• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Statement of

Rear Admiral Joseph Sestak
Director
Navy Quadrennial Defense Review
Department of the Navy
Before the Military Procurement Subcommittee
of the House Armed Service Committee

March 28, 2001

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before your committee.

Someone once said that a victorious warrior wins, then goes to war; a defeated warrior goes to war, and then thinks about winning. That is why any discussion of the "transformation" of our military must first begin with an assessment of its purpose and its strategic foundation. It is also why the Strategic Review that the President has directed leading into the Quadrennial Defense Review is exactly the correct approach. Only through this Strategic Review can we first determine the purpose and goal of a transformation..and, consequently, the correct components of that transformation.

With this in mind, an enduring characteristic of the future strategic environment is that the United States will remain a maritime nation with its vital economic, political and security interests across the sea, and that we secure our access to those interests by our command of those seas. Nations in those overseas regions of the world will inevitably have interests that, at times, compete with ours. And while no nation will be a peer competitor in the foreseeable future, it is likely that a number of nations may come to value their military forces as instruments that might challenge our ability -- or the perception of our ability -- to remain forward in their region of the world if a crisis were to become a major conflict. The degree to which a nation might be viewed as capable of denying our access to its region in a war would then serve to diminish the stature of regional relationships with the United States -- and our interests. The Navy is therefore transforming to meet the challenge of not only assuring U.S. strategic access forward, but doing so on a sustained basis. And since the Navy's enduring role in our nation's security is to provide deployed combat forces in support of U.S. interests overseas, it is important to first understand the return for our nation on its investment to maintain its Navy forward in peacetime, crisis and war in order to provide the strategic framework from which to view the Navy's transformation.

Command of the Seas. The first return of our nation's investment in a Navy is to command the seas..the global commons on which we depend not only to project national power and influence, but to secure our country's economic prosperity. This is evident from the fact that 99% of the volume -- and 80% of the value -- of the world's intercontinental trade moves by sea, which has increased each of the past fourteen years. From a U.S. perspective, one-third of our economic growth since 1993 has been because of exports, while the value of U.S. trade as a percentage of GDP has increased nearly 300% in the last thirty years. Also of growing significance to the global economy is the emerging importance of the 16 superports in the world -- those ports that have both the depth of water and sophisticated infrastructure to handle the most advanced mega-container ships. This is because the "conveyor belt" of globalization has become the containership industry, carrying 64% of the value of world trade today -- a percentage projected to increase to 80% by 2020. As "the ship at sea" becomes the world's inventory in a "just-in-time" global economy, these superports join the straits of the world as critical economic "choke points".

While we often take the security of this maritime trading "commons" as a given, assuring that freedom (and therefore our economic prosperity) is -- in and of itself -- worthy of a significant investment of this nation's resources. But to answer the question of how much, one must first consider the full return on the nation's investment in a naval force that can master the seas.

U.S. Sovereign Power Forward. The second substantial benefit from an investment in a forward deployed Navy stems from the ability to provide timely initial -- at times decisive -- crisis response from U.S. sovereign combat forces that are immediately employable from within theater, without any restrictions. In fact, Navy has provided that timely response on 144 occasions in just the last decade alone, including eleven different combat operations. It is this demonstrated ability to respond with combat credible capability across the entire spectrum of operations that also provides the power to help shape regions of interest by deterring potential adversaries, often preventing crisis from becoming conflict, while reassuring allies and friends of our commitment to shared interests. At the same time, forward deployed naval forces that provide the framework of security and stability within a region also deny sanctuary to potential adversaries by not permitting the littorals to be either a barrier, or a maritime area we cede to an enemy. And as threats to our homeland become a concern, the best place to begin countering a number of those threats to the United States is forward -- at the source -- by "picking the playing field" instead of leaving that choice wholly to an adversary. Similarly, forward deployed naval forces help to establish a regional "knowledge base" as we train and operate where the nation wants to fight and win its wars -- overseas.   

In sum, sustaining U.S. sovereign power forward means that the U.S. Navy has the "home field advantage" wherever the nation needs us. In many cases, because of the full spectrum of capabilities immediately employable from being forward, naval forces are often a decisive force for operations short of major theater war. However, when crisis escalates to war, naval forces will complement their ability to provide critical, early combat power from the sea by assuring access for the joint force -- the third compounded return from the nation's investment in its Navy.

