STATEMENT OF

COLONEL ADDISON D. DAVIS, IV

GARRISON COMMANDER

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA

June 28, 2001

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Panel, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I am pleased to report to you today about force protection at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

I would like to emphasize that we are trained, equipped, and ready to execute our wartime contingency missions. We demonstrate our readiness on a daily basis in worldwide deployments.

Fort Bragg is situated in the Sandhills of North Carolina, 10 miles northwest of downtown Fayetteville in the south central portion of the state. Fort Bragg occupies 161,000 acres (or 251 square miles), stretching into six counties. Included within this area are Camp MacKall (an auxiliary training complex), 7 major drop zones, 4 impact areas, 82 ranges, 16 live fire maneuver areas, and 2 Army airfields. As we focus on potential force protection threats, we must consider the fact that approximately 75 percent of our acreage includes ranges, deployment and training areas, with the remaining 25 percent dedicated to those areas where people live, work and play. Fort Bragg is a major city, providing approximately 20 million square feet of office buildings, 11 shopping centers, 28 restaurants, 11 miles of railroad lines, a major medical center, 8 schools, 11 churches, 183 recreational facilities, and approximately 5,000 homes housing over 11,000 family members. We are a significant economic presence in North Carolina, contributing an estimated $4.1 billion annually to local communities.

By population, Fort Bragg is the largest Army installation in the world, providing a home to almost 10 percent of the Army's active component forces. Like many thriving organizations and communities, the success of Fort Bragg is directly linked to the quality, dedication, and professionalism of its people. Approximately 43,000 military and 8,000 civilian personnel work at Fort Bragg. Their common daily focus is on training, deploying, mobilizing, and demobilizing America's strategic response forces and providing first-class services in such areas as retail, recreation, medicine, and education. We provide those services to a customer base of more than 250,000 soldiers, civilians, family members, and retirees.

"Home of the Airborne and Special Operations Forces," Fort Bragg's strategic response forces serve every Unified Command Commander-in-Chief and are postured for no-notice worldwide deployment by air, sea, and land; to fight on arrival and win. We maintain the Army's premier power projection platform, capable of launching the Army's first strike capability in 18 hours or less. In addition to the rapid deployment force capability, Fort Bragg maintains the capability to assemble and deploy a Joint Task Force Headquarters, deploy special operations forces, and receive, train, and deploy crucial mobilizing Reserve Component forces. The most important aspect of what we do is manifested in the diversity and sensitivity of those units located on Fort Bragg - - units such as the XVIII Airborne Corps, Joint Special Operations Command, and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (which includes Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces).

The essential elements that allow us to meet our "18-hour wheels-up mission" include:

Ø Close access to diverse modes of transportation (road, rail, air, and sea),

Ø First-class facilities to efficiently store and move large amounts of equipment and supplies,

Ø Facilities unique to rapid deployment forces, such as a brigade marshalling area, airborne operation preparatory areas, and an enhanced Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group operations facility,

Ø A container handling facility,

Ø An ammunition upload area, and

Ø Special Operations isolation facilities.

Neighboring Pope Air Force Base's operational capabilities provide the necessary airfield facilities to simultaneously airlift divisional and non-divisional forces, Special Operations forces, and Joint Task Force assets during deployments. Simmons Army Airfield gives Fort Bragg the additional capability to prepare, upload, and deploy crucial Army aviation elements in support of our mission.

The Threat

As the premier power projection installation, Fort Bragg is a high profile target. Fort Bragg is currently an open installation with unrestricted vehicle access to the 16,000-acre garrison area that contains many critical and sensitive sites. Three State highways transit the installation, with easy access from I-95. As such, the installation is vulnerable to criminal activity and terrorist actions.

