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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The SEAWOLF (SSN 21) Nuclear Attack Submarine was developed to maintain the U.S. technological lead in undersea warfare well into the 21st century. It is designed to rapidly deploy to militarily important hostile ocean areas and deny their use to the enemy, clear the way for strikes by other friendly forces, and engage and destroy enemy submarines, surface forces and land targets, supporting dominant maneuver as well as full-dimensional protection for afloat forces. Secondary missions are mine and special warfare. SSN 21 is designed to be a quiet, fast, heavily armed, shock resistant, survivable submarine, outfitted with the AN/BSY-2 Submarine Combat System.

The AN/BSY-2 Submarine Combat System is designed to support SSN 21 in all mission areas. It is required to track targets, platforms, and weapons. These characteristics will provide intelligence and strike capabilities to support the Joint Force Commander in precision engagement as well as provide full-dimensional protection. The combat control subsystem provides setting and control of weapons and mines, over-the-horizon targeting, combat systems management, and piloting and navigation functions. It includes the weapon launch equipment to support eight horizontal tubes, a vertical large screen display, and own ship data displays. More specific information is included in the classified version of this report.

The SSN 21 program began in 1982 and was approved for conceptual design in 1983. In December 1983, the preliminary design was authorized; it was completed in 1985. Approval for lead ship production was granted in 1988.

The DAB ADM for the SSN 21 Program Review decision of January 11, 1991, approved continuation of LRIP through completion of OT in FY98 (now scheduled for FY00). DOT&E's input to that decision was based upon an independent evaluation and assessment of projected performance of SSN 21. DOT&E identified several important aspects of performance without which SSN 21 may not achieve and retain the advantage over the projected threat. A detailed discussion of these aspects was published in the classified FY90 edition of this report. Performance changes due to programmatic changes to supporting systems are discussed in the FY95 Annual Report.

SSN 21's initial sea trials were delayed by concerns about the robustness of the titanium used in some of SEAWOLF's watertight integrity applications. This was partially resolved and SEAWOLF began initial sea trials in July 1996. On her second trial, a casualty to a sonar fairing occurred. The corrective action delayed delivery until mid-1997. Following delivery, USS SEAWOLF began acoustic trials, which were completed in November 1997.

SEAWOLF spent FY98 in post-delivery shakedown conducting Navy acceptance trials and some DT, entering a scheduled fourteen-month post-shakedown availability (PSA) at Electric Boat Company, Groton, CT, in August 1998. CONNECTICUT (SSN 22) began sea trials in September 1998. The first phase of CONNECTICUT's acoustic trials were completed in October 1998, and she will spend most of 1999 in post-construction shakedown, entering drydock for PSA in August 1999. The third and final SEAWOLF class submarine, JIMMY CARTER (SSN 23) is still in construction, with delivery scheduled for December 2001.

The Navy is staffing Revision 4 to the TEMP, which combined TEMPs for SEAWOLF and the AN/BSY-2 (V) Submarine Fire Control System. DOT&E expects the TEMP by the end of calendar year 1998.

At DOT&E's recommendation, COMOPTEVFOR is conducting a pre-OPEVAL OA of SEAWOLF. The OA is focusing on data and reports collected from the pre-PSA acoustic trials, the combined Weapons System Accuracy Trial and Launcher Trial, Tactical Development Exercises, and A/B-1 component shock testing. Integral with this OA, DOT&E drove the development of a coordinated data collection computer program to collect platform suitability data. This OA should aid COMOPTEVFOR's preparation of an efficient, effective OPEVAL Test Plan and help assess where SEAWOLF stands with respect to its overall preparedness for OPEVAL.

Acoustic Trials continued in 1998, with a third trial conducted in May 1998 to diagnose radiated noise deficiencies discovered earlier. Further acoustic trials will occur in FY00, after PSA. Weapons System Accuracy Trials (WSAT) and Launcher Trials were partially completed in 1998. Concurrent with WSAT and other ship operations, Technical Evaluation proceeded on the AN/BSY-2 (V). Other testing completed included Ship Control System Testing (April 1998), Ferromagnetic Silencing Testing (May 1998), and Extremely Low Frequency Signature Reduction Testing (May 1998). The program office reported overall test results as satisfactory, but DOT&E and OPTEVFOR have not analyzed and evaluated these tests because the program has not yet released results.

