U.S. Policy on Taiwan
Winston Lord
Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific.
6 February 1996
Mr. Chairman, Members
of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity
to appear before
you today to discuss one of the United States'
most
significant policy issues in Asia. It is also one of the
most
difficult ones. I commend you for addressing these
questions
at this time. I hope our exchanges today will serve
to dampen
recent tensions and promote American interests.
Peace in
the Taiwan Strait lies at the core of our China policy.
For
decades, we have stressed that we will support any
peaceful
solution to disagreements between Taiwan and the PRC.
Such a
solution obviously must be supported by both
sides.
My testimony will discuss the present security
situation in the
Taiwan Strait area. Then, I will explain why
the policy of the
United States serves the interests of all
parties concerned in
maintaining peace and stability. I will
describe the dangers to
our interests which would result from
conflict in the area. And
I will urge that we -- both the
Administration and Congress --
move cautiously and
cooperatively to maintain the delicate
balance that successive
Administrations have achieved.
Recent Developments
We may recall crises in the Taiwan Strait threatening
U.S.
involvement in the late 1950's. In the decades since,
peace and
stability have prevailed as a result of wise
policies on all
sides. However, following the visit to the
U.S. last summer by
Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, tensions
have risen with tough
political rhetoric in Beijing and a
series of military moves by
the People's Liberation Army. One
Chinese military exercise
included the firing for the first
time of surface-to-surface
missiles into the ocean a hundred
miles or so north of Taiwan.
These developments have raised
serious questions and concerns on
the island, in the United
States and in neighboring Asian
countries about stability in
the area. Most recently, there has
been speculation in the
U.S. and foreign press about further
military actions by the
PRC.
We are concerned by any rise in tension in the
region, we have
conveyed this to Beijing, and we are watching
developments
closely. However, having examined all of the
available evidence,
we cannot conclude that there is an
imminent military threat to
Taiwan. While it is abundantly
clear that the PRC wishes its
military activities to be
noticed, to influence Taiwan's
legislative and presidential
elections, and to have a restraining
effect on Taiwan's
international activities, they do not in our
judgment reflect
an intention to take military action against
Taiwan. Perhaps
more importantly, the Taiwan authorities have
reached the same
judgment. Though the scale of some of these
recent exercises
is substantial, the pattern of such exercises
in connection
with elections in Taiwan is not new; such
activities have been
observed since 1988. PRC authorities have
stated publicly,
as well as to us in diplomatic exchanges, that
there is no
change in their intention to seek a peaceful
resolution of the
Taiwan question. We, as always, will continue
to monitor
closely the situation in the Taiwan Strait. But all
evidence
at our disposal at this time leads to the conclusion
that the
PRC has no intention to initiate military action.
What
then lies behind the recent actions by the Chinese military?
As I have suggested, these demonstrations of military
strength
-- and there may be more -- are evidently intended
to send a
message to the Taiwan authorities to curb what the
PRC regards
as efforts to establish a separate, independent
identity for
Taiwan. Last June's visit to the U.S. by
President Lee Teng-hui
was interpreted by the PRC, wrongly in
our view, as a step toward
independence. The Chinese
position, of course, is that Taiwan
is a part of China, and
it thus views the issue as vital to its
interests. Some PRC
commentators have charged Lee Teng-hui with
the intention of
abandoning, or postponing indefinitely, the
Taiwan
authorities' long-standing goal of eventual reunification
with
the mainland.
While expressing a desire for recognition
of Taiwan as a
sovereign entity for now, the Taiwan leadership
has repeatedly
reaffirmed its interest in eventual
reunification. Meanwhile,
President Lee has sought to appeal
both to the desire of the
people on Taiwan for greater respect
and recognition from the
international community. It is also
apparent that the majority
there wish to remain separate from
the People's Republic of
China, at least until political and
economic conditions on both
sides of the Strait make
reunification more attractive.
Although neither Taiwan nor
the PRC wants a military
confrontation, there is a danger that
Chinese nationalism in the
PRC may collide with Taiwan's
search for international
recognition and status. Democratic
development in Taiwan has
permitted the free expression by a
portion of the Taiwan populace
of a desire for a separate
Taiwan identity, expression of which
had been largely
suppressed under the previous political
leadership in Taiwan.
Some in Beijing interpret this development
as challenging the
assumption underlying the political status quo
and source of
stability in the Taiwan Strait -- the acceptance
of a single
Chinese state by both sides.
Since 1950, Taiwan has been
seen in the PRC as a sensitive issue,
touching on core notions
of sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and feelings of
nationalism. With the meeting of these two
powerful
historical forces -- growing nationalism on the mainland
and
increased efforts by Taiwan's democratic polity to
obtain
greater recognition of its own identity and improve
its
international status -- tensions between Beijing and
Taipei have
increased. The drawn-out succession to Deng
Xiaoping on the
mainland and electoral politics on Taiwan have
further
complicated this situation.
United States'
Policy
It is vital to keep in mind U.S. interests in the
Taiwan issue.
