June 28, 2001

Introduction

Naval Base San Diego represents the Pacific Fleet's largest concentration of Surface Forces. Almost 2/3 of the PACFLT's Surface Force is homeported there. The immediate facility or Naval Station is roughly 1400 land acres and 326 water acres. It is divided into three major sections separated by local roads and rail. The two main portions of the facility are the west, often referred to as "wet side" and the east, or "dry side." The wet side is where all ships and immediate support commands are located. The dry side is further divided into two sections split by 32^nd St. The northern portion of the dry side houses the Navy Exchange and Commissary complex. The southern portion houses the Recreation, Bachelor Housing, Medical/Dental and Fleet Training Center. Its average daily population is approximately 25-30 thousand military and civilian personnel. There are 52 tenant commands ranging from direct support to fleet support as well as three U.S. Army detachments and two U.S. Coast Guard cutters and their detachments. Additionally a portion of the Base is located downtown San Diego. Commander, Navy Region Southwest, Fleet Industrial Supply Center as well as South West Naval Facilities Engineering Command are located there.

Because of its location, Naval Station serves as the primary hub for all dependent and retired activity in the area. It houses the number one Navy Exchange in the world and the fourth largest Commissary in the world. More than 90 thousand visitors walk through the doors at those two facilities monthly. On an average, more than 22 thousand vehicles pass through the three principle gates daily and more than 5000 decals and passes authorizing access to the facility are issued monthly.

Two Flag Officers currently occupy buildings at Naval Station; one is the Commander Amphibious Group 3 the other Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group 5. There are only two family housing units on the base, both are currently occupied by personnel with "low visibility" positions and are not likely targets for terrorist acts. All other military family housing is located in the surrounding community, the primary housing areas being Murphy Canyon Heights and Terrace View Villas.

The primary mission of Naval Station is to provide sustained logistic and maintenance support for ships while providing quality of service and quality of life for personnel and families. Naval Station houses more than 2000 sailors on a permanent and transient basis daily in nine different buildings. Each is centrally located on the Dry side of the base.

The surrounding community can be defined as inner city with inner city problems. Gang activity and drugs are a problem but with the help of local law enforcement officials, significant progress is being made to return the area to a safe and prosperous community. Crimes and or serious acts directed toward service members because of their affiliation with the military are not a common occurrence. Random acts of violence are situational and are categorized as "normal criminal " activity.

The Station is located roughly 19 miles from the U.S. Mexican border, which at times presents issues that involve U.S. Service members. Again, with the help of local Customs, DEA, FBI and Border Patrol we are seeing a decline in the number of significant incidents, however, the conditions and the proximity present real challenges to Force Protection. While no known subversive activity directed at the US Navy currently exists, the potential is always there. Border searches and sheer volume of traffic presents a real challenge if a militant organization chose to operate from outside CONUS. Local NCIS is heavily involved with supporting agencies to both stay abreast and assist where possible.

San Diego is a very large and growing city. More than 100,000 active duty military personnel live and work in the immediate area. Much of its heavy labor work force is Mexican and its diverse cultural make-up provides significant challenges for the collection of good and relevant intelligence. Providing protection and support for that many personnel should something happen, would be nearly impossible. The Naval Security Force onbase is structured to provide immediate support to the base only. The City and County governments are responsible for providing support outside the base.

San Diego is a wonderful host for the largest military concentration in the Pacific Fleet; the local community supports and is actively involved in military affairs. The close bond enjoyed by everyone here has been developed through years of dialogue and cooperative agreement. Law Enforcement, Regulatory and Support organizations from the local, state and federal level provide for a safe and supportive homeport to the Navy and Marine Corps.

Physical Security

Since 12 Oct 2000 much has occurred at Naval Station San Diego and the Region to better focus on identifying and fixing seams and gaps in our Force Protection Plan. Our strategy is one of "defense-in-depth" when applied toward Anti-terrorism and Force Protection. It is a constantly improving scenario where the more we exercise and examine, the more we learn and the more we find we need to do.

The zero-based review conducted by the Security Department in Nov and Dec 2000 identified force protection areas that need attention. Some were discrepancies and recommendations from previous Joint Staff and CNO Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (IVA) and studies. Others were revealed as lessons learned from incidents like the Khobar Tower and USS COLE. New engineering guidance has been released and new technology has been developed which needs to be incorporated into special projects and planned Military Construction Projects.

The most difficult challenge for Base Commanders in CONUS was to identify a threat that could be used as basis for the threat condition (THREATCON) "normal" condition of readiness. Since the AT/FP plan is based on defense-in-depth, it was important to properly identify what was expected. Using risk assessment, it was determined that the force should be able to provide for a secure controlled facility capable of responding to a slightly higher level of activity than previously used as the baseline.

