Military

Statement of Michael McDevitt

"China's Strategic Intentions and Goals"

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War expert opinion has had a dismal record in trying to forecast future outcomes.

But what if we could foresee the future perfectly? In the area of security policy toward China it would still be difficult to translate that vision into a future outcome. In security matters, diagnosis and prescription are not very closely aligned. All of America's war colleges instill in their students the strategic mantra of "matching ends, ways and means." Yet the reality is that matching means and ends is always difficult. Frequently there are no optimum choices, only "less bad" choices. This is particularly true, as the future does not always develop as we anticipate, and because national security planning and strategy is a competitive business.

Strategy, as we are considering it, does not exist in a vacuum. It may consist of two nations or a group of nations in a dynamic interaction. For example, when the United States responds to perceived dangers or tries to "shape" or hedge against uncertain outcomes with China, Beijing, as the object of these initiatives, will in turn adapt its stance in response to the actions of the United States.

The point is that it is impossible to be correct all of the time. Instead one must constantly reassess the current situation and make changes accordingly. With that caveat in mind the following represents the views myself and my colleague at CNA, Dr. David Finkelstein, regarding China's strategic intentions.

China's "Strategic Vision" for the future

China's "strategic vision" for the future is comprised of two key elements: Beijing's vision for China's own domestic development and Beijing's vision for its external security environment. In Beijing's view, the two are inextrica­bly linked. If one were to distill the essence of China's current and future national security objectives it could be boiled down to three words: sovereignty, modernity, and stability.

China's Long Term Strategic Goal

The quest for "modernity" means China will continue to focus on increasing the economic strength of the nation, enhancing the technological and scientific capabilities of the state, and raising the standard of living of the Chinese people. The "Dengist" vision of "economics as the central task" will likely continue to be the key driver of domestic policy decisions.

The only other major "drivers" for domestic policy decisions that could compete with economic reform will be the desire to preserve the pri­macy of the CCP as the source of governance and the maintenance of social stability.

It is important to realize that China has adopted a very realistic timeline for accomplishing the objective of "modernity." This long-tem vision was clearly articulated by Jiang Zemin at the 9^th National People's Congress in March 1998:

"When the People's Republic celebrates its centenary (2049), the modernization program will have been basically accomplished and China will have become a prosperous strong, democratic and culturally advanced socialist coun­try. At that time, our country will rank among the moder­ately developed countries of the world, the Chinese people will have achieved common prosperity on the basis of mod­ernization and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese state will have been realized."[1] China's Vision For its External Security

China will continue to pursue a two track "national security strategy," which is focused, first on defense of its sovereignty, and second, on playing a central role in the security calculations of Asia.

One track is the continued modernization of its armed forces. At a minimum Beijing will continue to strive to build a military that will be capable enough of imposing its will on other regional militaries, if need be, and credible enough to deter external intervention. Keep in mind that this is its goal and there is no guarantee that China can or will achieve this objective.

The second track will involve the utilization of the non-military elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, etc.) to shape the regional security environment in ways conducive to the achievement of China interests in Asia.

The conceptual context for this erstwhile national security strategy is a post-Cold War international sys­tem without a "sole superpower." Instead, China's preferred vision is one of a "multipolar world order" with no single dominant state.

Chinese international relations theorists predict, and Chinese policy makers would like to see, the eventual emergence of five roughly equal poles: the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and the European Union. In this schema no one "pole" will dominate and it provides a context for China to play a major role. This role would be:

.        While not a "superpower" in its own right, China would nonetheless see itself as a key world leader.

.        In the Asia-Pacific region the preferred outcome for China is to be the regional hegemon; and not, as currently the case, share a division of power with the United States.

However, an acceptable, minimum outcome in the region for China would have China as one among equals with Japan and the United States.

Over the long term what would be worrisome to China would be the continued economic, political, and military predominance of the United States on the rimland of Asia (on China's doorstep, as Chinese interlocutors often put it) or, worse, a U.S.-led multinational security system in Asia arrayed against China.

US Policy in East Asia

In translating this vision into a concept of security for the region, Beijing has adopted an approach that is generally at odds with America's alliance based security system. The US "system" has as its objective a politically and militarily stable East Asia that is not militarily dominated by a single regional power. Historically the central objective of U.S. policy has been to keep from being excluded, or frozen out of access to the markets of Asia. The PNTR debate is but the latest example of the great importance that US policy makers place on having access to the China market.

