MASS GRAVES AND OTHER ATROCITIES IN BOSNIA
US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
Wednesday, DECEMBER 6, 1995
STATEMENT OF IVAN LUPIS
RESEARCHER
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI
Mr. LUPIS. Thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to
testify. My name is Ivan Lupis. I am a researcher at the Helsinki Division of
Human Rights Watch, formerly known as Helsinki Watch. The following testimony
is based on an investigation carried out by myself and a consultant from July
31 to August 23, 1995. It describes the events leading up to, during, and
immediately after the fall of the U.N.-designated safe area of Srebrenica,
including gross violations of humanitarian law, as has been typical of
Serbian military conduct to date. The fall of the town of Srebrenica and its
environs to Serb forces in early July 1995 made a mockery of the
international community's professed commitment to safeguard regions it
declared to be safe areas. U.N. peacekeeping officials were unwilling to heed
requests for support from their own forces stationed within the enclave, thus
allowing Serb forces easily to overrun it and, without interference from U.N.
soldiers, to carry out systematic mass executions of hundreds, possibly
thousands, of civilian men and boys, and to terrorize, rape, beat, execute,
rob, and otherwise abuse civilians being deported from the area. The recent
Dayton peace plan and the guarded optimism that has accompanied this apparent
progress should not obscure the fact that no peace agreement will be stable
without justice for human rights abuses. The atrocities described in this
testimony, like the many others that have preceded them in the former
Yugoslavia, require of the international community, and specifically the
United States, a commitment to repatriation for victims and accountability
for the perpetrators. Before the war, approximately 37,000 people, 72 percent
Muslim and 25 percent Serbs, lived in the Srebrenica municipality. When
Bosnian Serb forces began their brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing with the
help of the Yugoslav People's Army in eastern Bosnia in 1992, most areas
quickly fell under Serb control. Most of the non-Serb men either fled, were
put into detention centers, or were indiscriminately killed. Thousands of
mostly Muslim refugees from other areas of eastern Bosnia flocked to places
like Zepa, Gorazde, and Srebrenica, where territorial defense units succeeded
in fending off Serb attacks. As a result of this sudden demographic shift,
Srebrenica's population swelled to an estimated 55,000 to 60,000 people and
remained under siege for more than 3 years. On April 16, 1993, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 819, declaring Srebrenica a safe area;
and a cease-fire was signed on April 17. But in July 1995, there were
numerous indications that Bosnian Serb forces were planning a summer
offensive against Srebrenica. Access to U.N. convoys was increasingly
restricted by Bosnian Serb forces, so that by late February and early March
1995, only one convoy per month was being allowed into the area to feed the
approximately 39,000 people left in the enclave. A U.N. official in Tuzla
told us that this was a deliberate tactic used by the Serbs to weaken the
population of the enclave in order to prepare the area for a final offensive.
