STATEMENT
BY
GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER
CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SECOND SESSION, 105TH CONGRESS
ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET
AND POSTURE OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY
12 MARCH 1998
Path to the Future
The best way to understand the state of today's Army is to envision our path to the
future. This path is marked by signposts corresponding to the three pillars of our
national military strategy: respond, shape, and prepare. To be ready to
"respond," we focus on ensuring near-term readiness so that our forces are ready
to react to requirements worldwide. We also "shape" the global environment,
increasing international understanding and cooperation, diminishing threats, and securing
America's place in a free and prosperous world. Finally, we "prepare" for the
future, transforming the Army so that our soldiers will be ready for the national security
tasks the Nation will face in the next century. In my testimony, I will address our
progress in each of these areas. The assessment I offer today is cautiously optimistic. I
am convinced today's Army is trained and ready. I am equally optimistic about the course
we have laid out for the future. However, we do not live in a risk-free environment and in
order to balance all the pillars of the National Military Strategy we have to take risks.
I believe these risks to be prudent. With continued congressional support, I am confident
that when America's soldiers are needed, they will always be there.
A Starting Point
Every path has a beginning. The Army's path to success starts with the support of the
American people represented by your concern and commitment. I want to personally thank you
for your continued support to the American soldier. Coincidentally, exactly 200 years ago
we faced a series of difficult decisions not too unlike those we see today. Our new
republic was in an era of transition, facing a future filled with ambiguity, potential
problems, and unprecedented opportunities. The Spring of 1798 saw new and unexpected
threats. President John Adams could not see the future, but he knew that Americans lived
in a dangerous world, and he understood well the cost of unpreparedness. The President
turned to Congress for support in strengthening the armed forces, and congressional
leaders responded to the call. They reestablished the United States Marine Corps under the
newly created Navy Department, added companies to the Army's regular regiments, and
enhanced the federal government's ability to call on the militia to supplement national
defense. These were difficult decisions made for the common good, putting the needs of the
new nation above regional issues and a thousand other concerns. Two centuries later, our
nation's leaders are no less vigilant. Our country has a remarkable history, a powerful
legacy of commitment to the common defense. Many of you have recently traveled around the
world, meeting, talking, and listening to America's soldiers. They were deeply
appreciative of your concern and interest. On behalf of all of them -- men and women of
the Active force, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve -- I want to
offer you their sincere appreciation and thanks.
A Turning Point
There is no question that since the end of the Cold War, the Army has undergone an
unprecedented transition. Today, we are at the turning point in creating a very different
army. We have become a globally engaged force, handling a broad range of military
missions. The need for land power during peacetime is greater than ever. The Army has
participated in 28 of the 32 major post-Cold War deployments by U.S. forces, providing
over 60 percent of the personnel involved in those operations. In 1997, on average, the
Army deployed about 31,000 Active, Reserve and National Guard soldiers away from their
home stations and families, spread across 70 countries around the world. Backing them up
were approximately another 62,000 men and women preparing to deploy, deploying, or
recovering from operations. During the year, a significant portion of the Army's soldiers
were on the move, supporting active operational commitments, while others were training
and preparing for the full spectrum of military operations, from conventional combat to
teaching chemical and biological detection and defense to civilian agencies. The
requirements of America's post-Cold War defense have made the U.S. Army busier than ever.
All of the activity of the past few years has taken place in conjunction with one of the
most significant force reductions in our Nation's history. We have taken more than 630,000
active and reserve component soldiers and civilian employees out of the force. We have
closed over 700 bases. In Europe, for example, we reduced the force from over 215,000
soldiers to about 65,000. The total drawdown in Europe would be equivalent to closing 12
major installations in the United States. While these reductions took place, the number of
Army deployments has increased by more than 300 percent. Despite the magnitude of our
efforts and the everyday pressures and stresses on the force, our soldiers continue to
perform magnificently. They have the willingness to take prudent risk, the boldness to
seize the initiative, and the professionalism to do their absolute best -- trademarks of
the American Army for 223 years.
As you do, I recognize that the service of our soldiers has not come without cost. We are
not perfect. Many are concerned whether the Army can maintain the tremendous progress we
have made since the end of the Cold War. Some worry that a "zero defects"
mentality might resurrect itself and that opportunities for assignments and promotion will
diminish. Others fear a return to what some refer to as "the hollow army," where
requirements far outstripped resources. Some are concerned that the high pace of
operations will detract from training to the point that units will lose their warfighting
edge. These concerns are understandable and bear watching because they highlight an
important constant that we can never compromise - at its core, the Army is about taking
care of people - because they are and always will be our greatest asset. In my remarks, I
will address what we are doing and what needs to be done to ensure our soldiers are
prepared to go in harm's way today and at every point along the path to the future.
