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104th Congress Rept. 104-18
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 2
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT
_______
February 6, 1995.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Gilman, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted
the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 7]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was
referred titles I, III, V, and VI, and sections 401 and 402 of
the bill (H.R. 7) to revitalize the national security of the
United States, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as
amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``National Security
Revitalization Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Policy.
Sec. 103. Purposes.
TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE
Sec. 201. Policy.
Sec. 202. Actions of the Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 203. Report to Congress.
TITLE III--REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Sec. 301. Establishment.
Sec. 302. Composition.
Sec. 303. Duties.
Sec. 304. Reports.
Sec. 305. Powers.
Sec. 306. Commission procedures.
Sec. 307. Personnel matters.
Sec. 308. Termination of the commission.
Sec. 309. Funding.
TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES
Sec. 401. Limitation on expenditure of Department of Defense funds for
United States forces placed under command or operational control of a
foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations.
Sec. 402. Limitation on placement of United States Armed Forces under
foreign control for a United Nations peacekeeping activity.
TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 501. Credit against assessment for United States expenditures in
support of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 502. Codification of required notice to Congress of proposed
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 503. Notice to Congress regarding United States contributions for
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 504. Revised notice to Congress regarding United States assistance
for United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 505. United States contributions to United Nations peacekeeping
activities.
Sec. 506. Reimbursement to the United States for in-kind contributions
to United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 507. Prohibition on use of funds to pay United States assessed or
voluntary contributions for United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 508. Limitation on use of Department of Defense funds for United
States share of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities.
Sec. 509. Codification of limitation on amount of United States
assessed contributions for United Nations peacekeeping operations.Sec. 510. Buy American requirement.
Sec. 511. United Nations budgetary and management reform.
Sec. 512. Conditions on provision of intelligence to the United
Nations.
TITLE VI--EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Findings.
Sec. 603. United States policy.
Sec. 604. Revisions to program to facilitate transition to NATO
membership.
TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS
Sec. 701. Restoration of budget firewalls for defense spending.
TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Since January 1993, presidential budgets and budget plans
have set forth a reduction in defense spending of
$156,000,000,000 through fiscal year 1999.
(2) The fiscal year 1995 budget is the 10th consecutive year
of reductions in real defense spending and, with the exception
of fiscal year 1948, represents the lowest percentage of gross
domestic product for any defense budget since World War II.
(3) During fiscal year 1995, the number of active duty,
reserve component, and civilian personnel of the Department of
Defense will be reduced by 182,000, a rate of over 15,000 per
month or over 500 per day. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimates that 1,200,000 defense-related private sector jobs
will be lost by 1997.
(4) Despite severe reductions and shortfalls in defense
funding and force structure, since 1993 United States military
forces have been deployed more often and committed to more
peacetime missions per year than ever before. Most of these
missions involve United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian
efforts. At the end of fiscal year 1994, over 70,000 United
States personnel were serving in such regions as Iraq, Bosnia,
Macedonia, the Adriatic Sea, Rwanda, and the Caribbean Sea for
missions involving Haiti and Cuba.
(5) United Nations assessments to the United States for
peacekeeping missions totaled over $1,000,000,000 in 1994. The
United States is assessed 31.7 percent of annual United Nations
costs for peacekeeping. The next highest contributor, Japan,
only pays 12.5 percent of such costs. The Department of Defense
also incurs hundreds of millions of dollars in costs every year
for United States military participation in United Nations
peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, most of which are not
reimbursed by the United Nations. For fiscal year 1994, these
Department of Defense costs totaled over $1,721,000,000.
(6) Credible and effective collective action on international
security concerns, through the United Nations and regional
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
can, in appropriate cases, advance world peace, strengthen the
national security of the United States, and foster more
equitable burden-sharing with friends and allies of the United
States in military, political, and financial terms.
(7) A return to the ``hollow forces'' of the 1970s has
already begun. At the end of fiscal year 1994, one-third of the
units in the Army contingency force and all of the forward-
deployed and follow-on Army divisions were reporting a reduced
state of military readiness. During fiscal year 1994, training
readiness declined for the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific fleets.
Funding shortfalls for that fiscal year resulted in a grounding
of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squadrons and cancellation
and curtailment of Army training exercises. Marine and naval
personnel are not maintaining the standard 12- to 18-month
respite between six-month deployments away from home. Marine
Corps units are spending up to two of their first four years
away from their base camps. The significantly increased pace of
Department of Defense operations has United States forces over
deployed.
(8) As of January 1, 1995, military pay is approximately 12.8
percent below comparable civilian levels. As a result, it is
estimated that close to 17,000 junior enlisted personnel have
to rely on food stamps and the Department of Defense will soon
begin providing supplementary food benefits to an estimated
11,000 military personnel and dependents living overseas.
(9) Defense modernization programs to maintain the
battlefield technology edge of the United States over other
nations are being delayed or canceled in an attempt to prevent
the further erosion of military force readiness.
(10) The centerpiece of the Administration's defense
strategy, the Bottom Up Review, reduces Navy ships by one-
third, Air Force wings by almost one-half, and funding for
missile defenses by over 50 percent, and the General Accounting
Office has reported that even the restrictive Bottom Up Review
could be underfunded by $150,000,000,000.
(11) The Administration has initially agreed to or proposed
treaty limitations, or has unilaterally adopted positions, that
prohibit the United States from testing or deploying effective
missile defense systems.
SEC. 102. POLICY.
The Congress is committed to providing adequate resources to protect
the national security interests of the United States.
SEC. 103. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to establish a commission to reassess United States
military needs and reverse the continuing downward spiral of
defense spending;
(2) to commit the United States to accelerate the development
and deployment of theater and national ballistic missile
defense capabilities;
(3) to restrict deployment of United States forces to
missions that are in the national security interest of the
United States;
(4) to maintain command and control by United States
personnel of United States forces participating in United
Nations peacekeeping operations;
(5) to reduce the cost to the United States of United Nations
peacekeeping activities and to press for reforms in the United
Nations management practices; and
(6) to reemphasize the commitment of the United States to a
strong and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE
SEC. 201. POLICY.
It shall be the policy of the United States to--
(1) deploy at the earliest possible date an antiballistic
missile system that is capable of providing a highly effective
defense of the United States against ballistic missile attacks;
and
(2) provide at the earliest possible date highly effective
theater missile defenses (TMDs) to forward-deployed and
expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States
and to friendly forces and allies of the United States.
SEC. 202. ACTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
(a) ABM Systems.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop for
deployment at the earliest possible date a cost-effective,
operationally effective antiballistic missile system designed to
protect the United States against ballistic missile attacks.
(b) Advanced Theater Missile Defenses.--The Secretary of Defense
shall develop for deployment at the earliest possible date advanced
theater missile defense systems.
SEC. 203. REPORT TO CONGRESS.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a plan for the deployment of an
antiballistic missile system pursuant to section 202(a) and for the
deployment of theater missile defense systems pursuant to section
202(b).
(b) Congressional Defense Committees.--For purposes of this section,
the term ``congressional defense committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on National Security and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
TITLE III--REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION
SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT.
There is hereby established a commission to be known as the
``Revitalization of National Security Commission'' (hereinafter in this
title referred to as the ``Commission'').
SEC. 302. COMPOSITION.
(a) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 members,
appointed as follows:
(1) Four members shall be appointed by the President.
(2) Four members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives in consultation with the minority
leader of the House of Representatives.
(3) Four members shall be appointed by the President pro
tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the majority
leader and the minority leader of the Senate.
(b) Qualifications.--The members of the Commission shall be appointed
from among persons having knowledge and experience in defense and
foreign policy.
(c) Term of Members; Vacancies.--Members of the Commission shall be
appointed for the life of the Commission. A vacancy on the Commission
shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner as
the original appointment was made.
(d) Commencement.--The members of the Commission shall be appointed
not later than 21 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The
Commission shall convene its first meeting to carry out its duties
under this section 14 days after seven members of the Commission have
been appointed.
(e) Chairman.--The chairman of the Commission shall be designated
jointly by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority
leader of the Senate from among members of the Commission appointed
under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3).
SEC. 303. DUTIES.
(a) Comprehensive Review.--The Commission shall conduct a
comprehensive review of the long-term national security needs of the
United States. The review shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the need for a new national security
strategy and, if it is determined that such a new strategy is
needed, identification of such a strategy.
(2) An assessment of the need for a new national military
strategy and, if it is determined that such a new strategy is
needed, identification of such a strategy.
(3) An assessment of the military force structure necessary
to support the new strategies identified under paragraphs (1)
and (2).
(4) An assessment of force modernization requirements
necessary to support the new strategies identified under
paragraphs (1) and (2).
(5) An assessment of military infrastructure requirements
necessary to support the new strategies identified under
paragraphs (1) and (2).
(6) An assessment of the funding needs of the Department of
Defense necessary to support the long-term national security
requirements of the United States.
(7) An assessment of the adequacy of the force structure
recommended in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review in executing the
national military strategy.
(8) An assessment of the adequacy of the current future-years
defense plan in fully funding the Bottom-Up Review force
structure while maintaining adequate force modernization and
military readiness objectives.
(9) An assessment of the level of defense funds expended on
non-defense programs.
(10) An assessment of the costs to the United States of
expanding the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
(b) Matters To Be Considered.--In carrying out the review, the
Commission shall develop specific recommendations to accomplish each of
the following:
(1) Provide members of the Armed Forces with annual pay
raises and other compensation at levels sufficient to begin
closing the gap with comparable civilian pay levels.
(2) Fully fund cost-effective missile defense systems that
are deployable at the earliest possible date following
enactment of this Act.
(3) Maintain adequate funding for military readiness accounts
without sacrificing modernization programs.
(4) Provide a stronger role for Guard and Reserve forces.
(5) Provide a new funding system to avoid diversions from
military readiness accounts to pay for peacekeeping and
humanitarian deployments such as Haiti and Rwanda.
(6) Support security enhancing measures in the Asia-Pacific,
including support for the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (``ASEAN'') Regional Forum, which is a regionwide
security dialogue encompassing the major Asia-Pacific nations.
SEC. 304. REPORTS.
(a) Final Report.--The Commission shall submit to the President and
the designated congressional committees a report on the assessments and
recommendations referred to in section 303 not later than January 1,
1996. The report shall be submitted in unclassified and classified
versions.
(b) Interim Report.--The Commission shall submit to the President and
the designated congressional committees an interim report describing
the Commission's progress in fulfilling its duties under section 303.
The interim report shall include any preliminary recommendations the
Commission may have reached and shall be submitted not later than
October 1, 1995.
(c) Designated Congressional Committees.--For purposes of this
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on National Security, the Committee on
International Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
SEC. 305. POWERS.
(a) Hearings.--The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out
this section, conduct such hearings, sit and act at such times, take
such testimony, and receive such evidence, as the Commission considers
appropriate.
(b) Assistance From Other Agencies.--The Commission may secure
directly from any department or agency of the Federal Government such
information, relevant to its duties under this title, as may be
necessary to carry out such duties. Upon request of the chairman of the
Commission, the head of the department or agency shall, to the extent
permitted by law, furnish such information to the Commission.
(c) Mail.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same
manner and under the same conditions as the departments and agencies of
the Federal Government.
(d) Assistance From Secretary of Defense.--The Secretary of Defense
shall provide to the Commission such reasonable administrative and
support services as the Commission may request.
SEC. 306. COMMISSION PROCEDURES.
(a) Meetings.--The Commission shall meet on a regular basis (as
determined by the chairman) and at the call of the chairman or a
majority of its members.
(b) Quorum.--A majority of the members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.
SEC. 307. PERSONNEL MATTERS.
(a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission shall serve without
compensation, but shall be allowed travel expenses including per diem
in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5,
United States Code, when engaged in the performance of Commission
duties.
(b) Staff.--The Commission shall appoint a staff director, who shall
be paid at a rate not to exceed the maximum rate of basic pay under
section 5376 of title 5, United States Code, and such professional and
clerical personnel as may be reasonable and necessary to enable the
Commission to carry out its duties under this title without regard to
the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments
in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of
chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title, or any other
provision of law, relating to the number, classification, and General
Schedule rates. No employee appointed under this subsection (other than
the staff director) may be compensated at a rate to exceed the maximum
rate applicable to level 15 of the General Schedule.
(c) Detailed Personnel.--Upon request of the chairman of the
Commission, the head of any department or agency of the Federal
Government is authorized to detail, without reimbursement, any
personnel of such department or agency to the Commission to assist the
Commission in carrying out its duties under this section. The detail of
any such personnel may not result in the interruption or loss of civil
service status or privilege of such personnel.
SEC. 308. TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION.
The Commission shall terminate upon submission of the final report
required by section 303.
SEC. 309. FUNDING.
Of the funds available to the Department of Defense, $1,500,000 shall
be made available to the Commission to carry out the provisions of this
title.
TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES
SEC. 401. LIMITATION ON EXPENDITURE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR
UNITED STATES FORCES PLACED UNDER COMMAND OR
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL ACTING ON
BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) In General.--(1) Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after section 404 the following new section:
``Sec. 405. Placement of United States forces under command or
operational control of foreign nationals acting on
behalf of the United Nations: limitation
``(a) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c),
funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of
Defense may not be obligated or expended for activities of any element
of the armed forces that after the date of the enactment of this
section is placed under the command or operational control of a foreign
national acting on behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of
international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar
activity that is authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
``(2) For purposes of this section, elements of the armed forces
shall not be considered to be placed under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations in
any case in which the senior military commander of the United Nations
force or operation is a United States military officer who has the
authority to dismiss subordinates in the command chain, establish
appropriate rules of engagement for United States forces involved, and
establish criteria governing the operational employment of such United
States forces.
``(b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection (a)
shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of
the armed forces under such command or operational control if the
President, not less than 15 days before the date on which such command
or operational control is to become effective (or as provided in
paragraph (2)), meets the requirements of subsection (d).
``(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency exists
that precludes the President from meeting the requirements of
subsection (d) 15 days before placing any element of the armed forces
under such command or operational control, the President may place such
forces under such command or operational control and meet the
requirements of subsection (d) in a timely manner, but in no event
later than 48 hours after such command or operational control becomes
effective.
``(c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a) shall not
apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of the armed
forces under such command or operational control if the Congress
specifically authorizes by law that particular placement of United
States forces under such command or operational control.
``(d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred to in
subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to Congress the
following:
``(1) Certification by the President that--
``(A) such a command or operational control
arrangement is necessary to protect national security
interests of the United States;
``(B) the commander of any unit of the armed forces
proposed for placement under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting directly on behalf
of the United Nations will at all times retain the
right--
``(i) to report independently to superior
United States military authorities; and
``(ii) to decline to comply with orders
judged by the commander to be illegal,
militarily imprudent, or beyond the mandate of
the mission to which the United States agreed
with the United Nations, until such time as
that commander receives direction from superior
United States military authorities with respect
to the orders that the commander has declined
to comply with;
``(C) any element of the armed forces proposed for
placement under the command or operational control of a
foreign national acting directly on behalf of the
United Nations will at all times remain under United
States administrative command for such purposes as
discipline and evaluation; and
``(D) the United States will retain the authority to
withdraw any element of the armed forces from the
proposed operation at any time and to take any action
it considers necessary to protect those forces if they
are engaged.
``(2) A report setting forth the following:
``(A) A description of the national security
interests that require the placement of United States
forces under the command or operational control of a
foreign national acting directly on behalf of the
United Nations.
``(B) The mission of the United States forces
involved.
``(C) The expected size and composition of the United
States forces involved.
``(D) The incremental cost to the United States of
participation in the United Nations operation by the
United States forces which are proposed to be placed
under the command or operational control of a foreign
national.
``(E) The precise command and control relationship
between the United States forces involved and the
United Nations command structure.
``(F) The precise command and control relationship
between the United States forces involved and the
commander of the United States unified command for the
region in which those United States forces are to
operate.
``(G) The extent to which the United States forces
involved will rely on non-United States forces for
security and self-defense and an assessment on the
ability of those non-United States forces to provide
adequate security to the United States forces involved.
``(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the
United States forces involved.
``(e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (c) shall
be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in classified
form.
``(f) Interpretation.--(1) This section is a limitation on the
expenditure of Department of Defense funds for any element of the armed
forces placed under the command or operational control of a foreign
national acting on behalf of the United Nations and is not to be
construed as an authorization--
``(A) for the President to use any element of the armed
forces in any operation; or
``(B) for the President to place any element of the armed
forces under the command or operational control of a foreign
national.
``(2) Subject to the power of the Congress to declare war under
article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution, nothing in this
section shall be construed to derogate or limit the authority of the
President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces under article II,
section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of such
chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``405. Placement of United States forces under command or operational
control of foreign nationals acting on behalf of the United Nations:
limitation.''.
(b) Report Relating to Constitutionality.--No certification may be
submitted by the President under section 405(d)(1) of title 10, United
States Code, as added by subsection (a), until the President has
submitted to the Congress (after the date of the enactment of this Act)
a memorandum of legal points and authorities explaining why the
placement of elements of United States Armed Forces under the command
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the
United Nations does not violate the Constitution.
(c) Exception for Ongoing Operations in Macedonia and Croatia.--
Section 405 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection
(a), does not apply in the case of activities of the Armed Forces in
Macedonia authorized pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and subsequent
reauthorization Resolutions, and in the case of activities of the Armed
Forces in Croatia authorized pursuant to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 743, adopted February 21, 1992, and subsequent
reauthorization Resolutions, as part of the United Nations force
designated as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
SEC. 402. LIMITATION ON PLACEMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES UNDER
FOREIGN CONTROL FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
ACTIVITY.
(a) In General.--Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of
1945 (22 U.S.C. 287d) is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 6. (a) Agreements With Security Council.--(1) Any special
agreement described in paragraph (2) that is concluded by the President
with the Security Council shall not be effective unless approved by the
Congress by law.
``(2) An agreement referred to in paragraph (1) is an agreement
providing for the numbers and types of United States Armed Forces,
their degree of readiness and general locations, or the nature of
facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made
available to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security in accordance with Article 43 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
``(b) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d),
the President may not place any element of the Armed Forces under the
command or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf
of the United Nations for the purpose of international peacekeeping,
peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by
the Security Council under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the
United Nations.