The threat to Fort Bragg personnel, facilities, and information consists of a wide spectrum of potential perpetrators, tactics and objectives. This spectrum of perpetrators includes terrorists, criminals, saboteurs, and foreign intelligence services. They may be in the form of computer hackers, criminals seeking monetary gain, vandals, protestors, disaffected persons, domestic paramilitary groups, foreign and domestic terrorist organizations and foreign intelligence agents. The spectrum of threat actions includes the disruption of automated information systems, criminal acts, vandalism, random violence, demonstrations, shootings, bombings and the employment of weapons of mass destruction.

The most probable threats are cyber terrorism, foreign intelligence service collection operations and criminal acts:

Cyber Terrorism. Cyber threats are a daily concern and are increasing in frequency across the Army. In 1999, a single computer virus had an impact on 14 mail servers at Fort Bragg. The virus came via email from 32 senders. In 2000, two viruses alone impacted 348 workstations and 13 servers. These two viruses infected a total of 204,798 files. We have had four virus attacks this year that resulted in 21 computers becoming infected. Computer users are routinely directed to update their anti-virus software, but even with these efforts command and control network and computer systems supporting installation operations are vulnerable to computer viruses. Probes of the computer network are seen at the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) on an almost daily basis. Our installation network security infrastructure has stopped these intrusions - so far. The potential for cyber terrorism is a daily fact of life for Fort Bragg.

· Foreign Intelligence Services. These services operate clandestinely to gain access to and obtain military information. They are designed to acquire sensitive unclassified and classified military information and technology through Human Intelligence or use of foreign agents on the ground; Signals Intelligence or intercept of unencrypted and encrypted telephone, fax and computer communications; Imagery Intelligence or use of satellites and other means (e.g., the Open Skies Treaty which allows many foreign countries to fly over and observe areas within the Continental United States); and Electronic Intelligence or collection of non-communications emitters to include both radar and beacons. There is evidence that Fort Bragg has been targeted by Foreign Intelligence Services using all of the above methods.

· Criminal Acts. The criminal climate around Fort Bragg is rated as moderate. While we have experienced infrequent violent crimes on the installation during the last five years, the impact on the quality of life of residents at Fort Bragg has been minimal due to the proactive efforts of our Military Police and Criminal Investigators. The majority of criminal acts typically involve crimes against property, e.g. petty theft or vandalism, and simple assaults with minor injuries, which mainly result from relationship conflicts between persons who know each other. There have been instances of gang-related activities in the region during the last few years. Local law enforcement agencies have identified approximately 10 extremist groups and 40 gangs within 50 miles of Fort Bragg.

Potential threats include:

· Demonstrations and Protestors. Fort Bragg and the Fayetteville area have been the target of peaceful demonstrators and protestors in the past. In February 2001, 106 demonstrators protested U.S. Army training and support of "Columbia's murderous military" by marching to the Airborne and Special Operations Museum located in downtown Fayetteville. After circling the museum, they delivered a mock exhibit to the museum curator detailing Special Forces involvement in Columbia. In 1997, Fort Bragg was the target of a demonstration by a group opposing the U.S. bombing of Iraq. Some personnel were arrested after they unlawfully entered the installation and demonstrated. Two of the personnel arrested were members of the Plowshares, a domestic terrorist organization with a presence in North Carolina. The Plowshares pose no threat to individuals, but have previously attacked military equipment (e.g., aircraft, ships, etc.) at other military installations in both North Carolina and Virginia.

· Bomb threats and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). With improved telephone tracing methods, the number of bomb threats has decreased; however, each must be approached as if an actual IED is involved until determined otherwise. The threat of an IED is considered as Low. However, experience indicates that incidents of this type escalate quickly during periods of force projection. The likelihood of an actual IED also increases. The employment of a vehicle bomb is the preferred method used by CONUS-based terrorist groups. While we have had bomb threats, there have been no IED's. Many of our critical and high-density population areas do not have sufficient standoff distance to mitigate the effects of a bomb under threat condition Normal.

