable system?

    And, by the way, I have yet to see the first criticism internally of the Russian's because they are using nuclear devices to protect their grandmothers and their babies from incoming weapons. If you could please provide that information for the record.

    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]

    Mr. BARTLETT. And I would now like to yield the remainder of my time to my friend, Curt Weldon, from Pennsylvania.

    Mr. WELDON. I thank my colleague for yielding. Mr. Secretary, perhaps we should put the Senate on the record and let them answer the negotiations that the previous Administration got us into on the ABM Treaty which some of my colleagues are enamored with.
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    And that negotiation led to two protocols that were negotiated in 1997. To follow up on the comments of my good friend and leader, Mr. Skelton, he said, treaties are the supreme law of the land. And as he full well knows, when you negotiate a change to a treaty, our Constitution requires that that change be submitted to the Senate.

    Now, it is interesting for my colleagues to realize that when President Clinton negotiated those two tightening amendments to the ABM Treaty in 1997, he never submitted them to the Senate, from 1997 until the time he left office, and he never submitted them because he knew that the Senate would never ratify them. They were in fact tightening up the ABM Treaty. One would multilateralize the treaty and make it more difficult to amend, and the second established an artificial demarcation between theater and national missile defense.

    You know, I went over to Geneva, Mr. Secretary, to meet the Russian negotiator, General Koltunov, with our State Department alongside of me. And I asked him questions, and asked how we arrive at this difference between theatre and national.

    And I came back here, and I wasn't satisfied with the Russian answer. I came back here a year later and I found out how they arrived at demarcation. Have you ever heard of a system called the anti-2,500, Mr. Secretary?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, I have.

    Mr. WELDON. Have you ever seen marketing brochures for that system of Russia?
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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Actually, I have got some, yes.

    Mr. WELDON. You have got some. Do we have them here? Would you mind holding that up? Is that marketing brochure in English or in Russian?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is in English.

    Mr. WELDON. So the Russians were planning to market a missile defense system that was right below the threshold of the ABM Treaty amendment that we got sucked into a year before they decide to market this system. Do you know who they were trying to market that system to, Mr. Secretary? Do you know which countries?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think this came from the Aubu-Dabi air show, but I am not sure.

    Mr. WELDON. It came from the Aubu-Dabi air show. Now, who were the Russians trying to sell that system to, do you have any idea?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I actually don't know.

    Mr. WELDON. Well, if you talked to the Ambassador, as my friends do from Greece and Israel, you will find the Russians are trying to sell this system. The point is, we are so enamored with this ABM Treaty which President Clinton tried to tighten up, though he didn't follow our Constitution, that the President in the previous Administration agreed to a limitation of our theater missile defense systems, which we all are concerned about, but which allowed the Russians to market their new systems a year later with no limitation.
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    But let's go beyond that, Mr. Secretary. Have you ever heard of a new system called the S–500 in Russia?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I believe that is the one that President Putin has talked about.

    Mr. WELDON. You are absolutely correct. Now, are you aware of how President Putin has described that system, Mr. Secretary?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think I would ask you for the details, Congressman Weldon.

    Mr. WELDON. Well, I think that you would probably agree with me that President Putin has said it is the best system on the face of the Earth, far better than anything America has. Now, I would argue to my colleagues—.

    Mr. SPRATT. What is—.

    Mr. WELDON. Excuse me. If you want to ask for you, Mr. Chair—on your time.

    Mr. SPRATT [continuing]. —What is the system?

    Mr. WELDON. The S–500 is a new system that the Russians have only done the theoretical calculations on and the physics on. I talked to their Deputy Defense Minister about it last year.
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    But my point is this: If the Russians have done as their Defense Ministry claims, that is, designed a system that is better than anything we have today, which means the NT–2,500, that means that system would be in violation of the very protocol that the Clinton Administration got us sucked into in Geneva.

    How many times are we going to fall for the Russian military giving us bad information? We fell for it in Krasnoyarsk. The Clinton Administration fell for it in Geneva. How many times are we going to realize that what Ronald Reagan said is true: Trust but verify. If you can't verify it, plan for the worst.

    Nobody is involved with Russian as much as I am. But I can tell you there are people in the Russian Defense Ministry that I don't trust. And it is not that I don't want to see arms control agreements succeed; but doggonit, there is a pattern here of deliberate attempts to mislead America and the allies on what Russia's ultimate plans are.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. But, Congressman Weldon, I mean you are living proof that this is a new era. We have relations with Russia that you would never conceivably have ever had with the old Soviet Union.

