JUDITH S. YAPHE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
THE ARAB STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF: CHALLENGES TO INTERNAL STABILITY, REGIONAL
SECURITY, AND U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS DATED 18 SEPTEMBER 1996 SUBMITTED
WEDNESDAY,
SEPTEMBER 25, 1996
In the two and one/half decades since the oil boom of the 1970s, the
Arab states of the Persian Gulf have enjoyed an unprecedented period
of political stability and economic security -- all this despite the
8-year long IraqIran war, the downfall of the Shah and subsequent
efforts by the Islamic republic to export its revolution across the
Gulf, and Saddam Husayn's invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990.
Saddam's advenfurism and Iranian pressures woke the states from a long
period of political and diplomatic torpor. Since August 1990, the six
states which comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council -- Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman -- have
been increasingly and directly confronted with a dynamic and dangerous
political environment which challenges many of their conventional
judgments about regional and internal stability. In my testimony, I
would like to identify some of the more serious challenges to regime
legitimacy and venture an assessment of the likely impact on regional stability, especially as might affect U.S. interests.
I would first note several "truths":
- Not all the Gulf slates were created equal. Some are resource-rich (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi) and others (Bahrain, Oman, some of smaller states of the UAE, and Yemen, which is not a member of the GCC) are comparatively resource-poor, dependent on "the kindness of strangers."
- Not all "citizens" ore created equal The Gulf states still restrict citizenship to reflect national and tribal origins and, except for Iraq, restrict political participation to Arab males. The "native" element of the population of several of the Gulf states is a minority. The majority of the population in several of the GCC states is still expatriate labor, although the composition of the labor force has shifted away from its predominantly Palestinian and Yemeni composition before Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.
- The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent feints/threats on Saudi Arabia and the UAE are helping to precipitate and shape the changes now confronting the GCC states. But neither Baghdad nor Tehran is totally or simply responsible for the challenges which confront regime authority or the changes which are coming in the Gulf states.
The Gulf states do not always cooperate with each other: Despite the common external political, economic, and military threats to their security and well-being, they are nearly as wary of each other as they are of Iraqi and Iranian intentions. The GCC was created in 1980 as a way to counter the Iran-Iraq war and to move towards economic union. While some progress has been made on economic cooperation and in resolving disputed borders, the states are divided by suspicion, greed for resources, and disagreement over how best to accommodate rising demands for infernal reform. They have broken ranks over reestablishing relations with Iran and Iraq and how and when to normalize relations with Israel.
What then are the key challenges to regime legitimacy and regional stability. Let me suggest a few. I will focus on succession/transition of power crises, economic stresses and demographic pressures, and the rise of Islamic radicalism as the primary--indeed only--voice of political protest. By the term radical or politicized Islam I mean the use of religion by Muslims as vocabulary and ideology to frame an agenda for political action, both non-violent and violent. Finally, I will speculate on what the Gulf regimes reaction -- or lack of reaction -- to the current Iraq crisis may portend for US strategic interests in the region.
Background
The governments of the Arab Persian Gulf states have shown a remarkable stability and resiliency over the past twenty-five years.
Several rulers have been in power since the 1960s or earlier -- Saddam Husayn has wielded power since the 1968 revolution and the rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE have ruled for more than two decades each. Except for Iraq, succession in the Gulf has been settled peacefully by family consensus. The exceptions are Iraq and Yemen, where military and party coups have determined change; there were also bloodless power transfers in Ornan in 1970 when the father of Sultan Qaboos was deposed and in Qatar in 1995 when the Amir was replaced by his son following a family spat.
This sense of political stability was strengthened by relatively stable economies in most countries. The oil markets were firm, prices and productionwere held within limits set by OPEC and OAPEC (with cheating a regular occurrence). In the smaller Gulf states, numerous disputes arose over contested borders and oil fields, most notably the ongoing dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the Hawar Islands and many disagreements between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. None of these events toppled governments.
Looming succession crises
In most Middle Eastern countries the issue is not so much who will succeed -- this has been determined by family consensus or long- established tribal traditions. Succession in the Gulf states passes within the family, either from father to son or to the next eldest male relative. Rather, the issue is how successful will the successor be in maintaining stability and the delicate balance of family, sectarian, and military-civilian interests. King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait's Amir Jabir aI-Ahmad, Bahrain's Amir Isa, and UAE head Shaykh Zayid are all aging, and some are in ill health. Designated successors exist in all but Oman. Some do not share the older generation's relative tolerance for sectarian differences or abilities to smooth over religious and ethnic tensions. A successor unpopular with large segments of the population could encourage opposition to the regime.