``(2) For purposes of this section, elements of the Armed Forces
shall not be considered to be placed under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations in
any case in which the senior military commander of the United Nations
force or operation is a United States military officer who has the
authority to dismiss subordinates in the command chain, establish
appropriate rules of engagement for United States forces involved, and
establish criteria governing the operational employment of such United
States forces.
``(c) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection (b)
shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of
the Armed Forces under such command or operational control if the
President, not less than 15 days before the date on which such command
or operational control is to become effective (or as provided in
paragraph (2)), meets the requirements of subsection (e).
``(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency exists
that precludes the President from meeting the requirements of
subsection (e) 15 days before placing any element of the Armed Forces
under such command or operational control, the President may place such
forces under such command or operational control and meet the
requirements of subsection (e) in a timely manner, but in no event
later than 48 hours after such command or operational control becomes
effective.
``(d) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (b) shall not
apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of the Armed
Forces under such command or operational control if the Congress
specifically authorizes by law that particular placement of United
States forces under such command or operational control.
``(e) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred to in
subsection (c)(1) are that the President submit to Congress the
following:
``(1) Certification by the President that--
``(A) such a command or operational control
arrangement is necessary to protect national security
interests of the United States;
``(B) the commander of any unit of the Armed Forces
proposed for placement under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting directly on behalf
of the United Nations will at all times retain the
right--
``(i) to report independently to superior
United States military authorities; and
``(ii) to decline to comply with orders
judged by the commander to be illegal,
militarily imprudent, or beyond the mandate of
the mission to which the United States agreed
with the United Nations, until such time as
that commander receives direction from superior
United States military authorities with respect
to the orders that the commander has declined
to comply with;
``(C) any element of the Armed Forces proposed for
placement under the command or operational control of a
foreign national acting directly on behalf of the
United Nations will at all times remain under United
States administrative command for such purposes as
discipline and evaluation; and
``(D) the United States will retain the authority to
withdraw any element of the Armed Forces from the
proposed operation at any time and to take any action
it considers necessary to protect those forces if they
are engaged.
``(2) A report setting forth the following:
``(A) A description of the national security
interests that require the placement of United States
forces under the command or operational control of a
foreign national acting directly on behalf of the
United Nations.
``(B) The mission of the United States forces
involved.
``(C) The expected size and composition of the United
States forces involved.
``(D) The incremental cost to the United States of
participation in the United Nations operation by the
United States forces which are proposed to be placed
under the command or operational control of a foreign
national.
``(E) The precise command and control relationship
between the United States forces involved and the
United Nations command structure.
``(F) The precise command and control relationship
between the United States forces involved and the
commander of the United States unified command for the
region in which those United States forces are to
operate.
``(G) The extent to which the United States forces
involved will rely on non-United States forces for
security and self-defense and an assessment on the
ability of those non-United States forces to provide
adequate security to the United States forces involved.
``(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the
United States forces involved.
``(f) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (e) shall
be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in classified
form.
``(g) Interpretation.--Except as authorized in section 7 of this Act,
nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as an authorization to
the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council
United States Armed Forces, facilities, or assistance.''.
(b) Report Relating to Constitutionality.--No certification may be
submitted by the President under section 6(e)(1) of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, as amended by subsection (a), until the
President has submitted to the Congress (after the date of the
enactment of this Act) a memorandum of legal points and authorities
explaining why the placement of elements of United States Armed Forces
under the command or operational control of a foreign national acting
on behalf of the United Nations does not violate the Constitution.
(c) Exception for Ongoing Operations in Macedonia and Croatia.--
Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended
by subsection (a), does not apply in the case of activities of the
Armed Forces in Macedonia authorized pursuant to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and
subsequent reauthorization Resolutions, and in the case of activities
of the Armed Forces in Croatia authorized pursuant to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 743, adopted February 21, 1992, and
subsequent reauthorization Resolutions, as part of the United Nations
force designated as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 501. CREDIT AGAINST ASSESSMENT FOR UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES IN
SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
(a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in Support
of Peacekeeping Operations.--
``(1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment to the
United Nations of the United States assessed share of
peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only to the extent
that--
``(A) the amount of such assessed share exceeds--
``(B) the amount equal to--
``(i) the total amount identified in the
report submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) for
the preceding fiscal year, reduced by
``(ii) the amount of any reimbursement or
credit to the United States by the United
Nations for the costs of United States support
for, or participation in, United Nations
peacekeeping activities for that preceding
fiscal year.
``(2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time of
submission of the budget to the Congress for any fiscal year,
submit to the designated congressional committees a report on
the total amount of incremental costs incurred by the
Department of Defense during the preceding fiscal year to
support or participate in, directly or indirectly, United
Nations peacekeeping activities. Such report shall include a
separate listing by United Nations peacekeeping operation of
the amount of incremental costs incurred to support or
participate in each such operation.
``(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
``(A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--The
term `United Nations peacekeeping activities' means any
international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
enforcing, or similar activity that is authorized by
the United Nations Security Council under chapter VI or
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, except that
such term does not include any such activity authorized
under chapter VII of such Charter with respect to which
the President has certified to the Congress that the
activity is of such importance to the national security
of the United States that the United States would
undertake the activity unilaterally if it were not
authorized by the United Nations Security Council.
``(B) Designated congressional committees.--The term
`designated congressional committees' includes the
Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The limitation contained in section 10(a)(1) of
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection
(a), shall apply only with respect to United Nations assessments for
peacekeeping operations after fiscal year 1995.
SEC. 502. CODIFICATION OF REQUIRED NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
(a) Required Notice.--Section 4 of the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b) is amended--
(1) by striking the second sentence of subsection (a);
(2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (d) a new subsection (e)
consisting of the text of subsection (a) of section 407 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
(Public Law 103-236), revised--
(A) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A),
by inserting ``in written form not later than
the 10th day of'' after ``shall be provided'';
(ii) in subparagraph (A)(iv), by inserting
``(including facilities, training,
transportation, communication, intelligence,
and logistical support)'' after ``covered by
the resolution''; and
(iii) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the
end the following new clause:
``(iv) A description of any other United
States assistance to or support for the
operation (including facilities, training,
transportation, communication, intelligence,
and logistical support), and an estimate of the
cost to the United States of such assistance or
support.'';
(B) by striking paragraph (3);
(C) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3)
and in the last sentence of subparagraph (A) of that
paragraph by striking ``and (ii)'' and inserting
``through (iv)'';
(D) by inserting after paragraph (3) (as so
redesignated) the following new paragraph:
``(4) New united nations peacekeeping operation defined.--As
used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the term `new United
Nations peacekeeping operation' includes any existing or
otherwise ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operation--
``(A) that is to be expanded by more than 25 percent
during the period covered by the Security Council
resolution, as measured by either the number of
personnel participating (or authorized to participate)
in the operation or the budget of the operation; or
``(B) that is to be authorized to operate in a
country in which it was not previously authorized to
operate.''; and
(E) in paragraph (5)--
(i) by striking ``(5) Notification'' and all
that follows through ``(B) The President'' and
inserting ``(5) Quarterly reports.--The
President''; and
(ii) by striking ``section 4(d)'' and all
that follows through ``of this section)'' and
inserting ``subsection (d)''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.--Subsection (a) of section 407 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law
103-236), is repealed.
(c) Designated Congressional Committees.--Subsection (f) of section 4
of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b(f)), as
redesignated by subsection (a), is amended to read as follows:
``(f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this section,
the term `designated congressional committees' has the meaning given
such term in section 10(f).''.
SEC. 503. NOTICE TO CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS FOR
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended
by adding after subsection (a), as added by section 501, the following
new subsection:
``(b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for Peacekeeping
Activities.--
``(1) Notice regarding united nations billing request.--Not
later than 15 days after the date on which the United States
receives from the United Nations a billing requesting a payment
by the United States of any contribution for United Nations
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the
designated congressional committees.
``(2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--The
President shall notify the designated congressional committees
at least 15 days before the United States obligates funds for
any assessed or voluntary contribution for United Nations
peacekeeping activities, except that if the President
determines that an emergency exists which prevents compliance
with the requirement that such notification be provided 15 days
in advance and that such contribution is in the national
security interests of the United States, such notification
shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48 hours
after such obligation.''.
SEC. 504. REVISED NOTICE TO CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE
FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C.
287d-1) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``other than subsection
(e)(1)'' after ``any other law''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least 15
days before any agency or entity of the United States Government makes
available to the United Nations any assistance or facility to support
or facilitate United Nations peacekeeping activities, the President
shall so notify the designated congressional committees.
``(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
``(A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000 in
the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than $5,000,000
in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
``(B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown
authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1),
2348a(c)(2)).
``(3) If the President determines that an emergency exists which
prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1) that
notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the contribution
of any such assistance or facility is in the national security
interests of the United States, such notification shall be provided in
a timely manner but not later than 48 hours after such assistance or
facility is made available to the United Nations.
``(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term `assistance'--
``(A) means assistance of any kind, including logistical
support, supplies, goods, or services (including command,
control, communications or intelligence assistance and
training), and the grant of rights of passage; and
``(B) includes assistance provided through in-kind
contributions or through the provision of support, supplies,
goods, or services on any terms, including on a grant, lease,
loan, or reimbursable basis; but
``(C) does not include the payment of assessed or voluntary
contributions.''.
SEC. 505. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
ACTIVITIES.
Section 4(d)(1) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22
U.S.C. 287b(d)(1)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new
subparagraph:
``(D) A description of the anticipated budget for the
next fiscal year for United States participation in
United Nations peacekeeping activities, including a
statement of--
``(i) the aggregate amount of funds available
to the United Nations for that fiscal year,
including assessed and voluntary contributions,
which may be made available for United Nations
peacekeeping activities; and
``(ii) the aggregate amount of funds (from
all accounts) and the aggregate costs of in-
kind contributions that the United States
proposes to make available to the United
Nations for that fiscal year for United Nations
peacekeeping activities.''.
SEC. 506. REIMBURSEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS
TO PUNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act of
1945 (22 U.S.C. 287d-1), as amended by section 504, is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)'';
(B) by striking ``United States: Provided,'' through
``Provided further, That when'' and inserting ``United
States. When''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after consultation
with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, determines that an emergency exists which
justifies waiver of that requirement. Any such waiver shall be
submitted to the designated congressional committees, as defined in
section 10(a)(3)(B), at least 15 days before it takes effect, except
that if the President determines that an emergency exists which
prevents compliance with the requirement that the notification be
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a nonreimbursable basis
is in the national security interests of the United States, such
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but no later than 48
hours after such waiver takes effect.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and services
provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of Defense to the
United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping operations under this
section or any other provision of law are reimbursed at the appropriate
value, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.''.
(b) Initial Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Representative of the United
States to the United Nations shall submit to the designated
congressional committees a report on all actions taken by the
United States mission to the United Nations to achieve the
objective described in section 7(f) of the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a)(2).
(2) Designated congressional committees defined.--As used in
this subsection, the term ``designated congressional
committees'' has the meaning given such term in section
10(a)(3)(B) of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as
added by section 501.
SEC. 507. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PAY UNITED STATES ASSESSED OR
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 is amended by adding after subsection (b), as added by section
503, the following new subsection:
``(c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities.--
``(1) In general.--Appropriated funds may not be used to pay
any United States assessed or voluntary contribution during any
fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities until
the Secretary of Defense certifies to the designated
congressional committees that the United Nations has reimbursed
the Department of Defense directly for all goods and services
that were provided to the United Nations by the Department of
Defense on a reimbursable basis during the preceding fiscal
year for United Nations peacekeeping activities, including
personnel and assistance provided under section 7 (except to
the extent that the authority of subsection (b)(2) of such
section to waive the reimbursement requirement was exercised
with respect to such personnel or assistance).
``(2) Exception.--The prohibition contained in paragraph (1)
shall not apply when the Department of Defense has failed to
submit its bills in a timely manner for goods and services that
were provided to the United Nations.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The prohibition contained in section 10(c) of
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection
(a), shall apply only with respect to fiscal years after fiscal year
1995.
SEC. 508. LIMITATION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR UNITED
STATES SHARE OF COSTS OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--(1) Chapter 20 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after section 405, as added by section 401 of this
Act, the following new section:
``Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share
of costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities:
limitation
``(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessment.--No
funds available to the Department of Defense shall be available for
payment of any United States assessed or voluntary contribution for
United Nations peacekeeping activities.
``(b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in Peacekeeping
Activities.--Funds available to the Department of Defense may be used
for payment of the incremental costs associated with the participation
of elements of the armed forces in United Nations peacekeeping
activities only to the extent that Congress has by law specifically
authorized the use of those funds for such purposes.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended
by adding at the end the following new item:
``406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of
costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.''.
(b) Effective Date.--Section 406 of title 10, United States Code, as
added by subsection (a), shall take effect on October 1, 1995.
SEC. 509. CODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON AMOUNT OF UNITED STATES
ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
(a) In General.--Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 is amended by adding after subsection (c), as added by section
507, the following new subsection:
``(d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated for
`Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities' for any
fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of the United States
assessed contribution for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in an
amount which is greater than 25 percent of the total amount of all
assessed contributions for that operation, and any arrearages that
accumulate as a result of assessments in excess of 25 percent of the
total amount of all assessed contributions for any United Nations
peacekeeping operation shall not be recognized or paid by the United
States.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The limitation contained in section 10(d) of the
United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a),
shall apply only with respect to funds authorized to be appropriated
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities'' for
fiscal years after fiscal year 1995.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 404(b) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (Public Law 103-236) is
amended by striking paragraph (2).
SEC. 510. BUY AMERICAN REQUIREMENT.
Section 10 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 is amended
by adding after subsection (d), as added by section 509, the following
new subsections:
``(e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary contribution
for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless the Secretary of
State determines and certifies to the designated congressional
committees that United States manufacturers and suppliers are being
given opportunities to provide equipment, services, and material for
such activities equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and
suppliers.
``(f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in this
section, the term `designated congressional committees' means--
``(1) the Committee on International Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;
and
``(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.''.
SEC. 511. UNITED NATIONS BUDGETARY AND MANAGEMENT REFORM.
(a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
``(1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations
budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20 percent of
the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for
United States assessed contributions for the regular United
Nations budget shall be withheld from obligation and
expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has
been made under subsection (b).
``(2) Assessed contributions for united nations
peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50 percent
of the amount of funds made available for that fiscal year for
United States assessed contributions for United Nations
peacekeeping activities shall be withheld from obligation and
expenditure unless a certification for that fiscal year has
been made under subsection (b).
``(3) Voluntary contributions for united nations
peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any fiscal year
pay any voluntary contribution to the United Nations for
international peacekeeping activities unless a certification
for that fiscal year has been made under subsection (b).
``(b) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (a)
for any fiscal year is a certification by the President to the
Congress, submitted on or after the beginning of that fiscal year, of
each of the following:
``(1) The United Nations has an independent office of
Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective audits,
inspections, and investigations relating to programs and
operations of the United Nations.
``(2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who was
appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the
General Assembly and whose appointment was made principally on
the basis of the appointee's integrity and demonstrated ability
in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or investigation.
``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
``(A) make investigations and reports relating to the
administration of the programs and operations of the
United Nations;
``(B) have access to all records, documents, and
other available materials relating to those programs
and operations;
``(C) have direct and prompt access to any official
of the United Nations; and
``(D) have access to all records and officials of the
specialized agencies of the United Nations.
``(4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and made
available to all member states, procedures that effectively
protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals against, any
staff member of the United Nations making a complaint or
disclosing information to, or cooperating in any investigation
or inspection by, the United Nations Inspector General.
``(5) The United Nations has fully implemented procedures
that ensure compliance with recommendations of the United
Nations Inspector General.
``(6) The United Nations has required the United Nations
Inspector General to issue an annual report and has ensured
that the annual report and all other reports of the Inspector
General are made available to the General Assembly without
modification.
``(7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed to
providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure the
effective operation of the United Nations Inspector General.''.
(b) Effective Date.--Section 11 of the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945, as added by subsection (a), shall apply only with respect
to fiscal years after fiscal year 1995.
SEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS.
(a) In General.--The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22
U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the United
Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by the United
States to the United Nations, the President shall ensure that the
Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense, has established guidelines
governing the provision of intelligence information to the United
Nations which shall protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
``(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually, to the
Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate on the types of intelligence provided to the United Nations and
the purposes for which it was provided during the period covered by the
report. The President shall also report to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, within 15 days after it
becomes known to him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
provided to the United Nations.
``(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first sentence
of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to the provision of
intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, United
States Government personnel serving with the United Nations.
``(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign
the duties of the President under this section.
``(d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the United
Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the Secretary), in
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense, shall work with the United Nations to improve the
handling, processing, dissemination, and management of all intelligence
information provided to it by its members.
``(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to--
``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to
section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413-415).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE VI--EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``NATO Expansion Act of 1995''.
SEC. 602. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
has helped to guarantee the security, freedom, and prosperity
of the United States and its partners in the alliance.
(2) NATO has expanded its membership on three different
occasions since its founding in 1949.
(3) The steadfast and sustained commitment of the member
countries of NATO to mutual defense against the threat of
communist domination played a significant role in precipitating
the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet
Union.
(4) Although new threats are more geographically and
functionally diverse and less predictable, they still imperil
shared interests of the United States and its NATO allies.
(5) Western interests must be protected on a cooperative
basis without an undue burden falling upon the United States.
(6) NATO is the only multilateral organization that is
capable of conducting effective military operations to protect
Western interests.
(7) The valuable experience gained from ongoing military
cooperation within NATO was critical to the success of joint
military operations in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait.
(8) NATO is an important diplomatic forum for discussion of
issues of concern to its member states and for the peaceful
resolution of disputes.
(9) Admission of Central and East European countries that
have recently been freed from Communist domination to NATO
could contribute to international peace and enhance the
security of those countries.
(10) By joining the Partnership for Peace, a number of
countries have expressed interest in NATO membership.