    I think we are moving forward. I agree there are bad elements left there. There are some that aren't so bad but that are still mired in Cold War thinking. I really plead with everybody, and you are a friend so I'll plead with you as well, let's—I mean, I have been involved in some of these very difficult debates—I have to go back to my files, I have to confess, of the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s.
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    I really do think there is a different spirit here. I really think whatever people may have argued in the past, I think there is real agreement on the need for missile defense. However suspicious some of your friends and mine were of the old Soviets, this is a—not that we completely trust Russia, but this is a completely different Russia. It should be a completely different relationship.

    I think that we have a chance to move forward. And I think the more we can—I really—I don't think it is possible to exaggerate the importance, in our negotiations with the Russians, of the appearance of consensus in this country.

    The more we look like we are together, that we are determined to go ahead and we are determined to cooperate, I think the better our chances of success.

    And so I appeal to you as a friend, I appeal to all sides of this debate. I understand the temptation to say you were right 14 years ago about Krasnoyarsk, and I applaud you for being right then. Think those old debates are best, I think, put behind us.

    Mr. WELDON. I am just trying to clarify the record.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I appreciate that.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maine—.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thanks for the brochures, by the way.
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    The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. —Mr. Allen is recognized.

    Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Kadish, for your testimony. And congratulations. That was a remarkable achievement, and I know a lot of people worked hard and long for it.

    Secretary Wolfowitz, I regret to have to say this, but what you just said and what you said in your testimony is to me personally offensive, because those of us who have policy differences with this Administration need to be able to voice them without being told that if we voice our policy differences, somehow we are making it more difficult to negotiate with the Russians.

    That is an argument that has echos of arguments made 30 years ago that were inappropriate then and are inappropriate now. This is a policy debating body, this Congress, and we are going to continue it.

    Some of us—you know we struggle with this. I consider myself a very strong supporter of theater missile defenses. I don't buy this layered defense concept. I don't buy it because I think it is designed to blur the distinction between both the threat and the technology differences between what we have called theater systems and national missile systems.

    There are parts of the argument that I don't buy. I think your argument in part comes down to that missile defenses will deter suicidal leaders of rogue states, but the military capabilities that we have today won't deter them. That makes no sense to me.
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    But what I really wanted to talk with you about, and I am probably most troubled by, your testimony today began with a hypothetical example of a genocidal dictator who threatens our allies and deployed forces with ballistic missile attack.

    You then referred to Saddam Hussein's SCUD attacks during the Gulf War. Each of those cases involved short- or medium-range missiles, the defenses against which are not affected by the ABM Treaty. Yet the thrust of your testimony is that the ABM Treaty leaves us defenseless against these threats.

    I want you in just one minute to explain that disconnect. Your argument, it seems to me, is that the real threats today are from short-range missiles, not ICBMs. Today, not a single rogue state can attack U.S. territory or, I believe, will be able to do so for a number of years.

    But your argument is we have to do away with the ABM Treaty within months, not years, on the grounds that the treaty prohibits testing of promising technologies needed to defend against real emerging threats.

    I don't get it. I think what the real threats are are short- and medium-range attacks on our deployed forces, on our allies, or even on this country, and national missile defense systems won't deal with those. And the ABM Treaty allows you to protect and to work against those short-term threats. I don't get the connection. If you would explain, I would appreciate it.

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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I am happy to explain. I would like to begin by saying I don't think you should take offense. There are no echos of the 1950s in anything I said.

    Mr. ALLEN. The 1970s.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a fact, I am sorry it puts you in a difficult position, but it is a fact that when the President goes into a negotiation with the Russians, if this request is approved, he will have a stronger hand. That doesn't mean you should vote for it regardless. But it is one of the things I think you need to take into account, and I ask you to.

    Now, you are entirely right to want to debate the issues. Let me try to answer your questions, because I think they are important ones.

    First of all, I would agree with you that the shorter range, or I think more accurately to say, the slower speed, because you know a long-range missile can hit a short-range target. It comes in at very high speed. The demarcation really is in terms of the reentry velocity of the missile.

    The SCUD is a very slow-reentry velocity missile. There are many, many SCUDs. We don't yet have, we think—we are not 100 percent sure—we don't think there is yet a North Korean ICBM. We don't think that there is an Iranian ICBM—very long-range, very high-speed reentry.

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    But, first of all, a significant portion of this budget is devoted to those shorter-range, slower-speed missiles. The PAC–3 and Navy area-wide are exclusively for slower-speed missiles. That alone is $1.3 billion of the $3 billion increase we are talking about.

    Second, many of these technologies are dual application. Most importantly, in my opinion, the boost-phase intercept. When you are intercepting a missile in boost phase, you don't discriminate whether it is short range or long range.

    The ABM Treaty prohibits an airborne laser, would make it—virtually make it impossible, whether it is intercepting a short-range missile or long-range one. That is an example of a technology that has application in the theater as well as long range that is prohibited by Treaty.

