STATEMENT OF
VICE
ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. DYER, UNITED STATES NAVY
COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
ON THE
NEED FOR THE V-22
FOR OUR MILITARY SERVICES
MAY 21, 2001
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss the readiness implications concerning the need for the V-22 aircraft for our military services.
The goal of the Naval Aviation Systems Team is to meet today's readiness demands while arming the Warfighter with technologies that effectively address future threats. An increased operational tempo, along with the growing cost of supporting aging weapons systems, threatens our ability to invest the necessary resources in modernization and recapitalization. Future wars will be tightly integrated, information intensive, and executed within a joint, network centric environment. Our challenge is to provide the highest value and responsiveness in answering Warfighter requirements for effective, reliable, interoperable, and affordable weapons systems.
The Naval Aviation Systems Team plays a critical role in advancing future military strategy by developing, and supporting airborne weapons systems that are technologically superior, readily available, and affordably priced and maintained. Delivering on these commitments presents unique challenges in today's environment, which is characterized by rapid changes in world politics, economic conditions, and technological advancements.
Maintaining readiness and reducing the maintenance burden on our Fleet is a clear and immediate priority for the Naval Aviation Systems Team. Investment in new technologies is required to extend the capability and reach of our operational forces. It behooves us to partner with industry and the Fleet to develop new capabilities that support future requirements with improved reliability, availability, and affordability.
The CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters operated by the Marine Corps today began their service in the mid-1960s. Through conversion, modernization and attrition, the Marine Corps is operating 229 CH-46Es and 9 HH-46Ds and 48 CH-53Ds. The Navy continues to operate a total of 70 H-46Ds, in three different variants. These aircraft are experiencing escalating maintenance costs; reduced reliability, availability, and maintainability; and significant performance degradation. Their production lines are closed, parts are scarce, and their maintenance requirements are climbing. They are legacy systems with numerous current and projected deficiencies in payload, range, and speed and no self-deployment or aerial refueling capability. These limited capabilities are placing a burden on scarce operational dollars. The direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour for the CH-46E has increased from 19.6 in 1995 to 27.2 in 2000, a 38.8 percent increase. For the CH-53D it has increased from 24.8 in 1995 to 27.9 in 2000, a 12.5 percent increase.
Twenty years ago the Marine Corps realizing that it would eventually have to replace these legacy systems began to consider replacement options for its aging helicopters. After thoroughly evaluating future mission requirements, tiltrotor technology was selected as the best option to achieve the future needs of the Marine Corps. The V-22 Osprey provides the combination of range, speed and payload of an airplane, while combining the vertical lift characteristics of a helicopter. It provides the potential to expand responsiveness and effectiveness in crisis response, special operations, sea-based operations and conventional military operations. It can be deployed by and operated from naval vessels and is fully capable of worldwide self deployment to reduce the demands on strategic lift.
During development, the Osprey underwent seven major Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEAs) by various government agencies and contractors. In each assessment, the aircraft was the clear first-choice among alternatives, and combinations of alternatives in a wide variety of scenarios. The COEAs also judged the V-22 to be the most cost effective procurement alternative available to the Department of Defense over the life of the aircraft. These studies also pointed out that the individual aircraft costs are higher than other platforms, but the capability of a single aircraft is so dramatically improved that missions could be accomplished faster, with less aircraft and less hostile exposure for our combat troops. In addition, the special DoD Blue Ribbon Panel reviewed the program and supports continuation of the V-22 program.
The V-22 also completed an extensive developmental test program with joint testing conducted by both contractor and government test pilots. Additionally, the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force tested the aircraft for operational effectiveness and suitability. During operational evaluation (OPEVAL) the MV-22 successfully met all the critical operating elements of the requirement. However, at the same time, the V-22 did not meet all the reliability, availability and maintainability requirements. We found that component reliability is the main reason for the poor metrics during OPEVAL. With improved component reliability, mean flight hour between failure will increase, maintenance man hours per flight hour will decrease and the mean flight hour between unscheduled maintenance will increase to meet the requirement. The reduction of maintenance man hours per flight hour will reduce maintainer workload and allow the manpower requirements to be satisfied. Additionally, experienced maintainers with an improved technical publication system and refined maintenance procedures will decrease the mean repair time (abort). To mitigate the long term effect, the V-22 Program Office has developed a reliability, availability and maintainability plan that is based on projections of component reliability fixes that are being incorporated into each production lot. A calculation of the individual contribution for each component reliability improvement with a confidence factor before the increase in overall reliability is projected. The improvement projections are conservative estimates and the plan includes 74 fixes to take the overall system reliability from 0.7 hours between failure to more than the required 1.4 hours. I know this sounds extremely low, but you must realize that every loose screw or burned out light bulb counts as a failure. As a point of comparison, the mean flight hours between failures for the CH-46 and CH-53D are 0.89 and 0.82, respectively.
The readiness rates (based on the same ground rules), full mission capable (FMC) rating and mission capable (MC) rating will improve as a result of the reliability plan. The logistic support for the V-22 was immature and supply delays were a major degrader for the demonstrated FMC/MC ratings. Immaturity of some systems, such as the blade fold wing stow which resulted in extremely low FMC ratings have now been corrected. The next operational test period will verify these improvements that severely impacted OPEVAL FMC/MC rates.
As the V-22 systems mature, reliability will improve and squadron maintainers will become familiar with the aircraft. These outcomes will allow the V-22 to meet its mission requirement within the required manning level outlined in the operational requirements document (ORD).
Unfortunately, during the fielding of the V-22 mishaps occurred and loved ones were lost. After the latest mishap, I directed that an independent review examine the V-22 Developmental Program. Prior to returning any operational aircraft to flight, a complete review of all development testing will be conducted. The review will assess the adequacy of testing and identify any additional testing that might be required. This review is currently underway. In addition, a V-22 Acquisition Working Group is developing a restructured MV-22 and CV-22 program that complies with the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations, acquisition policies, and service needs. The goal is to recommend a plan that will deliver to the military services a safe, reliable and operationally effective V-22.
The options being developed will consider both the time and the funding required to efficiently achieve operational capability. This entails completion of both planned and additional developmental testing, correction of deficiencies and suitability issues, verification through follow-on operational testing and evaluation, and retrofit of changes in existing aircraft. Restructuring of the program will be necessary to accommodate these actions.
It will take time to incorporate critical design improvements and we will proceed methodically. The current road map to full operations is a five-phased approach with specific entrance and exit criteria for each phase.
Phase 0: Commence technical assessment and complete thorough flight readiness.
Phase 1: Resume testing with engineering and manufacturing development aircraft (both the MV and CV models) and augment with low rate initial production aircraft as necessary.
Phase 2: Resume Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron-204 (VMMT-204) training operations and production acceptance flights.
Phase 3: Stand up a MV-22 operational squadron at New, River, North Carolina and a CV-22 training squadron at Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico.
Phase 4: Operational deployment/employment of the MV-22 and CV-22.
The immediate steps include: confirmation of industry willingness to support the restructured program; ensuring acquisition road map compatibility with technical assessment (development of entrance and exit criteria); finalizing a deficiency matrix (including reliability and maintainability issues); developing cost, schedule, and production adjustments; and finally, obtaining consensus among developmental and operational testers. We must also ensure that our training is deliberate and thorough and that quality assurance is maintained.
I will be the approving authority for the entrance into "return to flight testing" and "return to fleet training" phases. Also, included in the plan is to conduct an Executive Committee Review with senior operational and acquisition executives. I will serve on that Committee as well.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to share with the Subcommittee the challenges associated with the V-22 aircraft. I believe we are headed in the right direction.
2120 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
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