- In Bahrain, the ruling AI Khalifah family comes from the minority Sunni sect -- Shias comprise approximately 70 percent of-the population--and Amir Isa's son and designated successor, Crown Prince Hamad, is popularly perceived to be weak and unpopular. Hamad is viewed with suspicion by many Shias who see him as anti-reform and anti-Shia.
- In Kuwait, the succession rotates between the two main branches of the family. The Crown Prince and his cousin, who is the longest-serving Foreign Minister in the world, have long squabbled over the succession, power, and leadership issues.
- Succession in Saudi Arabia will pass from King Fahd to his half-brother Abdallah and then to other half-brothers, all sons of Ibn Saud. But Abdallah is in his early 70s, the same age as the King, and the likelihood that he will succeed, or if he does, rule a long time, is doubtful.
- I feel I must interject a contrast between these royal bloodlines and the Republican shaykhs. of the Persian Gulf. By contrast with the princely states of the GCC, military and party coups have determined succession in Iraq and Yemen.
To consolidate their rule, these leaders cloak themselves in traditional and tribal forms of legitimacy--as nationalist figures, symbols of their country's religious and historic past, patrons of secular and Islamic fundamentalist causes, and defenders of the beleaguered masses, especially the Palestinians. Saddam Husayn, for example, portrays himself as a republican shaykh, an "elected" president (he "won" 99.6 percent of the 1995 "election"), a traditional tribal leader, a descendant of the Prophet, an army general, and in 1990, after the occupation of Kuwait, as hero of the Palestinian and Islamic causes. He dispenses largesse in the same style as the amirs and princes of the Gulf, distributing guns, money, and cars to those tribal leaders vowing fealty-and instant justice for those denying it. Saddam's regime is rooted in the 20 percent of Iraq that is Arab and Sunni. He probably would like to pass on control of Iraq to one of his sons, but when Saddam goes -- whether by assassin, coup, or natural causes -- they are unlikely to succeed him.
Economic Uncertainties
From the 1970s through 1985 the Gulf region outperformed all other world regions in income growth per capita, equality of income distribution, improvements in life expectancy, primary school attendance, and literacy rates. These successes reflected high oil prices, small populations, and a less competitive world market. Many states could provide generous safety nets for their citizens-- including free education, health care, and consumer subsidies (food, electricity, housing).
The region has been in economic decline for the past decade. Reasons for the decline include the collapse in world oil prices in 1986, the fall in productivity caused by huge investments in state-owned enterprises, workers with skills no longer relevant to the job market, job seekers lacking the education and technical skills for employment, and increased international competition. In the Gulf, producers and consumers are now being asked for the first time to pay for services they have always received for free. Token user fees are now applied to electricity, education, water, telephone, and health care, and in Saudi Arabia gasoline prices have been raised. The problem is compounded by governments postponing or refusing to implement political or economic reforms because of corruption and fear of taking on entrenched interest groups. Companies that benefit from protectionist policies and cheap credit, a middle class accustomed to
subsidies and well-paying public sector jobs are reluctant to see their privileges erode. The result is static economic growth, low or no productivity, and growing dissatisfaction from groups and individuals frustrated by their seeming loss of power and frightened of changes which could result in a loss of status and lowered standards of living.
The Arab Gulf states -- be they oil-rich or oil-poor and dependent on largesse from their rich Arab brothers -- face unprecedented austerity measures because of overspending, corruption, high birth and lowered death rates, and subsidies most governments can ill afford. Over the next several years, the impact of economic downsizing is likely to have a significant impact on countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, where pursuit of wealth has been the primary preoccupation and the current generation has known only privilege and economic security. The impact will hit even harder in Bahrainand Yemen, which have large populations, burgeoning debt, and little or no resource base. Here, government is no longer able to be the employer and provider of last resort, foreign aid packages are shrinking, and the oil-rich Arab states are reluctant to hire their nationals or subsidize their fragile economies.
The Deal is in the Demographic Details.
Some statistics from the World Bank and other studies:
- there is a profound generation gap. In the Gulf, as in most Middle Eastern countries, political leaders over 60 years of age are governing societies where more than half the population is under age 16.