    Finally, on the point that the long-range threat is more remote in time. Yes, it is more remote in time. I think you use the figure a few years away.

    I was on the Rumsfeld Commission that nine of us of very, very differing points of view came to a unanimous consensus about—not about what to do about the threat, I would emphasize that, but about the nature of the threat, that the long-range threat to the United States was much closer than had been previously estimated and the approximate time frame we—five-year time frame. That is one of the reasons why I put such stress on the fact that 10 years after the Gulf War, we are only now beginning to be on the verge of deploying a defense against it.

    The threat is developing, you may say, slowly. The defenses against the threat are developing even more slowly. And that is why I think it is unreasonable to continue to inhibit your development of those defenses in order to preserve a treaty that we signed with a hostile superpower almost 30 years ago, that frankly I think is detrimental to good U.S.-Russian relations. It implies that the cornerstone of those relations is the ability to annihilate one another.
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    If you think about the world today, Russia has a huge interest in becoming a part of Europe. We have an interest in seeing them become a part of Europe, not just physically, but psychologically and politically. They have an interest in a stable Europe. We have an interest in a stable Europe. They have an interest in a stable Far East, including a China that behaves peacefully.

    That, I believe, is the cornerstone of stability in this new era, not the ability to annihilate one another. So that is the perspective that I would address those issues. Believe me, I am not trying to shut off debate, but I am hoping to achieve a consensus here because I think that we will all be better off if we have it.

    Mr. ALLEN. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Davis.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Kadish.

    Mr. Secretary could you tell me, after we develop this successful missile defense system, does the Administration envision selling the technology and equipment to our allies who might be interested in deploying their own system?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would answer that in two ways. I think the most important part of the answer is it is our view that we would like to see our allies as protected against limited missile attack as we like to see ourselves. That is what an alliance is about. The only reservation that you have to put on that is some of these technologies will undoubtedly turn out to be very sophisticated ones on which there may be issues of releasing the technology. That is a constant question in every weapons system that we work on.
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    But the principle is clear that we want to share it.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General Kadish, you state in your testimony that the challenge that you have is more of an energy challenge versus I think you said technology. Can you explain that?

    General KADISH. We currently have confidence now that at least in our hit-to-kill kinetic energy technology, we don't have to invent anything to make it work. So all of the piece parts, the radar, the battle management computer systems, the technology in on-board computers for our kill vehicles and our censors all exist. Making them work together on time lines that we almost have to measure in microseconds and make it all work together to be effective and reliable is the real challenge now.

    So over the past 20 years, the computer systems and the censor capability and the miniaturization capability that we have in this country has brought us to the point where those are no longer barriers they once were. But making them work together in a very effective way is our major challenge right now.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So then you probably deduce from that that a lack of funding is probably going to be more of a problem than developing future technology.

    General KADISH. I think it is borne out by history. It is more expensive to do the engineering, because you buy hardware. And quite frankly, you buy the talent, the people who can—very smart people who can put these things together. And you need a lot of them, unfortunately, to bring these weapons systems into being.
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    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you General, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. I want to commend the lady for asking the questions direct and to the point. You set a good example that maybe some of us could follow.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.

    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to follow that example. But I am interested in following up on the gentlelady from Virginia's comments relative to are we going to sell it or not. I think I heard the answer was with proper restrictions.

    But I want to point out that the Administration, and in particular President Bush, has made much about the desire to protect our allies with missile defense. So I am interested, General Kadish, what parts of your program are driven by the requirement to defend our allies rather than the requirement of protecting Americans at home?

    General KADISH. The idea of the layer defense that would protect not only the U.S. but our allies—and this is manifest in the shorter-range systems that we have been developing and the Secretary has alluded to—is that if they are mobile, if they are transportable, and if the quantities exist, we can protect our allies and deployed forces.
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    The definition between theater and national is a geographical one, and in the missile defense business, it is where you place your sensors and weapons that have an impact on geography. So all aspects of the program can be viewed as protecting our allies, or necessary to protect our allies as well as the U.S. and deployed forces.

    Mr. MEEHAN. So even though there are parts of the program that may not be driven by the requirements to defend allies, it just so happens that you could defend allies.

    General KADISH. Well, the Secretary has asked us to look at it differently and look at the allies. If you take the ground-based system that we tested on Saturday and put it in position, you would need a system like that to protect Northern Europe from the Middle East threat, for instance because of the range of the missiles.

    So this becomes a problem not only in layering defenses, but in the range of the missiles that we are trying to defend against. And it becomes a matter of geography, what you are trying to protect.

    Mr. MEEHAN. With regard to our allies, who will pay? Is that where the sale comes in? Will they pay? Will we pay?

    General KADISH. There are many ways to do this, and I would defer to the Secretary.