· Weapons of Mass Destruction. While the threat of a chemical, biological, or radiological incident is Low, a WMD attack using these methods could be potentially devastating. The Bragg/Pope 2010 Study conducted by DoD revealed that there would be significant delays in the deployment of military forces should an aggressor use this form of an attack.

· Terrorism. Current FBI reports received at Fort Bragg have assessed that the threat posed by both domestic and foreign terrorist groups within the United States is Low. Information is available in classified documents on the threat posed by domestic and foreign terrorist groups in the United States.

What We've Done

To mitigate and counter the threats posed by the above groups, we have taken the following actions to improve our force protection posture:

Proactive antiterrorism measures were put in place at mission essential and critical sites. This includes the installation of fencing, closed-circuit television and access security systems.

The Installation Force Protection Security Analyst sends a daily intelligence summary to unit intelligence and force protection officers. Intelligence threat information obtained from a variety of sources, to include. Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Counterintelligence Center, and HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations is updated daily and is available to our military and civilian personnel on both unclassified and classified websites.

To prevent cyber attacks we have installed installation level firewalls and intrusion detection systems at our network interface points to the Department of Defense networks. This provides us an initial top-level protection point against all potential cyber threats. Also, we distribute weekly updates to all customers on anti-virus software updates to provide the most current virus protection.

A vigorous antiterrorism exercise program known as Orbit Comet has been undertaken, with two exercises planned annually. In October 2000, over 150 military and civilian representatives from Fort Bragg, Pope AFB, local city/county/state emergency management and medical representatives and Federal agencies [e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Public Health] participated in a one-day tabletop exercise. The scenario involved a terrorist chemical attack that impacted three jurisdictions - Fort Bragg, Pope AFB, and the adjacent civilian community of Spring Lake. This scenario was continued in a field training exercise which included approximately 100 simulated casualties at Fort Bragg and another 35 in the civilian community. The Mass Casualty Plan was implemented and medical treatment was provided by Womack Army Medical Center, and two local medical centers. One of the purposes of this exercise was to test and validate our Terrorist Threat Response Plan. Another exercise was conducted in May 2001 to test our antiterrorism plan to defend critical facilities. That exercise also tested the Limited Access Control Plan that is designed to control vehicle access to the installation.

A Random Antiterrorism Measures Program, known as RAMP, is implemented on a routine basis. RAMP measures include Military Police checking motorists and the contents of their vehicles before allowing access to the main cantonment area, security screening of mail, periodical exercise of security plans and conducting identification security checks of personnel entering unit areas.

Security personnel review and approve all plans for new construction to assure that minimum Department of Defense antiterrorism standards are incorporated into the design. Protective measures reviewed include site layout (providing adequate standoff distance where possible), access control for vehicles and personnel, safety window glazing, and building hardening and survivability.

To decrease the chance of personal injury or death from glass shards by a bomb blast, Mylar security film was installed on the interior side of glass windows in approximately 50 critical areas and High Threat Target buildings.

An Installation Security Card containing antiterrorism tips and telephone numbers to report suspicious persons is issued to all newly arrived soldiers.

Military personnel, Department of the Army civilians, and their dependents are given antiterrorism awareness training before they depart the United States on a permanent change of station, temporary duty or leave. Information on travel threats is also provided. Security and antiterrorism training is also provided to unit security and force protection officers.

Antiterrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction training videos are periodically shown on Fort Bragg cable television.

A WMD Pilot Program was established for Fort Bragg and Pope AFB after DoD conducted the Pope/Bragg Study and found that adequate response to a WMD event was lacking. The U.S. Army Soldier's Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) developed the pilot program that consisted of WMD training for first responders (police, fire and medical personnel) and incident command personnel.

The following outside agencies reviewed our force protection posture on the dates shown.

· Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) - Jun 98

· FORSCOM Force Protection Assessment Team visit - Mar 00

· Bragg/Pope Study and follow-on WMD Pilot Program conducted by U.S. Army Soldier's Biological and Chemical Command -Final Report issued May 2000

These agencies provided a list of recommended actions, which are shown as follows, along with the action taken:

JSIVA Recommendations

Proposed Perimeter Fence Project - At the time of the JSIVA visit, plans were being finalized to fence the entire cantonment area. The JSIVA team commented that "Unobserved or unmonitored fence lines merely demarcate the boundary / property line and seldom serve as a credible impediment to a determined intruder." They recommended that "the installation pursue the establishment of gates at the entry points with some lateral fencing tied into the entry control points. This would achieve the goal of presenting a more formidable security posture while controlling vehicular traffic, as opposed to trying to preclude pedestrian access though what is believed would be an ineffective means." Action Taken: Construction of the gates and fencing of selected areas has been completed; however, additional fencing in other areas is required.

Mass Notification - The JSIVA team noted that Fort Bragg lacked the ability to rapidly notify the installation populace in the event of an impending threat or crisis in accordance with a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff message. They also commented on an extensive pager-type recall system in one of the tenant commands on the installation. The JSIVA recommended the installation consider the use of this type recall system as an integral part of the installation's Mass Notification System. They also suggested the use of all available media and communication's outlets (e.g., commander's net, installation cable TV, etc.) as well as installing facility-specific emergency evacuation alarms. Action Taken: As suggested by the JSIVA team, all available means are used to provide threat warnings. XVIII Airborne Corps also implemented the recall system recommended by the JSIVA team. An FY02 request for a Mass Notification System is waiting for funding.

Existing FP Program - The JSIVA team noted the lack of participation on the part of the operational commanders in the program. They also recommended the installation form Force Protection working groups to make recommendations and work actions benefiting the program and security posture of the installation. Action Taken: The XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg Terrorist Threat Response Plan was approved, exercised and validated in October, 2000. That plan established responsibilities for the various staffs and commands on Fort Bragg. The Fort Bragg Force Protection Work Group and Force Protection Committees meet at a minimum quarterly throughout the year to discuss FP issues.

FORSCOM Force Protection Assessment Team - March 2000

The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Force Protection Assessment Team (FPAT) evaluated Fort Bragg's Force Protection program using a Red/Amber/Green matrix. The program ratings and reason for the rating were as follows:

Force Protection Area Green Amber Red

Overall Force Protection Program X

Law Enforcement X

Physical Security X *

Antiterrorism X *

Information Operations X

High Risk Persons Security X *

Weapons of Mass Destruction X

Intelligence X

* Rated Amber because plans were in draft

Summary of FPAT Team Leader Comments. Three of the Force Protection pillar programs were rated as Amber because their supporting plans were in draft. The Team Leader commented "This is the first time we've ever seen WMD on an installation get a Green rating. "

Soldier's Biological and Chemical Command Pilot Program Recommendations May 2000:

Command and staff should be trained on the Federal Response Plan, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 (U.S. Policy in Counterterrorism) and PDD 62 (Combating Terrorism). Action Taken: Training was conducted on 20 June 01, as part of planning for Exercise Orbit Comet 29 Oct-1 Nov 01.

Planning efforts at Fort Bragg and Pope AFB should be continued to the next level by augmenting the WMD response matrices with functional checklists and SOPs. Action Taken: Draft XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological and High Explosive Incident Plan being finalized for staffing.

A plan for sustainment of Chemical Biological (CB) training and exercises should be developed to ensure the CB response skills developed are not lost through personnel turnover. Action Taken. First Responder personnel from Fort Bragg, Pope AFB and local community meet on a monthly schedule to train and discuss WMD response issues. Antiterrorism exercises include WMD response actions.

The Pope/Bragg leadership should conduct full-scale CB "muddy boots" exercises when planning efforts are complete. Action taken: Exercise Orbit Comet 01-1 in October 2000, was the largest joint Army, Air Force and local WMD exercise held to date.

Command and staff should resolve existing communications equipment incompatibilities between the installation and with off-installation responders and support agencies. Action Taken: Installation of a UHF Trunking radio system has resolved some but not all of these communications problems. Efforts to further refine the communications system are underway.