(11) The Partnership for Peace program is creating new
political and military ties with countries in Central and
Eastern Europe and provides the basis for joint action to deal
with common security problems. Active participation in the
Partnership for Peace will also play an important role in the
evolutionary process of NATO expansion.
(12) In particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia have made significant progress toward establishing
democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian
control of their armed forces, police, and intelligence
services, and the rule of law since the fall of their previous
Communist governments.
SEC. 603. UNITED STATES POLICY.
It should be the policy of the United States--
(1) to continue the Nation's commitment to an active
leadership role in NATO;
(2) to join with the Nation's NATO allies to redefine the
role of the alliance in the post-Cold War world, taking into
account--
(A) the fundamentally changed security environment of
Central and Eastern Europe;
(B) the need to assure all countries of the defensive
nature of the alliance and the desire of its members to
work cooperatively with all former adversaries;
(C) the emerging security threats posed by the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them;
(D) the continuing challenges to the interests of all
NATO member countries posed by unstable and
undemocratic regimes harboring hostile intentions; and
(E) the dependence of the global economy on a stable
energy supply and the free flow of commerce;
(3) to affirm that NATO military planning should include
joint military operations beyond the geographic bounds of the
alliance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty when the
shared interests of the United States and other member
countries require such action to defend vital interests;
(4) to expeditiously pursue joint cooperation agreements for
the acquisition of essential systems to significantly increase
the crisis management capability of NATO;
(5) that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia
should be in a position to further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area in the near future, and, in accordance with
Article 10 of such Treaty, should be invited to become full
NATO members, provided these countries--
(A) meet appropriate standards, including--
(i) shared values and interests;
(ii) democratic governments;
(iii) free market economies;
(iv) civilian control of the military, of the
police, and of the intelligence and other
security services, so that these organizations
do not pose a threat to democratic
institutions, neighboring countries, or the
security of NATO or the United States;
(v) adherence to the rule of law and to the
values, principles, and political commitments
set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and other
declarations by the members of the Organization
on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
(vi) commitment to further the principles of
NATO and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area;
(vii) commitment and ability to accept the
obligations, responsibilities, and costs of
NATO membership; and
(viii) commitment and ability to implement
infrastructure development activities that will
facilitate participation in and support for
NATO military activities; and
(B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all
their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity
of their neighbors;
(6) that the United States, other NATO member nations, and
NATO itself should furnish appropriate assistance to facilitate
the transition of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia to full NATO membership;
(7) to reaffirm article X of the North Atlantic Treaty and
the policy decision of the North Atlantic Council on December
1, 1994, that--
(A) each new member nation may be admitted to NATO
only by amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty; and
(B) each current NATO member nation will have to
complete the treaty amendment ratification process for
the admission of each new member nation to NATO,
subject to the internal legal processes of each current
NATO member nation, and that in the case of the United
States, the treaty amendment ratification process will
require advice and consent of two-thirds of the members
of the United States Senate present and voting;
(8) that the expansion of NATO should be defensive in nature
and should occur in a manner that increases stability for all
nations of Europe, including both NATO member nations and non-
NATO member nations;
(9) that NATO and its member nations should cooperate closely
with Russia on security issues and work to strengthen other
structures of security cooperation in Europe, including the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and
(10) that other European countries emerging from communist
domination may be in a position at a future date to further the
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic area, and at the appropriate
time they should receive assistance to facilitate their
transition to full NATO membership and should be invited to
become full NATO members.
SEC. 604. REVISIONS TO PROGRAM TO FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO
MEMBERSHIP.
(a) Establishment of Program.--Subsection (a) of section 203 of the
NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103-447; 22
U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Establishment of Program.--The President shall establish a
program to assist in the transition to full NATO membership of Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and any other European
country emerging from communist domination that is designated by the
President under subsection (d)(2).''.
(b) Eligible Countries.--
(1) Designated countries.--Subsection (d) of such section is
amended to read as follows:
``(d) Designation of Eligible Countries.--
``(1) Specified countries.--The following countries are
hereby designated for purposes of this title: Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
``(2) Authority for president to designate other european
countries emerging from communist domination.--The President
may designate other European countries emerging from communist
domination (as defined in section 206) to receive assistance
under the program established under subsection (a). The
President may make such a designation in the case of any such
country only if the President determines, and reports to the
designated congressional committees, that such country--
``(A) has made significant progress toward
establishing--
``(i) shared values and interests;
``(ii) democratic governments;
``(iii) free market economies;
``(iv) civilian control of the military, of
the police, and of the intelligence and other
security services, so that these organizations
do not pose a threat to democratic
institutions, neighboring countries, or the
security of NATO or the United States;
``(v) adherence to the rule of law and to the
values, principles, and political commitments
set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and other
declarations by the members of the Organization
on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
``(vi) commitment to further the principles
of NATO and to contribute to the security of
the North Atlantic area;
``(vii) commitment and ability to accept the
obligations, responsibilities, and costs of
NATO membership; and
``(viii) commitment and ability to implement
infrastructure development activities that will
facilitate participation in and support for
NATO military activities; and
``(B) is likely, within five years of such
determination, to be in a position to further the
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic
area.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--
(A) Subsections (b) and (c) of such section are
amended by striking ``countries described in such
subsection'' and inserting ``countries designated under
subsection (d)''.
(B) Subsection (e) of such section is amended--
(i) by striking ``subsection (d)'' and
inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''; and
(ii) by inserting ``(22 U.S.C. 2394)'' before
the period at the end.
(C) Section 204(c) of such Act is amended by striking
``any other Partnership for Peace country designated
under section 203(d) of this title'' and inserting
``any country designated under section 203(d)(2)''.
(c) Types of Assistance.--
(1) Economic support assistance.--Subsection (c) of section
203 of such Act is amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as
paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following
new paragraph (3):
``(3) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the Economic Support
Fund).''.
(2) Additional assistance.--
(A) In general.--Subsection (f) of such section is
amended to read as follows:
``(f) Additional Assistance.--In carrying out the program established
under subsection (a), the President may, in addition to the security
assistance authorized to be provided under subsection (c), provide
assistance to countries designated under subsection (d) from funds
appropriated under the `Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund'
account.''.
(B) Effective date.--The amendment made by
subparagraph (A) does not apply with respect to funds
appropriated before the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(d) Disqualification From Assistance for Support of Terrorism.--
Section 203 of such Act is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(g) Prohibition on Providing Assistance to Countries That Provide
Defense Articles to Countries Supporting International Terrorism.--The
President may not provide assistance to a country under the program
established under subsection (a) if such country is selling or
transferring defense articles to a state that has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, as determined by the
Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979.''.
(e) Report Prior to Obligation or Expenditure of Funds.--Section 203
of such Act (as amended by subsection (d)) is further amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(h) Report Prior to Obligation or Expenditure of Funds.--Prior to
providing assistance to a country for the first time through the
program established under subsection (a), the President shall transmit
to the designated congressional committees a report with respect to
that country that contains a description of the following:
``(1) The cost of membership in NATO for the country and the
amount that the country is prepared to contribute to NATO to
pay for such cost of membership.
``(2) The amount that the United States will contribute to
facilitate transition to full NATO membership for the country.
``(3) The extent to which the admission to NATO of the
country would contribute to the security of the United States.
``(4) The views of other NATO member nations regarding the
admission to NATO of the country and the amounts that such
other NATO member nations will contribute to facilitate
transition to full NATO membership for the country.''.
(f) Annual Report.--Section 205 of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
(title II of Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``<SUP>annual'' in the section heading
before the first word;
(2) by inserting ``annual'' after ``include in the'' in the
matter preceding paragraph (1); and
(3) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``and other'' and
all that follows through the period at the end and inserting
``and any country designated by the President pursuant to
section 203(d)(2).''.
(g) Definitions.--The NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of
Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``SEC. 206. DEFINITIONS.
``For purposes of this title:
``(1) NATO.--The term `NATO' means the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
``(2) Other european countries emerging from communist
domination.--The term `other European countries emerging from
communist domination' means any full and active participant in
the Partnership for Peace that--
``(A) is located--
``(i) in the territory of the former Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics; or
``(ii) in the territory of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; or
``(B) is among the following countries: Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, or Albania.
``(3) Designated congressional committees.--The term
`designated congressional committees' means--
``(A) the Committee on International Relations, the
Committee on National Security, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
``(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.''.
TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS
SEC. 701. RESTORATION OF BUDGET FIREWALLS FOR DEFENSE SPENDING.
It is the sense of the Congress that so-called ``budget firewalls''
between defense and domestic discretionary spending should be
established for each of fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Background and Purpose
H.R. 7, the ``National Security Revitalization Act'', is
intended to address serious national security issues requiring
attention during the 104th Congress.
With respect to the U.N. peacekeeping provisions contained
in H.R. 7, the bill is meant to strengthen the ability of the
United States to protect its security and financial interests
in all U.N. peacekeeping activities. Suggestions that this bill
undermines U.N. peacekeeping are simply unfounded.
Provisions of the bill within the primary jurisdiction of
the Committee on International Relations include title IV,
limiting the subordination of U.S. armed forces to the command
or operational control of foreign nationals acting on behalf of
the United Nations in peacekeeping operations; title V,
limiting the financial obligations imposed upon the United
States by United Nations peacekeeping operations and seeking to
promote management reform within the United Nations; and title
VI, endorsing and seeking to facilitate the expansion of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Provisions of the bill
within the primary jurisdiction of the Committee on National
Security include title II, regarding defense against ballistic
missile attacks; and title III, establishing a ``Revitalization
of National Security Commission'' to conduct a comprehensive
review of the long-term national security needs of the United
States.
A primary concern underlying the provisions of H.R. 7
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on International
Relations is the need to reassert the primacy of United States
national interests in conduct of United States foreign policy,
in the use of United States armed forces, and in the
expenditure of resources of the Department of Defense. This
concern is particularly acute with regard to United Nations
peacekeeping operations.
The bitter experience of the United States in the failed
United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia demonstrates
that such operations are not necessarily a low-cost means of
exerting United States influence in troubled parts of the
world. To the contrary, such operations can entangle the United
States in costly and ultimately futile efforts with little or
no connection to the national interests of the United States.
In a world in which serious threats remain to vital U.S.
national security interests, the United States cannot afford to
squander its resources on peacekeeping operations unconnected
to its national interests. The provisions of titles IV and V of
H.R. 7 are intended to ensure that future U.S. involvement in
United Nations peacekeeping operations advances U.S. national
security interests and does not detract from those interests.
Critics of Title V of H.R. 7, in particular critics of
section 501, argue that it will destroy U.S. peacekeeping and
eliminate peacekeeping as an option of U.S. foreign policy.
Nothing could be farther from the truth. Section 501 simply
requires that the U.S. will be reimbursed for our own military
expenditures in support of peacekeeping operations. With the
addition of the Presidential certification provision for
Chapter 7 operations, the total of our in-kind credits which
would have to be credited in FY 94 under this provision would
have been about one quarter of our total FY 94 peacekeeping
budget.
An additional concern underlying H.R. 7 is the need to
adapt the most successful collective security institution in
history--the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--to the
security requirements of the post-Cold War era. NATO can and
must play a central role in addressing the uncertainty in
Central and Eastern Europe that has developed since the end of
the Cold War. The United States should take the lead in making
clear to the countries emerging from communist domination in
Central and Eastern Europe that the door to the West will
remain open to them if they persist in the political and
economic reforms they have undertaken.
The process of NATO expansion endorsed by title VI of H.R.
7 is not intended to draw new lines across Europe or to
identify any country or group of countries as a threat to
others. Rather, the process of NATO expansion as endorsed by
H.R. 7 is a dynamic one that will begin with those countries
furthest along the path of reform but is intended to include
others over time as circumstances warrant. The ultimate goal is
not a redivided Europe, but rather a Europe whole and free, in
which all members of the Cold War alliance structures are
integrated into a new security architecture.
Committee Action
Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman Floyd Spence,
Representative Ed Bryant and Representative James A. Hayes
introduced H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, on
January 4, 1995, the first day of the 104th Congress.
On January 24, 1995, the full Committee held a hearing on
H.R. 7, during which testimony was given by the Honorable Jeane
Kirkpatrick, former Permanent U.S. Representative to the United
Nations and Dr. Barry Blechman, Chairman of the Henry L.
Stimson Center.
In January the full Committee also held a three-part series
of hearings on evaluating U.S. foreign policy. H.R. 7 was
discussed extensively during these hearings. The first of these
hearings was held on January 12, 1995, with the Honorable James
A. Baker, III former Secretary of State, as the witness. The
second hearing took place on January 19, 1995, during which
testimony was presented by the Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski,
former National Security Advisor to President Carter, and the
Honorable Charles William Maynes, Editor, Foreign Policy. The
third hearing was held on January 26, 1995, with the Honorable
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State.
In addition, the Committee held a closed briefing on
January 20, 1995, with the Honorable Madeleine Albright,
Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations. During
this briefing, Ambassador Albright outlined Administration
concerns with portions of H.R. 7 concerning United Nation
peacekeeping issues.
Roll Call Votes on Amendments; Final Committee Action
In compliance with clause (2)(l)(2)(B) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the record of committee
roll call votes taken on final passage or amendments during the
committee's consideration of H.R. 7 is set out below, as is a
report of the committee's final action on the bill.
On January 27, 30, and 31, the committee met to consider
H.R. 7, the required quorum being present at all times when the
committee conducted legislative business.
Janaury 27, 1995
By unanimous consent, the committee ordered that an
amendment in the nature of substitute offered by Chairman
Gilman be considered as original text for the purpose of
amendment, and that each section of the amendment in the nature
of a substitute be considered as having been read when
designated by the Chief of Staff.
The following amendments were the subject of roll-call
votes, and the disposition of those amendments is reported
here, as required by clause (2)(l)(2)(B) of rule XI:
Mr. Menendez offered an amendment to strike section 103(1)
of the amendment in the nature of a substitute. Section 103(1)
set out, as one of the purposes of H.R. 7, the establishment of
a commission to reassess United States military needs and
reverse the continuing downward spiral of defense spending. The
Mendendez amendment was defeated by a 17-21 roll-call vote, as
follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdenson Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos Mr. Leach
Mr. Torricelli Mr. Roth
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Hyde
Mr. Johnston Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Engel Mr. Smith
Mr. Martinez Mr. Burton
Mr. Payne Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Andrews Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Menendez Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Brown Mr. Rohrabacker
Ms. McKinney Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Hastings Mr. Royce
Mr. Wynn Mr. King
Mr. McNulty Mr. Kim
Mr. Moran Mr. Brownback
Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Menendez offered an amendment to strike Title III of
the amendment in the nature of a substitute. Title III of the
amendment in the nature of a substitute provides for the
Establishment of a Revitalization of National Security
Commission. The Menendez amendment was defeated by a 16-22
roll-call vote, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdension Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos Mr. Leach
Mr. Torricelli Mr. Roth
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Hyde
Mr. Johnston Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Engel Mr. Smith
Mr. Martinez Mr. Burton
Mr. Payne Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Andrews Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Menendez Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Brown Mr. Ballenger
Mr. McKinney Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Hastings Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Wynn Mr. Royce
Mr. McNulty Mr. King
Mr. Kim
Mr. Brownback
Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Chabort
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Ackerman offered an en bloc amendment to Title IV of
the amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Ackerman
amendment would have provided for the non-application of
certain sections of the bill in a case in which fewer than 50
members of the armed forces are participating in a particular
United Nations operation or activity. The Ackerman amendment
was defeated by a 14-22 roll-call vote, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Leach Mr. Gilman
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Goodling
Mr. Gejdenson Mr. Roth
Mr. Lantos Mr. Hyde
Mr. Berman Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Smith
Mr. Engel Mr. Burton
Mr. Martinez Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Payne Mr. Ballegly
Mr. Andrews Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Menendez Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Brown Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Hastings Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Wynn Mr. Royce
Mr. King
Mr. Kim
Mr. Brownback
Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. McNulty
Mr. Engel offered an en bloc amendment to sections 401 and
402 of the amendment in the nature of a substitute. Section 401
and 402 of the amendment in the nature of a substitute contain
limitations on the placement of United States armed forces
under foreign control for a United Nations peacekeeping
actitity. The Engel amendment would have provided for an
exception the limitations set out those sections in the case of
a proposed placement of any element of the Armed Forces under
the command or operational control of a military officer of a
NATO member state. The Engel amendment was defeated by a 14-20
roll-call vote, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Leach Mr. Gilman
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Goodling
Mr. Genjdenson Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Lantos Mr. Smith
Mr. Torricelli Mr. Burton
Mr. Berman Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Engel Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Menendez Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Brown Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. McKinney Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Hastings Mr. Royce
Mr. Wynn Mr. King
Mr. Moran Mr. Kim
Mr. Brownback
Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Andrews
January 30, 1995
Mr. Hastings moved to amend the amendment in the nature of
a substitute by striking section 501 thereof and inserting a
new section 501. The Hastings amendment would have provided
that the United States would receive credit for its costs in
support of peacekeeping to the degree that other nations
receive credit from the United Nations for their costs incurred
in support of peacekeeping. The Hastings amendment was defeated
by a 14-22 roll-call vote, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdenson Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos Mr. Hyde
Mr. Torricelli Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Smith
Mr. Johnston Mr. Burton
Mr. Menendez Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Brown Mr. Gallegly
Ms. McKinney Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Hastings Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Wynn Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. McNulty Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Moran Mr. Royce
Mr. Frazer Mr. King
Mr. Kim
Mr. Brownback
Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton
Mr. Andrews
Mr. Torricelli was granted unanimous consent to offer an
amendment en bloc to several sections of Title VI.
Subsequently, Mr. Goodling asked unanimous consent to divide
the motion, and by unanimous consent the consideration of the
amendment was divided.