- Population growth is outpacing economic growth. The population of the GCC states, Iraq, and Yemen is nearly 63 million {21 million Iraqis, 15 million Yemenis, and 27 million in the GCC states). Annual population growth rates range from to 2.58 percent for Bahrain, 2.74 percent for Qatar, 3.68 percent for Saudi Arabia, 3.71 percent for Oman, 3.72 percent for Iraq, 4.02 percent for Yemen, 4.55 percent for the UAE, to 7.46 percent for Kuwait (this includes returning Kuwaitis). These figures can be deceptive: the fertility rates for women in these countries range from 2.93 children born per woman for Kuwait, 3.12 for Bahrain, 4.53 for the UAE, 4.63 for Qatar, 6.16 for Oman, 6.48 for Saudi Arabia, 6.56 percent for Iraq, to 7.15 percent for Yemen.s
- Unemployment is a growing concern. Official unemployment figures range from an official estimate of 6.5 percent in Saudi Arabia, 15 percent in Bahrain, to 30 percent in Yemen. The figures for Kuwait and the UAE are negligible. Figures for Oman, Qatar, and Iraq are not available. Unofficial rates, including for pockets of poverty such as Shia villages in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province which is predominantly Shia, are considerably higher.
- The vast majority of the unemployed are firsttime job seekers. In Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria educated young male workers who have never held a job account for 60 to 80 percent of the unemployed. The profile is probably similar for the Gulf states.
Religion Provides a Solution: Islam is the Answer
For many in the Gulf -- as in the broader Middle East and North Africa region -- confused by the demands of change, uncertain of what the future may bring, and frustrated by defeat, Islamic revivalism is providing both explanation and vindication. Islamic activists demanding reform are becoming increasingly vocal and influential forces in the region. It is not the religion which has suddenly become "radical." it is, rather, a small but growing number of Muslims who have become radicalized, who have a political agenda, and who claim to see in Islam justifications for their actions.
What do the Islamists Want. Changing economic and social conditions in the Gulf over the past five years are increasing the pressures on regimes to reform and enhancing the appeal of radical Islamist parties as the primary vehicle of political change. Islamist-oriented groups, whether permitted to operate oertly in local political institutions and mosques or forced underground, are seen by many as the only alternative -- and the most easily comprehensible -- to the government. Several factors are shaping this view:
- Loss of faith in Arab nationalism as a credible so/ui/on to regional and regime weakness. In its stead, a radical Islamic theology of social protest is gaining popularly. Islamic radicals are able to shape the tone and terms of political discourse with the simplest formula, "Islam is the answer."
- Dashed economic expectations and decline in living standards in societies where the citizens once were cushioned from economic shock waves, such as inflation, taxes, and unemployment. The result in many cases is increased corruption and repression by government officials, their families, and private citizens to maintain their privileged positions.
- The information revolution, as surfing the net enables easy passage of information for dissidents and average citizens about local conditions, organizational activities, requests for money and other forms of assistance, and operational instructions. Regimes no longer have the capability to block out news by simply man/faring the mail, banning books, and confiscating cassettes.
In the Gulf, as in most countries of the Middle East and North Africa region, radicalized Islam has become the primary voice of opposition to the regime. These Islamisfs are becoming more outspoken in demanding governments reform and more insistent that communities conform to Islamic standards of morality and politics. Radicalized Islam has two basic forms: a more mainstream, nonviolent, accommodationist side which opts to work within the political system,
and a more militant, extremist side which believes the system must be destroyed and seeks confrontation with the regime through violence and terror. In Kuwait and Yemen, Islamic activists are frying to work within the political mainstream to shape the institutions of civil society, introduce Islamic law, and man/for government policy. More militant Islam/st radicals who believe terrorism and violence are their only recourse for changing the system tried an abortive coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981, were responsible for bombing U.S., French, and Kuwait/facilities in 1983, attempted to assassinate the Amir of Kuwaitin 1985, and were almost certainly responsible for the bombings in Riyadh in November 1995, in Dhahran (Khobar Towers) in June 1996, and the recurrent unrest in Bahrain. The differences between the mainstream and the militant are primarily tactical, not strategic.
The Five Pillars of Islam: The Radical Version
The Quran sets forth five specific duties that a righteous Muslim must perform. The duties are fast/many, the profession of faith that says "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God", prayer, charily, fasting during the daylight hours of the month of Ramadhan, and pilgrimage, required of every able adult Muslim to Mecca and Medina at least once in a lifetime.
Islamic activists-be they moderate or extremist, Sunni or Shia--have an additional and basic set of principles:
- they seek accountability. The rulers of most Muslim populations must be replaced because they are corrupt and incapable of reform.