Sustained Assured Access. One of the premises of our National Military Strategy is that the United States will have immediate and sustained access to any region of the world at any time. Assuring this access in the face of asymmetric threats is an issue for the entire joint force; but naval forces will play a critical role in enabling access for forces arriving from outside the theater by dint of already being there. Naval forces on rotational deployment already present offshore in regions of concern will provide much of the early combat power in any contingency; enable the projection of the Joint combat power into the area of operations from outside the theater; create the conditions that ease the access for follow-on combat and logistics forces; and then become part of the larger joint warfighting effort. Consequently, Navy's transformation necessarily focuses on warfighting capabilities and capacity; force architectures; and concept of operations required to defeat anti-access challenges and assure access on a sustained basis for both naval forces and the Joint force. This is absolutely critical for a navy that can operate from the littorals; project not only offensive power but also defensive power in the form of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) ashore; and one whose extended weapon and sensor reach allows it to even strike land-locked countries (e.g., Afghanistan in 1998, which it did while striking two continents (Asia and Africa) at the same time from the same Battlegroup dispersed across 1700 nautical miles).

By such a change in naval operations of today and the future, forces begin to flow into theater, surface combatants already there will project defense ashore, protecting coastal airfields, ports of debarkation, amphibious lodgment areas and allied forces and territory. These maritime TBMD forces -- operating freely from the high seas -- also ease the demands on the airlift in the critical early phases of conflict, allowing a more rapid transition to offensive operations for those follow-on forces flowing from the United States. Our forward deployed naval forces -- already on station -- also provide an immediate volume of offensive power projection through carrier aircraft, special operations capable amphibious ships, submarines and surface combatants. This firepower from the sea will clear the way for Joint operations ashore, at least until they are firmly established. This simultaneous projection of both offensive and defensive power from Navy and Marine Corps units will be critical to the success of the combat operations of a lighter, more expeditionary Joint force.

Although the Navy will play a leading role in assuring access on a sustained basis for the Joint force, assured access is a challenge for the entire Joint force. Clearly, it will be a Joint force that will fight and win our nation's wars in the future, and the evolution of each Service to realize its vision of that future relates to the fourth "investment" issue from our Navy -- the manner in which the Navy will help enable the transformation of the Joint force as our sister Services become more expeditionary and rapidly deployable.

Enabling the Transformation of the Joint Force. Navy capabilities will play a key role in enabling the transformation efforts of the other Services. The Navy's inherent capability to create the conditions that ease access for the introduction of the other elements of the Joint force will be critical to the efforts of the Army and Air Force to become more expeditionary in nature, while at the same time supporting the efforts of the Marine Corps to move the point of entry beyond the beachhead.

Similarly, the Navy's capabilities for projecting defense ashore from forward deployed surface combatants will help the Army and Air Force continue the expeditionary focus of their respective transformation efforts by providing a protective "umbrella" for the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) and the Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as they move into theater faster and lighter. In the same fashion, when there is no substitute for the combat power that can only be brought with troops on the ground, precision fires at extended ranges will provide fire support from the sea for earlier attainment of land dominance by both the Marine Corps and a lighter Army. The unique capability of the Navy-Marine Corps team to provide mobile, flexible combat power -- operating from the freedom of the high seas -- makes the Marines another "battery of the fleet" which can move over and around obstacles and to push the point of entry further inland.   

Navy's Transformation. The shift from blue water into the littoral with the Navy's strategic vision "..From the Sea" when the Cold War ended was a revolutionary step for the Navy that now permits immediate and sustained assured access to the battlespace overland. It required the establishment of new core competencies, the fielding of new capabilities, and changing our concept of operations. Throughout the Cold War, the Navy's initial focus was on sea control -- assuring access on the high seas; only after we gained control of the seas did the Navy project its power ashore in war in order to contribute directly to the joint fight on land. As a result, the Navy was platform-centric, necessarily executing its mission in a stove-piped manner by building platforms and organizing them into task-specific groups: anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare and air warfare taskings -- all for the high seas. With this force architecture, we commanded the seas and indirectly assured access to the battlefield on land by allowing the free flow of military force and logistics over the high seas to the fight. 

Following the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Navy's focus shifted to projecting power directly and immediately ashore from the sea. This required operations in the littoral, development of new capabilities such as deep precision strike, precision artillery from the sea and, in the future, a new capability -- projection of defense ashore -- as well as a shift in force architecture toward network-centric warfare to assure access to the new five-dimensional battlespace of sea, air, land, space and cyberspace simultaneously. By maintaining control of the seas, Navy is able to immediately project power directly ashore in support of the joint force.   

As a result, the Navy operates today in the littorals overseas, 365 days a year, with rotationally deployed forces -- not just in peacetime and crisis, but also major war. And if one looks inside our platforms today -- many of which were with us in the Cold War -- one sees how much the Navy has "transformed" over the last ten years to meet the challenge of operating in the littoral and supporting the joint force ashore. One sees how Navy's investments not only provide the lethality, payload and responsiveness required by the joint force today, but also how they can be leveraged to build a Navy after Next that is much different than the Navy of yesterday: a Navy that is immediately employable because it is forward deployed; that can simultaneously control and attack not just on the sea but within the entire five-dimensional battlespace; that is the critical enabler for effects-based warfare; and also enables the strategic transformation of U.S.-based forces to a lighter, more expeditionary, rapidly deployable force.