The first part of the Torricelli amendment, among other
things, deleted the policy language setting out a five year
time frame for the expansion of NATO and replaced that time
frame with the words ``in the near future.'' The first part of
the Torricelli amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
Mr. Smith moved to reconsider the vote by which the first
part of the Torricelli amendment was agreed to. The motion to
reconsider the vote was defeated by a 15-25 roll-call vote, as
follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Gilman Mr. Goodling
Mr. Roth Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Hyde Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Smith Mr. Kim
Mr. Burton Mr. Brownback
Mrs. Meyers Mr. Funderburk
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen Mr. Sanford
Mr. Ballenger Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Rohrabacher Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. Manzullo Mr. Lantos
Mr. Royce Mr. Torricelli
Mr. King Mr. Berman
Mr. Chabot Mr. Ackerman
Mr. Salmon Mr. Johnston
Mr. Houghton Mr. Engel
Mr. Martinez
Mr. Andrews
Mr. Menendez
Mr. Brown
Ms. McKinney
Mr. Hastings
Mr. Wynn
Mr. McNulty
Mr. Moran
Mr. Frazer
The second part of the Torricelli amendment would have
amended the amendment in the nature of a substitute by deleting
language directing the President to establish an assistance
program for certain countries eligible for participation in the
Partnership for Peace program, and instead made the
establishment of the program discretionary. The second part of
the Torricelli amendment also would have deleted the
designation of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia as eligible for assistance under the program.
The second part of the Torricelli amendment was defeated by
a 16-23 roll-call vote, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Gilman
Mr. Gejdenson Mr. Goodling
Mr. Lantos Mr. Roth
Mr. Torricelli Mr. Hyde
Mr. Berman Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Smith
Mr. Johnston Mr. Burton
Mr. Martinez Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Andrews Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Brown Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Ms. McKinney Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Hastings Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Wynn Mr. Manzullo
Mr. McNulty Mr. Royce
Mr. Moran Mr. King
Mr. Frazer Mr. Kim
Mr. Brownback
Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton
Mr. Engel
January 31, 1995
Mr. Berman offered an amendment to the amendment in the
nature of a substitute. The Berman amendment provided for a new
section of the bill which would have authorized the President,
subject to the power of the Congress to declare war, to deploy
``any member of the United States Armed Forces for
participation in support of peacekeeping activities authorized
by United Nations Security Council resolutions.'' The Berman
amendment was agreed to by a vote of 23-18, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Goodling Mr. Gilman
Mr. Leach Mr. Roth
Mr. Chabot Mr. Hyde
Mr. Sanford Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Houghton Mr. Smith
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Burton
Mr. Gejdenson Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Lantos Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Berman Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Johnston Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Engel Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Faleomavaega Mr. Royce
Mr. Martinez Mr. King
Mr. Payne Mr. Kim
Mr. Menendez Mr. Brownback
Mr. Brown Mr. Funderburk
Ms. McKinney Mr. Andrews
Mr. Hastings
Mr. Wynn
Mr. McNulty
Mr. Moran
Mr. Frazer
Note.--A motion to reconsider the vote by which the Berman
amendment was agreed to was subsequently offered, and agreed
to, and on reconsideration the amendment was defeated. See
below.
Mr. Hastings offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to the Gilman amendment in the nature of a
substitute. The Hastings amendment was the text of an earlier
version of H.R. 7. The Hastings amendment was defeated by a
vote of 0-40, as follows: YEAS NAYS
Mr. Gilman
Mr. Goodling
Mr. Roth
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Smith
Mr. Burton
Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Gallegly
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Royce
Mr. King
Mr. Kim
Mr. Brownback
Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton
Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. Lantos
Mr. Berman
Mr. Ackerman
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Engel
Mr. Faleomavaega
Mr. Martinez
Mr. Payne
Mr. Andrews
Mr. Menendez
Mr. Brown
Ms. McKinney
Mr. Wynn
Mr. McNulty
Mr. Moran
Mr. Frazer
Note.--Mr. Hastings answered ``present''.
Note.--The following vote, although not required by the
Rules to be included in this Report, is provided for the
purpose of clarifying the record of the committee's action on
the Berman amendment.
Mr. Goodling, who had voted on the prevailing side on the
roll-call vote on the Berman amendment to the amendment in the
nature of a substitute, moved to reconsider the vote by which
the Berman amendment was agreed to. The motion to reconsider
the vote on the Berman amendment was agreed to by a roll-call
vote of 22-18, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Gilman Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Goodling Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. Roth Mr. Lantos
Mr. Hyde Mr. Berman
Mr. Bereuter Mr. Ackerman
Mr. Smith Mr. Johnston
Mr. Burton Mr. Engel
Mrs. Meyers Mr. Faleomavaega
Mr. Gallegly Mr. Martinez
Ms. Ros-Lethtinen Mr. Payne
Mr. Ballenger Mr. Andrews
Mr. Rohrabacher Mr. Menendez
Mr. Manzullo Mr. Brown
Mr. Royce Ms. McKinney
Mr. King Mr. Hastings
Mr. Kim Mr. Wynn
Mr. Brownback Mr. McNulty
Mr. Funderburk Mr. Moran
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton
The Goodling motion to reconsider the Berman amendment to
the amendment in the nature of a substitute having been agreed
to, the Chair put the question on agreeing to the Berman
amendment. On reconsideration, the Berman amendment was
defeated by a roll-call vote of 20-21, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Chabot Mr. Gilman
Mr. Hamilton Mr. Goodling
Mr. Gejdenson Mr. Roth
Mr. Lantos Mr. Hyde
Mr. Torriceli Mr. Bereuter
Mr. Berman Mr. Smith
Mr. Ackerman Mr. Burton
Mr. Johnston Mrs. Meyers
Mr. Engel Mr. Gallegly
Mr. Faleomavaega Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
Mr. Martinez Mr. Ballenger
Mr. Payne Mr. Rohrabacher
Mr. Menendez Mr. Manzullo
Mr. Brown Mr. Royce
Ms. McKinney Mr. King
Mr. Hastings Mr. Kim
Mr. Wynn Mr. Brownback
Mr. McNulty Mr. Funderburk
Mr. Moran Mr. Sanford
Mr. Frazer Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton
Note.--Mr. Andrews answered ``present''.
The Chair put the question on agreeing to the amendment in
the nature of a substitute, which passed by a roll-call vote of
23-18, as follows:
YEAS NAYS
Mr. Gilman Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Goodling Mr. Gejdenson
Mr. Roth Mr. Lantos
Mr. Hyde Mr. Torricelli
Mr. Bereuter Mr. Berman
Mr. Smith Mr. Ackerman
Mr. Burton Mr. Johnston
Mrs. Meyers Mr. Engel
Mr. Gallegly Mr. Faleomavaega
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen Mr. Payne
Mr. Ballenger Mr. Menedez
Mr. Rohrabacher Mr. Bown
Mr. Manzullo Ms. McKinney
Mr. Royce Mr. Hastings
Mr. King Mr. Wynn
Mr. Kim Mr. McNulty
Mr. Brownbck Mr. Noran
Mr. Funderburk Mr. Frazer
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Sanford
Mr. Salmon
Mr. Houghton
Mr. Andrews
Note.--Immediately following the vote recorded above, the
following ensued:
Mr. Goodling moved that the Chief of Staff be authorized to
make technical and conforming amendments to the bill, that the
committee report the bill as amended to the House with the
recommendation that the bill, as amended, do pass, and that the
Chairman be authorized to take any other necessary steps
required to bring the bill before the House for consideration.
The motion was agreed to without objection, the requisite
quorum (majority of the full committee) being present. Mr.
Hamilton requested that the Minority be accorded three days to
file dissenting views.
Section-by-Section Analysis
section 1--short title; table of contents
Section 1 provides the short title for the Act, the
``National Security Revitalization Act,'' and sets out a table
of contents for the Act.
TITLE I--FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES
section 101--findings
Section 101 sets forth congressional findings relevant to
the Act.
section 102--policy
Section 102 declares the commitment of the Congress to
providing adequate resources to protect the national security
interests of the United States.
section 103--purposes
Section 103 sets forth the purposes of the Act, including,
inter alia, restricting deployments of U.S. forces to missions
that are in the national security interest of the United
States, maintaining command and control by U.S. personnel of
U.S. forces participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations,
reducing the cost of U.N. peacekeeping activities to the United
States, pressing for reforms in U.N. management practices, and
reemphasizing the commitment of the United States to a strong
and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
TITLE II--MISSILE DEFENSE
sections 201, 202, and 203--missile defense
Sections 201, 202, and 203 contain provisions regarding
defense against missile attacks. These sections are outside the
jurisdiction of the Committee on International Relations.
TITLE III--REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION
section 301--establishment
Section 301 establishes the ``Revitalization of National
Security Commission''.
section 302--composition
Section 302 provides for, inter alia, the appointment,
qualifications, and term of service of members of the
Commission.
section 303--duties
Section 303 directs the Commission to conduct a
comprehensive review of the long-term national security needs
of the United States. It further specifies issues to be
assessed in the comprehensive review and matters to be
considered. Among the issues to be assessed is the costs to the
United States of expanding the membership of NATO. Among the
matters to be considered and addressed in the Commission's
specific recommendations are providing a new funding system for
peacekeeping and humanitarian deployments such as Haiti and
Rwanda that will avoid diversions from military readiness
accounts, and supporting security-enhancing measures in the
Asia-Pacific region, including the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations Regional Forum.
section 304--reports
Section 304 establishes a timetable for submission by the
Commission to designated congressional committees of an interim
and a final report.
section 305--powers
Section 305 specifies the powers of the Commission to
conduct hearings, secure assistance from Federal departments
and agencies, use the United States mails, and receive
assistance from the Secretary of Defense.
section 306--commission procedures
Section 306 provides procedures for the convening of
Commission meetings and establishes a quorum requirement for
the transaction of business by the Commission.
section 307--personnel matters
Section 307 provides for the appointment of Commission
staff, the detail of personnel to the Commission from Federal
departments and agencies, and payment to Commission members of
travel expenses including per diem in lieu of subsistence.
section 308--termination of the commission
Section 308 provides that the Commission shall terminate
upon submission of this final report.
section 309--funding
Section 309 provides that of the funds available to the
Department of Defense, $1.5 million shall be made available to
the Commission.
TITLE IV--COMMAND OF UNITED STATES FORCES
section 401--limitation on expenditure of Department of Defense Funds
for United States Forces Placed Under Command or Operational Control of
a Foreign National Acting on Behalf of the United Nations
Section 401(a) amends title 10 of the United States Code to
add a new section 405 entitled ``Placement of United States
forces under command or operational control of foreign
nationals acting on behalf of the United Nations: limitation''.
The new section 405(a) of title 10 provides that funds
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of
Defense may not be obligated or expended for activities of any
element of the U.S. armed forces that after the date of
enactment is placed under the command or operational control of
a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations for
purposes of international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
enforcing, or similar activity.
The new section 405(a) further provides that U.S. forces
shall not be considered to be under the command or operational
control of a foreign national in any case in which the senior
military commander of the United Nations force is a United
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules
of engagement for the U.S. forces involved, and establish
criteria governing the operational employment of such U.S.
forces. This proviso is intended to address situations in which
foreign nationals may be placed in the chain of command between
a senior military commander of a U.N. operation who is a U.S.
national and a U.S. military unit.
The new section 405(c) provides an exception to the
restrictions of the new section 405(a) for instances in which
Congress has specifically authorized by law the placement of
U.S. armed forces under the command or operational of a foreign
national acting on behalf of the United Nations. The new
section 405(b) provides an exception to the restrictions of the
new section 405(a) for cases in which the President submits a
certification and report to Congress meeting requirements
specified in section 405(d) not less than 15 days before
placing U.S. forces under such command or operational control.
The new section 405(d) provides that a certification under
section 405(b) is required to contain the President's
certification to Congress of the following: (1) The foreign
command or operational control arrangement is necessary to
protect national security interests of the United States; (2)
the U.S. commander of any U.S. unit proposed for placement
under the command or operational control of a foreign national
acting on behalf of the United Nations will at all times retain
the right to report independently to superior U.S. military
authorities, and to decline to comply with orders judged by
such commander to be illegal, militarily imprudent, or beyond
the mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed
with the United Nations, until such time as that commander
receives direction from superior U.S. military authorities; (3)
the U.S. forces will at all times remain under U.S.
administrative command for such purposes as discipline and
evaluation; and (4) the United States will retain the authority
to withdraw any U.S. forces from the proposed operation at any
time and to take any action it considers necessary to protect
those forces if they are engaged.
Any such presidential certification must be accompanied by
a report from the President to Congress setting forth
additional details regarding the proposed foreign command or
operational control arrangement.
If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency
exists that prevents the President from submitting the
certification and report described above to Congress 15 days
before placing U.S. armed forces under foreign command or
operational control, the President may submit such
certification and report to Congress in a timely manner, but in
no event later than 48 hours after such command or operational
control becomes effective.
The new section 405(f) is an interpretation provision
clarifying that nothing in the section is to be construed as
providing statutory authorization for the President to use U.S.
armed forces in any operation or to place any element of the
U.S. armed forces under the command or operational control of a
foreign national. Section 405(f) further clarifies that nothing
in the section is to be construed to derogate or limit the
President's constitutional authority as commander in chief.
Section 401 of the Act contains two additional provisions
that are not incorporated into the new section 405 of title 10.
Section 401(b) provides that no presidential certification
may be submitted under the new section 405(d)(1) of title 10
with respect to any proposed foreign command or operational
control arrangement until the President has submitted to the
Congress a memorandum of legal points and authorities
explaining why the placement of U.S. forces under the command
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf
of the United Nations does not violate the United States
Constitution. This section is intended to address the concern
that any subordination of United States armed forces to the
command or operational control of foreign nationals may violate
the Constitution, including the Appointments Clause (Article
II, section 2, paragraph 2) and the Oaths Clause (Article VI,
paragraph 3).
Section 401(c) excepts from the restrictions of the new
section 405 of title 10 participation of U.S. armed forces in
the ongoing United Nations operations in Macedonia and Croatia
on terms substantially similar to those on which U.S. armed
forces are currently participating in those operations.
section 402--limitation on placement of united states armed forces
under foreign control for a united nations peacekeeping activity
Section 402(a) amends section 6 of the United Nations
Participation Act (section 287d of title 22, United States
Code) to remove the grant of authority from Congress to the
President currently contained in section 6 to negotiate a
special agreement or agreements with the Security Council in
accordance with article 43 of the PUnited Nations Charter.
Section 6 as revised will retain the requirement of the current
section 6 that any agreement with the Security Council in
accordance with article 43 of the United Nations Charter be
approved by Congress by law before taking effect.
The new subsection 6(b) of the United Nations Participation
Act provides that the President may not place any element of
the U.S. armed forces under the command or operational control
of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations
for purposes of international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-
enforcing, or similar activity.
The new section 6(b) further provides that U.S. forces
shall not be considered to be under the command or operational
control of a foreign national in any case in which the senior
military commander of the United Nations force is a United
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules
of engagement for the U.S. forces involved, and establish
criteria governing the operational employment of such U.S.
forces. This proviso is intended to address situations in which
foreign nationals may be placed in the chain of command between
a senior military commander of a U.N. operation who is a U.S.
national and a U.S. military unit.
The new section 6(d) provides an exception to the
restrictions of the new section 6(b) for instances in which
Congress has specifically authorized by law the placement of
U.S. armed forces under the command or operational of a foreign
national acting on behalf of the United Nations. The new
section 6(c) provides an exception to the restrictions of the
new section 6(b) for cases in which the President submits a
certification and report to Congress meeting requirements
specified in section 6(e) not less than 15 days before placing
U.S. forces under such command or operational control.
The new section 6(e) provides that a certification under
section 6(c) is required to contain the President's
certification to Congress of the following: (1) The foreign
command or operational control arrangement is necessary to
protect national security interests of the United States; (2)
the U.S. commander of any U.S. unit proposed for placement
under the command or operational control of a foreign national
acting on behalf of the United Nations will at all times retain
the right to report independently to superior U.S. military
authorities, and to decline to comply with orders judged by
such commander to be illegal, militarily imprudent, or beyond
the mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed
with the United Nations, until such time as that commander
receives direction from superior U.S. military authorities; (3)
the U.S. forces will at all times remain under U.S.
administrative command for such purposes as discipline and
evaluation; and (4) the United States will retain the authority
to withdraw any U.S. forces from the proposed operation at any
time and to take any action it considers necessary to protect
those forces if they are engaged.
Any such presidential certification must be accompanied by
a report from the President to Congress setting forth
additional details regarding the proposed foreign command or
operational control arrangement.
If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency
exists that prevents the President from submitting the
certification and report described above to Congress 15 days
before placing U.S. armed forces under foreign command or
operational control, the President may submit such
certification and report to Congress in a timely manner, but in
no event later than 48 hours after such command or operational
control becomes effective.
The new section 6(g) is an interpretation provision
clarifying that, except as authorized in section 7 of the
United Nations Participation Act, nothing in that Act is to be
construed as providing statutory authorization for the
President to make available to the Security Council United
States Armed forces, facilities, or assistance.
Section 402 of the Act contains two additional provisions
that are not incorporated into the new section 6 of the United
Nations Participation Act.
Section 402(b) provides that no presidential certification
may be submitted under the new section 6(e)(1) of the United
Nations Participation Act with respect to any proposed foreign
command or operational control arrangement until the President
has submitted to the Congress a memorandum of legal points and
authorities explaining why the placement of U.S. forces under
the command or operational control of a foreign national acting
on behalf of the United Nations does not violate the United
States Constitution. This section is intended to address the
concern that any subordination of United States armed forces to
the command or operational control of foreign nationals may
violate the Constitution, including the Appointments Clause
(Article II, section 2, paragraph 2) and the Oaths Clause
(Article VI, paragraph 3).
Section 402(c) excepts from the restrictions of the new
section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act participation
of the U.S. armed forces in the ongoing United Nations
operations in Macedonia and Croatia on terms substantially
similar to those on which U.S. armed forces are currently
participating in those operations.
TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS
section 501--credit against assessment for united states expenditures
in support of united nations peacekeeping operations
Section 501 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 10(a) entitled ``Credit Against Assessment
for Expenditures in Support of Peacekeeping Operations''.
The new section 10(a)(2) of the United Nations
Participation Act requires the President's annual budget
submission to Congress to include a report on the total amount
of incremental costs incurred by the Department of Defense
during the preceding year to support or participate in,
directly or indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping activities.
For purposes of the new section 10(a), the term ``United
Nations peacekeeping activities'' is defined to mean any
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity
authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or VII of
the United Nations Charter, except that such term does not
include any such activity authorized under chapter VII of such
Charter with respect to which the President has certified to
the Congress that the activity is of such importance to the
national security of the United States that the United States
would undertake the activity unilaterally if it were not
authorized by the United Nations Security Council.
