U.S. Policy on Taiwan
Kurt Campbell
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific.
7 February 1996
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome
the opportunity
to appear before you today. Ambassador Lord
presented a very
comprehensive statement on the security
situation in the Taiwan
Strait. I think it's important for
you to know at the outset
that we keep in close consultation
with the State Department and
share the Ambassador's
conclusions. My comments will supplement
Ambassador Lord's
very thorough statement and address three major
points
focusing on our Department of Defense perspectives.
First,
how we implement DOD responsibilities under the
Taiwan
Relations Act. Second, how the military component of
Taiwan
security fits into the broader context of Taiwan
comprehensive
security and stability in the Taiwan Strait. And
third, some
thoughts on how we believe we should proceed in
the coming
months.
Obligations Under The Taiwan
Relations Act
The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 is our
framework for defense
obligations. Somewhat simply put, it
requires that we: 1) assess
the military balance to ascertain
Taiwan's defense needs; 2)
provide the articles and services
necessary to Taiwan to maintain
a sufficient self-defense
capability; 3) keep Congress informed
on Taiwan's security
requirements; and 4) maintain the capacity
of the United
States to resist force or coercion against the
people of
Taiwan.
In assessing Taiwan's defense needs, the
Department of Defense
and U.S. military have dedicated
significant intelligence
resources over the past two decades
to monitoring the military
balance in the Strait. We also
have active dialogue with
Taiwan's security authorities to
keep current on their defense
issues. Additionally, the
United States Government maintains a
strategy of engagement
with the PRC, and DOD specifically with
the PLA, with the goal
of gaining clearer insights not only into
Chinese military
capabilities, but also intentions. I would also
note that
since the events of last summer, we intensified our
efforts
in all areas that help us carry out our responsibility
to
assess the balance.
Our second obligation, providing
Taiwan a sufficient self-defense
capability, was covered
thoroughly by Ambassador Lord. I would
only reiterate his
point that Taiwan has a formidable capacity
to defend itself
and maintains a strong defensive posture. When
we look at the
threats to Taiwan from air, surface, sub-surface,
and PLA
ground forces, in every area we feel Taiwan maintains a
very
credible defense. Regarding the PLA missile threat that
was
evidenced last summer, it is important to note that Taiwan
is
being equipped with a most modern missile defense system
-- MADS
-- a Patriot system derivative. That said, we
continually
reevaluate Taiwan's posture in fulfilling our
obligations to
provide Taiwan with sufficient self-defense
capability.
Under the Taiwan Relations Act, our third
obligation is to keep
Congress informed. In this regard, as
we are doing before you
today, we maintain very active
dialogue with members of Congress
and Staff of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Armed
Services Committee,
House International Relations Committee, and
House National
Security Committee. We do this not only due to the
Taiwan
Relations Act, but because it is not possible for
any
Administration to maintain a China policy that supports
our
national interest without the active involvement and
support of
Congress.
Fourth, our obligation to Taiwan
includes the maintenance of the
United States' capacity to
resist any resort to force or coercion
that would jeopardize
the security of Taiwan. This obligation is
consistent with
America's overall strategy in the region, our
commitment to
peace and stability, and our regional military
posture. Our
forward deployed forces in Asia, based primarily in
Japan and
the Republic of Korea, have deterred aggression and
provided
the regional stability that has made possible
Asia's
remarkable economic and political
progress.
Today, this commitment continues through a
stable
forward-deployed force of about 100,000 United States
personnel.
The Administration's commitment to maintaining
troops in the
region for the foreseeable future is well-known
and widely
appreciated throughout the region. American
strength is solid,
and based on sound bilateral alliances and
enduring friendships
throughout the region. Partly because of
our military presence,
the Asia-Pacific region is now more at
peace than it has been at
any time in this century. Tensions
and uncertainties remain, but
as the only Asia-Pacific power
with truly global capabilities,
we are able to bring together
multilateral coalitions to
guarantee the maintenance of
regional peace and stability. By
maintaining our alliances and
forward military presence while
engaging in security dialogues
with China and other key powers,
we ensure both that the
region remains at peace and that the
United States remains a
Pacific power.
Taiwan Security
Beyond my discussion
of military deterrence, my second point this
morning has to
do with Taiwan security in the broader context
which
Ambassador Lord emphasized. The success of our policy must
be
evaluated foremost upon the preservation of stability in
the
Taiwan Strait. Since 1979, our policy has had a direct
positive
impact on Taiwan's tremendous political and economic
development
which has added immeasurably to Taiwan's national
strength. Our
"one-China" policy has led to significant
increases in
cross-Strait trade and investment which provides
powerful
incentives to both Beijing and Taipei to seek
peaceful resolution
of their differences.
Our
long-standing policy rests firmly on three legs --
Washington
and Beijing relations which are built around our
policy of
engagement; the relationship between Washington and
Taipei which
I have just described and which remains vibrant;
and,
Beijing-Taipei relations which, until May 1995,
showed
encouraging signs through the sustainment of dialogue
on
important cross- Strait issues. It is through the third leg
of
this triangle, Beijing-Taipei relations, that the Chinese
people
themselves will ultimately find a peaceful resolution
to their
differences. The period of tension over the past 8
months is an
anomaly when we look back over the cross-Strait
relations since
the early 1970s. Our belief is that it remains
in the best
interest of Beijing and Taipei to be talking and
the likelihood
of resumption of dialogue in the coming months
appear good.
Where To Go From Here
For my final
comments, I will add some thoughts to those already
expressed
by Ambassador Lord. It goes without saying that we
are
vigilant and are closely monitoring events. However, for
the
longer term objectives of stability in the Strait and our
own
national interest, we must approach both Beijing and
Taipei to
get them to refrain from actions which increase
tensions in the
region and encourage them to resume
dialogue.
Recent tensions between the PRC and Taiwan are
exacerbated in
Beijing and Taipei by complex domestic politics
-- presidential
elections in Taiwan and succession politics
in the case of the
PRC. We must ensure our own actions take
cognizance of this. It
is imperative that Beijing and Taipei
manage the Taiwan issue
prudently and not overreact to
perceived slights or unwelcome
actions. The delicate balance
in the cross-Strait-relationship
has been upset recently by
Beijing's opposition to what it sees
as Taiwan steps towards
independence and, in important part, by
recent PRC military
exercises and provocative rhetoric. We cannot
state strongly
enough that it is in everyone's interest to
restore the
climate of security and stability that has existed
for so
long. In particular, we hope that Beijing and Taipei
will
agree to resumption of the high-level, cross-Strait
dialogue and
avoid steps that may be seen as
provocative.
Again, the key point is that our policy works
to achieve peace
and stability in the Taiwan Strait over the
longer term.
Overreaction to current events would jeopardize
U.S. national
interests. We would put at risk the economic and
political
progress achieved by the people of Taiwan. We would
also risk the
growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan and
the mainland,
exchanges which benefit people on both sides of
the Strait. In
the end, actions which would be inconsistent
with our long
standing "one-China" policy put at risk the
interests of the
people of the United States which are clearly
for the
preservation of stability and peace. Abandoning our
policy
commitments are a risk to the interests of the people
of Taiwan,
and the larger interests of the entire region. We
must continue
to maintain that the question of Taiwan-PRC
relationship is an
issue to be resolved by the Chinese people
themselves. Our
abiding interest is that the resolution come
about peacefully.
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