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Military

 DOT&E Director, Operational Test & Evaluation  
FY98 Annual Report
FY98 Annual Report

TOMAHAWK


Navy ACAT IC Program: Prime Contractor
Total Number of Systems:4,170 missilesHughes Missile Systems Company
Total Program Cost (TY$):$11,210M 
Average Unit Cost (TY$):$1.4M 
Full-rate production:3QFY84Service Certified Y2K Compliant
TBIP Production:1QFY021QFY99

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

Tomahawk is a long-range cruise missile designed to be launched from submarines and surface ships against land targets. Three primary variants are currently operational: (1) nuclear land attack (TLAM-N) (not deployed); (2) conventional land attack (TLAM-C); and (3) conventional land attack submunition (TLAM-D). Each missile is contained within a pressurized canister to form an all-up-round (AUR). The submarine AUR is launched from torpedo or vertical tubes. Surface ships employ a vertical launching system (VLS) to launch various missile types, including the Tomahawk AUR. Engagement planning, missile initialization, and launch control functions are performed aboard the launch platform by a Combat Control System (submarines) or Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TWCS) (surface ships). Targeting for Tomahawk is supported by the Theater Mission Planning Center (TMPC) and by the Over-the-Horizon Detection, Classification, and Targeting System.

Tomahawk provides perhaps the most recognizable example of a precision engagement system in the U.S. inventory, and has done so since its initial operational capability in 1984. Upgrades, leading to the Block III TLAM-C and TLAM-D configurations, have improved the system's flexibility. Additional technological innovations are currently in development, and are envisioned to further increase Tomahawk's responsiveness and exploit information superiority to a very high degree.


BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Development of the Tomahawk began in 1972. The program originally included a ship-attack variant (TASM) in addition to the three land-attack variants. IOT&E began in 1981. DOT&E submitted B-LRIP reports for TASM and TLAM-N in 1984; TLAM-C in 1985; and TLAM-D in 1991.

The Block III upgrade to TLAM-C and TLAM-D includes: (1) GPS navigation; (2) improvements to the terminal update system (DSMAC IIA); (3) time-of-arrival control; and (4) a new warhead for TLAM-C. The TWCS software was also upgraded to a Block III configuration. A major upgrade to the TMPC (hardware and software) was undertaken at approximately the same time. OT&E of the Block III AUR was completed in FY92 and TWCS testing was completed in FY93. OT&E of the upgraded TMPC was completed in FY94. End-to-end FOT&E of the Block III Tomahawk Weapon System (TWS) was also completed in FY94.

Improvements to the Block III TWS are ongoing. The most recent upgrades are software version 2.4 for the TMPC and the Advanced Tomahawk Weapon Control System (ATWCS). ATWCS is planned as a comprehensive upgrade to the current TWCS, replacing the 1970s vintage hardware and re-hosting and upgrading the software. ATWCS implementation will proceed in two stages, first replacing the current TWCS Track Control Group, then the current Launch Control Group. The next major upgrade, the Baseline IV is currently scheduled to enter OT in FY99.

The Baseline IV Phase I Tactical Tomahawk is in development. The Tactical Tomahawk is to be more responsive and more flexible than current variants. The AUR will be equipped with a significantly upgraded mission computer, a two-way satellite data-link, and an anti-jam GPS receiver. The Tactical Tomahawk is to be capable of being redirected to secondary pre-planned targets after launch ("en route flex"). It also is to be capable to send a new or modified mission plan to the missile after launch ("in-flight retargeting"). Meanwhile, the missile is to be able to provide information on its in-flight status and confirm arrival in the target area ("battle damage indication"). Improvements to the mission planning and launch-platform weapon-control systems will reduce the overall Tomahawk planning cycle. Crews aboard launch platforms will be able to plan some types of missions from launch to impact.


TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY

OT and FOT&E were conducted to evaluate the ATWCS Track Control Group Replacement (TCGR). The OT was conducted in three phases: (1) Modeling and Simulation at the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren Division (NSWC-DD); (2) two TLAM strike scenarios on-board the Aegis cruiser USS Monterey; and (3) a maintainability demonstration also on-board the USS Monterey. During the test, USS Monterey participated in several over-the-horizon targeting scenarios while cooperating with command nodes ashore and afloat and with other Tomahawk launch platforms. The scenarios included several simulated TLAM engagements. OT culminated in the flight of one Block II TLAM-C, launched by USS Monterey. The OT test results were finalized and reported in FY98 and indicated the need for additional testing. FOT&E was conducted in FY98 to verify that the deficiencies identified in OT were corrected.

DOT&E established an ongoing program to build a data base on TLAM accuracy and reliability. The program is being executed by COMOPTEVFOR. Data from a total of eight FY98 TLAM flights will contribute to this data base. Begun in FY94, this effort is scheduled for completion in FY99.

All Tomahawk TEMPs and Test Plans are current and testing is proceeding in accordance with these documents.


TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

In OT-IIJ, ATWCS TCGR demonstrated a capability for successful planning, preparation, and execution of TLAM missions. However, engagement planning throughput of this new upgrade failed to match the capability of the old system. In addition, the system reliability, maintainability, and human factor COIs were determined to be unsatisfactory. The problems included:

  • Reliability: TCGR lost communications with the Launch Control Group in tests conducted at NSWC. Mission Data Processing locked up while attempting to access mission data from the Master Mission Library.


  • Maintenance: Poor maintenance manuals were not sufficiently accurate and extensive enough to support the operation and maintenance of the ATWCS.


  • Human Factors: High operator workload generated by a large number of procedures designed to avoid inherent software problems. The frequency of occurrence and complexity of these workarounds generated additional work, and the crew was unable to accomplish all of the required actions in the allotted time. After the planning was complete operators reviewed planned engagements. During some of these reviews, operators experienced slow system performance due to unnecessary background operations in the computer. All of this contributed to reduced operator performance.

DOT&E was influential in the CNO decision not to approve fleet introduction of the ATWCS TCGR until the deficiencies discovered in OT were corrected and their correction verified through an additional phase of OT&E.

Follow-on testing of the ATWCS TCGR took place in OT-IIJ1. The test revealed that significant system slowdowns experienced in OT-IIJ were corrected, and that on-line help included in the software update corrected many operator problems. Although engagement planning throughput improved to the required level and the loss of communications with TCGR was corrected, documentation was still inadequate to support the maintenance requirement.


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