The incremental denial of food, water, electricity, and proper medical
supplies by the Serbs over a long period of time should actually have been
viewed as the true preparatory stages of the July assault on the enclave and
should have served as a warning signal to the international community that
the so-called U.N. safe area of Srebrenica was in danger. Prior to the
offensive, Bosnian Serb forces also hampered peacekeeping effectiveness as
well as troop rotations into the enclave. Two rotations of Dutch troops
stationed in the enclave had been allowed to leave, but the Bosnian Serbs
refused their replacements' entry. Thus, the entire pocket, civilians and
UNPROFOR troops alike, were psychologically and physically exhausted weeks
prior to the offensive. Just 2 days before the attack, Bosnian Serb forces
allowed 1 convoy carrying 100,000 liters of diesel fuel, an unprecedented
amount, into the pocket. This fuel was then recaptured when the safe area
fell. Given the embargo of the Bosnian Serbs, as well as their refusal to
allow fuel into the enclave on previous occasions, this sudden influx of fuel
should have been suspicious to the Dutch U.N. soldiers. Without the fuel,
Bosnian Serb forces would not have been able later to bus tens of thousands
of Muslims to Bosnian Government-controlled territory. By July 5,
approximately 5,000 Serb troops had surrounded the enclave with 50 artillery
pieces and 15 to 20 battle vehicles and launched a full-scale offensive on
Srebrenica at 3:15 a.m. on July 6. The shelling was too heavy to count the
number of detonations, but U.N. estimates were in the thousands. Serb troops
began taking control of U.N. observation posts one by one, and by the time
the offensive was over, 55 U.N. troops had been taken hostage. Dutch soldiers
within the enclave requested close air support from the U.N. commanders, but
the date of the request remains disputed. U.N. officials interviewed by us
deny that Dutch troops in the safe area requested close air support before
July 10. Other evidence, however, suggests that Dutch troops in the enclave
acted sooner and believe that close air support might have dissuaded Serb
forces from pressing their offensive. According to the Dutch, close air
support was requested on July 6. That request and subsequent ones were
repeatedly turned down by the commander of U.N. peace forces in former
Yugoslavia, Bernard Janvier. On July 10, according to UNHCR estimates,
approximately 30,000 people began to evacuate Srebrenica and move back to the
northern part of the enclave toward the U.N. base in Potocari, a village
located halfway between Srebrenica and Bratunac. Finally, on July 11, 2 days
after Serbian forces had driven through Srebrenica, four fighter planes took
part in an attack which resulted in the destruction of one Serb tank. Bosnian
Serb commander Ratko Mladic threatened to fire on the Dutch compound and the
civilian population of Srebrenica and to execute Dutch peacekeeping hostages
if more air strikes were carried out. The air strikes were not repeated and
the U.N. effort to save the U.N. safe area of Srebrenica shifted to damage
control. Now, due to my limited amount of time, I have to skip over what
happened with the women, children, and elderly people in Potocari and move on
to the massacres because this is the focus of this testimony. If there are
any questions about what the Serbs had done in the Potocari compound,
questions could be raised after. As Srebrenica was falling, the overwhelming
majority of military-aged men and boys and a smattering of women and children
gathered in separate locations in order to make the journey through Bosnian
Serb-held areas to reach Bosnian Government-controlled territory. The
majority of the persons in this group of 12,000 to 15,000 trekkers were
civilians. Men and boys interviewed by us stated that only between 3,000 to
4,000 of them were armed. After the U.N. failed to defend the safe area of
Srebrenica, the enclave's military-aged men no longer trusted the UNPROFOR
troops, nor did they believe their safety would be guaranteed by them. They
formed a column which stretched for approximately ten kilometers and walked
in a vulnerable formation because they had been warned of a mined terrain.
During the trek, the column was exposed to numerous attacks and ambushes by
Serbian forces, during which violations of humanitarian law were committed. A
displaced person I interviewed vividly described the horrific ordeal which
the men and boys experienced. He mentioned: "After about three kilometers, we
encountered our first ambush at a stream. The center of our column was hit by
anti-aircraft machine guns and mortars. Around 200 people died just from
that. The Cetniks"-which is a term used by many to describe nationalist
Serbs-"then came down from the hills, and about 2,000 men from the middle of
the column got caught in the line of fire. The people at the front and back
of the column scattered everywhere. I was in the middle and saw how the Serbs
were shooting everyone and slaughtering us with bayonets. "Furthermore,
during the nighttime and during the ambushes, Serb soldiers in civilian
clothing managed to infiltrate the column, spreading disinformation and
