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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The Defense Message System (DMS) contributes to the information superiority necessary to achieve Joint Vision 2010 by enabling anyone in DoD to exchange messages with anyone else in DoD. This is accomplished by a worldwide, secure, accountable, and reliable, reader-to-writer messaging system. DMS with associated bridging systems is to replace the official "organizational" messaging system¾ the Automatic Digital Network. This will reduce the cost and manpower demands of the legacy system that is based on 1960s technology. To accomplish this, DMS must be implemented on over 360,000 desktop computers at over 7,000 sites worldwide. This includes tactical forces, allies, other designated federal government users, and defense contractors. DMS must also provide ordinary E-mail ("individual" messaging) by translating among commercial and government standards. The DMS program capitalizes on existing and emerging commercial messaging technology by employing the international X.400 messaging standard and X.500 directory services standard. DMS is a value-added service on a separate computer and communications backbone-the Defense Information Infrastructure. The National Security Agency has taken responsibility for DMS security. It will be based on the Multi-level Information System Security Initiative (MISSI) technology that uses Fortezza cards for personnel identification and encryption services. By focusing on standards-based architecture, DMS relies almost exclusively on vendors such as MicroSoft® and Lotus® to extend their commercial software products to conform to international standards and security protection features.

The DMS program began in 1989. In 1992, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence issued a policy mandating the transition to, and use of, DMS compliant systems. In March 1995, additional policy guidance imposed a moratorium on the acquisition of non-DMS compliant electronic messaging systems.

The Air Force manages the DMS component acquisitions in accordance with the DMS target architecture developed by the Defense Information Systems Agency. AFOTEC led a joint test team to conduct the IOT&E of DMS Release 1.0 in August 1997; compliant with the TEMP approved by DOT&E in April 1997. Although DMS 1.0 showed improvement over its previous releases, it could not adequately support several critical requirements, such as exchanging messages with non-DMS users, rerouting traffic around failed elements, and operating through properly configured firewalls. Consequently, on September 30,1997, the Major Automated Information Systems Review Council approved DMS 1.0 as a baseline, but required additional operational testing of the fixed system, DMS 1.1. However, before the OT&E of DMS 1.1 could be planned, the Joint Staff (J-6) issued a revised requirements document stating that DMS must adhere closely to commercial standards even if some critical missions would have to be supported by other means. Without a clearly defined mission and validated concept of operations, DOT&E downgraded the OT&E to a Limited User Field Test.

AFOTEC led a joint test force in conducting the Limited User Field Test of DMS 1.1 from March 23-April 8, 1998, in compliance with the TEMP approved by DOT&E in April 1997. The Limited User Field Test assessed the same performance areas as the IOT&E: (1) messaging services; (2) directory services; (3) security; (4) survivability; (5) suitability; and (6) usability. The Backbone Message Transfer Agent malfunctioned early in the test process and had to be fixed. The early test events were rerun.

Other capabilities were tested for the first time. These included: (1) installation and setup; (2) compatibility with properly configured firewalls; and (3) defensive configuration to protect against information warfare attacks.

Operational test limitations included: (1) the lack of an overseas test site; 2) the Joint Staff's deferral of some capabilities that had failed developmental testing; and (3) dependence upon the Defense Information Infrastructure implying, for example, that DMS cannot ensure availability of the global communications systems during wartime.

After the Limited User Field Test of DMS 1.1, the Joint Interoperability Test Command conducted a Joint Operational Assessment for DMS 2.0. The operational test and evaluation of DMS Releases 2.1 is scheduled for March 1999.

The Limited User Field Test of DMS 1.1 demonstrated that 90 percent of the measures of performance (MOPs) were improved, with 77 percent fully met. Nevertheless, five of the nine "most critical" MOPs did not meet their criteria. Again, DMS was unable to adequately exchange messages with non-DMS users or reroute traffic around failed elements; no site was able to install DMS and setup operations without the assistance of contractors; and no site achieved the laboratory-tested secure configuration against information warfare attacks. Although the solution to the security "firewall" compatibility appeared sound during planning, it was not tested because the site never became fully operational. Several problems appear to result from a common cause-the complexity of the DMS infrastructure relative to the training and assistance given to the administrative support personnel in the field. The training and support provided to the system administrative personnel must be strengthened to reduce the impact of these deficiencies.

The DMS program needs more widespread user involvement. With better user-defined policies, developers and users will be able to improve system administration, directory management, and security administration support through streamlined procedures, more usable documentation, improved training and help desks, and possibly with automated aids. Since future DMS releases will incorporate higher security levels, more automated interfaces, and more complex management tasks; it is imperative that administrative burden be minimized.

Improved integration testing by the development contractor, Lockheed Martin Federal Systems, is needed to identify and correct problems before the product is delivered to the government for beta and operational testing. This should help expedite DMS' progress.

The strong correlation of the results in the majority of the Limited User Field Test messaging trials show that diverse operational scenarios are required to adequately evaluate DMS in future tests.