Perimeter fencing is the first line of defense for controlled access. Around Naval Station there is a mix of High Security Wrought Iron fence, reinforced with concrete footings and 1-inch wire, and standard 6-8 ft high chain link fence with razor wire. Only two gates are reinforced and two have no means of allowing them to be secured. A number of gates are simple chain link and pole providing no stopping power. Our survey of the perimeter showed gaps do exist in some areas especially where creeks and watersheds run through the station. Repairs to fence lines are being programmed to fix this problem. The perfect solution for the station would be to complete the wrought iron fencing thus allowing less chance for simple penetration. The difficulty is the fact that more than 3 miles of fencing is still needed to complete the project. History has shown that successful penetrations are normally done in the locations where chain link fence and razor wire exist. Access through the gates is controlled during posted hours by Security force personnel. During Normal threat conditions all gates that are open are manned except those entering the Commissary and Navy Exchange complex. Although identified as a soft target, manning of those particular gates during threat condition "Normal" is not possible with current force structure.

Manned guard shacks at each of the major gates were identified as vulnerabilities because they failed to meet the minimum standards for force protection. With the help of Seabees we have begun to rectify that problem by installing compliant guardhouses. To date, three have been completed, a fourth is under construction, and two more are scheduled to be completed within the year. Construction of the three remaining guardhouses is being programmed for completion in future fiscal year budgets. Each guardhouse costs roughly $ 25K. Six sets of remotely activated Bollard systems, which allow for better control and access to gates, are being installed this year. Each set costing approximately $100-150K.

Waterfront access provided the biggest challenge. Prior to the COLE incident, the primary AT/FP emphasis was dedicated to protect a ship from attacks from the shore. Security on the water would only be provided as a result of increased THREATCON onboard each ship and not provided as part of the Base Security requirement. Today, towers have been relocated from various locations on the station to a strategic point at the end of two piers, one at each end of the station, which allow a shipboard watch stander to see miles in all directions and provide the much needed visual presence and warning. Additionally, buoys and booms have been installed to clearly mark and define Security Zones established under USC 33. This slight change has had the greatest local impact. Visually, local boaters are now made acutely aware of the restriction and sightseeing trips into and out of slips at Naval Station have all but ceased. While the booms and buoys are not meant to stop a terrorist, they are positive visual lines of demarcation making it easier for a commander to assess hostile intent. The cost to build and install these systems at Naval Station/Naval Air Station North Island/ Submarine Base Pt Loma was $344K.

San Diego Harbor is the highlight of southern California. The volume of boating traffic within the harbor, during certain times of the year, is tremendous. Harbor Police and local U.S. Coast Guard provide law enforcement when requested, however, immediate response and patrolling of the waterfront to meet Force Protection requirements is beyond their capability. Six 22ft Security boats, secured from Coast Guard excess inventory, were overhauled and re-engined locally, at a cost of $185K, to provide an immediate organic waterborne security force. Currently manned by sailors from ships, they will soon be manned by 25 Naval Security Force personnel. Additionally, CINCPACFLT is purchasing modern and better-equipped 28ft boats. At a cost of $182K each, the estimated arrival of the first of nine boats in San Diego is March 2002.

Much of the rest of Naval Station is pre-80s architecture making implementation of stringent AT/FP measures very challenging. Modifications to doors and entrances at every building are being planned for prioritization. Standoff distances to buildings have been reviewed, or will be reviewed, and where feasible established. Portable barrier plans have been developed for implementation and some barriers have been pre-positioned to allow for a more rapid execution of defense when conditions warrant. This barrier plan only works, however, if prior warning is provided. Barriers of this type are only meant to slow not stop an intruder. Complying with required standoff distances in most areas of the base is physically not possible without severe impact to Quality of Work. The downtown complex where Commander, Navy Region Southwest resides is the most difficult. It presents the single easiest high-impact target. It is surrounded on all sides by public road and access. Moving the roads or building is not possible and hardening the target is cost prohibitive. Some measures can be taken and various projects are being considered to minimize the risk. A number of measures are being programmed to remove existing parking areas in the immediate vicinity of high-risk buildings especially around housing areas and commonly known softer target areas.

Security Manpower

Naval Station presently has 97 personnel assigned to its Naval Security Force (NSF). Of that number, 39 are sailors of other specialty training/rates who carry the 9545 Navy Enlisted Classification Code. These "9545's" are graduates of a basic six-week course at Lackland Air Force Base. After reporting to the station they receive instruction in watch-standings procedures, attend the Emergency Vehicle Operator's Course (EVOC) and receive local area familiarization. Fifty-three of the NSF are DoD civilian police officers and the remaining five personnel comprise the leadership within the Department. These Sailors and DoD police provide security at mostly fixed posts primarily at the entry control points that access the Naval Station. Programming is in place to increase the NSF force on Station by an additional 23 personnel by the end of FY-01.

Not permanently assigned to Naval Station, but located on base is the Naval Boat Unit recently established this year. It is comprised of six small boats and 25 sailors, 13 of who are rotated to this assignment from the ships homeported in San Diego. The remaining 12 are regional personnel temporarily assigned to this unit until permanent billets are established 30 July 01. The Boat Unit mission and tasking are to continuously patrol San Diego's waterfront operations and piers 24 hours each day of the week.