Already expeditionary, the Navy's own transformation is therefore about changes in force posture -- not necessarily force structure. That means leveraging the inherent mobility of naval platforms, improving their stealth, and distributing offensive and defensive capability throughout the force. Most importantly, the Navy is focusing on the ability to act faster than an adversary by a transformation of its force posture from platform-centric to network-centric operations, with an emphasis on effects-based warfare vice attrition-based planning.

This strategic transformation to an immediately employable naval force from the littorals in war means a naval force that can simultaneously control and attack in the entire battlespace to rapidly apply offensive and defensive power for effect; and it means a Navy that no longer focuses first on sea control, and then on power projection only on a secondary or sequential basis. To fully comprehend what this strategic transformation has brought about in terms of the dramatic change within the Navy's force posture, one needs to also appreciate that Navy platforms are long-term capital investments -- two-thirds of the ships sailing the seas or being built today will still be with us in 2020. Therefore, to "see" the Navy's transformation one must first as mentioned above, look "inside" current ships and aircraft to understand how they have evolved with improved capabilities and new operational concepts for employing them. From technology insertions in existing platforms such as Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) in submarines, and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) in surface combatants and the E-2C Hawkeye for assuring missile protection of the battlegroup, a transformation is occurring that links information and weapons in new ways to maximize the Navy's ability to project power overland. Meanwhile, the capability to conduct offensive strikes ashore has been distributed from just 14 platforms in the 1980's -- the carriers -- to 144 of the surface and subsurface ships we have today. Less than a decade ago, only a dozen aircraft in a carrier air wing were capable of delivering precision ordnance; today, all fifty carrier air wing strike fighters are Precision Guided Munition (PGM)-capable. The combat capability of individual platforms has also been enhanced, as illustrated by the example of the carrier air wing. During Desert Storm, the notional air wing was capable of striking 162 aimpoints in a successful day of normal flight operations. Improved weapons and aircraft make today's air wing capable of striking more than four times as many targets as the Desert Storm air wing -- with fewer total airframes. By 2008, currently programmed improvements will result in an air wing capable of striking nearly seven times as many aim points as its Desert Storm counterpart. And the transformation continues with our new future platforms, as we distribute stealth beyond submarines to our new generation of ships and aircraft, and pursue open system architectures and modular designs to allow for the continued rapid incorporation of emerging technologies -- all while reducing manning. For example, DD-21 is being designed with comprehensive radar, acoustic, magnetic and infrared signature control -- a mere fraction of the signatures of a DDG-51 Burke class destroyer -- an open architecture combat system, with an integrated power system that provides a revolution in power density and design flexibility -- with a crew 1/3 as large as the Burke class.

In summary, the Navy's continued transformation will support the ability to conduct sustained combat operations at sea in anti-access environments -- enabling the transformation efforts of the other Services. By being present forward, creating the conditions that will enable access for the Joint force, the Navy will assist the other Services to become more expeditionary. By providing offensive strike power, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, fire support from the sea along with ensuring sea control, the Navy supports faster deployments by a lighter Joint force -- more self-contained and ready sooner for the transition to offensive operations. At the same time, the Navy itself is transforming to the network centric force of the future -- a force with improved stealth, distributed firepower, and improved lethality in each platform.

Investment for the Future. This sovereign power to assure U.S. access overseas is sustained only through investment. The importance of continuing this investment in the future is demonstrated by the trends cited earlier: an increasingly interdependent world, with a globalizing economy dependent upon freedom of the seas and the potential for regional actors to assert their influence in conflict with U.S. national interests by attempting to deny access to U.S. power projection. As these trends do not appear to have a horizon, the role of the Navy in addressing these challenges will endure.

The challenge today is investing in the right systems and platforms to continue this transformation to assure sustained access for the joint forces. The Navy's modernization and recapitalization programs specifically address asymmetric and area denial threats by investing not only in new mission areas that will continue to assure command of the seas, but also in the transformation to a knowledge-superior, networked force using cyberspace and space to assure speed of command. The Navy's investments in capabilities like expeditionary, non-organic sensors such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), high-speed/high-capacity command and control links, and networked ship information technology installations represent some of the means by which naval forces will be netted with other organic and national sensors in joint integrated networks to permit a tempo of operations superior to that of any likely adversary.