The new section 10(a)(1) provides that funds may be
obligated for payment to the United Nations of the United
States assessed share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal
year only to the extent that the amount of such assessed share
exceeds the total amount of incremental costs identified in the
report submitted pursuant to section 10(a)(2), as reduced by
any amount reimbursed or credited to the United States by the
United Nations. The effect of the provision is to permit the
United States to pay United Nations peacekeeping assessments
only to the extent that such assessments exceed the
unreimbursed incremental costs to the Department of Defense
during the preceding year for direct or indirect U.S.
participation in or support to certain U.N. peacekeeping
operations.
section 502--codification of required notice to congress of proposed
united nations peacekeeping activities
Section 502 amends section 4 of the United Nations
Participation Act to clarify and tighten existing requirements
for notice to Congress regarding the authorization of new and
the reauthorization of existing United Nations peacekeeping
operations.
Section 4 as amended will require that all such notice be
provided in writing. Section 4 as amended will further require
that any significant expansion of an existing peacekeeping
operation (defined as expansion by more than 25% as measured by
either the number of personnel participating (or authorized to
participate) in the operation or the budget of the operation)
be treated as authorization of a new peacekeeping operation for
purposes of the reporting requirements.
section 503--notice to congress regarding united states contributions
for united nations peacekeeping activities
Section 503 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 10(b) entitled ``Notice to Congress Regarding
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities''.
The new section 10(b) requires the President to notify
designated congressional committees within 15 days of the
receipt of a billing request from the United Nations for
payment of U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping activities.
The new section 10(b) further requires the President to
notify the designated committees at least 15 days before the
U.S. funds are obligated to pay assessed or voluntary U.S.
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities, except that if
the President determines that an emergency exists and that such
contribution is in the national security interests of the
United States, such notification shall be provided in a timely
manner but no later than 48 hours after such obligation.
section 504--revised notice to congress regarding united states
assistance for united nations peacekeeping activities
Section 504 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 7(e).
The new section 7(e) requires the President to notify
designated congressional committees 15 days in advance of the
provision by any agency or entity of the United States
Government of any assistance or facility to support or
facilitate United Nations peacekeeping activities. The
President may notify the designated committees up to 48 hours
after providing assistance or facility in situations in which
the President determines that an emergency exists and that
providing such assistance or facility is in the national
security interests of the United States.
No notice to the designated committees is required with
respect to (1) assistance having a value less than $1 million
in the case of nonreimbursable assistance, or less than $5
million in the case of reimbursable assistance, or (2)
assistance provided under the emergency drawdown authority
contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. The payment of assessed and voluntary
contributions to the United Nations is not considered
assistance for purposes of the new section 7(e).
section 505--united states contributions to united nations peacekeeping
activities
Section 505 amends section 4(d)(1) of the United Nations
Participation Act to require the President to include in his
annual budget submission to the Congress a description of the
anticipated budget for the next fiscal year for United States
participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities. Included in this
report shall be a statement of the aggregate amount of funds
available to the United Nations for that fiscal year that may
be made available for United Nations peacekeeping activities,
and the aggregate amount of funds and the aggregate cost of in-
kind contributions that the United States proposes to make
available to the United Nations for that fiscal year for U.N.
peacekeeping activities.
section 506--reimbursement to the united states for in-kind
contributions to united nations peacekeeping activities
Section 506(a) amends the United Nations Participation Act
to add a new section 7(b)(2) and a new section 7(f).
The new section 7(b)(2) revises existing law regarding
waiver of the requirement that the United Nations reimburse the
United States for assistance provided to U.N. peacekeeping
activities. Under the new section 7(b)(2), the waiver authority
currently vested in the President would be vested instead in
the Secretary of Defense. The standard for exercising the
waiver would be modified from ``exceptional circumstances, or
when the President finds it to be in the national interest'' to
situations where the Secretary of Defense, after consultation
with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget ``determines that an emergency exists
which justifies waiver'' of reimbursement.
The new section 7(b)(2 requires that any such waiver be
notified to designated congressional committees at least 15
days after the waiver takes effect. If the President determines
that an emergency exists and that providing assistance to the
United Nations on a nonreimbursable basis is in the national
interests of the United States, the designated committees may
be notified of the waiver in a timely manner, but no later than
48 hours after such waiver takes effect.
The new section 7(f) requires the Secretary of State to
ensure that the United Nations reimburses the United States for
goods and services provided on a reimbursable basis under any
provision of law for U.N. peacekeeping activities at the
appropriate value, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.
Section 506(b) requires the representative of the United
States to the United Nations to submit to designated
congressional committees not later than one year after the date
of enactment a report on all actions taken to achieve the
objective of the new section 7(f) of the United Nations
Participation Act.
section 507--prohibition on use of funds to pay united states assessed
or voluntary contributions for united nations peacekeeping activities
Section 507 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 10(c) entitled ``Prohibition on Use of Funds
to Pay Assessed or Voluntary Contributions for Peacekeeping
Activities''.
The new section 10(c) prohibits payment of assessed and
voluntary U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities
during any fiscal year until the Secretary of Defense certifies
to Congress that the United Nations has reimbursed the
Department of Defense directly for all goods and services
provided on a reimbursable basis by that Department for United
Nations peacekeeping activities during the preceding year. This
prohibition would not apply to the extent that the Department
of Defense has failed to submit its bills for goods and
services provided to the United Nations in a timely manner.
Section 508--Limitation on Use of Department of Defense Funds for
United States Share of Costs of United Nations Peacekeeping Activities
Section 508 contains an amendment to title 10 of the United
States Code establishing a limitation on the use of funds
available to the Department of Defense for peacekeeping
activities. As a limitation on the expenditure of Department of
Defense funds, this section is outside the jurisdiction of the
Committee on International Relations.
Section 509--Codification of Limitation on Amount of United States
Assessed Contributions for United Nations Peacekeeping Activities
Section 509 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 10(d) entitled ``Limitation on Assessed
Contribution with Respect to a Peacekeeping Operation''.
The new section 10(d) prohibits payment by the United
States of assessed contributions for U.N. peacekeeping in an
amount which is greater than 25 percent of the total amount of
all assessments. The section further provides that any
arrearages that accumulate as a result of United Nations
assessments in excess of 25 percent of the total amount of all
assessed contributions for any peacekeeping operation shall not
be recognized or paid by the United States.
Section 510--Buy American Requirement
Section 510 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 10(e) and a new section 10(f).
The new section 10(e) prohibits obligation or expenditure
of assessed or voluntary U.S. contributions to U.N.
peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of State certifies
to designated congressional committees that U.S. manufacturers
and suppliers are being given opportunities to provide
equipment, services, and material for U.N. peacekeeping
activities equal to the opportunities being given to foreign
manufacturers and suppliers.
The new section 10(f) defines ``designated congressional
committees'' for purposes of the new section 10 as the
Committee on International Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
Section 511--United Nations Budgetary and Management Reform
Section 511 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 11.
The new section 11(a) requires withholding at the beginning
of each fiscal year of 10% of the amounts made available for
assessed U.S. contributions to the regular U.N. budget, 50% of
the amounts made available for assessed U.S. contributions to
U.N. peacekeeping, and all voluntary U.S. contributions to U.N.
peacekeeping, until the President submits an annual
certification to Congress in accordance with section 11(b).
The new section 11(b) provides for an annual certification
by the President regarding the U.N. office of Inspector
General. In general terms, each such certification must include
the following elements: (1) The U.N. has an independent Office
of Inspector General; (2) the U.N. Inspector General was
appointed principally on the basis of the appointee's integrity
and demonstrated ability; (3) the Inspector General is
authorized to, inter alia, have access to all records and
officials of the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
(4) the United Nations has fully implemented procedures that
effectively protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals
against, United Nations staff members who complain to or
cooperate with the inspector General; (5) the United Nations
has fully implemented procedures that ensure compliance with
the recommendations of the Inspector General; (6) the United
Nations has ensured that the annual and all other reports of
the Inspector General are made available to the General
Assembly without modification; and (7) the United Nations has
provided, and is committed to providing, sufficient budgetary
resources to ensure the effective operation of the Office of
Inspector General.
Section 512--Conditions on Provision of Intelligence to the United
Nations
Section 512 amends the United Nations Participation Act to
add a new section 12.
The new section 12(a) provides that the President shall
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall
protect U.S. intelligence sources and methods before any such
information is provided to the United Nations.
The new section 12(b) provides that the President shall
report not less frequently than semiannually to designated
congressional committees on the types of intelligence provided
to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was
provided during the period covered by the report. This section
further requires the President to report to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees within 15 days after he learns
of any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided to the
United Nations.
The new section 12(c) provides that the President may not
delegate the duties vested in him under section 12.
The new section 12(d) directs the Secretary of State or his
designee to work with the United Nations to improve its
handling of all intelligence information provided it by its
members.
TITLE VI--EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
section 601--short title
Section 601 provides the short title for this title of the
Act, the ``NATO Expansion Act of 1995''.
section 602--findings
Section 602 contains congressional findings relevant to the
NATO Expansion Act of 1995.
section 603--united states policy
Section 603 declares that it should be the policy of the
United States that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia should be in a position to become full NATO members in
the near future, provided they satisfy criteria related to
democratization and readiness to joint NATO set forth in the
section. Section 603 also declares that the United States,
other NATO members, and NATO itself should furnish appropriate
assistance to facilitate the transition of Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Slovakia to full NATO membership.
Section 603 further declares that other European countries
emerging from communist domination may be in a position to join
NATO at a future date and should be assisted in doing so at
that time.
section 604--revisions to program to facilitate transition to nato
membership
Section 604 amends the NATO Participation Act (title II of
Public Law 103-447) to enhance in a number of key respects the
program authorized by that Act to facilitate the transition to
full NATO membership of European countries emerging from
communism.
Section 604 makes the establishment of the transition
assistance program authorized by Public Law 103-447 mandatory
rather than discretionary. In addition, section 604 designates
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia as
immediately eligible to participate in the transition
assistance program by eliminating the requirement that they be
designated by the President to participate. Section 604 adds
economic support fund assistance and assistance from the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament fund account to the types of
assistance that may be provided to eligible countries through
the transition assistance program.
TITLE VII--BUDGET FIREWALLS
section 701--restoration of budget firewalls for defense spending
Section 701 contains an expression of the sense of the
Congress regarding the restoration of budget firewalls between
defense and domestic discretionary spending for fiscal years
1966, 1997, and 1998. This section is outside he jurisdiction
of the Committee on International Relations
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports
that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings
No findings or recommendations of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight were received as referred to in
clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives is inapplicable because H.R. 7 does not provide
new budget authority, new spending authority, new credit
authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax
expenditures.
Inflationary Impact Statement
In compliance with clause 2(l)(4) of rule XI of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that
H.R. 7 will have no significant inflationary impact on prices
and costs in the operation of the national economy.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(C) of rule XI of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth
with respect to H.R. 7 the following estimate and comparison
prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Offices
under section 403 of the Budget Act of 1974:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, February 3, 1995.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
reviewed the amendments to H.R. 7, National Security
Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the House Committee
on International Relations on January 31, 1995. Neither the
Committee's amendments nor the bill as introduced would have
pay-as-you-go implications. They would not explicitly authorize
appropriations nor would they have an impact on the budget of
state and local governments.
A few provisions of H.R. 7 could imply changes in the
authorization of discretionary appropriations--particularly,
Title II (Missile Defense), Title V (United Nations), and Title
VI (Revitalization and Expansion of NATO). The attachment
discusses these implications of H.R. 7 as introduced. The costs
discussed in the attachment would come to bear only if
subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
The Committee's amendment to section 501 changes H.R. 7 as
introduced in two main ways. First, the amendment would lower
payments for peacekeeping assessments by the incremental costs
of using U.S. forces in U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations
unless the Department of Defense (DoD) has been reimbursed for
those costs. In H.R. 7 as introduced, payments would be lowered
by the total (not incremental) costs of those operations. The
amendment does not change the budgetary impact of H.R. 7
because both incremental and total costs are expected to exceed
U.S. assessments.
The Committee's amendment would allow the President to
waive the provisions of section 501 if he certifies that the
United States would have undertaken the operation unilaterally
if it were not authorized by the U.N. This change could lessen
the budgetary impact of section 501 if the President makes one
or more certifications. The size of the budgetary impact would
depend on the number of certifications and the cost of the
related operations.
If you would like further details on this estimate, we will
be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Kent
Christensen, Raymond Hall, and Michael Miller.
Sincerely,
Robert D. Reischauer, Director.
Attachment.
budgetary implications of h.r. 7, national security revitalization act
This document considers the budgetary implications of H.R.
7 as introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on January
4, 1995. It serves as a basis for understanding the budgetary
impacts of any Committee on floor amendments.
Strictly speaking, H.R. 7 has no direct budgetary impact.
It has no pay-as-you-go implications nor does it explicitly
authorize appropriations. Nevertheless, some provisions of H.R.
7 could imply changes in the authorization of discretionary
appropriations--particularly, Title II (Missile Defense), Title
V (United Nations), and Title VI (Revitalization and Expansion
of NATO.) These implications would come to bear only if
subsequent legislation explicitly authorizes appropriations.
Title II--Missile Defense. H.R. 7 calls on the Secretary of
Defense to develop national and theater missile defenses, but
it is silent on how much funding would be available for this
purpose. The cost of such a system could total $29 billion to
$30 billion over the next five years, or about $10 billion to
$11 billion more than is currently programmed for missile
defense.
In 1992, the Department of Defense planned to deploy a
national missile defense (NMD) system at an initial site by
2004 and at multiple sites soon thereafter. This plan called
for deploying both ground-based systems and space-based sensors
commonly referred to as Brilliant Eyes. These two components of
the 1992 plan are the basis for our current estimate for the
costs of NMD system. The current estimate does not, however,
embrace the component of the 1992 plan calling for space-based
interceptors (commonly known as Brilliant Pebbles). An
enhancement to NMD, Brilliant Pebbles raises more concerns
about violating the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Treaty
than do other elements of NMD.
Deploying a ground-based system of radars, interceptors,
and command and control at an initial site by 2006 would cost
about $10 billion. This sum would also support eventual
deployment at multiple sites. Finally, the additional funding
would support research and development into technologies that
would enable the system to counter emerging threats.
For about $1 billion more this system could be expanded to
accelerate the deployment of space-based sensors. With this
additional funding, some sensors could be deployed by 2002 to
provide cuing and initial targeting data. This sensor
capability is supposed to permit the ground-based interceptors
at the initial site to protect the entire continental United
States against limited missile attacks from the north.
As for theater missile defense, this estimate assumes that
the current plan for theater missile defense is consistent with
the aims of H.R. 7. That plan would deploy groundbased radars
and missiles with forward-deployed elements of the Army and
Marine Corps by the end of the century. Eventually more capable
systems such as the Navy's sea-based vertical launch systems,
the Air Force's boost-phase interceptors, or the Army's mobile
air and missile defenses would be deployed.
Under these assumptions H.R. 7 would add $10 billion to $11
billion to missile defense costs and bring the total budget for
these capabilities to $29 billion or $30 billion. But the
ultimate costs are quite uncertain. These estimates assume that
the 1992 plan is technically feasible, that the financial plan
matched the real components of the system, and that the plan
could be resumed after a two-year hiatus with costs rising only
for inflation.
Title III--Revitalization of National Security Commission.
The bill would establish a commission to conduct a
comprehensive review of defense strategy, force structure,
modernization, readiness, infrastructure, and funding. Of the
funds otherwise available to DoD, $1.5 million would be
available to carry out the provisions of the title.
Title IV--Command of United States Forces. H.R. 7 would
amend title 10 of the U.S. Code and the United Nations
Participation Act to prohibit a foreign national from
commanding U.S. forces unless the President makes certain
certifications. Neither change would have a significant
budgetary impact.
Title IV would also require the Congress to approve in law
any agreement between the President and the U.N. Security
Council for the use of U.S. forces in maintaining international
peace and security. CBO cannot predict the extent of U.S.
involvement in peacekeeping activities. Nevertheless, if
Congress denied U.S. participation in some peacekeeping
activities the budgetary savings would likely be no more than a
few hundred million dollars per year based on recent
experience. For example, if the United States had not used its
forces in Bosnia it would not have incurred expenses of about
$300 million a year in 1994 and 1995. Similarly for U.S.
expenses in Somalia, the average savings would have been about
$700 million a year in 1993 and 1994. Aside from deployments to
Southwest Asia, the deployments to Bosnia and Somalia have been
the most costly contingencies of recent years.
Title V--United Nations. Title V addresses U.S. financial
responsibilities to the U.N. in support of international
peacekeeping Enactment of Title V could:
lower payments of assessed and voluntary
contributions that help fund U.N. peacekeeping
activities;
lower payments of assessed contributions that help
fund the U.N. operating budget; and
limit DoD's involvement in U.N.-sponsored
peacekeeping activities.
Certain sections of Title V would have overlapping effects.
For example, sections 501 and 507 could reduce assessed
payments to the United Nations for peacekeeping--currently
about $1.0 billion a year--for fiscal years after 1995.
Similarly sections 507 and 511 could reduce the assessments and
voluntary contributions totalling about $0.1 billion a year.
Thus, the potential budgetary effects of these sections were
not additive.
Section 501 would probably lower or eliminate the payment
of assessed peacekeeping contributions, which will total about
$1.0 billion in 1995 if the President's supplemental request if
fully funded by the Congress. Under section 501, payments would
be lowered by the total cost of using Forces in peacekeeping
activities that are authorized by the U.N. unless the U.N. has
reimbursed DoD for those costs.
DoD currently is incurring incremental peacekeeping costs
from U.N. authorized operations in Haiti, the former
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere that will total about $2 billion in
1995. Total costs could be much higher. If DoD continues its
current level of peacekeeping activity, section 501 would
eliminate the payment of U.S. contributions because DoD's total
costs could far exceed peacekeeping assessments. If, however,
DoD dramatically scales back its peacekeeping activities, and
if payments for assessed contributions remain at about $1.0
billion annually, section 501 could lower U.S. contributions by
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Similarly, section 507 would deny assessed and voluntary
contributions for unreimbursed costs, but section 507 focuses
more on noncombat operations while section 501 would affect all
types of U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. The Secretary
of Defense however, may waive this provision if he determines
that an emergency exists. This provision could lower annual
payments for assessments by the same $1.0 billion targeted by
section 501, and voluntary payments by about $0.1 billion
annually.