Another security measure implemented this year is the addition of four watchtowers, two of which are at Naval Station Piers and the third across the Bay at Coronado and the fourth at Pt Loma. These towers are manned by shipboard crewmembers on a rotational basis and again, are manned 24 hours each day of the week. No Naval Station NSF are used in support of these last two initiatives, but rather are supported by Regional assets that are based at Naval Station or sailors temporarily assigned from ships in port. Homeported ships on a rotational 24-hour basis also provide pier-side sentries.

Thirteen Military Working Dogs (MWD) trained in explosive and drug detection and patrol duties augment our security posture. There are currently 10 military personnel assigned to this unit whose area of responsibility (AOR) extends throughout Navy Region Southwest.

All assets mentioned above can be augmented, in emergency or heightened periods of THREATCON, by part or all of the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF). The ASF is a trained 120-person reserve contingent made up of sailors from Naval Station tenant commands. Members of the ASF complete a locally organized two-week training "Academy" coordinated by a Marine Cadre assigned to Naval Station. Present THREATCON levels have not necessitated mobilization of the ASF except during the CNO IVA exercise in May 2001.

Also available, but not assigned to Naval Station is the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), San Diego Field Office. This agency has provided threat analysis and intelligence information to the Command on a periodic basis. It is by virtue of their office location that I am afforded this special courtesy.

Communications

The cornerstone of any plan is the ability to communicate the information to all concerned as it becomes available. Identified as a shortfall in nearly every visit and assessment, we continue to struggle with putting together a system that provides for a rapid and secure communications throughout all the commands.

As an outcome of the GAO visit in January 2001, priority was given regionally to ensure Secure Message Traffic and e-mail capability (SIPRNET) was provided to each Base Commander Officer, Executive Officer and Security Officer at their desktop. In the past month that capability has been achieved at Naval Station. Highlighted traffic and updates to the threat environment are routed routinely. This capability not only speeds the dissemination of information, but also allows the Commander to assess the threat and make his own judgment calls.

As a matter of course NCIS has provided periodic briefs to me and my staff keeping us informed of matters and investigations that might affect security. Within the next quarter, NCIS has offered to assign a full time Staff Counter Intelligence Officer (SCIO) to Navy Region Southwest staff to further improve threat information analysis and dissemination.

One of the major shortfalls within the Response Metrics includes the ability to communicate and pass information to tenants and ships as threat situations unfold or develop. Currently, the primary means of contacting each command is via landline, early warning net or naval message. Both of these forms of communication can be unreliable and ineffective. The Station has no means of notifying all personnel during a situation or for alerting them of potential dangers as they exist. Naval Stations Emergency Operation Center is capable of dealing locally with a controlled situation but has difficulty communicating on a large scale if required. Currently the Region is reviewing a plan for the formulation of a single wireless Personnel Alert System and Communications package that can alleviate this significant discrepancy. During a recent CNO IVA this problem was highlighted as one of the more serious issues that needed to be solved. It was also noted that the Regional Dispatch organization and the Border Tactical (BORTAC) system has allowed for an excellent synergism of communications between all local, state and Federal Emergency Response Elements when required.

Technology

The presently deployed security systems were sufficient to deal with the relatively unsophisticated terrorist organizations of the past, but now we have identified several systems that require modernization to successfully combat the terrorist organizations of today. Technology will play a major role in helping to level the playing field and multiply the force available to conduct Force protection. A number of Commercial Off-The- Shelf (COTS) systems are being evaluated to improve detection coverage and potentially reduce the number of required security personnel. One system, which shows the greatest promise, was developed by SSC San Diego and is currently installed at NSA Bahrain. This sensor package provides for subsurface surveillance, integrated thermal imaging cameras and radar to provide a complete surface and subsurface picture.

To assist in the monitoring of traffic and access control, technology is needed to help do what people can't. Currently Military Working Dogs assist but there needs to be a concerted effort to install back-scatter x-ray machines at gates and metal detectors where best suited. NSF personnel need technology to help minimize their risk.

Within the year San Diego will begin to issue the Common Access Card (CAC). This card is the replacement for the Armed Forces ID card and is intended to become the backbone for all Smart Base technology. If employed as planned, it could prove to be a major contributor to access and control issues currently faced by NSF personnel.

From the Base Commander's perspective, embracing technology is the single most cost effective way to reduce risk and gain an advantage.

Breaking the Paradigm

As with any major change in business, attitudes and perceptions must also change. Personnel need to be educated in the thought process required to better provide the desired outcome. Training starts at the senior most level and generates down. Since attending Level IV AT/FP training, my awareness has been significantly heightened. An open gate means something different today than it did six months ago.

Personnel taking pictures on the pier are not an alert factor to today's sailor. We need to change that mindset. Educating our force is vital to achieving the edge. Security and Force Protection is not a matter of convenience, it is meant to save lives and force the terrorist to choose another target or abandon his plan. Building realistic Force Protection plans to deter and, if necessary, respond to an actual event or threat is paramount. Looking at AT/FP daily and incorporating into every phase of our business will result in a more capable force.

Being alert to the potential dangers is critical and during the CNO directed one-day stand-down to be conducted prior to the end of next month I intend to inform and educate. Level 1 AT training is a must for all hands, military and civilian. Vigilance, unity of effort and presence of purpose will determine the winner and we are winners!

NEWSLETTER

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