- they insist on rule by Islamic law. Their end goal is the establishment of Islamic government and rule by Islamic law (sharia as the basis of all law to best ensure social justice.
- they demand the elimination of foreign influence and interests-- especially U.S.--from the region. They oppose the presence, in particular, of foreign, non-Muslim forces on Arabian soil to protect the heartland of Islam.
- they believe in jihad (holy war). In Arabic, the word implies personal or political struggle to achieve the just society, the Islamic state. For some this can mean only war.
- they oppose the existence of the State of Israel. They say Jews cannot rule over the Islamic ummah (community) or waqf (territory or wealth held in trust for the community). They view the Oslo accords as a sell-out of Muslims' rights to Jerusalem and its holy places, which, they argue, no one--Muslim or Palestinian--is empowered to do.
Many Islamists advocate the use of Western-style democracy to come to power, but they deny it is a suitable system to rule "'believers." Academic !specialists are divided on the willingness of Islamic activists to rule i"democratically" once elected. Would Islamists allow elections that would !result in their defeat? Some scholars argue a politics of inclusion, which states that Islamists once
elected will act like politicians in general and seek accommodation to make political gains. The activists themselves arei ambiguous on the issue of democracy. They tend to talk only about the :legitimate transfer of power by democratic means to their cause, especially to Western audiences. They do not talk about subsequent transfer to non- Islamic groups. They agree with radical Islam/st leaders such as Hasan aI-Turabi, head of Sudan's National Islamic Front, and Husayn Nasrallah, a Shia cleric prominent in Lebanon's Hizballah, that democracy is man-made and therefore flawed, a !means to the end of true Islamic government.
Trends. Some disturbing trends in the spread of Islamic radicalism are becoming increasingly evident in the Gulf:
- The appeal of/he Is/am/sis/s spreading horizontally and vertically, crossing class, ethnic, and sectarian lines. Broader segments of the population -- secular and religious, Sunni and Shia, Western-educated technocrats and locally trained clerics -- are attracted because of stagnant or declining economic conditions, the activists' ability to fund a wide range of religious and social welfare programs, and the fundamental simplicity of the message. In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Sunni militants have made common cause with Shia radicals to demand political reform, regime accountability, and an end to economic discrimination. This is especially true in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, where most Saudi Shia live, and Bahrain, where unemployment rates for the Shia are double those of the Sunni communities and discrimination has long been a fact of life. Half the signers of the petitions which began the challenges to the Saudi and Bahraini governments in the early 1990s were Islamic clerics and radicals, but the other half were moderate liberals, many technocrats educated in the West.
- Most groups are and will continue to be locally based, locally led, and self-sustaining, They depend, for the most part, on tithes from the local community and donations from wealthy rulers and expatriates living abroad. The exception are the self-styled Hizballah organizations, which exist in several of the Gulf states and receive encouragement from Tehran. Their activities are centered in mosques in small, rural towns and among the mosques and religious centers in the poorer neighborhoods of cities such as Manama. In Saudi Arabia, Islamist activity is centered as well in the religious universities.
Their agendas are centered on domestic political issues-- political reform and gaining power, implementation of Islamic law, ensuring new laws conform with Islam, and gaining influence over decisions affecting the economy and education. Their focus on domestic issues means foreign influence will probably be limited to provision of financial assistance -- the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood giving seed money to new Brotherhood-type groups, for example.
- Islamist leaders and groups ore expanding/heir contacts with like- minded gro ups outside/heir countries. This networking helps them acquire training, Iogistic and financial assistance, brooder community
supped, and enhances their operational capabilities. In my view, the assistance from outsiders - be it the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or Iron -- is not likely to effect internal timeclocks or political agendas.
Nor is this networking is likely to produce a monolithic Islamic movement -- no green version of Comintern.
Most regimes tend to blame foreign influence more than domestic problems for the rise of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. Omen blames outsiders for the presence of a Muslim Brotherhood cell uncovered in 1994; it was allegedly plotting rebellion end those arrested included mid-level military and government officials. Saudi Arabia end Bahrein hold Iron responsible for local unrest and urban violence. The charges do not entirely hold up to close scrutiny. Iron does encourage end offer support to Gulf opposition movements but its ability to stir up local action may be overestimated.
Tension between radical Islamists and the state is likely to increase as local economic conditions deteriorate end governments respond with greeter repression. According to the World Bank, the only bright spots where economic reforms begun several years are bearing fruit are Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco -- all of which have managed to marginalize their Islamist opponents so far.