We insist that the PRC and Taiwan work out
their differences
peacefully, so as not to disturb the
security of the region and
the people there. At the same
time, our approach is to strictly
avoid interference in the
process whereby the two sides pursue
resolution of
differences.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms
the basis of U.S.
policy regarding the security of Taiwan.
Its premise is that an
adequate defense in Taiwan is conducive
to maintaining peace and
security while differences remain
between Taiwan and the PRC.
Section 2 (b) states:
"It
is the policy of the United States...to consider any effort
to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the
peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave
concern to the
United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of
a defensive
character; and to maintain the capacity of the
United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the
people on Taiwan."
Section 3
of the TRA also provides that the "United States will
make
available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services
in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan
to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."
It further
stipulates that:
"The President is directed to inform the
Congress promptly of any
threat to the security or the social
or economic system of the
people on Taiwan and any danger to
the interests of the United
States arising therefrom. The
President and the Congress shall
determine, in accordance with
constitutional processes,
appropriate action by the United
States in response to any such
danger."
The key
elements of the United States' policy toward the
Taiwan
question are expressed in the three joint communiques
with the
PRC as follows:
-- The United States
recognizes the Government of the PRC as
"the sole legal
Government of China."
-- The U.S. acknowledges the
Chinese position that "there is but
one China and Taiwan is
part of China." In 1982, the U.S.
assured the PRC that it has
no intention of pursuing a policy of
"two Chinas" or "one
China, one Taiwan."
-- Within this context, the people
of the U.S. will maintain
cultural, commercial and other
unofficial relations with the
people of Taiwan.
-- The
U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan
issue
is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the
Chinese
themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that any
resolution
be peaceful.
I reiterate the above passages
from the TRA and the joint
communiques in some detail, since
they express precisely the
governing principles of our policy.
They serve U.S. interests
today just as well as in past
decades.
Let me now call attention to an aspect of the
August 17, 1982,
Joint Communique between the United States
and the People's
Republic of China which is extremely
important to Taiwan's
security. In this document, the PRC
stated that its "fundamental
policy" is "to strive for a
peaceful resolution to the Taiwan
question." Based on that
PRC assurance, the United States
Government made reciprocal
statements concerning our intentions
with respect to arms
sales to Taiwan -- that we did not intend
to increase the
quantity or quality of arms supplied and, in
fact, intended
gradually to reduce these sales. At the time the
Joint
Communique was signed, we made it clear to all
parties
concerned that our intentions were premised on the
PRC's
continued adherence to a policy of striving for
peaceful
reunification with Taiwan. We continually review our
assessment
in light of events, particularly during periods of
heightened
tension. Our judgment is that the PRC has not
changed this
policy, and we have abided by our
commitments.
Taken as a whole, our policy has been
unequivocally successful
in obtaining our fundamental
objective regarding the security of
Taiwan -- peace and
stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan
Relations Act and
the 1982 Communique have been complementary
elements of this
policy. The former has provided the means for
our continued
support for Taiwan's self-defense capability while
the latter
forms the basis for the understanding with the PRC
that any
resolution of the differences between Taiwan and the
mainland
must be achieved through peaceful means. U.S. arms
sales to
Taiwan have been consistent with both the TRA and the
1982
Joint Communique.
Taiwan's weapons systems are not
offensive in character, but
constitute a credible deterrent
to military action. With the
addition of several new
defensive systems purchased or leased
from the U.S. in the
past few years, Taiwan's self-defense
capability will be as
strong as at any time since 1949. Those
systems include
various types of military aircraft, ships, and
air-defense and
anti-ship missiles. In addition, the U.S. has
provided
significant technical support for Taiwan's own
production of
the Indigenous Defense Fighter and
PERRY-class
frigates.
With U.S.-supplied and jointly
developed systems, taken together
with those systems which
Taiwan has produced domestically and
those it is purchasing
from other countries -- notably 60 MIRAGE
fighter aircraft and
six LAFAYETTE-class frigates from France --
Taiwan has a
formidable capacity to defend itself. Although
there may be
other defensive systems which Taiwan will seek to
obtain for
its self-defense, the basic inventory of equipment
which
Taiwan has or will have in its possession will, in our
view,
be sufficient to deter any major military action
against
Taiwan.
While our arms sales policy aims to
enhance the self-defense
capability of Taiwan, it also seeks
to reinforce stability in the
region. We will not provide
Taiwan with capabilities that might
provoke an arms race with
the PRC or other countries in the
region. Moreover, our
policy must be applied with a long-term
perspective. Any
transfer of a complicated modern weapon system
generally
requires years of lead time before the capability is
fully in
place. Each new system, moreover, demands a U.S.
commitment
for continuing logistical and technical support in
order to
remain effective. Decisions on the release of arms
made
without proper consideration of the long-term impact both
on the
situation in the Taiwan Strait and on the region as a
whole would
be dangerous and irresponsible.