Responding to Our Nation's Needs - Ensuring Readiness through Recruiting, Retention, and
Realistic Training
Responding to the needs of Americans at home and abroad has always been a tenet of our
military strategy and the Army's time-honored task. Every American who has watched an Army
National Guard truck deliver a load of sand bags to help shore-up a levy holding back a
raging flood, or an Army convoy plow through an ice storm to deliver lifesaving supplies,
understands what we mean by the "respond" pillar of the national military
strategy. In like manner, people across the earth -- from a Korean War veteran in Yongsan
to an impressionable young Hungarian meeting his first American at the Army headquarters
in Kaposvar -- have experienced first hand the meaning of the presence of U.S. ground
forces and America's resolve in responding to crisis worldwide.
Recruiting
Supporting the "respond" pillar of the national military strategy requires above
all else, a trained and ready force. Meeting this responsibility starts with recruiting
high quality soldiers. The Army continues to enjoy success in attracting and retaining
high quality recruits, but enticing young people to serve, in the numbers that we need, is
becoming increasingly difficult. As you know, history shows that the difficulty of
recruiting increases as the jobless rate declines, and unemployment figures have been at
their lowest point in a decade. Nevertheless, the Army is blessed with an outstanding
corps of professional recruiters who have done a tremendous job of bringing young men and
women into the force. We fully expect to accomplish our recruiting mission this year. The
importance of this mission continues to increase as the drawdown concludes and we begin to
replace losses on a one-for-one basis. The Army's recruiting effort in the next few years
is crucial to maintaining readiness. In particular, we have placed increased emphasis on
recruiting in critical combat military occupational specialties. This should give
commanders confidence that they will continue to have high quality soldiers, in sufficient
numbers, to fill their ranks.
Every soldier who joins the Army is an important and a valued member of the team. As you
know, in the recent Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel Report and the Report of
The Inspector General, the Army took a hard look at what needs to be done to ensure each
recruit is treated with proper dignity and respect. This work resulted in the Army's Human
Relations Action Plan. The plan fully recognizes that initial entry training (IET) is a
critical step in the "soldierization" process, and we are aggressively
implementing the recommendations of both reports. We are expanding Basic Combat Training
(BCT) by a week to ensure every recruit is thoroughly grounded in Army values, teamwork,
and discipline. The changes we are making in the training base are not about lowering
standards. In fact, we are working to make IET even more challenging and physically
demanding, ensuring we produce highly motivated, confident young men and women graduates.
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we are also currently reviewing the report
by the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues (the
Kassebaum-Baker Report). Many of the committee report's findings mirror the conclusions in
the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel and the Report of The Inspector General.
These concerns are being addressed by the initiatives outlined in the Army's Human
Relations Action Plan. The committee also makes additional recommendations that we are
carefully considering. Although our review of the report has not been finalized, I can
assure you it will focus on three objectives: 1) enforcing the highest standards in
discipline and training; 2) ensuring every soldier lives and trains in a safe and secure
environment where they are treated with dignity and respect; and 3) building the cohesion,
confidence, and teamwork that will prepare soldiers for success in their units. We are
committed to following an approach to training that will provide the most efficient and
effective military force, while realizing the full potential of the young Americans who
serve our country.
Retention
Ensuring the Army's near-term readiness and America's ability to respond to any crisis
worldwide also requires retaining the world's best soldiers. The increased frequency of
deployments combined with concerns over inadequate pay for our enlisted personnel,
benefits, health care, and retirement have the potential to increase uncertainty and
adversely affect retention. I think the very high reenlistment rates among units that have
conducted the most frequent operational deployments under harsh and dangerous conditions
say a lot about the professionalism of American soldiers. Our men and women know that they
are well trained. They have the tools to put that training into practice. Most important,
they believe their effort and sacrifice is making a difference, saving lives, protecting
property, and contributing to freedom and prosperity in places where these words had no
meaning until an American soldier stood behind them. Our soldiers sacrifice a great deal
to serve their country. It is our obligation to provide them and their families with fair
and adequate pay, quality medical care, safe and affordable housing, and stable retirement
benefits. Maintaining a high quality of life for both married and single soldiers remains
a top priority for the Army.