Fort Bragg and Pope AFB should be provided chemical/biological response equipment, not committed to deployment, for use in response to attacks on the installation. This equipment includes:

o Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Fire/HazMat (Level A-C), healthcare providers (Level C) and Pope AFB security forces (Level C)

o CB Detectors/monitors for Fire/HazMat, Womack Army Medical Center, and initial response teams

o Decontamination equipment for Fire/HazMat and chemical companies

Action Taken: A small quantity of Level A PPE has been obtained for Fire/HazMat. Requests to purchase other WMD PPE and chemical detectors are waiting for funding.

Because Fort Bragg and Pope AFB are the premier power projection site in CONUS, they should be provided a biological detection capability independent of XVIII Airborne Corps. Action Taken: A request to purchase a separate detection capability for Fort Bragg is waiting for funding.

The Way Ahead

Although very deliberate measures have been taken to enhance our force protection status, much work remains to be done to ensure the adequate protection of our personnel and facilities. We believe that we are doing a good job in identifying threats but have not eliminated the possibility of a no-notice terrorist attack.

We are currently preparing plans to implement FORSCOM Operations Order 01-2001, Installation Access Control. This order requires that Fort Bragg and other FORSCOM installations establish a vehicle registration program and commence control measures at the major installation access points in order to reduce the likelihood of criminal or terrorist threat activity. Random vehicle checks are to be made at the secondary installation access points. To achieve this level of access control will require 225 Military Policemen. No additional funding has been provided to implement this plan.

To implement continuous access control on all major access points and secondary roads would require approximately 555 Military Police (MP) and/or other soldiers on a daily basis. Vehicle inspection duties at the access control point require Military Police presence in the event that contraband is found or there is a security issue involving the driver. There are not enough MPs assigned at Fort Bragg to handle the complete vehicle access control mission. There are 975 MPs authorized in the 16^th MP Brigade with duties at Fort Bragg. Four MP Companies and a Detachment and Brigade Headquarters elements from the 16^th MP Brigade are assigned to Fort Bragg. Two companies deployed to Kosovo for 179 days each in 1999, and the Detachment and one company deployed in 2000. One company is currently in Kosovo and another could be alerted for the next deployment. This trend is likely to continue for the next 24 months. The 16^th MP Brigade daily mission to provide law enforcement and traffic control support to Fort Bragg consumes about 146 soldiers daily. Considering these military deployments, daily law enforcement and traffic control mission, plus schools and other individual training, there would be a daily shortfall of 205 personnel. Thus, it will be essential that non-MPs augment the MPs to perform this mission. Adequate military support for the mission becomes even more difficult to sustain in a major theater of war scenario or a small-scale contingency that may require all four MP companies to deploy at one time.

Given the current manning of Army units, we believe that this guard augmentation mission would be accomplished more efficiently by either a contracted guard service or civil service employees. Contracted guards are preferred; however 10 U.S.C 2465 Contracting for Performance of Civilian Commercial or Industrial Type Functions severely restricts Commanding Officers of military installations located within the United States from planning and providing adequate force protection measures. Basically, this law has been interpreted to prohibit installations from contracting for guard services unless a guard services contract involving a particular function or activity was in place on September 24, 1983. Currently, we have a limited number of contracted guard services that were in place prior to 1983. However, the existing contracts are only located at our Ammunition Supply Point and the Joint Special Operations Command. The majority of our security needs, such as the access control points required under the FORCOM operations plan, are not under contract. In addition, the statute has also been interpreted to prohibit modifications of existing contracts if the modification covers additional or new functions that may now require guard services.