confusion, giving wrong directions, injecting men with what was believed to
have been hallucinatory drugs, drawing groups and individuals away from the
column, and opening fire on and executing people from within the column." As
the ambushes and infiltrating Serbs continued to pick away at the column, men
and boys tried desperately to regroup after the ambush. The column eventually
became smaller and smaller in number, and smaller groups were left behind and
separated from the rest. Many men and boys surrendered, and several witnesses
told us that they saw unarmed men shot in the process of surrendering. We
conducted interviews with a witness to a massacre in the Nova Kasaba/Konjevic
Polje area and with four other persons who were sent to mass executions at
two sites in the Karakaj area, a town north of Zvornik on the Bosnian-
Serbian border. Mass summary executions were also carried out at at least two
locations in the Bratunac area, and evidence points to the existence of two
sites in the Kravice area as well. The systematic nature of the operation,
already described in the offensive, and the attack designed to break up the
escaping column of men can be further adumbrated during the round-up phase of
the dispersed trekkers. Serb forces strategically positioned themselves along
major roads and rivers over which the men would have to cross in order to
reach Bosnian Government territory. Serb forces apparently tried to capture
as many men as possible before they could cross so that they could be
detained at sites around Nova Kasaba and Konjevic Polje. As described in our
reports, Serb forces communicated orders and instructions to the men by
megaphones on how and where to surrender before they could reach the two
roads. According to a displaced person, large massacres were carried out in
this area. He recounted: "The place was full of Cetniks so we hid in some
high grass and waited. Muslims were coming down on the main road from
everywhere giving themselves up. The Cetniks picked out Muslims who they
either knew about or knew, interrogated them, and then made them dig pits
which would be used as mass graves. "During our first day there, the Cetniks
killed approximately 500 people. They would just line them up and shoot them
into the pits. The approximately 100 men whom they interrogated and who had
dug the mass graves then had to fill them in. At the end of the day, they
were ordered to dig a pit for themselves and line up in front of it. Then
with M53 machine guns, they were shot into the mass graves. "At dawn, it was
still the same. A bulldozer arrived and dug up a pit which seemed to be about
30 meters long and about 15 meters wide, and they buried about 400 men alive.
The men were encircled by Cetniks. Whoever tried to escape was shot. After
that, they packed down the earth so it almost looked as good as new." In this
area, many men and boys described the appearance of Bosnian Serb General
Ratko Mladic, who oversaw parts of the operation being carried out. Moreover,
they reported seeing Serb soldiers dressed in U.N. garb driving around in
white U.N. armored personnel carriers. The fact that four of the survivors
were detained in and transited through the Nova Kasaba/Konjevic Polje area
and were then bused to Karakaj via Bratunac further suggests that the
campaign carried out by the Serb forces was systematic in nature. A number of
citizens of Bratunac and its surrounding villages told about the violent
deaths of a large number of men from Srebrenica. The villagers' accounts were
consistent in many details, including the place and the method of execution.
One woman, a resident of Serbia proper, reportedly said that she had just
been to visit her brother-in-law, who was a Bosnian Serb soldier. "He and his
friends are quite open about what is going on," the woman exclaimed. "They
are killing Muslim soldiers. They said they killed 1,600 yesterday alone and
estimated in all they had killed about 4,000. They said they were in a big
hurry so they were shooting most of them." In the Karakaj area, men were
ordered to get out of the trucks in groups of five or ten and line up in
front of the Serb soldiers who fired on them. Four survivors disclosed
details which indicate that the mass executions were well-planned and
systematically carried out. For example, all noted that for extended periods
of time, trucks pulled up to the sites and dropped off loads of prisoners.
Firing squads would execute several groups and were then ordered to walk
among the corpses to make sure everyone was dead. The presence of bulldozers,
which pushed the dead bodies onto tractor-trailers, indicated that the Serb
authorities had prepared for a large number of persons to be executed at the
sites. One of two survivors of a mass execution carried out on a meadow
recounted:
"There were 12 of us in a small truck. We were driven for about 2 to 3
minutes, and when the truck stopped, we were ordered to get out. I saw
grass underneath my blindfold. My cousin, Haris, took my hand. He said,
'They're going to execute us.' As soon as he said that, I heard gunfire
from the right side. Haris was hit and fell toward me, and I fell with him.