Iron and Sudan, the only states headed by radical Islamic regimes, will continue to provide support to radicalized Islamists in the Gulf, some of whom will use terrorism to achieve their ends. Tehran and Khartoum will support Islamic causes because they believe it is their duty and a relatively cheap way to expand national influence and promote their anti-Western brand of Islam.
Even if the region's radical Islamists ccept peace with Israel, they will nci accede to any resolution which leaves the city of Jerusalem in Israeli hands. Some Arab Muslim governments - such as Saudi Arabia - have already said they cannot accept a final settlement without Jerusalem, while Islamic radicals could use their governments' failure to defend Islamic interests on Jerusalem to challenge the domestic credibility, legitimacy, and popularity of those regimes. The Islamists would accuse the regimes of following a U.S. dictat rather than serving Islamic interests, language intended to rouse popular passions against the rulers.Over the next few years, radical Islamist groups could face growing internal strains caused by leadership rivalries, disagreements over tactics to pursue in challenging or cooperating with the regime, reliance on foreign supporters, and how to respond to the prospect of an end to state-sponsored opposition to Israel. If Algeria is an example, leaders of Islamist factions from their jails or exile could have little control or influence over the militant elements fighting the civil war at home or over tame Islamists with whom the regime is willing to hold talks. Factions within mainstream groups could grow increasingly frustrated over the slow pace of reform or the lack of progress after years of politically correct behavior. The disagreements could also be more cosmetic than real, intended to dived attention away from clandestine operations.
Flashpoints. While this may seem a risky judgment, I do not think that any government in the Gulf is likely to be overthrown by radicalized Islamists within the next several years, but Bahrain and Saudi Arabia face an increasing risk of violence and all face demands for political reform from increasingly outspoken, radical Islamist factions.
Following are some Gulf case studies:
I. Bahrain as Regional Bellwether. A small, resource-poor country, Bahrain lives primarily on declining revenues from an oil refinery, Saudi largesse, and service industries. Poor by Gulf standards, Bahrain has an economy many countries would envy. Per capita GDP is approximately $] 4,500 a year, the GNP is $4.1 billion, and average life expectancy is about 70 years. The official unemployment rate is 15 percent, but the rate probably approaches 30 percent in Shia villages. Bahrain's Shias generally hold lower paying jobs and are the last-hired, first-fired. The annual growth rate is 2.8 percent, low for the region, but the rate is higher among Shia families than Sunnis, and new job creation cannot keep pace with new job seekers entering the market for the first time. Approximately 30 percent of the population is under 14 years of age.
Bahrain's woes are those of the region in microcosm. An ailing but tolerant ruler, Amir Isa has enjoyed widespread support from the Sunni and Shia communities in the 35 years he has ruled. Isa governs in consultation with family members, particularly his brother who is Prime Minister and his son and designated successor, Crown Prince Hamad, and a small Cabinet which has Sunni and Shia representation. Political parties are prohibited, and Islamic law is a source rather than the source of law. Bahrain permits the consumption of alcohol, a relaxed style of Western dress not tolerated in neighboring Saudi Arabia, and allows Christian, Jewish, Sikh, Hindu, and Bahai communities to openly practice their religion.
Manama is under increasing pressure from radical Islamists seeking an end to years of economic and political discrimination. The Islamists come mostly from the tiny country's Shia community, nearly 70 percent of the population. Joined by Sunni activists, these Islamists demand jobs, government accountability, and a return to the shod-lived national assembly--convened in1973 and closed two years later because of its allegedly disruptive behavior and Saudi pressure. One anti- regime Islamist faction--the Bahrain Freedom Movement--claims loyalty to the Amir but wants reforms and the opportunity to work within the system; another faction--the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain--was responsible for an aborted coup attempt in 1981 and is depicted by observers as more militant and revolutionary, its leaders in exile in Iran or London.
The "troubles" began after the end of the Gulf war. In 1992, 300 prominent Bahrainis, including Sunni and Shia clerics, signed a petition calling for the restoration of the constitution and parliamentary rule. The government responded by creating a new appointive, consultative council of 30 members, half Sunni and half Shia. A second petition two years later called for political reform and the return of political exiles. It, too, was signed by Sunni, Shia, and secularist leaders. Since 1994, there has been recurrent unrest, including street demonstrations, bombings of luxury hotels used by foreigners, and arson fires. In January 1996, Manama arrested a prominent Shia cleric and several hundred supporters for allegedly plotting to destabilize the regime.
