Prepared Statement Of
THE HONORABLE GORDON R. ENGLAND
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY27 June 2001
Chairman Stump, Congressman Skelton, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk about the decision regarding Navy and Marine Corps training exercises on the Island of Vieques.
Before discussing this subject, let me reiterate the pledge I made two weeks ago at the Naval War College and also at my first hearing before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee; that is, I pledged to be forthright, honest and direct in all my dealings with everyone and in every circumstance. Accordingly, I welcome the opportunity to address this issue along with the Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Clark and Assistant Commandant Marine Corps General Williams before this very important Committee.
Vieques was an issue I found on my desk upon confirmation as the Secretary of the Navy. Unfortunately, although people of good faith have worked diligently for the past two years to solve this problem, it has become a very contentious issue. After reviewing the situation, it was obvious to me that there was no fully satisfactory solution to Vieques. But this should not be a surprise. Vieques has been an issue off and on since the Navy first began acquiring land for training in 1941. In fact, the House Armed Services Committee conducted a study and issued a report on Navy training activities on Vieques between 1978-81. History and culture have and still do greatly exacerbate the problems associated with training there.
There are several facts and dates that I would like to present to you, as they were relevant in my decision process:
1. Vieques is a combined training site for our Sailors and Marines and an alternative site or training approach is not likely to be readily available in the near term.
2. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2001 authorizes, among other things, a referendum scheduled to be held on November 6 of this year. That referendum allows the registered voters of Vieques to decide one of two options; namely, to allow Navy/Marine Corps training, which may include live-fire training, to continue indefinitely or to decide that the Navy/Marine Corps training will cease no later than May 1, 2003. The Act further authorizes up to $40M to be invested in Vieques for economic assistance to the citizens of Vieques. An additional $50M, that was authorized but not yet appropriated, can be spent after the referendum if the outcome of the referendum is positive; that is, continuing to train on Vieques.
3. At the time of my decision, the next round of Navy and Marine Corps training was scheduled to commence the following Monday, June 18th. The situation regarding Vieques has been mired in controversy and legal action since a tragic bombing accident April 19 of 1999. For example, during the training exercises in April/May 2001, 180 people were arrested. Of that number, 93 have thus far been found guilty by federal judges and sentenced from "time served" to up to 90 days in prison. Seven civil cases have been filed against the Navy, six in Federal Court and one in Commonwealth Court (subsequently removed to Federal Court), and about 1900 administrative tort claims have been made against the Navy with more expected.
4. Navy onsite personnel reported that the situation was (and still is) disruptive to normal base and training activities and adds to safety concerns.
These are the facts and the situation that were available to me when I announced my decision on Friday, June 15.
Based on these facts, it was evident to me that the Vieques issue was highly emotional with many entrenched positions that went well beyond the stated objective of the Department of the Navy; namely, effective training of our Sailors and Marines. In this emotionally charged atmosphere, it was my genuine concern that events beyond the control of the Department of the Navy could have resulted in our not being able to conduct training on Vieques. Specifically, training could have become untenable well before May 2003 and well before any alternative method or site could be developed. In my judgment, this downside risk was both high and unacceptable, and a decision prior to the June training was important. My rationale was twofold: (1) to dampen the emotion and perhaps the demonstrations surrounding the training scheduled for June. I did not want to have anything occur that might add to our risk. And (2) seize the initiative and refocus our efforts on the real issue.effective training for our Naval forces.
Based on the above rationale, I decided to do the following:
1. Seek a legislative change to the FY2001 Defense Authorization Act and cancel the November 2001 referendum. While the purpose of the legislation was understandable when passed last year, upon assuming office and evaluating the current environment, this policy was troubling to me as a precedent for the future. A proposed change to that legislation has been drafted, and you will receive it shortly.
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Actively plan to discontinue training by May 2003, thereby establishing an endpoint to this divisive issue; and,
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Support a study to help pull together ongoing efforts to identify alternatives to Vieques from both a geographical and technological standpoint and suggest other ways to provide effective training for our Sailors and Marines.
I believe this is the best approach for our Sailors and Marines, the people of Vieques, and the United States.
Regarding the viability of Vieques alternatives, a number of studies were conducted into the Vieques situation following the April 1999 accident. Each of these reports, and I believe the Committee is familiar with them, (namely, the Pace-Fallon, Rush Panel, and Center for Naval Analysis reports), have provided useful insights and will serve as a solid foundation for the alternatives study mentioned earlier. No study concluded that there was a site or approach that replicated Vieques exactly. But neither did any of them conclude that alternatives were not possible. In fact, the CNA report clearly argues that a combination of several existing ranges appears promising to accommodate the various Vieques training events, granted with some changes that would need to be worked through and some investments that would have to be made.
Two years is a challenging timeline, but I believe if we approach this as a mission to accomplish, then we will find alternatives that meet our primary goal; namely, well-trained Navy and Marine combat forces ready for deployment. CNA is being put under contract to perform this study, which will be led by senior retired military officers.
I want to thank this Committee again for its leadership on this issue and reiterate my shared commitment to work with the Congress, OSD and the Navy and Marine Corps to find a way ahead. Your support of our approach is appreciated. This will put an end to the indecision. Certainty and clarity are important to the resolution of this issue.
The Deputy Secretary, Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Commandant and I are ready to answer your questions.