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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As to how we would make these agreements?

    Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, I am interested to hear that, but I am wondering has the requirement to defend allies been incorporated into BMD's notion; in other words, this notion where the President talks about the desire to protect our allies, it is obviously part of what we are looking at. I am wondering, specifically, has it been incorporated, how has it been done, and why has it been done?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman Meehan, I don't think you can allocate any specific part of this program to allies as opposed to other purposes. We are trying to develop the best capability to defend against ballistic missiles of all ranges, including our deployed forces, by the way. And once you protect your deployed forces, you are almost by definition protecting allies.

    But we have a clear definition of which of those technologies work. I really can't answer your question about how much we are investing in protecting one geographic area or another where we have systems that work. For example, PAC–3, we can say that—I mean, I can tell you that that is a significant investment aimed principally at protecting our allies and our deployed forces in the Persian Gulf and in Korea.

    The Fort Greeley, Alaska deployment is one—if it provided that eventual rudimentary defense capability—would, I guess, be fair to say be exclusively to protect the United States. But we will have to see piece by piece as we proceed.

    But it was Secretary Rumsfeld's strong view that it was very artificial, both technologically and politically, to make an arbitrary distinction between different ranges or different categories of people that you are trying to protect.
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    Mr. MEEHAN. Okay. I am just trying to get at the point that, Mr. Secretary, I think politically speaking, the President and others are saying this isn't just for our troops deployed around the world to protect the Americans at home, it is really for our allies as well. And I don't see any evidence that it is a driven requirement; in other words, that defending our allies is a driven requirement.

    Let me ask you another question, Mr. Secretary. The Department recently informed our traditional allies and the Russians that the fiscal year 2002 missile defense program will challenge the ABM Treaty in months rather than years. Can you give a better estimate of when that would occur, and what is the first event that you expect will challenge the treaty?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If I might go back for just a minute. I think I have a clearer idea of your previous question. This program, if it is successful, will provide many ways of defending our allies and many capabilities to defend our allies. How much is invested in these capabilities will be a function largely of what they want to have, and that is going to depend on many other factors. But there is a lot of capability that will cover them.

    On your question about when we will encounter these issues, as I tried to indicate in my testimony, we think the most serious issue in this 2002 budget request is the one connected with the development of the Alaska test bed. Construction on that would begin sometime late spring, early summer of next year.

    And that is why—I shouldn't say that is the single reason, that is the kind of reason why we are saying months and not years.
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    Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Tauscher.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary, General Kadish, how are you?

    Mr. Secretary, in your Senate testimony last week and again today, you stated, quote, that this Administration does not intend to violate the ABM Treaty, we intend to move beyond it. What distinction do you have between ''violating'' and ''moving beyond it,'' a term I don't understand?

    And as you are well aware, there are a number of activities in this budget which raise the issue of treaty interpretation.

    You mentioned in response to a question a little while ago that you have your lawyers, I guess, checking out what all of that is about, what the trip wires might be. Will we have the results of your treaty compliance review group before we are asked to approve this budget?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In answer to your first question, there are different ways that one can imagine moving beyond the ABM Treaty. I suppose the least desirable is to have to withdraw unilaterally. That is provided for in the treaty with six months' notice.
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    And I think the reason why—I mean, we do not intend to violate—pretending we are complying with the treaty while acting illegally. As Congressman Weldon said, the old Soviets did that. We don't intend to do that. But what we really would like to do in terms of moving beyond it, and I think that we can get there, is to come to some agreement with the Russians on what this new era is, what our new relationship should be.

    And I think an agreement based on the fundamental fact that I think it is in our interest for Russia to be protected against limited missile attack—and I hope we can persuade them that it is in their interest for us to protect ourselves against limited missile attack.

    On your question about when Congress might know about the results of our review, I can't put a date on it or specify a time frame. I mean, we understand the urgency in the first place of letting the President know when these issues arise, and I assume that at that point there will be a decision made about—depending on where we think it puts us—to consult with you about it.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Secretary, I have two kinds of theorems that I think that we should concentrate on. One is that Russia should get a voice but not a veto, and that we should attempt as vigorously as possible to amend but not abrogate the treaty. As long as we go along with those kinds of theorems, we are kind of open about it and we are having the kinds of conversations that we are having, I think that you are going to get support from any of us. But I think that there has got to be much more of an engagement among those of us that are kind of for this than what I think we have been getting so far.
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    But I appreciate your comments.

    General Kadish, last year in front of this committee, you testified about the complexity of the national missile defense system and you said, quote: It would be irresponsible, both from a programmatic and financial standpoint, to rush into a testing program that sought to prove the system's effectiveness against the most stressful targets.