Realistic Training
Near-term readiness is also about providing realistic and relevant training. The Army's
senior leadership has an obligation to give leaders and soldiers a reasonable expectation
that they'll have the time and resources they need to train. "Slowing down the
train" is an important part of this effort. More training is not always better
training. I do not think we can do more with less - but we must get more out of what we
have got.
Fewer and higher quality training events are more
important than ensuring every moment on the training schedule is chock full of activity.
For starters, as you know the Joint Chiefs of Staff have committed to reducing joint
training and exercise requirements by 25 percent. This reduction is designed to eliminate
the least effective training events and should help to reduce the burden on commanders
who, all too frequently, meet themselves coming and going, racing from one training
exercise to the next.
We are also fine-tuning the Army's training programs. In the coming year we will relook
how we train at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The CTCs remain the "crown
jewels" of our training system, and we need to begin to look at expanding their role
in training for the asymmetrical threats we anticipate our soldiers will face in the years
ahead. This training will not dilute or detract from our warfighting focus, but it will
place additional emphasis on emerging threats, such as urban combat, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and the greater intermingling of combatants and noncombatants
on the battlefield. The sophistication of the CTCs has increased by "an order of
magnitude" since the end of the Cold War, but continues to be focused on tough,
realistic high intensity combat. Our efforts at the CTCs will be paired with an increased,
more cost effective and balanced use of live training, distance learning and simulations
at home station. We have made tremendous gains in learning how to mix new training
technologies with traditional field training. As a result of this effort, I think we will
be adequately positioned to provide a support base for realistic, relevant training in the
years ahead.
Realistic, relevant training remains the glue holding the force together. If I have one
concern, it is that commanders at major commands and installations who face tighter
budgets and diminished resources have fewer and fewer options in managing the assets at
their command. We need to empower these creative, innovative, and highly competent
leaders. In that light, we are looking at programmatic solutions and the potential of
proposing revisions to legislation to provide commanders some relief and flexibility in
how they structure and support their missions. I ask for your consideration and support
with these efforts.
Responding to the diverse and often unforeseen mission requirements of the post-Cold War
world requires disciplined, well-trained and ready forces. I believe the steps I have
outlined here will ensure that we will continue to have those forces as we walk the path
to the future.
Shaping the International Environment - With Total Army Solutions
In recent years, the Army's shaping responsibilities have become the most demanding aspect
of our mission. The Army has truly become America's premier shaping force -- from our
forward-presence forces in Korea and Europe; to stability operations in Bosnia, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Haiti, Ecuador, Peru and the Sinai; to international
programs, such as the Partnership for Peace exercises and military-to-military contacts
with friends and allies around the world. In addition, visits with my counterparts in
Asia, South America, and Central Europe lead me to believe strongly that there is more the
Army could and should do, particularly as part of an interagency approach, to promote
regional stability, provide strategic early warning of global change, and mitigate threats
before they become acute. The Army's utility in the post-Cold War world is vast, and we
are being increasingly called upon to work with the other instruments of national power to
help shape the international environment.
Managing the high operational and personnel tempo required to sustain our efforts
represents one of the most significant challenges we will face in the year ahead.
Ongoing stability operations in Bosnia are a case in point. Recognizing the need for an
extended commitment in this region, we are now looking at ways to avoid consecutive tours.
Our soldiers remain committed to the mission and are proud of the fact that they have
saved thousands of lives and mitigated human suffering thorough their efforts. We are,
however, beginning to see soldiers conducting "back to back" deployments. To
lessen the burden of high tempo operations, we must develop new, creative operational and
personnel policies specifically tailored to recognize the reality of conducting business
in the post-Cold War world.
The foundation of our approach to future operations must rely on Total Army solutions that
make the best and most appropriate use of a mix of active, United States Army Reserve, and
Army National Guard soldiers. As you know, 54 percent of the Army's force structure is in
the Guard and Reserve. Recent experience clearly demonstrates that any significant
deployment requires a robust mix of component capabilities. About one quarter of our force
in Bosnia, for example, consists of soldiers from the Army National Guard and United
States Army Reserve, while other soldiers from the reserve components have deployed to
Europe to "backfill" active duty soldiers serving in the Stabilization Force.
Providing sustained support to shaping activities across the globe, while continuing to
meet the requirements of the other two pillars of the national military strategy, requires
Total Army solutions.
We are using the four principles outlined by the Secretary of Defense in his recent letter
on Total Force Integration to focus our efforts on ensuring that each component is
properly resourced, structured, and assigned missions to support our Nation's strategy.