The
Stakes
If armed conflict were actually to break out in the
Taiwan
Strait, the impact on Taiwan, the PRC and, indeed, the
region
would be extremely serious. The peaceful, stable
environment
that has prevailed in the Taiwan Strait since the
establishment
of our current China policy in 1979 has promoted
progress and
prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
The benefits to
Taiwan and the PRC have been obvious. The
shift from the earlier
belligerent climate in the Strait to
a peaceful and stable one
has permitted the realization of
Taiwan's economic miracle and
has had a direct impact on
Taiwan's positive political
transformation. Taiwan is now a
world-class economic power, and
the March presidential
elections will cap Taiwan's transition
to
democracy.
The PRC has enjoyed a positive
relationship with the United
States and other Western
countries that has allowed it to carry
out the program of
reform and opening to the outside world that
has propelled
China toward becoming an economic power. Taiwan
capital --
over $20 billion -- has fueled a significant part of
China's
economic progress, large numbers of Taiwan residents
have
visited China, and the mainland has become one of
Taiwan's
largest export markets. All of these achievements
would be
immediately put at risk in the event of conflict in
the Strait.
Conflict would also be costly to the United
States and to our
friends and allies in the region. Taiwan
is an important
economic actor throughout East Asia. It is
located along one of
the main sea lanes in the western
Pacific. Any confrontation
between the PRC and Taiwan,
however limited in scale or scope,
would destabilize the
military balance in East Asia and constrict
the commerce and
shipping which is the economic life-blood of the
region. It
would force other countries in the region to
re-evaluate their
own defense policies, possibly fueling an arms
race with
unforeseeable consequences. It would seriously affect
the
tens of thousands of Americans who live and work in Taiwan
and
the PRC. Relations between the U.S. and the PRC would
suffer
damage regardless of the specific reaction chosen by
the
President in consultation with Congress. For all these
reasons,
we are firmly determined to maintain the balanced
policy which
is best designed to avoid conflict in the
area.
What would the U.S. do if commitments to peaceful
settlement
appeared to weaken; if hostilities appeared more
likely? In this
unfortunate circumstance, which neither side
seeks, the
Administration would immediately meet its
obligations under the
TRA to consult with the Congress on an
appropriate response.
Circumstances leading to this situation
would be important in
determining our response -- what caused
the breakdown? Both
sides have a responsibility to act in
ways that promote stability
and avoid needless provocation.
But I hardly need remind this
committee that the people of the
United States feel strongly
about the ability of the people
of Taiwan to determine their
future peacefully. This
sentiment must not be underestimated.
The
Challenge
Our policy must be consistent, and must be
carefully designed to
encourage both sides to find a peaceful
and durable solution.
As always, our own national interest
must be the guiding
principle to our policy.
In this
regard, we will continue to make clear to the PRC
through
diplomatic and other channels that any attempt to
resolve the
Taiwan question through other than peaceful means
would seriously
affect the interests of the United States.
This position
comprises a fundamental premise that underlies
our policy: that
the PRC will pursue a peaceful settlement.
Over the past months,
and indeed recent days, we have made
clear in our diplomatic
dialogue with Beijing our deep concern
over exercises and the
dangers of escalation. We also have
used and will continue to
use our military-to-military
relationship with the PRC to
communicate these concerns
directly to PLA leaders.
We must, though, avoid
unwarranted actions that could further add
to tensions. We
should maintain our present prudent and
effective policy of
arms sales, within the framework of the TRA
and in conformity
to the 1982 Joint Communique. We have an
enormous stake in
preserving stability in Asia and maintaining
a productive
relationship with the PRC. We will continue to
engage the
Chinese Government on issues of mutual interest and
encourage
the PRC's positive participation in the
international
community. We seek engagement, not
confrontation. We expect the
Taiwan authorities as well to
avoid any actions which could
potentially put at risk the
interests of all parties concerned.
Taiwan and the PRC
must eventually find some sort of common
ground, if they are
to continue to enjoy the peace and prosperity
that exists in
the Strait area today. Both sides need to avoid
provocative
political or military actions that have the potential
to
destabilize the situation. They must together actively
seek
ways to address their differences peacefully. This is
the only
long-term guarantee of Taiwan's security. It is also
the only
long-term guarantee of peace and stability in East
Asia. Only
through the resumption of positive dialogue
directly between
Beijing and Taipei can the route to a
peaceful and lasting
settlement be found. We understand that
the Taiwan authorities
are prepared to resume cross-Strait
talks. The PRC has also
indicated their willingness to expand
ties with Taiwan in a
number of areas as long as the Taiwan
authorities continue to
embrace the principle of "one China."
We hope the two sides will
agree as soon as possible to take
up again the dialogue that was
suspended last June.
Mr.
Chairman, several Administrations of both political
parties
have followed a consistent policy on the subject of
today's
timely hearing. It is a policy that has served the
interests of
the United States, the PRC, Taiwan, and regional
security and
prosperity. We intend to pursue this course as
outlined in this
statement. We call on Beijing and Taipei to
exercise restraint
and resume dialogue looking toward a
peaceful resolution of the
issues between them. And we urge
bipartisan support in the
Congress and Administration that
will send a steady signal of
American purposes and resolve.
We will work closely with you
towards this goal.
Thank
you.
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