    Yet part of the Administration's massive budget request for missile defense is focused on an expanded and robust testing program. You are beginning construction of a missile defense test site at Fort Greeley and, in addition, conducting tests at the existing Kodiak site. Last year you seemed very much aware of the dangers of ramping up testing and pushing the science further than it could go. What has caused you to change your mind?

    General KADISH. I don't believe that I have changed my mind. In fact, this approach gives us the ability to increase the complexity of the testing in a very reasonable, measured, disciplined way, and not rush and cut corners to do that. So from my point of view, this is an extension of the same concerns that I expressed last year about our approach and, in fact, provides us a more effective method to achieve the goals that we have set out for ourselves.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Well, many of us have congratulated you on the success of Saturday's test, albeit there seems to be a problem with the X-Band system overload in reporting the results of the test. It took a year from test to test.

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    Was the Saturday test a repeat of the previous test that failed a year ago?

    General KADISH. Saturday's test was a repeat of the previous test a year ago, which was a repeat of the test before that, which was a repeat of the test before that.

    What we are trying to accomplish here is to build our confidence in the reliability of the basic technology and integration of the elements to accomplish that.

    And we are well on our way to do that in the test program, not without our failures, but we have learned a lot. No test goes perfectly, and so we have learned a lot from every one of those particular efforts.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Would it be safe to say, General Kadish, that you have, and your scientists and your engineers, have pretty much moved forward beyond this test and are prepared to do another test much sooner than a year?

    General KADISH. In fact, we are planning for the next test in late October, early November, of this year. And we didn't give them much rest from their return from this test to go on to deciding whether to ship the hardware in the next 10 or 12 days to prepare for the next test. So I believe we have achieved a measure of confidence in our processes to do that .

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Will that include more countermeasures and much more stress?
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    General KADISH. Certainly over the next year we will be adding more complexity if we continue our record of successes here, but those decisions haven't been taken yet. And we will, as soon as we need to. But our intention is to introduce more complexity as we build our confidence in the basic integration of the technology.

    Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you General. Thank you Mr. Secretary.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews.

    Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Mr. Secretary, and General.

    I think the record shows that there is a compelling national need to deploy a missile defense system, and I support it. I think the record also shows that the men and women that General Kadish has assembled are entirely capable of meeting the technological challenges that they face, and my faith in the brilliance and work ethic of those men and women leads me to believe that we will be successful, as you were on Saturday.

    I think the record also shows that we are running a risk by talking about a major disruption in the ABM Treaty of two undesired consequences. The first is a disruption in our international alliances, which serve us quite well in many aspects of national defense, serve us quite well in dealing with the same rogue states that you talked about earlier, Mr. Secretary, when those rogue states engage in more conventional assaults on their neighbors.

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    Mr. ANDREWS. It serves us quite well in reacting to international terrorism. It serves us quite well in the need for cooperative diplomatic and cooperative economic matters on a number of scores, whether it is enforcing sanctions or what have you. I also agree that there is a significant political disagreement in our country over the proper course to take with respect to the ABM Treaty. I think there is a potential solution, though, to this seemingly irreconcilable problem.

    In one of your own statements, Mr. Secretary, a few minutes ago in response to one of the questions about the possible sale of NMD technology to other allies, you said we would like to see our allies protected to the extent that we have protected ourselves, which I agree with. With those principles in mind, let me ask you a couple questions about the ABM Treaty.

    First of all, it is my understanding that the purpose of the ABM Treaty is to prevent a deployment of an ABM system by one signatory state against another. Is that right, essentially?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is not the exact wording of the treaty. I think the treaty is to prohibit the defense of the national territory, but implicit is—.

    Mr. ANDREWS. That is the concept the treaty gets at, though, isn't it?

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The U.S.-Soviet bilateral treaty.
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    Mr. ANDREWS. That is right. And second, by definition, the treaty binds the parties. It binds the United States, and it bound the Soviet Union. Interesting question as to whether it binds the new Russian Republic or not. But it would bind us under ordinary circumstances. I would encourage the Administration to think about this problem in these terms.