At the same time, an emphasis on evolving mission areas -- both Navy unique and those competencies the Navy shares with sister Services -- will support the Navy's contribution to the Joint warfighting effort. Counter-mine capabilities that are organic to the carrier battlegroup or other deployed forces will use a family of systems including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) launched from ships and submarines, as well as airborne sensors and shooters, to detect, identify and clear mines so that our Navy platforms can continue to operate forward. By projecting defense ashore with Navy Area and Theater-Wide TBMD from Aegis ships -- assuring access to ports, bases, and airfields -- the Navy may permit forces deploying from the United States to travel lighter by reducing their requirement for defensive weapons and ordnance. Other modernization programs -- such as the next generation Tactical Tomahawk and the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet -- are focused on projecting offensive power deeper ashore and with greater responsiveness. These modernized strike systems, supported by improved command and control connectivity, will enable better focused, effects-based targeting. Netted sensors -- the foundation of the capabilities above -- are the key to Navy's ability to remain forward despite the anti-access challenge. Take, for example, Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). This revolutionary capability -- to deploy in the first battlegroup next year -- provides the ability for any ship to fire on another ship's aircraft or missile contact. For the first time through netted warfare, Navy units are provided real-time "sensors-in-depth", for assured protection in the most complex of missile threat environments.

By changing our force posture from platform-centric to network-centric, we are able to geographically disperse our sensors, weapons and platforms, driving up the information needs of our adversary and presenting him with a force architecture that is difficult to attack. At the same time, technological advances are allowing us to create expeditionary sensors that extend sensor reach without sacrificing warfighting capacity because they do not compete with weapons for the critical space within our platforms, even while such advances also increasingly permit sensors to be deployed from our platforms. For instance, UAVs deployed from naval platforms will provide a point of view over land that cannot be provided by shipborne sensors, allowing Navy to provide artillery from the sea in real-time to support the ground battle and attack mobile and relocatable targets at risk with deep precision strike weapons. Technology is also allowing us to reduce the space required for more highly capable sensors resulting in greater precision and lethality in our existing platforms. For example, miniaturization allows Navy to place AEGIS-like phased-array radar (called AESA) on an aircraft, the F/A-18E/F, allowing the aircraft to see farther, more precisely, with less energy -- against both air and ground targets. Longer sensor reach, greater precision and less energy transmitted will make the Super Hornet more lethal while improving its survivability.   

Just as technological advances have allowed us to create expeditionary sensors and miniaturize/extend the reach of organic sensors, and network their information in real-time as knowledge across the battlespace, they are also allowing us to increase the lethality of our weapons and payload of our platforms. Smart, precise weapons with extended reach permit the Navy to hold more targets at risk with fewer weapons and with less risk of collateral damage.   

Tactical Tomahawk is an example of a deep precision strike weapon that will benefit from a revolution in military affairs. Able to hold time-critical targets at risk, this weapon will extend the reach of the shooter to well over the present Tomahawk capability to strike 1000 miles inland; it will also be able to loiter over the target, and act as an expeditionary sensor by providing its view of the battlespace back to the shooter.

When making these investment decisions we must ensure that the proper undersea warfare, mine warfare and information operations investments are made, as well as the balanced resourcing of netted sensors and new platforms, including DD-21 and the Virginia class submarine. In the end, modernization programs resourced for combat credible naval power in both sufficient numbers and the right capabilities -- combined with fully funded programs to network with joint theater and national sensors -- are what will continue to ensure our nation has the enabling force forward to ensure U.S. assured access in peacetime, crisis and war. At the same time, Navy has formalized its transformation process with the establishment of the Naval Warfare Development Center to oversee Fleet Battle Experiments in conjunction with joint experimentation in order to continue to address emerging challenges of the future.

In summary, our culture remains expeditionary and forward deployed. Naval forces in theater will build the knowledge base of operating patterns, electronic fingerprints and centers of gravity; and they will provide timely -- often initial and decisive -- crisis response, with the combat-credible power to sustain access should crisis become war. When you look at the investments Navy is making today, one sees how they not only provide the lethality, payload and responsiveness required by the joint force today, but also provide for a Navy that is immediately employable because it is forward deployed; that can simultaneously control and attack within the entire battlespace; and that enables the strategic transformation of U.S.-based forces to a lighter, more expeditionary, rapidly deployable force. It is a key instrument to shape regions of interest -- reassuring allies while deterring potential adversaries -- and if crisis becomes war, the cost of our entry will be less if the forces that assure access by immediately projecting both offensive and defensive power ashore are already present forward in peacetime, enabling the transformation of the joint force to rapidly come forward to fight and win. This access from the sea is both assured and sustained 24 hours a day, every day, by naval forces already there operating from the littorals. As President Bush said on 4 March 2001: "The.vast network that connects information and weapons in new ways.will revolutionize the Navy's ability to project American power over land and sea, assuring access for all our forces, wherever our vital interests are threatened."

 

---