Let me briefly outline here the principles and some of the key initiatives we have
undertaken.
The first principle highlights responsibility. We recognize that responsibility for the
Total Army can only be taken through energetic leadership and effective communications.
The Army has moved to improve communications. Our Reserve Component Chiefs presented their
budget issues personally to the Defense Resources Board during the fiscal year 1999 budget
preparation process. They are more frequently and routinely in my office and others to
ensure there are no filters. I have had several meetings in small groups of state Adjutant
Generals. The Secretary of the Army has established an Army Forum on Integration of the
Reserve and Active Components to ensure Army leadership involvement in Total Army
integration issues. The Secretary has placed renewed emphasis on our Army Reserve Forces
Policy Committee, composed of Active, Guard, and Reserve general officers. The Vice Chief
of Staff has reenergized the Reserve Component Coordination Council to address tough
policy and resourcing issues.
The second principle outlined by the Secretary of Defense relates to the relevance of
missions. This principle recognizes the importance of establishing clear and mutually
understood missions for each unit. We believe missioning all units is essential because it
establishes the purpose and relevancy of the force. Currently, the Army is converting up
to 12 combat brigades of Army National Guard structure to meet the combat support and
combat service support requirements identified in the National Military Strategy. There
is, however, much more work to be done in the area of assigning relevant missions.
Currently, there are eight Army National Guard combat divisions and three separate
brigades that have no defined operational mission in the Defense Planning Guidance.
Nevertheless, the Army needs these forces to help meet its worldwide commitments for
shaping the conditions that will enhance America's global interests and responding to the
threats that endanger our peace and security. Our task is to define the role of these
forces and embed their missions clearly in the defense planning guidance. An implied task
is to gain consensus in the Department of Defense and with Congress that recognizes the
need to resource these missions.
One option for enhancing the utility of Reserve Component forces might be to create
"dual-capable" units that have the potential to perform traditional combat
missions but can also meet a range of requirements. In this area, we are looking at a
number of innovative concepts. These concepts range from forming multi-component units
that could augment or replace other forces, to giving new missions to the reserve
components that they could assume within their existing force structure. One of the most
important areas for potential "collateral" missions is the area of homeland
defense. These missions could include responsibilities for National Missile Defense,
protection of critical infrastructure, and response to domestic emergencies, including the
threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Another potential area of emerging
requirements is earmarking commands as "bridging forces" for working with our
friends and allies around the world. These forces would serve as important links to
facilitate combined and multinational operations. They could form habitual training
relationships with allied nations. Training would put special emphasis on the linguistic
and liaison capabilities that facilitate multinational operations.
The Army senior leaders must work closely with the Army Reserve leadership, the National
Guard Bureau, and the Adjutant Generals to explore these new requirements and initiatives,
realistically defining what can and should be done. Our objective must be to get the
greatest utility out of every element of the force. At the same time, our goal should be
to add predictability and stability to the force. Rapid and unplanned force structure
changes place additional stresses on the force, complicating not only resourcing
decisions, but long-term professional development of officers and soldiers. Where
possible, we must make smart decisions that minimize turmoil while providing the most
effective and responsive force possible. This is an achievable goal, but only if we make a
concerted effort to complete the missioning process.
The Secretary's third principle recognizes the importance of training, maintaining, and
modernizing all the components of the force. In the last few years, the Army, with
congressional support, has made significant progress in creating an integrated approach to
enhancing the capabilities of the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve.
New initiatives continue to be developed. The Reserve Associate Support Program, for
example, will provide enhanced training for United States Army Reserve soldiers and
enhanced readiness for Reserve combat support and combat service support units. After
individual entry training, soldiers are attached to an Active Army combat support or
combat service support unit for 24 months of active duty. These soldiers then return to
their United States Army Reserve unit experienced and fully trained. The Army has approved
a pilot program to test the feasibility of the concept. Another significant initiative is
the development of the Integrated Division. Over the next year, the Army will create two
integrated divisions, placing three Enhanced Separate Brigades under a headquarters
commanded by an active duty major general. Upon mobilization, the brigades would deploy as
separate forces while the headquarters serves as a center for training follow-on forces.