    It is entirely consistent with the ABM Treaty for a multilateral alliance, a sort of ballistic defense NATO, if you will, to come together, test and eventually deploy a system, not against signatories to the ABM Treaty but against those who would engage in acts of terror, be they rogue states or extranational organizations. In other words, I believe that some of the things that the Administration has already done in the theater area, particularly the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program, may provide a guidepost for how we might address this problem. I don't believe that it is imperative, logically or legally, that proceeding with aggressive research and eventual deployment of a system must violate the ABM Treaty as it today exists if the deployment is a mutual project of an alliance of nations dedicated to the principle of protecting against these kind of attacks and if the purpose of the deployment is not for one nation state signatory to gain the upper hand over the other but for this collective force of law abiding nations to gain an upper hand against those who would disrupt peace in the world. And I would just commend to you that sort of thought as the way we might reconcile some differences that are rather deeply felt.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I welcome that suggestion. I think the spirit of it, actually, is what we are trying to get at with this cooperative framework with Russia, and I think one of my reasons for some optimism that we will succeed, the kinds of things that Congressman Weldon in particular has been pioneering with some of his counterparts in—not just counterparts but with Russian entities who are interested in missile defense. And I might point out, I mean, the Russians never quite adopted the view that we adopted after the ABM Treaty was signed that defenses were intrinsically a bad thing. In fact, they retain a very thick defense around Moscow, as I think was referred to earlier. So I think we might disagree about the modalities, but I absolutely agree with you. I think the principle is to say we are not threatening one another. The threats come from somewhere else. Let us build defenses that deal with those threats, and I believe there are ways in proceeding to give plenty of reassurance that we are not doing it in a way that threatens the security of—.
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    Mr. ANDREWS. I was just talking about the new security framework that you make reference to would be broader than just a discussion with the Russians and include many of our allies, and I yield back my time.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I welcome that comment.

    The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis and then Dr. Snyder.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was actually almost packing up. I thought we were about to leave. The question referred earlier to the failure of the radar part of that in the system, and I just wonder if you could comment on that. I think we certainly supported the resolution. I wanted to commend everybody, and yet it is so difficult when you understand that there were some failures even though they may have been actually considered, you know, quite small by the Pentagon, and I am wondering is it better to have all the information out there for the public at the time that it occurs, and how would you respond to the Times article?

    General KADISH. I think we were very clear prior to the test, as we were in every test, that no test goes perfectly, and that we would expect to have some failures in it. The other rule of testing, as it is in general things of this nature, is that you don't know everything you would like to know at the time people want to know it, which was right after the test. But all the indications we had there was that we didn't have any major problems in terms of accomplishing the objectives.
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    As time goes on, 45 days from now, we will be looking at every specification that we tried to verify, and we will find some that were not met and others that were exceeded, and you could pick any one of those issues and make a statement, but in our view, the test on Saturday, based on the results we have today, is a very solid set of objectives being met. We didn't meet one of them. We—and no test is perfect. And I wish I could be able to put out information before the newspapers find out about it, but sometimes we are not quite as responsive to them.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. We share that concern. I can assure you, General. I appreciate that. You talked also about the integration of all the technologies and our need to work towards that, then in isolation the technology—the engineering maybe—well, the technology may be there. The engineering isn't always there.

    One of the things is that I have sat with a number of scientists in my community who are very skeptical of the ability of this integrative real-world situation to work, not in an isolated test. How do you answer their concerns?

    General KADISH. I think that we would be just as—I would describe it ourselves as skeptical as well. That is why we are doing the development, and that is why we are doing the test. But being accountable for it and looking at how we are progressing in detail gives us great confidence we can do this, and I think that is the nature of technological development in history, is that there is always skeptics, but if you only worked on those skeptics of the world, we wouldn't make any progress. And so we are confident that we are following a disciplined approach and that we are going to get there. But if we don't, we also have the ability to say we are just not going to get there. But so far our perseverance and our constancy of purpose has shown that we think we can do this.
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    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And finally, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just very quickly, in terms of the costs, the $100 million per test, is that roughly what you anticipate as we move forward, or do you think that is going to change dramatically?

    General KADISH. I think that over time my hope is that we will get better at understanding how to do these things more effectively and therefore lower the costs. But the development of these systems is expensive, and that is why we want to get every ounce of information we possibly can get out of every test. So we load them down with an awful lot of things that generate some of the headlines that you just referred to. So in the future, although I think we can get more efficient in our testing, we ought to recognize that this is, especially against long-range systems threats, very expensive to do these types of things. And that is why we are asking for the support of this test bed idea to get more robust testing and more efficient in our testing.

    Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you both for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Snyder, do you want to try to get your question? You have got about 5 minutes. The Secretary has to leave at 12:30.

    Mr. SNYDER. We have got a series of votes coming, so we will try to get going and I will be fairly brief.

    Mr. Secretary, just following up on some of the things said earlier with regard to your opening statement, you mentioned the scenario in your opening statement of what happened with the SCUD missiles from Iraq into Kuwait and the potential threat to Kuwait, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. We have the potential at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two Koreas. I am correct, am I not, that there is no international treaty, and no one would be surprised at all were we to completely develop and deploy a missile system that would be able to stop short-range missiles coming from North Korea to South Korea and threatening our troops there or going from Iraq into Kuwait or Israel? We would have the ability to do that now without any threat at all over the next year or two as you were talking about with the deployment.
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    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is more complicated than that. We have some ability. For example, the PAC–3, which is a hit-to-kill intercept, raises no ABM Treaty issues. On the other hand, if we go after boost phase intercept of those same missiles, and that would be the most effective means of intercepting, whether long range or short range, we would have an ABM Treaty problem. In fact, I remember during the Gulf War our pilots flying over western Iraq, flying what they called SCUD cap, would actually see these bright walls of fires of SCUD missiles when rising up in the air and had no capability to shoot those missiles down. That capability, would in fact, airborne or mobile, be capable of shooting down a long-range missile as well and therefore would raise an ABM Treaty problem.