In light of this statute, Fort Bragg must either provide the security with active duty military personnel or federal civilian employees. The hiring of additional civilian employees is not a viable option. Primarily the result of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Outsourcing and Privatization Program, reductions in our civilian workforce have been an ongoing trend since fiscal year (FY) 95. At that time, we were authorized 2,279 civilian employees within the garrison; the figure in fiscal year 01 is only 1,700. This is a 25 percent reduction over the last six years. It is currently projected that we must draw down our civilian workforce another 16 percent by fiscal year 03 to 1427. We are projected to stay at this authorization level through fiscal year 05; however, with competitive sourcing remaining a major pillar of the Defense Reform Initiative, this number may be further reduced as we continue with Office of Management and Budget A-76 commercial activities studies.

Further, emerging technology could help reduce the number of personnel required to man the access points. "Smart" vehicle registration tags could also assist us in flowing traffic through checkpoints more quickly, reducing backlogs. A $2.4M request for Vehicle Access Sensors was submitted as an FY02 OPA request to HQDA. There were extensive traffic delays at some gates during the test of the Limited Access Plan during Exercise Orbit Comet in May. For example, the line of vehicles waiting to get through the checkpoint at our Reilly Road entrance extended over three miles, causing traffic problems and delays for schools and businesses in the adjacent civilian community. The daily traffic count at some access points exceeds 30,000 vehicles daily.

We will meet later this summer with the North Carolina Department of Transportation to discuss the construction of the Highway 13 bypass that will provide a loop around Fort Bragg and Fayetteville. The road will extend from I-95 along the southern boundary of Fort Bragg continuing around Fayetteville and then reconnecting to I-95 south of Hope Mills. This road will have an as yet undetermined impact on the flow of traffic going through the installation and our force protection operations. In concert with the State, we are reviewing the potential for over and under passes on NC Highway 24 (Bragg Boulevard) and other possible infrastructure improvements to reduce the number of required access control points along major routes.

Funding for antiterrorism and physical security has not been received at the levels we believe necessary to adequately implement necessary force protection measures. Antiterrorism funding has been declining; in FY99, Fort Bragg received $449K, $255K in FY00 and only $144K this year, against a requirement for $910K or about 16%. An FY2000 Other Procurement Army (OPA) request for barriers was approved in the amount of $232K and provided by Department of the Army this year. The Army Physical Security program is essential to successful force protection and that program is declining in terms of money and personnel. We received $370K in FY99 and $124K in FY00. This year, we received $339K in physical security funds against a requirement of $1.1M or about 31%. Funding is also lacking for WMD programs; for example, $2.4M was requested in FY01 for Personal Protective Equipment for first responders and chemical detection equipment and no funding was received (there is no separate funding category for WMD requirements). Funding for computer security projects also decreased; we received $80K in FY99, $50K in FY00 and $42K in FY01. Overall, base operations funding is so limited this year that we currently do not have the funds to pay the 4^th quarter utility bills.

In summary, we believe that an investment in antiterrorism and physical security is required to implement necessary force protection measures. At the forefront of these investment requirements is an increase in personnel for access control and physical security initiatives. This increased manning, as discussed earlier, can be provided through legislative relief with additional funding to allow for the contracting or outsourcing of guard forces, relief from the DoD civilian manpower constraints set forth in the Quadrennial Defense Review, or an increase in our Military Police Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) (three MP Companies). Funding for infrastructure upgrades such as construction of additional access control points for secondary routes, over and under passes, modifications to major routes, cantonment area perimeter fencing as identified in the 1998 JSIVA Report, and a mass notification warning system is also needed to continue to fortify our force protection posture. In addition, we need to continue to invest in WMD equipment for consequence management by first responders to ensure we will not be caught short in the event of a no-notice terrorist attack. We also need to research new and emerging technologies in an effort to leverage the enhanced capabilities they may offer against our existing shortfalls.

Conclusion

I sincerely thank this Committee for the opportunity to discuss these issues that are so important to the nation. Force Protection is essential. We believe that we have taken adequate force protection measures to protect our soldiers and their families, and our Department of the Army civilians within the constrained resources. I am prepared to answer your questions.

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