The Secretary's fourth principle emphasizes that Total Force integration programs must
culminate with a commitment to resource forces adequately to accomplish their assigned
missions. Despite the Army's declining share of the Department of Defense budget, the
Reserve Component's share of the Army budget has risen commensurately with their increased
use. The Reserve Component's share as a percentage of the Army's budget is the highest it
has been since 1962. In addition, over the last six years the Army has invested an
unprecedented $21.5 billion in modernizing Reserve Component forces, including cascading
equipment. In the future, more can be done to ensure the efficient and appropriate
distribution of resources. For example, we are expanding Reserve Component participation
in Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, using their expertise to help validate Army
warfighting requirements and allocate resources within the Army's budget.
We have also reviewed the successful integration of both the Air Force and the United
States Marine Corps. We think there are opportunities for the Army to use the underlying
principles of these models. Using them, we are currently refining concepts that provide
for even greater integration of the Active, National Guard and Reserve soldiers with
emphasis on rounding out units up to the company level. At that level, soldiers and
leaders focus on a single system and the challenges of integration are the most
manageable.
We are fully committed to managing the Total Army in accordance with the Secretary of
Defense's four principles for force integration. We believe that the result will be Total
Army solutions that allow the U.S. Army to conduct prolonged, responsive shaping
operations today, tomorrow, and into the next century.
Preparing for the Challenges Ahead - Experimenting with the Force, Readying the Leaders,
Reengineering the Infrastructure
As you know, the Army has been preparing for the future through our Force XXI process. The
process is designed to spearhead the development of Army XXI, a product-improved force
that will see the Army into the next century. Army XXI is primarily concerned with
enhancing our current systems with information age technology. In addition, Force XXI is
directing our explorations into the Army After Next (AAN). AAN is a future force designed
specifically to meet the national security requirements of the 21st century. It will most
probably include organizations and systems which do not yet exist. The objective of Force
XXI is to synchronize modern equipment, quality people, doctrine, force mix, training, and
leader and soldier development -- the six Army imperatives -- ensuring that the United
States Army can conduct a variety of missions in diverse environments, from today until
well into the next century.
The centerpiece of the Force XXI process has been a series of Advanced Warfighting
Experiments (AWEs) designed to test new systems and operational concepts. In the last
year, we conducted two pivotal experiments: the Task Force XXI AWE at the National
Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and the Division AWE at Fort Hood, Texas. These
experiments have provided a range of insights into future force design. In particular,
they validated the importance of "spiral development," synchronizing the
evolution of new systems with organizational, training, leader, soldier, and doctrinal
developments. The experiments also reaffirmed the importance of situational awareness and
information dominance provided by new technologies. As a result of the AWEs, I am
convinced more than ever that developing and fielding digitized divisions and a digitized
corps is both feasible and absolutely essential for providing the competent, capable
forces we will need in the future. But, the AWEs are more than just technology. They are
about spearheading the cultural and institutional change that will prepare the force
mentally for the challenges of the next century.
Through the lessons learned from Task Force XXI and Division AWE experimentation and
wargaming, we will develop the insights we need in order to make the programmatic
decisions to carry us through the year 2005 timeframe. This year we will invest
considerable effort in fine tuning our modernization programs for the decade ahead. In
particular, we must make sure we have in place the backbone of systems we need to conduct
information based operations. We must also focus our Research and Development efforts and
pinpoint potential AAN capabilities that can be brought forward and developed now. We can
not yet clearly define the timeline for fielding an AAN force, but it is time to think
about taking AAN initiatives out of the theoretical stage and begin looking at potential
applications. In particular, future experimentation will focus on the capabilities of
light forces and increased joint experimentation. We continue to work closely with the
United States Marine Corps on the development of land warfare. Recently, the Air Force and
the Army have agreed to begin planning on a cooperative warfighting experiment, which I
hope will serve as the precursor for a truly joint experimentation program that will
inform and energize a fully integrated joint modernization process.
In addition to the tremendous progress we have made in experimentation, this year marks a
significant development in our Force XXI leader development programs.
The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI and the new Officer Efficiency Report (OER) are important components of our future-oriented programs. Though these are officer programs, they are intended as a start point for institutionalizing leader programs for the 21st century across the Army. OPMS XXI restructures how active duty officers will be managed, developed, and promoted over a career of service. The changes it introduces are significant. The new system will not only open new opportunities for advancement, command and education, but will better serve the Army's demanding and diverse needs for officer leadership in the 21st century. We developed OPMS XXI hand-in-hand with the revision of the OER system. The new report places special emphasis on ethical attributes and the ability to share and instill those qualities in subordinates. These initiatives, in conjunction with our other Force XXI efforts, are important steps in growing the soldiers and leaders of the next century.