Section 511 would reduce payments to the U.N. unless the
U.N. has appointed an Inspector General (IG) and has
established an operational IG office that could investigate the
U.N. and its specialized agencies. Under section 511, 50
percent of the peacekeeping assessments, 20 percent of the
payments in support of the U.N. operating budget, and all
payments from voluntary contributions would be withheld unless
the President certifies that the IG provisions have been met.
Thus, section 511 could reduce payments for peacekeeping
assessments (like sections 501 and 507) by about $0.5 billion,
payments for the U.N. operating budget by about $0.05 billion,
and voluntary payments (like section 507) by $0.1 billion
unless the President makes the certification.
Section 508 would prohibit DoD from participating in
peacekeeping activities sponsored by the U.N. unless Congress
has authorized it to use funds for such purposes. Peacekeeping
activities sponsored by the U.N. typically have far less U.S.
involvement than activities authorized by the U.N. The
incremental cost to the United States of a large U.N.-sponsored
peacekeeping operation historically has been less than $50
million annually. Thus, if the Congress denied U.S.
participation in any one operation, savings could total up to
$50 million a year.
Section 508 would also prohibit DoD funds from being used
to pay U.N. peacekeeping assessments. Compared with current
law, this provision would not have any budget impact because
DoD is not authorized to use funds for such purposes.
Title VI--Revitalization and Expansion of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. H.R. 7 would reaffirm the United
States' commitment to NATO and support the expansion of NATO to
include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and
other countries designated by the President. The bill would
authorize the use of economic support assistance and
nonproliferation and disarmament assistance to facilitate the
transition to NATO membership. Any implicit authorization of
appropriations is open-ended. For 1995, the Economic Support
Fund (ESF) is funded at roughly $2.4, billion with about $2.0
billion of that going to Egypt and Israel and about $0.4
billion going to about 20 other countries. Nonproliferation and
Disarmament funding is now $10 million.
Title VII--Budget Firewalls. This title expresses a sense
of Congress that there should be firewalls between defense and
nondefense discretionary spending for 1996, 1997, 1998. This
title would affect only the distribution, not the level, of
spending under the caps on discretionary spending that were
established under the Budget Enforcement Act.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
titles I, III, V, and VI, and sections 401 and 402 of the bill,
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in
roman):
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 20--HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ASSISTANCE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
Sec.
401. Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with
military operations.
* * * * * * *
405. Placement of United States forces under command or operational
control of foreign nationals acting on behalf of the United
Nations: limitation.
406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of
costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities: limitation.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 405. Placement of United States forces under command or
operational control of foreign nationals acting on
behalf of the United Nations: limitation
(a) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (b)
and (c), funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the
Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for
activities of any element of the armed forces that after the
date of the enactment of this section is placed under the
command or operational control of a foreign national acting on
behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of international
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity
that is authorized by the Security Council under chapter VI or
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
(2) For purposes of this section, elements of the armed
forces shall not be considered to be placed under the command
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf
of the United Nations in any case in which the senior military
commander of the United Nations force or operation is a United
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules
of engagement for United States forces involved, and establish
criteria governing the operational employment of such United
States forces.
(b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection
(a) shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any
element of the armed forces under such command or operational
control if the President, not less than 15 days before the date
on which such command or operational control is to become
effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the
requirements of subsection (d).
(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency
exists that precludes the President from meeting the
requirements of subsection (d) 15 days before placing any
element of the armed forces under such command or operational
control, the President may place such forces under such command
or operational control and meet the requirements of subsection
(d) in a timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours
after such command or operational control becomes effective.
(c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a) shall
not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of
the armed forces under such command or operational control if
the Congress specifically authorizes by law that particular
placement of United States forces under such command or
operational control.
(d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred
to in subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to
Congress the following:
(1) Certification by the President that--
(A) such a command or operational control
arrangement is necessary to protect national
security interests of the United States;
(B) the commander of any unit of the armed
forces proposed for placement under the command
or operational control of a foreign national
acting directly on behalf of the United Nations
will at all times retain the right--
(i) to report independently to
superior United States military
authorities; and
(ii) to decline to comply with orders
judged by the commander to be illegal,
militarily imprudent, or beyond the
mandate of the mission to which the
United States agreed with the United
Nations, until such time as that
commander receives direction from
superior United States military
authorities with respect to the orders
that the commander has declined to
comply with;
(C) any element of the armed forces proposed
for placement under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting directly
on behalf of the United Nations will at all
times remain under United States administrative
command for such purposes as discipline and
evaluation; and
(D) the United States will retain the
authority to withdraw any element of the armed
forces from the proposed operation at any time
and to take any action it considers necessary
to protect those forces if they are engaged.
(2) A report setting forth the following:
(A) A description of the national security
interests that require the placement of United
States forces under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting directly
on behalf of the United Nations.
(B) The mission of the United States forces
involved.
(C) The expected size and composition of the
United States forces involved.
(D) The incremental cost to the United States
of participation in the United Nations
operation by the United States forces which are
proposed to be placed under the command or
operational control of a foreign national.
(E) The precise command and control
relationship between the United States forces
involved and the United Nations command
structure.
(F) The precise command and control
relationship between the United States forces
involved and the commander of the United States
unified command for the region in which those
United States forces are to operate.
(G) The extent to which the United States
forces involved will rely on non-United States
forces for security and self-defense and an
assessment on the ability of those non-United
States forces to provide adequate security to
the United States forces involved.
(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of
the United States forces involved.
(e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (c)
shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in
classified form.
(f) Interpretation.--(1) This section is a limitation on the
expenditure of Department of Defense funds for any element of
the armed forces placed under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting on behalf of the United
Nations and is not to be construed as an authorization--
(A) for the President to use any element of the armed
forces in any operation; or
(B) for the President to place any element of the
armed forces under the command or operational control
of a foreign national.
(2) Subject to the power of the Congress to declare war under
article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution, nothing in
this section shall be construed to derogate or limit the
authority of the President as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces under article II, section 2, clause 1 of the
Constitution.
Sec. 406. Use of Department of Defense funds for United States share of
costs of United Nations peacekeeping activities:
limitation
(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Payment of Assessment.--
No funds available to the Department of Defense shall be
available for payment of any United States assessed or
voluntary contribution for United Nations peacekeeping
activities.
(b) Limitation on Use of Funds for Participation in
Peacekeeping Activities.--Funds available to the Department of
Defense may be used for payment of the incremental costs
associated with the participation of elements of the armed
forces in United Nations peacekeeping activities only to the
extent that Congress has by law specifically authorized the use
of those funds for such purposes.
* * * * * * *
----------
UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1945
* * * * * * *
Sec. 4. (a) Periodic Reports.--The President shall, from time
to time as occasion may require, but not less than once each
year, make reports to the Congress of the activities of the
United Nations and of the participation of the United States
therein. [He shall make special current reports on decisions of
the Security Council to take enforcement measures under the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and on the
participation therein, under his instructions, of the
representative of the United States.]
* * * * * * *
(d) Annual Report.--In addition to the report required by
subsection (a), the President, at the time of submission of the
annual budget request to the Congress, shall submit to the
designated congressional committees a report that includes the
following:
(1) Costs of peacekeeping operations.--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(D) A description of the anticipated budget
for the next fiscal year for United States
participation in United Nations peacekeeping
activities, including a statement of--
(i) the aggregate amount of funds
available to the United Nations for
that fiscal year, including assessed
and voluntary contributions, which may
be made available for United Nations
peacekeeping activities; and
(ii) the aggregate amount of funds
(from all accounts) and the aggregate
costs of in-kind contributions that the
United States proposes to make
available to the United Nations for
that fiscal year for United Nations
peacekeeping activities.
[(D)](E) In the case of the first 2 reports
submitted pursuant to this subsection, a
projection of all United States costs for
United Nations peacekeeping operations during
each of the next 2 fiscal years, including
assessed and voluntary contributions.
* * * * * * *
(e) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations.--
(1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall
consult with the Congress on the status of United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
(2) Information to be provided.--In connection with
these consultations, the following information shall be
provided in written form not later than the 10th day of
each month to the designated congressional committees:
(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations
peacekeeping operations, the following:
(i) A list of all resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council
anticipated to be voted on during such
month that would extend or change the
mandate of any United Nations
peacekeeping operation.
(ii) For each such operation, any
changes in the duration, mandate, and
command and control arrangements that
are anticipated as a result of the
adoption of the resolution.
(iii) An estimate of the total cost
to the United Nations of each such
operation for the period covered by the
resolution, and an estimate of the
amount of that cost that will be
assessed to the United States.
(iv) Any anticipated significant
changes in United States participation
in or support for each such operation
during the period covered by the
resolution (including facilities,
training, transportation,
communication, intelligence, and
logistical support), and the estimated
costs to the United States of such
changes.
(B) With respect to each new United Nations
peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to
be authorized by a Security Council resolution
during such month, the following information
for the period covered by the resolution:
(i) The anticipated duration,
mandate, and command and control
arrangements of such operation.
(ii) An estimate of the total cost to
the United Nations of the operation,
and an estimate of the amount of that
cost that will be assessed to the
United States.
(iii) A description of the functions
that would be performed by any United
States Armed Forces participating in or
otherwise operating in support of the
operation, an estimate of the number of
members of the Armed Forces that will
participate in or otherwise operate in
support of the operation, and an
estimate of the cost to the United
States of such participation or
support.
(iv) A description of any other
United States assistance to or support
for the operation (including
facilities, training, transportation,
communication, intelligence, and
logistical support), and an estimate of
the cost to the United States of such
assistance or support.
(3) Interim information.--(A) The President shall
submit to the designated congressional committees a
written interim report if, during the period between
the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1),
the United States learns that the United Nations
Security Council is likely, before the next such
consultation, to vote on a resolution that would
authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation
and that resolution was not previously reported on
pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall
include the information described in clauses (i)
through (iv) of paragraph (2)(B).
(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not
less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations
Security Council, unless the President determines that
exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the
requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the
President makes such a determination, the interim
report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case
later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a
copy of the determination and a description of the
exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that
determination.
(4) New united nations peacekeeping operation
defined.--As used in paragraphs (2) (B) and (3), the
term ``new United Nations peacekeeping operation''
includes any existing or otherwise ongoing United
Nations peacekeeping operation--
(A) that is to be expanded by more than 25
percent during the period covered by the
Security Council resolution, as measured by
either the number of personnel participating
(or authorized to participate) in the operation
or the budget of the operation; or
(B) that is to be authorized to operate in a
country in which it was not previously
authorized to operate.
(5) Quarterly reports.--The President shall submit
quarterly reports to the designated congressional
committees on all assistance provided by the United
States during the preceding calendar quarter to the
United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. Each
report shall describe the assistance provided for each
such operation, listed by category of assistance. The
report for the fourth calendar quarter of each year
shall be submitted as part of the annual report
required by subsection (d) and shall include cumulative
information for the preceding calendar year.
[(e) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has
the meaning given that term by section 415 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995.]
(f) Designated Congressional Committees.--As used in this
section, the term ``designated congressional committees'' has
the meaning given such term in section 10(f).
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 6. The President is authorized to negotiate a special
agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall
be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act
or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types of
armed forces, their degree of readiness and general locations,
and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights
of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its
call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The
President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of
the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its
call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter
and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the Armed
Forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein:
Provided, That, except as authorized in section 7 of this Act,
nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization
to the President by the Congress to make available to the
Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or
assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and
assistance provided for in such special agreement or
agreements.]
Sec. 6. (a) Agreements With Security Council.--(1) Any
special agreement described in paragraph (2) that is concluded
by the President with the Security Council shall not be
effective unless approved by the Congress by law.
(2) An agreement referred to in paragraph (1) is an agreement
providing for the numbers and types of United States Armed
Forces, their degree of readiness and general locations, or the
nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of
passage, to be made available to the Security Council for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security in
accordance with Article 43 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
(b) Limitation.--(1) Except as provided in subsections (c)
and (d), the President may not place any element of the Armed
Forces under the command or operational control of a foreign
national acting on behalf of the United Nations for the purpose
of international peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or
similar activity that is authorized by the Security Council
under chapter VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
(2) For purposes of this section, elements of the Armed
Forces shall not be considered to be placed under the command
or operational control of a foreign national acting on behalf
of the United Nations in any case in which the senior military
commander of the United Nations force or operation is a United
States military officer who has the authority to dismiss
subordinates in the command chain, establish appropriate rules
of engagement for United States forces involved, and establish
criteria governing the operational employment of such United
States forces.
(c) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) Subsection
(b) shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any
element of the Armed Forces under such command or operational
control if the President, not less than 15 days before the date
on which such command or operational control is to become
effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the
requirements of subsection (e).
(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an emergency
exists that precludes the President from meeting the
requirements of subsection (e) 15 days before placing any
element of the Armed Forces under such command or operational
control, the President may place such forces under such command
or operational control and meet the requirements of subsection
(e) in a timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours
after such command or operational control becomes effective.
(d) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (b) shall
not apply in the case of a proposed placement of any element of
the Armed Forces under such command or operational control if
the Congress specifically authorizes by law that particular
placement of United States forces under such command or
operational control.
(e) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred
to in subsection (c)(1) are that the President submit to
Congress the following:
(1) Certification by the President that--
(A) such a command or operational control
arrangement is necessary to protect national
security interests of the United States;
(B) the commander of any unit of the Armed
Forces proposed for placement under the command
or operational control of a foreign national
acting directly on behalf of the United Nations
will at all times retain the right--
(i) to report independently to
superior United States military
authorities; and
(ii) to decline to comply with orders
judged by the commander to be illegal,
militarily imprudent, or beyond the
mandate of the mission to which the
United States agreed with the United
Nations, until such time as that
commander receives direction from
superior United States military
authorities with respect to the orders
that the commander has declined to
comply with;
(C) any element of the Armed Forces proposed
for placement under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting directly
on behalf of the United Nations will at all
times remain under United States administrative
command for such purposes as discipline and
evaluation; and
(D) the United States will retain the
authority to withdraw any element of the Armed
Forces from the proposed operation at any time
and to take any action it considers necessary
to protect those forces if they are engaged.
(2) A report setting forth the following:
(A) A description of the national security
interests that require the placement of United
States forces under the command or operational
control of a foreign national acting directly
on behalf of the United Nations.
(B) The mission of the United States forces
involved.
(C) The expected size and composition of the
United States forces involved.
(D) The incremental cost to the United States
of participation in the United Nations
operation by the United States forces which are
proposed to be placed under the command or
operational control of a foreign national.
(E) The precise command and control
relationship between the United States forces
involved and the United Nations command
structure.
(F) The precise command and control
relationship between the United States forces
involved and the commander of the United States
unified command for the region in which those
United States forces are to operate.
(G) The extent to which the United States
forces involved will rely on non-United States
forces for security and self-defense and an
assessment on the ability of those non-PUnited
States forces to provide adequate security to
the United States forces involved.
(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of
the United States forces involved.
(f) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection (e)
shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if necessary, in
classified form.
(g) Interpretation.--Except as authorized in section 7 of
this Act, nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as
an authorization to the President by the Congress to make
available to the Security Council United States Armed Forces,
facilities, or assistance.
Sec. 7. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law
other than subsection (e)(1), the President, upon the request
by the United Nations for cooperative action, and to the extent
that he finds that it is consistent with the national interest
to comply with such request, may authorize, in support of such
activities of the United Nations as are specifically directed
to the peaceful settlement of disputes and not involving the
employment of armed forces contemplated by chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(b)(1) Whenever personnel or assistance is made available
pursuant to the authority contained in subsection (a) (1) and
(2) of this section, the President shall require reimbursement
from the United Nations for the expense thereby incurred by the
[United States: Provided, That in exceptional circumstances, or
when the President finds it to be in the national interest, he
may waive, in whole or in part, the requirement of such
reimbursement: Provided further, That when] United States. When
any such reimbursement is made, it shall be credited, at the
option of the appropriate department of the Department of
Defense, either to the appropriation, fund, or account utilized
in incurring the obligation, or to an appropriate
appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the
purposes for which expenditures were made.
(2) The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for
reimbursement under paragraph (1) if the Secretary, after
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, determines that an
emergency exists which justifies waiver of that requirement.
Any such waiver shall be submitted to the designated
congressional committees, as defined in section 10(a)(3)(B), at
least 15 days before it takes effect, except that if the
President determines that an emergency exists which prevents
compliance with the requirement that the notification be
provided 15 days in advance and that the provision under
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of personnel or assistance on a
nonreimbursable basis is in the national security interests of
the United States, such notification shall be provided in a
timely manner but no later than 48 hours after such waiver
takes effect.
* * * * * * *
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), at least
15 days before any agency or entity of the United States
Government makes available to the United Nations any assistance
or facility to support or facilitate United Nations
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify the
designated congressional committees.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to--
(A) assistance having a value of less than $1,000,000
in the case of nonreimbursable assistance or less than
$5,000,000 in the case of reimbursable assistance; or
(B) assistance provided under the emergency drawdown
authority contained in sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2318(a)(1), 2348a(c)(2)).
(3) If the President determines that an emergency exists
which prevents compliance with the requirement in paragraph (1)
that notification be provided 15 days in advance and that the
contribution of any such assistance or facility is in the
national security interests of the United States, such
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not later
than 48 hours after such assistance or facility is made
available to the United Nations.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term
``assistance''--
(A) means assistance of any kind, including
logistical support, supplies, goods, or services
(including command, control, communications or
intelligence assistance and training), and the grant of
rights of passage; and
(B) includes assistance provided through in-kind
contributions or through the provision of support,
supplies, goods, or services on any terms, including on
a grant, lease, loan, or reimbursable basis; but
(C) does not include the payment of assessed or
voluntary contributions.
