Demonstrated values for MC surpassed the 100,000 flight-hour standard specified in 1993; however, the standard was increased in the 1998 ORD when higher rates appeared attainable. The MC rate hovered near 90 percent in 1997 before spare parts shortages and increasing depot maintenance caused it to drop. The measures for FMC, although well below the 1993 and 1998 ORD objectives, were initially trending upward, however due do recent failures of some key components, the trend has reversed. The Head-Up-Display (HUD), OBIGGS, the main landing gear, fuel system fittings, and navigation system software have impacted FMC. Extensive downtime has been attributed to a lack of equipment to re-boresight and realign HUD mounting trays, high failure rates for OBIGGS components, lack of durability in main landing gear parts, and inadequate integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) and inertial reference unit software. An OBIGGS improvement program is being considered for FY03. A HUD alignment program is in work. Landing gear durability tests are underway, and design changes are anticipated. New navigation software is being developed and tested.

Developmental Test and Evaluation will continue at Edwards AFB under the heading of the Follow-On Flight Test Program (FOFTP). AFOTEC-Det 5 at Edwards AFB will maintain involvement through ongoing communication with the Program Office and the C-17 Test Team resident at Edwards AFB.

The apparent limited capability for dual-row airdrops (release of two rows of cargo platforms positioned side-by-side in the aircraft) may necessitate sequential (side by side) release of rather than simultaneous release of the special 88-inch wide by 16-foot long platforms to prevent collisions after they exit the aircraft. The resultant effect is an increase in delivery time and required drop zone length; however, the total number of aircraft required to drop equipment for a brigade has been significantly reduced. At present, the combined effects of dual-row airdrop and aircraft spacing for personnel drops have positively impacted the strategic brigade airdrop execution time, which is getting nearer to the Army's goal.

The Program Office is revising the TEMP to better address continuing flight tests, particularly the Follow-On Flight Test Program at Edwards AFB and continued operational testing by the 33 FLTS at McGuire AFB. The current TEMP was approved in 1995, and contained substantial information on FOT&E. A revised TEMP will better address FOFTP at Edwards AFB and operational testing by AFOTEC and the 33 FLTS. In addition, an updated OT test plan will be submitted. The updated plan will focus on the transfer of OT management responsibility to the 33 FLTS and a more detailed scope of the proposed testing for the next four years. In addition, AFOTEC will have an increased role in future operational testing. The TEMP will also define the future LFT program.

The ARC-210 radio antennas and logic modules were being removed at a high rate because of diode failures not evident in previous components. Retrofit was completed in May 2000. Fuel system power wiring in Block 11 aircraft requires replacement upon delivery. Alignment deficiencies between the Head-Up Display (HUD) and the Inertial Reference Units (IRUs) is a deceptively complex issue that precludes safe assault landings on short airfields. In addition, Block 10/11 aircraft (one-third of the current fleet) were initially fielded IRU/GPS/MC software that experience navigation accuracy problems restricting aircraft to CONUS-only flight. The fix to CONUS restrictions is being evaluated. Root cause for the landing gear post problem is still being examined.

Regarding planned upgrades, Block 12 (which includes the extended range fuel tank and several Global Air Traffic Management functions) will be the most significant configuration change yet. Block 12 aircraft should begin delivery in February 2001. They will contain 280,000 different lines of software, and 33 percent of the line replaceable units will be different. A two-phase implementation (Blocks 12- and 12+) is being proposed. Block 12 software and sub-systems modifications appear to be more complex than Block 10, which produced an inordinate number of operational difficulties. Blocks 10/11 lacked appropriate spares, technical orders, and training for flight and ground crews. Problems are currently being addressed. With more key modifications and enhancements planned for Blocks 13 and 14, the need for OT&E to ensure the delivery of effective/suitable systems continues to increase.

Challenges to developmental and operational flight testing in 2001 and beyond include constraints to individual project budgets, test resources, and aircraft availability for test. Only a single dedicated aircraft exists for developmental flight testing. Requests for flight test time on operational aircraft are in stiff competition with high operational mission demands. Also, the large number of aircraft scheduled for modification has limited the available aircraft to perform mission requirements and testing. These challenges have affected the depth and duration of testing conducted following aircraft modification and upgrade.

A large measure of the C-17's documented operational success is attributable to T&E decisions by DOT&E and DEPSECDEF during EMD. At the same time, deficiencies identified during IOT&E still remain; i.e., OBIGGS. When prior deficiencies are combined with operational effectiveness and suitability problems identified since the C-17 Reliability, Maintainability and Availability evaluation, it appears that greater resource allocations for deficiency correction and enhanced T&E priority after Milestone IIIB could have reduced or eliminated many current troubles.

In addition, policies and procedures flowing from the push toward commercial acquisition are leading the C-17 down a risky path. A lack of fiscal, technical, and testing realism may be creating fleets that cannot meet effectiveness, sustainability, or interoperability requirements. In the case of the C-17, data suggest that no more than three aircraft on any base are in the same configuration. This negatively impacts the logistics supportability and availability of the fleet. Moreover, the partially mission capable rates are now consistently below the command standard, and aircraft availability (because of constant modification) has become a significant issue.