In FY98, the Navy conducted component shock tests on submarine shock test vehicles at the Aberdeen Test Center. Components tested included hull penetrations, hatches, and weapons launch system components. The Navy and DOT&E participated in a joint effort to update and improve the LFT&E Strategy in the SSN 21 TEMP. Congress had appropriated funds in FY 1996 to conduct the Full Ship Shock Test (FSST), which is the capstone test for certifying the combat ruggedness of the ship class. The Navy elected to use funds to help pay for correction of unforeseen problems with the fairing to the ship's wide aperture array (WAA) sonar. The Navy rescheduled the FSST to FY00 and programmed additional funds to support the FSST, but Congress then explicitly prohibited any FY99 funds from being spent for preparations for the FY00 FSST. The Navy has since deleted all SEAWOLF FSST funding from the Navy FYDP, citing Congressional action and arguing the test is "neither operationally mandated nor affordable" within the Navy's current budget.

To date, SEAWOLF's test program has been disrupted by several significant equipment or design problems. Although the number of deficiencies identified in the SEAWOLF program is not historically above normal, the nature of several of these deficiencies has proven problematic. These deficiencies are discussed in more detail in the classified version of this report.

First and foremost, correction of a major technical problem with a sonar hull array fairing, which occurred during initial sea trials in 1996 (and reported in the FY96 and FY97 reports), resulted in the Navy reprogramming funds appropriated to the full ship shock test (FSST) to correct the problem. Further details are provided in the classified version of this report. This event caused significant turbulence in both the budget process and the test program. Eventually, the Navy proposed and DOT&E concurred with moving the FSST from FY97-FY00. Congress has now deleted FSST funds from the FY99 budget, and the Navy has deleted all future FSST funding from the FYDP. DOT&E strenuously opposes this action because omission of the FSST places SEAWOLF's design combat survivability in question. Ship shock tests have historically revealed serious but correctable design deficiencies that were not detected during component testing, modeling, simulation, or analysis.

During WSAT, significant design deficiencies with SEAWOLF's weapons launch systems were discovered. These design deficiencies also exist in CONNECTICUT. Remedies to these problems will be installed and tested on CONNECTICUT during her WSAT and Launcher Trials, scheduled for February 1999. If successful, these fixes will be fully installed in all three SEAWOLF class hulls. More details can be found in the classified version of this report.

Several significant class problems exist, which are discussed in the classified version of this report. These problems have been coupled with numerous lesser material problems, causing the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) to request a re-inspect of the ship after PSA. These disruptions in testing, including acoustic trials, appear to have delayed the Navy's analysis and reporting of acoustic trials. The program office has been aggressive in addressing known acoustic deficiencies, but technical limitations and funding constraints may preclude achieving all design thresholds. Cost cap restrictions have also forced the program office to proceed very cautiously before implementing fixes, since every dollar is at a premium. DOT&E continues to monitor acoustic performance, and is now analyzing the recently received preliminary pre-PSA acoustic trials report. These schedule perturbations caused by material problems carried over into planned tactical development.

Although there has been no formal OT, AN/BSY-2 has in general performed as expected, with some exceptions that are discussed in the classified version of this report. The Joint Maritime Command Information System capability of AN/BSY-2 passed land-based certification and is installed in CONNECTICUT.

In initial at-sea operations, CONNECTICUT has proven more reliable than SEAWOLF. She has progressed smoothly through sea trials and builder's acoustic trials. The ship is scheduled for WSAT in February 1999. CONNECTICUT's performance and reliability record to date is an indication that the Navy and the builder, the Electric Boat Company, are using lessons learned from SEAWOLF difficulties.

The SEAWOLF program still has almost two years to correct deficiencies before OPEVAL. This period includes the yearlong period (PSA) in the shipyard, which is now in progress and scheduled to be complete in August 1999. Ultimate OPEVAL success will hinge upon development of tactics that capitalize on the high stealthy speed and increased weapons and sensor capability of the class.

The cost cap, which served its purpose to rein in cost growth, continues to adversely impact the future operational effectiveness of the ship since planned enhancements have had to be delayed or scrapped, resulting in some material deficiencies foregoing complete correction before OPEVAL. Cost pressures also have led to the delay or cancellation of important tests.

Unanticipated problems arise in any acquisition program, and in a technologically complex program, such problems are to be expected. The difficulty with the sonar fairing led first to the delay, and eventually the cancellation, of the Full Ship Shock Test. The SEAWOLF program needs to be sure that new difficulties that arise in one area, e.g. weapons launch systems, do not cause important tests to be canceled in other areas. Since SEAWOLF is a major defense acquisitions program, DOT&E will assess the OT adequacy, evaluate operational effectiveness and suitability, and submit a final test and evaluation report to Congress as required by 10 U.S.C. 2399. This assessment of operational effectiveness and suitability should precede the decision to operationally employ the SEAWOLF Class.