"Someone was ordering them to finish us off individually. This process
continued all day. During the day, I also heard trucks continuously driving
up to another area about 100 meters away and gunshots which would follow
shortly thereafter. There must have been two execution sites right next to
each other. I also heard a bulldozer working in the background and became
horrified. My worst nightmare was that I would be buried alive. "I kept
hearing people gasping and asking for water so they wouldn't die thirsty.
Others kept on repeating, 'Kill me. Just finish me off.' Later I woke up. I
wasn't sure whether I blacked out or fell asleep, and it was drizzling. It
was nighttime, and I saw light beams from a bulldozer's headlights. I still
heard the same noises as before-trucks driving up, people getting out, and
gunshots. I also remember distinctly an older voice calling, 'Don't kill
us. We didn't do anything to you,' followed by gunfire. "I waited for about
4 or 5 minutes after all the Serbs had left to make sure that it wasn't
some kind of trick. When I finally decided to get up, I couldn't. My whole
body was numb. It took me a few minutes to get adjusted, but when I got up,
I saw corpses littering a meadow about 150 meters by 100 meters. Suddenly I
heard someone ask, 'Are you wounded?' I answered that I wasn't. It was a
60-year- old man. "I tried to make my way over to him without stepping on
the dead. It was impossible, so I tried at least not to step on the chest
and torsos, but onto the arms and hands instead. We saw two other wounded
men both in their thirties. They were both shot in the legs and one was
shot in the hip. We checked to see if they could move, and they realized
there was no way we could help them. They realized this, too, and told us
to run away as quickly as possible. "Before we left, the man who was
wounded in the legs told me he was cold, and asked me to take a shirt or
something off one of the dead bodies so that he could cover himself. The
last thing I heard them say was, 'Run, brothers, save yourselves.' "
The July 1995 attack on the U.N.-declared safe area of
Srebrenica by Serb forces was planned well in advance, and abuses perpetrated
after the fall of the enclave were systematic and well-organized. According
to the UNHCR, up to 8,000 men, including boys as young as 12 years old,
remain missing; and many are believed to have been killed or executed.
Although the U.N. member states and U.N. officials have been ready to condemn
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia, little has
been done to prevent or stop such abuses from taking place. Between August
and October 1995, while the United States carried out active negotiations
with Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, systematic ethnic cleansing continued
to be carried out against tens of thousands of non-Serbs in northwestern
Bosnia. Two thousand men, civilians who had never engaged in armed
resistance, disappeared as their families were expelled into Bosnian
Government-controlled territory. Numerous witnesses reported seeing
Serbian-based special forces of Arkan operating in the area. Arkan is the
nom-de- guerre of Zeljko Raznatovic, a suspected war criminal from Serbia.
Moreover, we also obtained several testimonies and photographic evidence
pointing to a mass execution of approximately 150 civilians, which took place
in the end of September 1995. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki would like to use
this opportunity to call on the international community, and especially the
U.S. Government, to insist on immediate international access to all detainees
from the Srebrenica safe area and demand that their safety and well-being are
ensured, and insist that the Bosnian Serb authorities provide immediate
access to the sites of reported massacres during the Srebrenica offensive.
The fate of the missing and disappeared must be disclosed. Furthermore, if
relevant, the United States and the international community must disclose all
available information, including the intelligence, that implicates Serbia in
supplying, assisting, or directing Bosnian Serb troops, and also strengthen
the mechanisms for monitoring external support to Bosnian Serb forces.
Finally, the international community and the United States must ensure that
the Dayton peace agreement guarantees the right to repatriation of survivors
of ethnic cleansing and that the full protection of all returnees and
minority groups is actively carried out. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for
listening. Chairman SMITH. Mr. Lupis, thank you for that very moving
testimony and your call, which I do believe will go heeded. Access is
extremely important. That it be immediate is crucial to the kind of
documentation that will be needed to get convictions in the War Crimes
Tribunal. So I want to thank you for your good work and your fine testimony
this afternoon.
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