    Mr. SNYDER. I want to be clear, Mr. Secretary, though. But we do have a method that is well on its way, close to deployment, that is one of the methods that you all are researching that would be in no way a violation of the ABM Treaty, though; is that correct? I understand your point.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is correct. We have some significant capability without any problem under the treaty, but there are capabilities that would be, I think, even more significant that are prohibited by the treaty and eventually by the way the treaty would—if you got faster and faster short-range missiles, which is entirely possible, you would be limited by the treaty.

    Mr. WELDON. Would the gentleman yield on that point just for one clarification?

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    Mr. SNYDER. I think I won't, Mr. Weldon. We are running out of time here, but I appreciate your comment.

    The second point I would make, and it is really not a question so much, Mr. Secretary. You have been around the town a long time and working these issues for a long time. I am in my third term here. For the last 4-1/2 years we have seen a gradual improvement in the bipartisan support within the Congress for the defense bill, but I also think within the country, of putting behind us some of the divisions that really my generation has experienced ever since, you know, I enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1967. This issue and perhaps related to some others, I fear we are heading down a road again of dividing the Congress and dividing the country. When I go back home—and this happened this past weekend—no one asked me about how is that Army transformation coming on? What is going on with the F–22? What do you think of Wolfowitz?

    Everybody has got an opinion, though, about this issue of national missile defense, and it is very strong opinions, lobbying efforts have been generaled up. It has become almost a zealotry on both sides that is going to divide the country, I think divide the Congress. You have seen some of it here today, the intensity of emotion. There is nothing wrong with intensity of emotion, but I think it falls a lot on you and the job that you have to try not only to pull the Congress together but in a way to pull the country together. I envision that we would potentially have these fights year after year after year in a way that ultimately I don't think can be healthy for the defense budget, for supporting our men and women in uniform. I think there has got to be a way of doing this process so that we can bring people together who at this point may appear to be fairly dramatically divided, but we have made progress in the last five years in bringing folks together around the defense budget.

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    And the last point I would make to you in response to Mr. Taylor's comments about do we have the ability to stop artillery rounds in North and South Korea, and you made a comment that you wouldn't want to get into that kind of wing of priorities, but I think that is what we all are about. And I probably have a misunderstanding what you meant. But this is all the weighing of priorities, how we spend dollars. And the concern that some of us have had is not the development of the system and the great technology that General Kadish has been responsible for, but to have it within balance. This is one part of our defense budget, what you are working on. It is one defense, but we have a whole lot of others out there and a whole lot of other issues, but this one has become almost a litmus test, theological. The word ''zealotry'' comes to mind with some of the proponents of this thing, and I don't think that ultimately that is going to be good for our responsibility to provide for the common defense, not just to provide for a national missile defense. I appreciate you all's work.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Could I just say—.

    The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt a minute? We are going to have to go vote. We have less than 2 minutes and, Dr. Snyder, can hear the answer when we get back.


    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I think we will proceed. Mr. Skelton told me to proceed, and I think you answered Dr. Snyder's question, did you not? It is my understanding he is not coming back now.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I might add very briefly for the record that I certainly understand the spirit of what he is saying, and I think it is very important, not just in our negotiations with Russians, but if you look at maintaining a 10- or 15-year development program on a steady program, then I think we need to put the argument of the past behind us, move forward in a more consensual way than we obviously have in the past.
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    I do think that getting that new framework worked out with the Russians is going to make a lot of these debates of the past disappear and I think we will have a different basis for going ahead.

    The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Weldon, did you want to—.

    Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to clarify a couple of points and then make a closing statement. First of all, thank you both for being here. In response to Mr. Snyder, who I have the highest respect for on the committee, I would make the point that we have never had broader consensus and more cooperation. There has been no split in the Congress up until President Bush made it a major priority nationally in a televised speech to the country. The votes on the missile defense bill in the last session were veto-proof. There wasn't some split where there was a big ideological chasm, and it wasn't partisan. More Democrats supported the bill than supported the President in opposing the bill two years ago. 103 voted for the bill. 102 voted against it.