Manama's reaction to its troubles has been to blame Iran and to arrest, deport, imprison, and, in one case, execute an oppositionist for killing a policeman. These activities only serve to arouse more anger and anti-regime demonstrations. This month, Manama announced it was expanding its consultative council from 30 to 40 members, a move unlikely to have any impact on the unrest. Isa's death and Hamad's succession could fuel renewed unrest among Bahrain's activists.
2. Differing Circumstances in the Other GCC Stales. In Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE Islamic activists are able to push their agendas within the bounds of the political system. Islamist clerics -- most of whom are not natives -- are allowed to preach and raise funds with the understanding that they will be deported if they misbehave by criticizing the government or supporting opposition activities or terrorism. Gulf rulers hope that by providing safehaven to radical Islamists, they will burnish their Islamist credentials at home and avoid acts of violence.
- In Kuwait, Islamists serve in the National Assembly and openly challenge the government on political issues. For example, for the first time Kuwaitis have been openly questioning government officials in parliament about the ruling AI Sabah family's failure to defend the country against Iraq, its expenditures of funds from the special Reserve Fund for Future Generations, and alleged corruption of Cabinet ministers. Kuwait will hold elections for the Assembly on October 7, the second since it was reopened following the Gulf war.By contrast, Saudi Arabia and Oman, like Bahrain, view virtually all Islamic radicals as a threat to be outlawed and contained, by force if necessary. The specter of recent violence reminds us and them of the potential of the militants to challenge their legitimacy, destabliize the regime, and disrupt U.S.-regime ties:
- The November 1995 bombing at SANG headquarters in Riyadh in which five Americans died and the June 1996 bombing at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran where 19 Americans were killed. Three groups claimed responsibility for the first attack and after the second one, dissidents including the London-based Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights warned that the attacks would continue "until the departure of the last American soldier" from Saudi Arabia.
- Recurrent unrest in Bahrain could place U.,9. personnel and facilities at similar risk. The attacks have included street demonstrations, bombings, and arson fires at hotels, restaurants, and other facilities frequented by foreigners. The U.S. Navy (NAVCENT) has extensive facilities in Bahrain, with 500-600 military and civilian personnel on shore.
Omani and UAE authorities have uncovered clandestine Muslim Brotherhood cells which were allegedly plotting revolution. Muscat, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai allow the United States military access to facilities, prepositioning of equipment, and provide local support.
U.S. Regional Interests and Strategies
The regimes in the Persian Gulf are "troubled" by succession/transition-ofpower crises, economic shortfalls resulting from flat revenues, burgeoning populations, and overspending, and they are facing perhaps their most serious challenge yet from radicalized Muslims who are demanding political reform, greater economic justice, and shelter from change. Most of the regimes are not yet at imminent risk, however, of overthrow or of having to concede or share power with new parties or interest groups. Similarly, U.S. interests in the region are probably stable in the short term. Government disagreements with the United States over the threat posed by Iran and Iraq and strategies for coping with their Islamist and other critics could present problems for U.S. policies in the longer term, however, if the region's pro-U.S. ruling families lose their gdp on power, economic conditions worsen, and opposition elements become better organized.
I. The Changing Face of the Security Threat. The Gulf states' sense of "threat" is changing as the image of the Gulf war recedes and the U.S. presence grows increasingly visible. Iraq, weakened by war and sanctions, is not seen as a significant threat in the short term. Iran is seen as a threat but one that is probably containable through negotiation, pressure from powerful friends, andfinancial blandishments. Except for Kuwait, the growing popular perception appears to see the absence of a clear and present danger and wonders. "Do we really need the U.S. forces here and must we pay for it?" Regime leaders tend to see the greatest threat to their security as an internal one spiked by Islamic radicals and their foreign backers. They may see the U.S. mission in the region as helping to protect them from their internal threat or even each other. Qatar and Bahrain have both sought U.S. backing in their rival claims for the Hawar Islands and may hope their support for U.S. military presence gains them even tacit approval.
2. Coping Strategies Conflict with U.S. Policies Regimes in the Middle East and North Africa are applying a wide range of strategies aimed at containing and eliminating the challenge or threat from Islamist movements. These strategies include:
- Downplaying secularism and promoting Islam. Most governments are trying to rival the Islamists' humanitarian activities by
sponsoring Islamic causes, such as Bosnia, and building and/or patronizing local religious institutions. The legitimacy of the AI Saud family rests on their claim to be Protectors of the Two Holy Mosques. All the Gulf rulers contribute lavishly to Islamic causes and perform the pilgrimage and other duties of a good Muslim prince and believer. Saddam Husayn lavishly refurbished the Shia Muslim shrines in Karbala his forces destroyed in suppressing the rebellion of 1991. Few radical Islamists are won over by these appearances of piety, but there is no real impact on U.S. policy either.