(f) The Secretary of State shall ensure that goods and
services provided on a reimbursable basis by the Department of
Defense to the United Nations for United Nations peacekeeping
operations under this section or any other provision of law are
reimbursed at the appropriate value, as determined by the
Secretary of Defense.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 10. (a) Credit Against Assessment for Expenditures in
Support of Peacekeeping Operations.--
(1) Limitation.--Funds may be obligated for payment
to the United Nations of the United States assessed
share of peacekeeping operations for a fiscal year only
to the extent that--
(A) the amount of such assessed share
exceeds--
(B) the amount equal to--
(i) the total amount identified in
the report submitted pursuant to
paragraph (2) for the preceding fiscal
year, reduced by
(ii) the amount of any reimbursement
or credit to the United States by the
United Nations for the costs of United
States support for, or participation
in, United Nations peacekeeping
activities for that preceding fiscal
year.
(2) Annual report.--The President shall, at the time
of submission of the budget to the Congress for any
fiscal year, submit to the designated congressional
committees a report on the total amount of incremental
costs incurred by the Department of Defense during the
preceding fiscal year to support or participate in,
directly or indirectly, United Nations peacekeeping
activities. Such report shall include a separate
listing by United Nations peacekeeping operation of the
amount of incremental costs incurred to support or
participate in each such operation.
(3) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection:
(A) United nations peacekeeping activities.--
The term ``United Nations peacekeeping
activities'' means any international
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or
similar activity that is authorized by the
United Nations Security Council under chapter
VI or VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
except that such term does not include any such
activity authorized under chapter VII of such
Charter with respect to which the President has
certified to the Congress that the activity is
of such importance to the national security of
the United States that the United States would
undertake the activity unilaterally if it were
not authorized by the United Nations Security
Council.
(B) Designated congressional committees.--The
term ``designated congressional committees''
includes the Committee on National Security of
the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate.
(b) Notice to Congress Regarding Contributions for
Peacekeeping Activities.--
(1) Notice regarding united nations billing
request.--Not later than 15 days after the date on
which the United States receives from the United
Nations a billing requesting a payment by the United
States of any contribution for United Nations
peacekeeping activities, the President shall so notify
the designated congressional committees.
(2) Notice regarding proposed obligation of funds.--
The President shall notify the designated congressional
committees at least 15 days before the United States
obligates funds for any assessed or voluntary
contribution for United Nations peacekeeping
activities, except that if the President determines
that an emergency exists which prevents compliance with
the requirement that such notification be provided 15
days in advance and that such contribution is in the
national security interests of the United States, such
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but
no later than 48 hours after such obligation.
(c) Prohibition on Use of Funds To Pay Assessed or Voluntary
Contributions for Peacekeeping Activities.--
(1) In general.--Appropriated funds may not be used
to pay any United States assessed or voluntary
contribution during any fiscal year for United Nations
peacekeeping activities until the Secretary of Defense
certifies to the designated congressional committees
that the United Nations has reimbursed the Department
of Defense directly for all goods and services that
were provided to the United Nations by the Department
of Defense on a reimbursable basis during the preceding
fiscal year for United Nations peacekeeping activities,
including personnel and assistance provided under
section 7 (except to the extent that the authority of
subsection (b)(2) of such section to waive the
reimbursement requirement was exercised with respect to
such personnel or assistance).
(2) Exception.--The prohibition contained in
paragraph (1) shall not apply when the Department of
Defense has failed to submit its bills in a timely
manner for goods and services that were provided to the
United Nations.
(d) Limitation on Assessed Contribution With Respect to a
Peacekeeping Operation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated
for ``Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities''
for any fiscal year shall not be available for the payment of
the United States assessed contribution for a United Nations
peacekeeping operation in an amount which is greater than 25
percent of the total amount of all assessed contributions for
that operation, and any arrearages that accumulate as a result
of assessments in excess of 25 percent of the total amount of
all assessed contributions for any United Nations peacekeeping
operation shall not be recognized or paid by the United States.
(e) Buy American Requirement.--No funds may be obligated or
expended to pay any United States assessed or voluntary
contribution for United Nations peacekeeping activities unless
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the
designated congressional committees that United States
manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to
provide equipment, services, and material for such activities
equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and
suppliers.
(f) Designated Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in
this section, the term ``designated congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on International Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
Sec. 11. (a) Withholding of Contributions.--
(1) Assessed contributions for regular united nations
budget.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 20
percent of the amount of funds made available for that
fiscal year for United States assessed contributions
for the regular United Nations budget shall be withheld
from obligation and expenditure unless a certification
for that fiscal year has been made under subsection
(b).
(2) Assessed contributions for united nations
peacekeeping.--At the beginning of each fiscal year, 50
percent of the amount of funds made available for that
fiscal year for United States assessed contributions
for United Nations peacekeeping activities shall be
withheld from obligation and expenditure unless a
certification for that fiscal year has been made under
subsection (b).
(3) Voluntary contributions for united nations
peacekeeping.--The United States may not during any
fiscal year pay any voluntary contribution to the
United Nations for international peacekeeping
activities unless a certification for that fiscal year
has been made under subsection (b).
(b) Certification.--The certification referred to in
subsection (a) for any fiscal year is a certification by the
President to the Congress, submitted on or after the beginning
of that fiscal year, of each of the following:
(1) The United Nations has an independent office of
Inspector General to conduct and supervise objective
audits, inspections, and investigations relating to
programs and operations of the United Nations.
(2) The United Nations has an Inspector General who
was appointed by the Secretary General with the
approval of the General Assembly and whose appointment
was made principally on the basis of the appointee's
integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting,
auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis,
public administration, or investigation.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to--
(A) make investigations and reports relating
to the administration of the programs and
operations of the United Nations;
(B) have access to all records, documents,
and other available materials relating to those
programs and operations;
(C) have direct and prompt access to any
official of the United Nations; and
(D) have access to all records and officials
of the specialized agencies of the United
Nations.
(4) The United Nations has fully implemented, and
made available to all member states, procedures that
effectively protect the identity of, and prevent
reprisals against, any staff member of the United
Nations making a complaint or disclosing information
to, or cooperating in any investigation or inspection
by, the United Nations Inspector General.
(5) The United Nations has fully implemented
procedures that ensure compliance with recommendations
of the United Nations Inspector General.
(6) The United Nations has required the United
Nations Inspector General to issue an annual report and
has ensured that the annual report and all other
reports of the Inspector General are made available to
the General Assembly without modification.
(7) The United Nations has provided, and is committed
to providing, sufficient budgetary resources to ensure
the effective operation of the United Nations Inspector
General.
Sec. 12. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the
United Nations.--Before intelligence information is provided by
the United States to the United Nations, the President shall
ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense, has established guidelines governing the provision of
intelligence information to the United Nations which shall
protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure in accordance with section 103(c)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall
periodically report, but not less frequently than semiannually,
to the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the types of
intelligence provided to the United Nations and the purposes
for which it was provided during the period covered by the
report. The President shall also report to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, within 15
days after it becomes known to him, any unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence provided to the United Nations.
(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first
sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to
the provision of intelligence that is provided only to, and for
the use of, United States Government personnel serving with the
United Nations.
(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or
assign the duties of the President under this section.
(d) Improved Handling of Intelligence Information by the
United Nations.--The Secretary of State (or the designee of the
Secretary), in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall work with the
United Nations to improve the handling, processing,
dissemination, and management of all intelligence information
provided to it by its members.
(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to--
(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5));
or
(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413-415).
----------
FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION
ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1994 AND 1995
* * * * * * *
TITLE IV--INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
PART A--UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 404. ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS.
(a) * * *
(b) Limitation on United States Contributions.--
(1) * * *
[(2) Subsequent fiscal years.--Funds authorized to be
appropriated for ``Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities'' for any fiscal year after
fiscal year 1995 shall not be available for the payment
of the United States assessed contribution for a United
Nations peacekeeping operation in an amount which is
greater than 25 percent of the total of all assessed
contributions for that operation.]
* * * * * * *
SEC. 407. CONSULTATIONS AND REPORTS.
[(a) Consultations and Reports on U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations.--
[(1) Consultations.--Each month the President shall
consult with the Congress on the status of United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
[(2) Information to be provided.--In connection with
these consultations, the following information shall be
provided each month to the designated congressional
committees:
[(A) With respect to ongoing United Nations
peacekeeping operations, the following:
[(i) A list of all resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council
anticipated to be voted on during such
month that would extend or change the
mandate of any United Nations
peacekeeping operation.
[(ii) For each such operation, any
changes in the duration, mandate, and
command and control arrangements that
are anticipated as a result of the
adoption of the resolution.
[(iii) An estimate of the total cost
to the United Nations of each such
operation for the period covered by the
resolution, and an estimate of the
amount of that cost that will be
assessed to the United States.
[(iv) Any anticipated significant
changes in United States participation
in or support for each such operation
during the period covered by the
resolution, and the estimated costs to
the United States of such changes.
[(B) With respect to each new United Nations
peacekeeping operation that is anticipated to
be authorized by a Security Council resolution
during such month, the following information
for the period covered by the resolution:
[(i) The anticipated duration,
mandate, and command and control
arrangements of such operation.
[(ii) An estimate of the total cost
to the United Nations of the operation,
and an estimate of the amount of that
cost that will be assessed to the
United States.
[(iii) A description of the functions
that would be performed by any United
States Armed Forces participating in or
otherwise operating in support of the
operation, an estimate of the number of
members of the Armed Forces that will
participate in or otherwise operate in
support of the operation, and an
estimate of the cost to the United
States of such participation or
support.
[(3) Written information.--The information described
in clauses (i) and (iii) of paragraph (2)(A) and the
information described in clauses (i) and (ii) of
paragraph (2)(B) shall be provided each month to the
designated congressional committees in written form not
later than the 10th day of that month.
[(4) Interim information.--(A) The President shall
submit to the designated congressional committees a
written interim report if, during the period between
the monthly consultations required by paragraph (1),
the United States learns that the United Nations
Security Council is likely, before the next such
consultation, to vote on a resolution that would
authorize a new United Nations peacekeeping operation
and that resolution was not previously reported on
pursuant to paragraph (2)(B). Each interim report shall
include the information described in clauses (i) and
(ii) of paragraph (2)(B).
[(B) Any such interim report shall be submitted not
less than 5 days before the vote of the United Nations
Security Council, unless the President determines that
exceptional circumstances prevented compliance with the
requirement to report 5 days in advance. If the
President makes such a determination, the interim
report shall be submitted promptly (but in no case
later than 3 days after the vote) and shall include a
copy of the determination and a description of the
exceptional circumstances which were the basis for that
determination.
[(5) Notification and quarterly reports regarding
united states assistance.--(A) The President shall
notify the designated congressional committees at least
15 days before the United States provides any
assistance to the United Nations to support
peacekeeping operations. This subparagraph does not
apply to--
[(i) assistance having a value of less than
$3,000,000 in the case of nonreimburseable
assistance or less than $14,000,000 in the case
of reimburseable assistance, or
[(ii) assistance provided under the emergency
drawdown authority of sections 506(a)(1) and
552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2318(a)(1) and 2348a(c)(2)).
[(B) The President shall submit quarterly reports to
the designated congressional committees on all
assistance provided by the United States during the
preceding calendar quarter to the United Nations to
support peacekeeping operations. Each report shall
describe the assistance provided for each such
operation, listed by category of assistance. The report
for the fourth calendar quarter of each year shall be
submitted as part of the annual report required by
section 4(d) of the United Nations Participation Act of
1945 (as added by subsection (b) of this section) and
shall include cumulative information for the preceding
calendar year.]
* * * * * * *
----------
NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994
* * * * * * *
SEC. 203. AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM TO FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO
MEMBERSHIP.
[(a) In General.--The President may establish a program to
assist the transition to full NATO membership of Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other Partnership
for Peace countries emerging from communist domination
designated pursuant to subsection (d).]
(a) Establishment of Program.--The President shall establish
a program to assist in the transition to full NATO membership
of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and any
other European country emerging from communist domination that
is designated by the President under subsection (d)(2).
(b) Conduct of Program.--The program established under
subsection (a) shall facilitate the transition to full NATO
membership of the [countries described in such subsection]
countries designated under subsection (d) by supporting and
encouraging, inter alia--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Type of Assistance.--In carrying out the program
established under subsection (a), the President may provide to
the [countries described in such subsection] countries
designated under subsection (d) the following types of security
assistance:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to the
Economic Support Fund).
[(3)](4) Assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to
international military education and training).
[(4)](5) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms
Export Control Act (relating to the ``Foreign Military
Financing Program'').
[(d) Designation of Partnership for Peace Countries Emerging
From Communist Domination.--The President may designate
countries emerging from communism and participating in the
Partnership for Peace, especially Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia, to receive assistance under the program
established under subsection (a) if the President determines
and reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate that such countries--
[(1) are full and active participants in the
Partnership for Peace;
[(2) have made significant progress toward
establishing democratic institutions, a free market
economy, civilian control of their armed forces, and
the rule of law;
[(3) are likely in the near future to be in a
position to further the principles of the North
Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of
the North Atlantic area; and
[(4) are not selling or transferring defense articles
to a state that has repeatedly provided support for
acts of international terrorism, as determined by the
Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979.]
(d) Designation of Eligible Countries.--
(1) Specified countries.--The following countries are
hereby designated for purposes of this title: Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
(2) Authority for president to designate other
european countries emerging from communist
domination.--The President may designate other European
countries emerging from communist domination (as
defined in section 206) to receive assistance under the
program established under subsection (a). The President
may make such a designation in the case of any such
country only if the President determines, and reports
to the designated congressional committees, that such
country--
(A) has made significant progress toward
establishing--
(i) shared values and interests;
(ii) democratic governments;
(iii) free market economies;
(iv) civilian control of the
military, of the police, and of the
intelligence and other security
services, so that these organizations
do not pose a threat to democratic
institutions, neighboring countries, or
the security of NATO or the United
States;
(v) adherence to the rule of law and
to the values, principles, and
political commitments set forth in the
Helsinki Final Act and other
declarations by the members of the
Organization on Security and
Cooperation in Europe;
(vi) commitment to further the
principles of NATO and to contribute to
the security of the North Atlantic
area;
(vii) commitment and ability to
accept the obligations,
responsibilities, and costs of NATO
membership; and
(viii) commitment and ability to
implement infrastructure development
activities that will facilitate
participation in and support for NATO
military activities; and
(B) is likely, within five years of such
determination, to be in a position to further
the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and
to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area.
(e) Notification.--At least 15 days before designating any
country pursuant to [subsection (d)] subsection (d)(2), the
President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees
in accordance with the procedures applicable under section 634A
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394).
[(f) Determination.--It is hereby determined that Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia meet the criteria
required in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (d).]
(f) Additional Assistance.--In carrying out the program
established under subsection (a), the President may, in
addition to the security assistance authorized to be provided
under subsection (c), provide assistance to countries
designated under subsection (d) from funds appropriated under
the ``Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund'' account.
(g) Prohibition on Providing Assistance to Countries That
Provide Defense Articles to Countries Supporting International
Terrorism.--The President may not provide assistance to a
country under the program established under subsection (a) if
such country is selling or transferring defense articles to a
state that has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of
State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979.
(h) Report Prior to Obligation or Expenditure of Funds.--
Prior to providing assistance to a country for the first time
through the program established under subsection (a), the
President shall transmit to the designated congressional
committees a report with respect to that country that contains
a description of the following: (1) The cost of membership in NATO for the country
and the amount that the country is prepared to
contribute to NATO to pay for such cost of membership.
(2) The amount that the United States will contribute
to facilitate transition to full NATO membership for
the country.
(3) The extent to which the admission to NATO of the
country would contribute to the security of the United
States.
(4) The views of other NATO member nations regarding
the admission to NATO of the country and the amounts
that such other NATO member nations will contribute to
facilitate transition to full NATO membership for the
country.
SEC. 204. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, in
the interest of maintaining stability and promoting democracy
in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and [any
other Partnership for Peace country designated under section
203(d) of this title] any country designated under section
203(d)(2), those countries should be included in all activities
under section 2457 of title 10, United States Code, related to
the increased standardization and enhanced interoperability of
equipment and weapons systems, through coordinated training and
procurement activities, as well as other means, undertaken by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and other allied
countries.
SEC. 205. ANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
The President shall include in the annual report required by
section 514(a) of Public Law 103-236 (22 U.S.C. 1928 note) the
following:
(1) A description of all assistance provided under
the program established under section 203(a), or
otherwise provided by the United States Government to
facilitate the transition to full NATO membership of
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, [and
other Partnership for Peace countries emerging from
communist domination designated pursuant to section
203(d).] and any country designated by the President
pursuant to section 203(d)(2).
(2) A description, on the basis of information
received from the recipients and from NATO, of all
assistance provided by other NATO member nations or
NATO itself to facilitate the transition to full NATO
membership of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, [and other Partnership for Peace countries
emerging from communist domination designated pursuant
to section 203(d).] and any country designated by the
President pursuant to section 203(d)(2).
SEC. 206. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this title:
(1) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
(2) Other european countries emerging from communist
domination.--The term ``other European countries
emerging from communist domination'' means any full and
active participant in the Partnership for Peace that--
(A) is located--
(i) in the territory of the former
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; or
(ii) in the territory of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia; or
(B) is among the following countries:
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria,
or Albania.
(3) Designated congressional committees.--The term
``designated congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on International Relations,
the Committee on National Security, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ELIOT L. ENGEL, REPRESENTATIVE
SHERROD BROWN, AND REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MENENDEZ
The minority views relating to H.R. 7 fully and clearly
express the problems H.R. 7 will pose for American foreign
policy in the future and the serious flaws with the Committee's
deliberative process. This bill micromanages foreign policy and
our military relations with NATO governments, will destroy U.N.
peacekeeping, and represents a profound assault upon the
President's constitutional authority as commander in chief.
We would, however, like to distinguish ourselves from one
portion of the minority views. While we must not act in haste
without objective standards in adding new countries to NATO,
the Alliance--and its expansion--represents the best guarantee
for the freedom of the West. Bearing in mind that other Central
and East European countries have taken significant strides
toward meeting the criteria necessary for NATO membership,
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have reached
the point where they may soon be ready to join the Alliance.