While we continue our Force XXI process, we are
reviewing the findings of the recently completed work of the National Defense Panel (NDP).
The panel's report has far reaching implications that deserve to be discussed and
considered. On the whole, I find the report's findings as a vote of confidence for the
path we are on and see nothing that leads me to believe we should significantly alter our
path. We must take a prudent course; each pillar in our national strategy carries great
importance. We would be ill-advised to assume undue risk in one area for the sake of
speeding developments in another. A balanced approach to the future -- responding to and
deterring threats when they present themselves, shaping the strategic environment to
mitigate potential sources of instability before they become acute, and preparing in a
disciplined, deliberate manner for the challenges we know we will face ahead -- remains
our best hope for ensuring Americans peace and prosperity from today to tomorrow.
One finding of the NDP report with which I fully agree is the recommendation to eliminate
excess infrastructure. I fully recognize that this is a contentious and controversial
issue. Yet, I believe it is one that we as a Nation must address. As you know, the Army
has made every effort to be as efficient and effective as possible. The Army has
programmed approximately $10.5 billion in efficiencies over the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP). While we have assumed a degree of risk through the aggressive pursuit of
efficiencies, we believe the risk is known, balanced, and manageable. I am concerned,
however, that these efficiencies alone will not be enough to balance readiness and
modernization in the out years. Reducing excess infrastructure and increasing our
flexibility in directing resources and management reform is the surest, most efficient
means for improving the value of America's investment in defense.
The Strategic Balance -- Requirements and Resources
The Army is not only an invaluable strategic force, it is also cost effective, accounting
for less than 25 percent of the Department of Defense budget. We are justifiably proud of
the return we provide for the American citizen's investment. Yet as I testified last year,
we remain a force under stress. The greatest potential threat to Army readiness is the
medium- and long-term impact of an increased operational pace and insufficient
modernization funding. By failing to modernize and update our equipment, we put tomorrow's
soldiers at risk. I cannot overestimate the risk we take by failing to modernize. The
continued threat of weapons proliferation can allow even no-tech nations to field
high-tech armies in the flash of an arms deal. Though no nation may be capable of fielding
a force that can compete with the United States in a conventional war, any nation can
develop a "niche" capability that will cost American lives in a future conflict.
At the same time, sacrificing force structure and undercutting quality of life programs
are equally unacceptable. Our requirement for ground forces to shape and respond will not
diminish. In fact, the changing international environment will probably increase the
requirement for the sustained forward presence of our forces and enhanced power projection
capabilities. Any option other than maintaining the balance between current readiness and
prudent modernization places our ability to effectively implement the national military
strategy at undue risk.
As you are aware, as requirements for shaping and responding have expanded in the
post-Cold War years, the Army has relied on modernization accounts as the primary bill
payer. In fiscal year 1998, Army procurement reached its lowest level since 1960.
Quadrennial Defense Review personnel reductions, savings from better business practices,
and congressional supplemental appropriations have off-set somewhat the drain on Army
modernization, but these initiatives alone are not sufficient to mitigate the risk that
the Army will be unprepared for the national security challenges of the future. The
proposed fiscal year 1999 Army budget only begins to bring our requirements back into
balance. The fiscal year 1999 President's Budget for the Army totals $64.3 billion. While
this is a $3.3 billion increase over the fiscal year 1998 budget, it follows 13 years of
decline (except for Desert Storm) in real terms and reflects the continued decrease in the
Army's percentage of the Department of Defense's budget from 27 percent in fiscal year
1989 to 24.9 percent fiscal year 1999. Implementing the budget requires the Army to assume
risk in certain areas and make tough choices to balance requirements and resources.
One Team, One Fight, One Future-America's Soldiers
Balancing priorities is never an easy task. Our first congressional leaders learned that
lesson well 200 years ago, and very little has changed. There are no easy answers, no
silver bullets, no magic solutions. Inside the Army, we have done our best to provide the
right balance among readiness, endstrength, modernization, and quality of life. We are one
team, United States Army Active, Reserve and National Guard. We believe in one fight
conducted by an integrated joint combat force in concert with other federal agencies --
providing for the common defense. We are working for one future: a better, more secure
place for America in a safer and more prosperous world. At the heart of this commitment
are American soldiers, prepared and ready to serve whenever and wherever our nation calls.
Supported by these exceptional men and women, we can and will face the tough choices ahead
and make the right decisions to safely travel down the path to the years ahead.