    For the six years that I chaired the Research and Development (R&D) committee, every year working with General Kadish and General Lyles and before that General O'Neill, we had no split votes. We didn't have one split vote in six years, in spite of plussing up the funds for missile defense every year by a billion dollars. There is no split in the country. There is no split in the Congress. We didn't see the vitriolic language come out until President Bush made his speech earlier this year to reinforce what the Congress had done. Then all of a sudden you have seen a massive series of negative articles come out and negative arguments presented against what the President is proposing. So I don't see that split up until this year, and I think there are enough of us who will in fact work together in that regard.
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    The second point, and you mentioned this, and I am glad you reported it. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, and you know this very well. We need a new approach with Russia and I don't want to relive the Cold War. I only made those points because many of the opponents of missile defense are using the ABM Treaty as the key issue and want to relive some history, which some of my colleagues are unaware of. I agree with you 1,000 percent and you know if I have my way, our whole approach with Russia would be to offer a new package, far beyond Nunn-Lugar and far beyond cooperative threat reduction and far beyond the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS). It would engage the Russians so that the Russian people see that our ultimate intent is to help them, and then a part of that would be cooperation in missile defense. So for the record, I just—and as you know, I have given you some ideas, and I hope we can work together on those ideas.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You have been a pioneer in this area, Congressman.

    Mr. WELDON. I hope we can work together. The final point that I would make, for those that are—and there are going to be some who are going to oppose this effort up and down, like those 50 who sued General Kadish last year—not sued him but went to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and alleged criminal activity on his behalf, which was the most outrageous thing I ever heard of. In February of this year, the FBI came out with a report that I put in as a part of the record saying that their statements were ridiculous, but there are going to be some who are going to oppose us. And I just want to say for the record that I think there is a parallel story in the history of Western civilization that I just want to put on the record as an analogy, Mr. Chairman.
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    It goes back to the late 1930s. Britain and Europe was concerned about what was happening in Germany and the buildup of a strong military in Germany. There were those in Britain who wanted to make sure that Britain was properly prepared, and they were working on one specific new cutting-edge technology that those who wanted to appease Hitler and Germany thought would provoke a conflict. And so they prevailed. Neville Chamberlain would not allow Britain to develop this new technology, for the specific reason that he thought it would upset Hitler, would lead to war and conflict and perhaps escalate a new arms race. So the British government, under Neville Chamberlain, did not pursue that technology.

    Remember the famous speech when Neville Chamberlain said to the British citizens, peace is at hand; I have reached an agreement with the German leadership, and now we will have peace in our lifetime. That was right before the rockets started bombing London. Thank goodness, Winston Churchill was a member of the British Parliament, and Winston Churchill eventually became the leader of Britain, and thank goodness, Winston Churchill and other members of the Parliament were pushing Britain to pursue that new technology which the appeasers didn't want to pursue.

    As you well know, Mr. Secretary, that technology was radar, and if it hadn't been for Winston Churchill, Britain and the European Community and the world perhaps would not have had radar. To understand that Hitler wanted to take out innocent people, it had nothing to do with whether or not Britain built radar, but the fact was that there were those in Britain at the time in the 1930s saying we don't want to offend the Germans; we don't want to upset them. We have got to be more concerned with whether or not this technology
is—in fact, I think there is a parallel here, and I would hope that those who are adamantly opposed to missile defense would just remember that, I think, related story that occurred not too long ago.
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    With that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for you indulgence, and I thank you both for your service to the country.

    The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Are there others? Mr. Skelton?

    Mr. SKELTON. No. I just thank the both of you for being with us today. We have some real challenges here, but I hope at the end of the day we can sing from the same sheet of music.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I applaud that, Congressman Skelton, and I look toward to working with you.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman?

    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor.

    Mr. TAYLOR. General Kadish, I know we are trying to abide by the five-minute rule, but it did pose the question. You made it real clear in your testimony this is not going to stop a massive attack from the former Soviet Union or China. What is the number you could stop?

    General KADISH. It depends on how big a system we build, and at this point—.

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    Mr. TAYLOR. What are you asking for this year? What do you envision those capabilities being?

    General KADISH. It will be adequate for the task at hand, Congressman, and those numbers are classified and I think it should remain so.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Well, then I would very much like for you to privately tell me.

    General KADISH. I sure will.

    Mr. TAYLOR. Because if I am going to spend $8 billion of the taxpayers' money, when I know of all the other defense needs out there, then I have got to feel confident that that is the best way to spend it.

    General KADISH. Recognize, there is no deployed architecture to answer that question yet. That is not part of this program. So it will depend on some scenarios.

    The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, General Kadish, we thank you very much. Sorry for the interruptions. We appreciate your patience. Thanks for appearing. We look forward to working with you.

    Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

    The CHAIRMAN. Meeting is adjourned.
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    [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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