Monitoring the militants and repressing the opposition.
The governments in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and, to lesser extent, Oman, apply draconian tactics in dealing with potential and real Islamist opponents. Those suspected of membership in or having sympathies for Islamist movements -- be they moderate or militant -- are watched closely, isolated from society by denial of jobs and housing, arrested, interrogated, tried in military courts rather than civilian ones, condemned to exile, prison, or death. Police shoot-outs with "terrorists" often do not discriminate between the presumed innocent and guilty. Violations of human rights and civil liberties are common, and U.S. protests are viewed by most governments as interference in their internal affairs.
Limiting access to the political process. Only Kuwait and Iraq have elected parliaments. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE have consultative councils whose members-mostly tribal and community leaders known for their loyalty--are all appointed by the ruler. There is a dilemma here for the U.S. The regimes see their actions--no electoral assembly, no human rights protections, few civil liberties-- as internal matters and assume they will have U.S. support because of shared strategic interests and treaty commitments. Islamists, on the other hand, regard the U.S. government as hypocritical in not supporting their quest for traditional, basic American values of democracy, equality, and the application of constitutional safeguards. The United States asserts its right to meet with whomever it pleases but shies away from contacts with dissidents which might seriously disrupt relations with regimes that support U.S. policies.
- Coopting critics by assuming their issues. This is perhaps the area of greatest risk for U.S. policy. Most radicalized Islamists demand the elimination of U.S. influence and presence from the regime. The demand s loudest in the case of Saudi Arabia, where opponents of the AI Saud criticize them for allowing foreign, non-Muslim forces on Arabian soil to protect the Muslims' heartland. Most regimes will look for assurances of U.S. protection and presence as they perceive a growing threat against their rule from domestic forces, but they may also separate themselves publicly from U.S. policy initiatives. They could refuse requests for expanded propositioning of military equipment and billeting of personnel, and deny greater access to military facilities or move U.S. forces to isolated areas to render them invisible. If is unlikely that they would refuse to participate in joint training exercises, but they are likely to become
increasingly reluctant on burdensharing, i.e. paying the costs of U.S. deployment in the region. Prior to the Likud victory in Israel, they were waffling on normalizing relations with Israel -- maybe recognition but no diplomatic relations, no official end to the boycott, and except for Oman and Qatar, no trade. This summer, Gulf leaders joined in summit meetings with other Arab states to discuss a common strategy for dealing with Israeli Prime Minister Nefanyahu's apparent rejection of the land-for- peace formula which was the basis of the peace negotiations. They could stop backing sanctions for Iraq; they never supported the embargo on Iran. Dual containment, which has never been a popular policy in the Gulf, is now openly criticized in some Arab media as "U.S. policy, not ours."
Outlook
The next decade is likely to be a critical period for the Persian Gulf states. Some governments will confront troubling problems of succession, most will have static economies tied to a flat oil market, and all have burgeoning populations which will threaten to eliminate the modest economic gains. The issue for the next decade will be change, for the most part, and how to manage it. The disgrunflement and dissatisfaction of many in the Gulf, and in the wider Middle East, is already being expressed in a common form -- the language of Islamic radicalism. Radicalized Islam--either in its moderate accommodationist form or in its more extreme, militant version will continue to be the primary voice of political opposition in the region. I have described two countries at present risk of widening confrontations with oppositionists using the politics of radicalizedIslam to justify their anti-government activities -- Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. All the countries in the region are and will be dealing with Islamist politics over the next decade.
Some observations/recommendations of U.S, Policy
Several policy options suggest themselves, ranging from the kind of containment applied to the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War through the selective engagement/communism-is-not-a-monolith approach of the latter years of the Cold War. I realize the risk in offering some of these judgments following on the heels of the most recent actions by Saddam, but here goes. Some observations/recommendations are:
- The United Stales can try to reduce the risk to its presence by improving communications with host governments, ernphasizing the temporory nature of troop deployments, limiting demands for on increased presence size and the purchase of U.S. arms packages, and recognizing the burden of burdensharing. High-visibility joint exercises and the appearance of a U.S. presence are important for deterrence, but a lower profile overall may be the key to maintaining presence and lessening local hostility. Demands for more military access and exercises, civilian commercial contracts, and complicated negotiations with host governments can overwhelm regimes and stir up local protest. The demands also raise questions among domestic
opponents about the regime's ability to provide for the well-being of the country. Reliance on current levels of prepositioned equipment, rapid deployment and drawdown, and simulation exercises could help maintain a U.S. presence.