Since in the future US East Asian policy seems unlikely to diverge dramatically from is historical roots it is worth spending a moment or so reviewing what the Chinese currently profess as their preferred security environment, which unfortunately suggests several points of competition, at least at the rhetorical level.

A "New Security Concept" For Asia

As a construct by which nations in a future multipolar world order should interact, Beijing has called for a "New Security Con­cept." As outlined in China's 1998 defense white paper ("China's National Defense") the concept rests upon three basic points:

"The relations among nations should be established on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non- aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."

"In the economic field, all countries should strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation, open up to each other, eliminate inequalities and discriminatory policies in economic and trade relations, gradually reduce the development gaps between countries and seek common prosperity."

"All countries should promote mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and cooperation, and seek the settlement of divergences and disputes among nations through peaceful means."

Typically, these high-minded principles state what China is "for." But the Chinese have also made clear in multiple fora, public and pri­vate, what they are "against." And what they are against is an interna­tional and regional security system dominated by the United States.

China will continue to reject the notion that formal military alliances contribute to regional stability. Today China acknowledges it can do little about the US alliance system, and therefore will have to "live with it"-but they don't like it.

As a result Beijing will continue to castigate the U.S. alliance system, in Europe as well as Asia. It will continue to be belittle U.S. alliances as remnants of the "Cold War mentality," "out of touch with the trend of the times and the aspirations of other nations," "inherently destabilizing to world peace," and, worst of all in China's view, transparently part of an American strategy of contain­ing China now and into the future.

Consequently, any U.S. military posture in Asia in the foreseeable future that assumes the continu­ation of formal military alliances and forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region will by definition be opposed in principle by Beijing and assumed to be directed against it.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the U.S.'s continued reliance on the military element of national power, especially the U.S.'s reliance on military alliances, as the bedrock of its own security concept is precisely the antithesis of China's vision.

The Chinese Prognosis for the Future: The U.S. as the Great Spoiler

Chinese government analyses conducted in late 1999 and early 2000 looked some 20 years into the future. As a result, Beijing's analysts have concluded that by the year 2020 a mutlipolar world will not yet have fully emerged, nor will the "New Security Concept" be any closer to realization than it is today. These forecasts are based on what is termed "current and future objective realities." The proximate cause of this "pessimistic" Chinese forecast was the reassessment of their own current and future security situation in the wake of the "U.S.-led" NATO intervention in Kosovo.

In a significant reversal of previous optimistic forecasts, Chinese projections now reach the judgment that there is a high probability that the U.S. will maintain its current position as "sole superpower" well into the second decade of the new century because:

• The U.S. is strengthening and expanding its military alliances in both Europe and Asia.

• The U.S. is continuing to widen its lead in military capabilities through high-technology

• The U.S.' s economy shows no signs of weakening.

• The U.S. continues to be able to dominate world trade and financial institutions.

• The key objective of U.S. national security policies (such as the pursuit of National   Missile Defense and alliance building) is to maintain its position as "sole superpower"   indefinitely by seeking "absolute security" for itself.

What Beijing's pessemistic analysis means in practical terms is that China must continue to focus on economic develpoment in the hope that its relative power can increase, while over time America's relative power declines. It also means that it is in Beijing's national interest to sustain a peaceful relationship with the United States.

Conclusions

China, clearly, is undergoing a profound period of transition and transformation on all fronts: political, economic, social, and military. What kind of China will we face in the future? Extrapolating from today, we can postulate a continuing genuine commitment to Chinese nationalism, a leadership unwilling to compromise on core sovereignty issues especially Taiwan, and continued suspicion and resentment toward the United States as the key impediment to the realization of China's strategic vision. Therefore I conclude that:

• China will not accept an independent Taiwan nor will it renounce the use of force as an option for reunification.

• China will continue to pursue an alternative vision of a regional security structure.

• The U.S.'s continuing role as the sole "superpower will be the major factor in China's strategic calculus.

• U.S.-PRC relations will continue to be characterized by cycles of cooperation and competition.

The key for the United States is to ensure that whenever competition is the predominate feature of relations with China, that the competition take place at the diplomatic and rhetorical level and not spill into overt military competition.

China is in many ways already a rival in East Asia. But being a rival is not the same as being an enemy and it would be a mistake for US policy to assume a hostile predisposition. The best orientation for US security policy would be to ensure that the United States continues to be appreciated by the vast majority of the countries of East Asia as a stabilizing presence. Emulating Teddy Roosevelt's formulation to "speak softly, but carry a big stick" would be a good way to do that.