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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The principal air threat to U.S. naval surface ships is a variety of highly capable anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). These include subsonic (Mach 0.9) and supersonic (Mach 2+), low altitude ASCMs. Detection, tracking, assessment, and engagement decisions must be accomplished to defend against these threats, with the duration from initial detection of an ASCM to its engagement with weapons typically on the order of a minute or less. SSDS is designed to accomplish these defensive actions.

With radars and anti-air weapons for self defense of today's amphibious ships and aircraft carriers installed as stand-alone systems, considerable manual intervention is required to complete the detect to engage sequence against ASCMs. The Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) is designed to expedite that process. SSDS, consisting of software and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, integrates radar systems with anti-air weapons, both hardkill (missile systems and rapid fire gun systems) and softkill (decoys). SSDS includes embedded doctrine to provide an integrated detect-through-engage capability with options ranging from use as a tactical decision aid (up to the point of recommending when to engage with specific systems) to use as an automatic weapon system to respond with hardkill and softkill systems (as targets become engageable.) Although SSDS will not improve capability of individual sensors, it enhances target tracking by integrating the inputs from several different sensors to form a composite track. For example, SSDS will correlate target detections from individual radars, the electronic support measures (ESM) system (radar warning receiver), and the identification-friend or foe (IFF) system, combining these to build composite tracks on targets while identifying and prioritizing threats. Similarly, SSDS will not improve capability of individual weapons, but should expedite the assignment of weapons for threat engagement, and provide a "recommend engage" display for operators, or if in automatic mode, initiate weapons firing, ECM transmission, chaff or decoy deployment, or some combination of these.

SSDS integrates previously "stand-alone" sensor and engagement systems for aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare ships, thereby supporting the Joint Vision 2010 concept of full-dimensional protection, by providing a final layer of self protection against air threat "leakers" for individual ships. By ensuring such protection, SSDS contributes indirectly to the operational concept of precision engagement, in that strike operations against targets are executed from several of the platforms receiving SSDS.

A successful at-sea demonstration was conducted with an amphibious ship (LSD-41) in June 1993 as a proof-of-concept exercise, at the direction of Congress. Milestone II was conducted in May 1995. Total procurement consists of 58 units, with 48 slated for amphibious ships and aircraft carriers and ten supporting training and engineering development. LRIP consisted of four units. The LRIP decision in late FY96 was supported by an OA conducted by COMOPTEVFOR. OPEVAL of SSDS Mark 1 was conducted during June 1997 in accordance with a DOT&E-approved plan and TEMP, to support the BLRIP decision for procurement of SSDS. Based on OPEVAL results, SSDS is operationally effective against subsonic, low altitude ASCMs. This conclusion alone marks a major improvement in the self defense capability of amphibious warfare ships against air threats. SSDS is operationally suitable. The Navy acquisition decision authority granted approval for full production in March 1998. Planning is underway for an upgrade of SSDS to the Mark 2 configuration, which will incorporate features of the Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) Block 1 and provide the interface for integration with the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC).

Activity in FY98 consisted of planning for FOT&E onboard the remotely controlled Self Defense Test Ship. The FOT&E will be conducted concurrently with OPEVAL of the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1 system at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division sea range at Point Mugu, CA during the second quarter of FY99. Use of the Self Defense Test Ship will permit threat-representative profiles by ASCMs and surrogates for realistic testing of SSDS without the safety concerns associated with use of a manned ship. A separate phase for examining operational suitability issues will be conducted on USS ASHLAND (LSD 48). Testing will be conducted in accordance with a DOT&E-approved test plan and TEMP, and will be observed by the Director and his staff.

Our assessment of SSDS Mark 1 is that it is operationally effective against subsonic, low altitude ASCMs. This conclusion alone marks a major improvement in the self defense capability of amphibious warfare ships against air threats. SSDS is operationally suitable. Our BLRIP report was published in January 1998.

Although missile firings, supported by SSDS Mark 1, were conducted for the concurrent RAM Block 1 DT during September and October, as of this writing, analysis of DT results is still being conducted. SSDS FOT&E and the concurrent RAM OT should begin in the second quarter of FY99.

This testing was delayed by a leak in the 42 year old hull of the Self Defense Test Ship. This ship, which is controlled remotely and is unmanned during testing, is required in order to present threat-representative attack profiles by the targets for adequate testing of SSDS when firing RAM (and future short range, self defense systems). Safety precludes use of a fleet ship for this testing due to the attendant danger of impact by target debris.

The FOT&E for SSDS Mk 1 is considered adequate, but the Self Defense Test Ship will require more thorough maintenance to ensure its availability for FOT&E of the upgraded SSDS Mark 2. Additionally, its use will be required by other short range, self defense systems.