- Do not expect the Gulf stales to support all LI.S. requests for policy or financial support. Islamic radicals and other regime critics could capitalize on local grumbling about the need ands cost for a U.S. military presence. A growing number in the region, including some in ruling, scholarly, and business circles, doubt the need for an expanded U.S. presence and question U.S. policy on Iraq and Iron. Many seem to be forgetting Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the reasons for the U.S, build-up in the region, A number of Gulf Arabs, for example, wonder aloud whether the October 1994 and August 1995 claims that Iraq was massing troops on Kuwait's border for an attack was a U.S. play to get the Gulf states to pay for maneuvers and new equipment. The Gulf Arabs were notably quiet on the unilateral decision by the United States to punish Saddam for what they saw as an internal matter involving defending the territorial integrity of Iraq.
- The GCC states will pursue their own interests regarding regional foreign policy and arms purchases. They will revert to pre- 1990 styles of conducting foreign and defense policy -- negotiation, pressure frompowerful friends, and financial blandishments rather than confrontation owhich may not necessarily comply with U. S. policy. They favor improved relations with Iran to mollify a potentially dangerous neighbor and will probably at some point want to restore a semblance of normal relations with Iraq. In their view, Saddam has been able to withstand 6 years of war and sanctions and is likely to remain in power. Relations with Baghdad will be seen as key to restoring a semblance of the traditional balance of power in the Gulf. Arms purchases are viewed as an extension of foreign policy and intended to buy support and influence with a number of suppliers and governments. Interoperability is not an argument the Gulf states accept. Rather, they are concerned that if all purchases are made from one source, including the United States, then there is a risk of not obtaining the latest equipment and of having requests turned down, something which smacks of paternalism and infringes on their sovereignty.
- the U.S. military will continue to be welcomed by host governments, but the degree of cooperation could depend increasingly on regime perceptions that Islamists' criticism of its U.S. ties weakens legitimacy. A unilateral drawdown by the U.S. in the face of terrorist attacks or Islamists criticism would raise the anxieties of host governments that the United States is not willing to live up to its security commitments. It would also encourage Islamic militants that the United States was backing down in the face of a threat.
- the United State should tailor policy to local conditions and with an eye to what can be realistically attained in each country. Islamic radicalism is not a monolith. A one-size-fits-all strategy will not
work where societies and movements are so diverse and Islamists are pursuing different localized strategies. A policy which identifies "good" and "bad" Muslims would be dangerous for the Muslims and counterproductive for us.
- the United States should encourage friendly governments to broaden access to the political process, even if that opening is one of inches and not miles. Many Gulf scholars and government experts believe the traditional relationship between rulers and ruled is fragmenting, especially in the countries still ruled by more traditional, tribal- oriented, ruling families. Islamic radicals accuse the United States of shoring up corrupt rulers rather than supporting democratic reform. Public opinion is in danger of becoming increasingly influenced by Islamist politics -- more polarized, less flexible in tolerating rival "isms." The point would be not to encourage governments to allow the Islamists "in" but to permit more accountability and transparency in government decisionmaking in order to limit the appeal of a morally rigid, politically radicalized Islamist politics.
- U.S. personnel and their dependents need to be better prepared for the culture shock and the risks of o prolonged stay in the region. Actions that, out of ignorance, are seen as disrespectful of local institutions and customs play into the hands of Islamists eager to criticize the United States.
- U.S. policymakers need to be aware of economic and demographic trends and declining wealth. Radical Islamist demands for change do not occur in a vacuum. They reflect the unease of many Muslim societies with the ability of their regimes to cope with and afford change. Most of the regimes appear unwilling or unable to make the choices needed to adapt to the demands of modernization and their Islamist critics.
NOTES:
* Dr. Yaphe is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Prior to joining INSS, she was a senior analyst on the Middle East for the United States government. She is the author of numerous studies on Iraq, the Gulf states, and the impact of Islamic radicalism on the region. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the position of the National Defense University. the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
1 See The World Factbook 1995, Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.
END
Sep 26, 1996 16:08 ET .EOF
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