Title VI of H.R. 7 embodies the notion that early accession to
NATO by these four countries is in the interest of the United
States. We agree.
Eliot L. Engel.
Robert Menendez.
Sherrod Brown.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT MENENDEZ
The proposed ``National Security Revitalization
Commission'' in Title III of H.R. 7 is ill-advised and
unnecessary for national security and fiscal reasons. The
Commission also would interfere with the Legislative and
Executive Branch's prerogatives in safeguarding the national
security of the United States. Secretary of Defense William
Perry has eloquently testified before the House of
Representatives to the needless and obtrusive nature of this
proposed commission.
The stated legislative purpose of the commission, to
``reassess United States military needs and reverse the
continuing downward spiral of defense spending,'' places an
unwise and inappropriate conclusory directive upon the
commission's findings. The $1.5 million cost is further reason
that the Congress ought not to establish this commission. It is
difficult to reconcile the expenditure of $1.5 million of
America's taxpayers' money on this needless commission at a
time of sparse budgetary resources that we have mandated with
the passage in the House of Representatives of a Balanced
Budget Amendment to the Constitution.
Furthermore, the partisan composition of the commission
would be an intrusion by the Congress into the duly constituted
authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States. The commission's prefatory charge
to ``reverse the continuing downward spiral of defense
spending,'' precludes any objective conclusions regarding
national security and ensures that the taxpayers' money is
wasted.
The Congress already has at least seven committees with
jurisdiction over issues affecting the national security of the
United States. These committees have the requisite competence
and expertise to reassess United States military needs.
Adding a new layer of bureaucracy in this case is clearly
unwarranted, unless it is the view of the Majority on this
committee that the relevant committees of jurisdiction of the
House and Senate are not sufficiently expert to assess, or to
reassess, America's military needs. Unfortunately, the Majority
in the House International Relations Committee, in voting
unanimously, 22 to 16, to defeat an amendment I authored to
eliminate this commission, has expressed a profound lack of
confidence in the competence of congressional committees to
safeguard the U.S. national security.
Secretary of Defense William Perry, in testimony on January
27 before the House National Security Committee, stated
eloquently that the proposed commission was unnecessary and
obtrusive:
* * *I find it deeply disturbing that it is now
proposed that we change that relationship, that we
interpose a commission between the Secretary of Defense
and this committee, a commission which effectively is
authorized to do both our jobs * * *
You are my commission. I do not need an independent
commission interposing itself between myself and you,
and you do not need an independent commission
interposing itself * * *
You should not dilute the responsibilities of the
Secretary of Defense by trying to turn a key part of
them over to an independent commission. Rather, you
should hold me accountable for meeting those
responsibilities. And if you find that I'm incapable or
unwilling to meet those responsibilities, you should
ask me to step down as the Secretary of Defense.
* * *I feel strongly that the proposed commission
usurps the responsibilities of the Secretary of
Defense. At the same time, I believe that this
independent commission would interfere with the ability
of this committee to fulfill its responsibilities, by
interposing itself between the committee and the
Secretary of Defense * * *
* * *Preventing a return of the nuclear threat,
managing the defense drawdown, and making the right
decisions about the use of military force. These are
the three big issues, the three big challenges, which I
face every day as the Secretary of Defense, and which
you as a committee face. How do we maintain a stable,
peaceful world in which economies and democracies
prosper without becoming the world's policemen?
* * *I believe that the answer is to get these on the
table, debate them openly in the proper context, with
the full policy and budgetary implications, on the
table and understood. This is our job, your job and my
job, not the job of the commission.
Unfortunately, the Majority strongly disagrees with the
Secretary of Defense. For all the above reasons, I urge my
colleagues on the Majority to reconsider the inclusion of Title
III to H.R. 7.
Robert Menendez.
MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON, HON. SAM GEJDENSON, HON. TOM
LANTOS, HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN, HON. GARY L.
ACKERMAN, HON. HARRY JOHNSTON, HON. ELIOT L. ENGEL, HON. ENI F.H.
FALEOMAVAEGA, HON. MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, HON.
ROBERT MENENDEZ, HON. SHERROD BROWN, HON. CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, HON.
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, HON. ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, AND
HON. VICTOR O. FRAZER
We strongly oppose H.R. 7, the National Security
Revitalization Act, as ordered reported by the Committee on
International Relations. We believe it cripples U.N.
peacekeeping, puts excessive conditions and restrictions on the
President's conduct of national security affairs, and moves the
United States toward new security commitments in Eastern and
Central Europe at a time of declining resources. Rather than
revitalize U.S. national security, we believe the cumulative
effect of H.R. 7 would be to undermine our foreign policy and
damage our national security.
H.R. 7 is the most far-reaching foreign policy legislation
to come before the House of Representatives in several years.
As Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before the
committee, had H.R. 7 been law in 1990, President Bush would
not have been able to deploy troops and ships to Operation
Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. H.R. 7 would have
blocked President Clinton from deploying 30,000 troops to
Kuwait in 1994. It would even have blocked President Truman
from deploying troops to Korea in 1950.
H.R. 7 is bad foreign policy. It torpedoes the concept of
collective security that has been at the heart of postwar peace
and security. It is a political document based on the Contract
with America. We prefer the Constitution.
h.r. 7 micromanages american foreign policy
A disturbing aspect of H.R. 7 is that it micromanages U.S.
foreign policy. It is intrusive in the extreme. It dictates how
the President should conduct U.S. foreign policy.
In testimony before the Committee, Secretary of State
Christopher and former Secretary of State James Baker warned of
the dangers of micromanagement. As Secretary Baker stated:
``Attempts at congressional micromanagement were a bad idea
when the Democrats were in control. And they remain a bad idea
today.'' Yet the committee paid no heed.
Several examples illustrate this excessive micromanagement.
In the area of peacekeeping, H.R. 7:
Requires an Act of Congress before the President
could send a single U.S. military observer to join a
U.N. force--yet Congress has never authorized a U.N.
peacekeeping effort;
Requires the President to give 15 days' prior notice
to Congress before the United States participates in,
or contributes to, a U.N. peacekeeping operation--yet
the world will not wait for Congress in a crisis; and
Dictates the terms and conditions of U.S. military
command and control arrangements, requiring detailed
reports, certifications, and legal memoranda from the
President on his constitutional authorities.
As John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State during the
Reagan Administration, stated:
* * * the required reports and certifications serve
only to prevent the United States and others from using
the United Nations to contain conflict. At worst, they
may prevent the United States from doing any thing
other than acting unilaterally.
H.R. 7 also micromanages U.S. policy with respect to the
future expansion of NATO. The bill:
Mandates the creation of a new foreign assistance
program for NATO transition assistance--without
authorizing new assistance resources;
Dictates which countries must receive NATO transition
assistance--removing the executive branch's discretion
to judge whether their internal and external records
warrant such assistance; and
Picks winners and losers for future NATO membership--
discouraging reformers in countries not named, and
irritating U.S. friends and allies, thereby making more
difficult the President's ability to manage the complex
process of NATO expansion involving 16 NATO member
governments.
h.r. 7 destroys united nations peacekeeping
The cumulative impact of sections 501 and 508 of H.R. 7
would be to gut, if not kill, U.N. peacekeeping, and destroy
the concept of collective security.
Section 501
Section 501 requires that the United States offset against
its U.N. peacekeeping assessment all costs incurred by the
Department of Defense in support of operations authorized by
the United Nations Security Council, even when those operations
are conducted unilaterally by the United States, with U.S.
forces under U.S. command and control.
Testimony from the Department of Defense indicates that in
fiscal year 1994, such DOD costs were estimated to total some
$1.7 billion, plus an additional $850 million in costs for U.S.
troops in South Korea still deployed under a U.N. Security
Council resolution. Under H.R. 7, the $1 billion annual U.S.
peacekeeping assessment to the United Nations would be more
than offset by this $2.55 billion, effectively cancelling out
the U.S. contribution.
If section 501 were enacted, we would expect other
countries to adopt similar measures. For example, it would
encourage Russia to demand offsets for its military cost in
deploying peacekeepers in the former Soviet Union. France would
likely claim offsets for its costs in deploying its military to
Rwanda in 1994. Other nations would follow suit. Collective
security, the cornerstone of the United Nations, would become
financial anarchy.
Section 501 permits an exemption from the offset
requirement for U.N. Chapter VII (enforcement) operations if
the President certifies to the Congress that the operation is
important to U.S. national security and that the United States
would undertake the operation unilaterally. this does not
mitigate the negative consequences of section 501 because the
President would be required to make endless hypothetical
certifications to Congress that we would be willing to
undertake on our own actions in which we ask other countries to
share the burden. Such certification would undermine the
ability of the President to encourage other countries to
participate in multilateral operations.
Democrats are working hard to reform the United Nations
because we believe much more needs to be done. We believe our
U.N. peacekeeping assessment is too high, so last year we
enacted into law language that prohibits the United States from
paying more than 25% of total peacekeeping costs. We believe
the United Nations must improve its financial management, so
last year we enacted into law a provision mandating the
establishment of an Inspector General at the United Nations. We
will continue to press for additional U.N. reforms.
But we seek to reform the United Nations, not destroy it.
Section 501 would present the United States with an
unacceptable choice: either kill U.N. peacekeeping by
eliminating our assessment, or prohibit the Department of
Defense from undertaking costly operations such as the
deployment to Rwanda in 1994, which saved hundreds of thousands
of lives but which would have more than offset our assessment.
We believe we need to keep U.N. peacekeeping as an option
in U.S. foreign policy. Section 501 removes that option.
Section 508
Section 508 provides, first, that no Department of Defense
funds can be used to pay U.S. peacekeeping expenses. Second, it
prohibits the use of DOD funds to pay the incremental costs of
U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations unless the Congress
has authorized such specific use in advance.
This is an unprecedented assault on the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief and on U.N. peacekeeping.
Section 508 would prohibit the President from deploying a
single U.S. soldier to a U.N.-authroized operation without an
Act of Congress. Section 508, had it been law, would have
prohibited President Bush's deployment of U.S. troops and ships
in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It would have
blocked President Clinton from deploying 30,000 U.S troops to
Kuwait in 1994 to counter Saddam Hussein's renewed threats of
aggression against that country. It would have prevented the
successful deployment of U.S. troops to Rwanda to save hundreds
of thousands of lives last year.
If enacted, section 508 would require the withdrawal of
U.S. troops currently deployed in Jerusalem, Kuwait, the
Western Sahara, Mozambique, and the Republic of Georgia until
Congress passed laws authorizing their deployment. Congress has
never authorized such activities in advance.
Section 508 would also require U.S. troops to cease
enforcement of sanctions against Iraq, and stop the
humanitarian air lift to starving people in Bosnia in the dead
of winter--again, because Congress has not authorized those
actions.
As we interpret section 508, it could also require the
withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Korea because Congress
has never specifically authorized that deployment. We doubt
that the authors of this legislation intended to require a U.S.
withdrawal from South Korea at this delicate time. The fact
that section 508 might require that action testifies to the
dangers of Congress trying to write iron-clad rules to cover a
wide range of complex situations.
H.R. 7 Undermines Presidential Authority
H.R. 7, as ordered reported, seriously undermines the
ability of the President to act as Commander-in-Chief. H.R. 7,
in order to be consistent with the Contract with America,
hamstrings the President. We choose to be consistent with the
Constitution.
Sections 401 and 402 prohibit the President from placing
U.S. troops under foreign command without specific
congressional authorization unless he first reports to Congress
that such action is not unconstitutional and then certifies
that the action meets a series of requirements, detailed in
five pages in the bill, is necessary to protect U.S. national
security. This represents a significant restriction on the
President's ability to command and control U.S. troops.
Section 508, while technically not within the jurisdiction
of the Committee on International Relations, reaches the same
constitutional issue. It would effectively prohibit the
president from sending a single soldier to participate in any
U.N. peacekeeping activity--even as part of a medical team to
help in Croatia--without specific congressional authorization.
As Democrats, we believe that Congress should set
guidelines for U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping
operations, including guidelines relating to foreign command
and control. We believe it is best to keep U.S. troops under
U.S. command and control, particularly when in combat. But
Congress should not mandate to the President precisely how he
commands U.S. troops, or try to micromanage our military
relationships, even with NATO governments. That is a serious
overreach of congressional war powers authority.
Congress shares with the President responsibility for
deploying troops abroad for combat purposes, whether they are
operating under a U.N. Security Council resolution,
unilaterally, or in some other multilateral context. But this
general principal cannot reasonably be applied to each
deployment of a single soldier, airman, or sailor without
infringing on the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief.
We are puzzled that Republicans, who have spent many years
defending the President's prerogatives, have chosen to tie the
President's hands. Initially, the committee adopted a new
section reaffirming both congressional war powers authority and
the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief under the
Constitution. Several Republican Members of the committee voted
for the amendment. Upon reconsideration of the amendment,
however, all but one of those Members either changed their vote
or were absent, and the amendment was not adopted.
h.r. 7 tries to dictate the process of nato expansion
Title VI of H.R. 7 sets out U.S. policy to extend NATO
membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
and mandates an assistance program to help these countries
become NATO members.
We support the concept of NATO expansion. The question is
whether Congress, through its attempts to dictate the pace and
direction of NATO expansion, helps or hinders that process. The
executive branch, together with the other 15 NATO members, is
in the process of determining the proper framework and
timetable for NATO expansion. The Partnership for Peace
initiative allows the process to evolve without preconditions
or preconceptions about the outcome of that process.
H.R. 7 interferes with that process and therefore is
harmful to eventual NATO expansion--and harmful to U.S.
national interests.
First, H.R. 7 prejudges and dictates the pace and direction
of NATO expansion. Attempts by the Congress to force premature
decisionmaking will hinder the process of NATO expansion. The
enlargement of NATO is a consensual, diplomatic process
involving the governments and Parliaments of the sixteen
sovereign countries of NATO. It cannot be dictated by statute.
Second, H.R. 7 short circuits the Partnership for Peace
initiative. This program is an important first step in
establishing closer military and political ties between NATO
and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in order to
prepare these nations for possible NATO membership. It offers a
practical means to build political and military cooperation.
Decisions on NATO expansion should evolve from the Partnership
for Peace, and from the ability of states to assume the
responsibilities of NATO membership. NATO expansion should not
be dictated by legislative fiat.
Third, H.R. 7 mandates an ambitious program of military and
economic assistance for four countries--Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia--without authorizing funding. The
Congress should not hamstring the President by forcing him to
create new, costly, country-specific assistance programs when
resources for foreign assistance are shrinking. We believe the
President must have the flexibility to adapt existing
assistance programs to the complex, fluid situation in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Fourth, it is unwise for Congress to spell out a hierarchy
of prospective NATO states in which some are picked as winners
and the rest as losers. Such an approach would foster
complacency in some states and demoralize reformers in others.
It should create instability and tensions in the region, and
threaten to draw dangerous new lines in Europe which could once
again force Europe into two hostile camps. This would hardly
serve U.S. national security interests and would place new
pressures and responsibilities on NATO.
Fifth, H.R. 7 would create a dangerous gulf between our
commitments in Europe and the resources required to meet them.
U.S. force levels in Europe have declined by two-thirds since
1990. Because of declining force levels, it is difficult to
foresee how the United States would be able to meet expanded
NATO security commitments in Central and Eastern Europe by any
means other than a nuclear commitment.
Finally, there is no immediate security threat in Europe.
That is the judgment of the last two Administrations, and every
government in Europe--all are cutting defense spending. There
is no reason to rush the process of NATO expansion. Before we
take on commitments of such magnitude and significance we must
be sure the American people are ready for them.
h.r. 7 short-circuited the deliberative committee process
We must register our concerns about the entire process
through which the committee considered H.R. 7. We will not
detail here every procedural transgression of the majority in
the course of the markup. But we disagree in the strongest
terms with Republican decisions that limited debate, silenced
executive branch testimony, prohibited appeals to rulings of
the Chair, and otherwise prevented a full and fair deliberative
process on legislation that goes to the heart of U.S. national
security policy and the responsibilities of this committee.
We want to be very clear about the reason for our repeated
requests for executive branch views and questions about the
intent of Members of the Majority in particular sections of the
bill. H.R. 7 has extraordinarily far-reaching foreign policy
implications. It deserved serious and careful scrutiny. Having
received a final draft of the Chairman's mark one full hour
after the bill was originally scheduled for markup, and less
than 24 hours before markup actually commenced, we sought to
raise pertinent questions and offer amendments to the most
problematic sections of the draft bill. Only through this means
could we illuminate the merits of the bill before the committee
acted.
Deliberative effort to shed light on substantive issues of
great import should not be characterized as attempts to delay.
Members should be able to address questions to and receive
responses directly from other Members who are the authors of
various provisions. Such effort is consistent with the
responsibility of every Member of the committee on any bill of
such significance.
We note in particular the multiple instances in which
Members of the Majority moved the previous question or
otherwise moved to limit debate. One such instance occurred
during debate on what was arguably the most important amendment
to the bill: an amendment to section 501, which sought to
prevent the complete destruction of financing for international
peacekeeping.
We also are deeply disturbed about the lack of respect and
courtesy accorded witnesses from the executive branch. On
several occasions, administration witnesses were cut off while
responding to a question from a Democratic Member of the
committee. In one instance, a Member of the Majority moved the
previous question while the Ranking Democratic Member was
posing a question to a uniformed military officer from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We select these examples to illustrate the flawed process
that characterized committee consideration of H.R. 7. We
believe that a bipartisan process could have been achieved
during markup of H.R.7. At several points, a handful of
amendments received bipartisan support. We hope that
highlighting problems will prevent their recurrence, and
increase the chance for bipartisanship in future committee
deliberations.
Sam Gejdenson.
Eliot L. Engel.
Jim Moran.
Cynthia A. McKinney.
Eni Faleomavaega.
Harry Johnston.
Victor O. Frazer.
Robert Torricelli.
M.G. Martinez.
Alcee L. Hastings.
Gary Ackerman.
Howard L. Berman.
Albert R. Wynn.
Lee H. Hamilton.
Donald M. Payne.
Bob Menendez.
Tom Lantos.
Sherrod Brown.
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