The charter of the Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) Joint Test & Evaluation (JT&E) is to investigate, evaluate, and improve BDA support to the joint force commander in order to facilitate operational decision making. Potential improvements will be identified, prioritized, and coordinated with the appropriate commands.

The JBDA JT&E will establish a baseline case by evaluating and documenting current BDA processes and procedures in operational scenarios. Potential deficiencies and opportunities for improvements will be identified. The selected improvements will then be installed and tested in environments as closely aligned with baseline measurements as possible. Analysis of the collected data will be used to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the proposed enhancements. For the JBDA JT&E, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Unified Commands are designated as participating Services/Commands, with the Army designated as the lead Service and executive agent.

At the conclusion of Desert Storm, BDA was identified as one of the four major intelligence shortcomings. "The BDA process was difficult especially for restrike decisions. BDA doctrine and organization must be determined" (Department of Defense [DoD] Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992). DIA, the Services and the unified and specified commands have begun to institutionalize a BDA structure that will satisfy combatant commanders' requirements." (Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992)

Desert Storm outstripped intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, sharply reducing BDA effectiveness. This was further exacerbated by the lack of trained analysts and doctrine that specified BDA production responsibilities. Beginning immediately after the war, DoD addressed the BDA problems in Desert Storm by reorganizing targeting activities within DIA. DIA created the Deputy Directorate for Targets (J2-T) as the single national level point of contact for targeting matters, and formed a BDA Working Group under the existing Military Targets Intelligence Committee.

The BDA improvements and changes following Desert Storm have been incorporated - at least in part - in subsequent contingencies and operations. The first operation that included enough targets to effectively exercise BDA was Desert Fox. With its scripted nature, short duration, and very limited target development, Desert Fox was not a vehicle for determining whether or not Desert Storm BDA problems were fixed. For example, while Desert Storm found that there was a critical need to develop a process for maneuver force BDA, Desert Fox emphasized infrastructure and not ground force equipment. CINCCENT stated that he had "seen no seams in the intelligence community in terms of differences of opinion," and that BDA had been rapid, responsive, and well analyzed. BDA worked in Desert Fox. The CINC was satisfied, and it appears that members of the intelligence community worked well together. However, Desert Fox did not answer the question of whether or not Desert Storm BDA problems were fixed; the operations were simply too dissimilar.

The second significant combat operation subsequent to Desert Storm was Allied Force. This was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, running from 24 March through 20 June 1999. Federated BDA was used during Allied Force. The target sets were federated between USEUCOM (the USEUCOM-established Joint Task Force was designated as the BDA authority) and the NMJIC. As in Desert Fox, Federated BDA mitigated some of the coordination problems and appeared to increase BDA responsiveness.

Allied Force and Desert Storm shared some common characteristics including some pre-conflict buildup and training; coalition forces; sanctuaries; aircraft and cruise missile strikes; and target development throughout the operation. One of the major differences in the two operations was scale - the numbers of strike aircraft, numbers of sorties, numbers of bases, and geographical area. Desert Storm was larger in almost every category. There was also a vast difference in the BDA focus for the two operations. Desert Storm emphasized ground force targets, while the same targets were fourth on the Allied Force target list. Finally, the tempo of operations was continuous in Desert Storm and intermittent in Allied Force.

Desert Fox and Allied Force illustrated that advances have been made in BDA since Desert Storm. At the same time, these two operations highlight the need for further improvement. Training of analysts is still problematic. Processes and procedures are in place for conducting BDA on fixed targets, but these processes can and should be enhanced to provide BDA in a more timely and accurate fashion to meet the commander's decision cycle. Finally, there has been little focus or effort on improving mobile target BDA since Desert Storm.

To address these recurring shortcomings, the Deputy Director, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E), under the Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation (DTSE&E), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), directed the Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA) Joint Feasibility Study (JFS) in June 1999. The Army was designated as the lead Service, and responded quickly to the SAC's guidance, moving the JFS sponsorship to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and assembling the initial staff.

During this past year, the JBDA JT&E participated in Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL 01) to provide continuity between the Joint Warfighters JT&E as it ceases testing and this follow-on JT&E begins. The Program Test Plan was developed and is in final stages of coordination at this time.

The JBDA JT&E program meets the stated purposes of the OSD JT&E Program and the Services and CINCs continue to support the project. Resources and planning are on track to support continued field testing.