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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The StandOff Land-Attack Missile (SLAM) is a precision tactical weapon for deployment aboard aircraft carriers and is launched from an F/A-18 aircraft. SLAM provides standoff precision strike against fixed, high value land targets; secondary targets include relocatable stationary land targets and ships. It satisfies intermediate tactical needs between long-range cruise missiles and short-range free fall munitions. The improvements provided by SLAM-ER (Expanded Response) take advantage of new technological innovations to provide naval tactical aircraft with the tools required for precision engagement. These improvements include: (1) longer range to increase survivability of launch and/or control aircraft; (2) reduced susceptibility to countermeasures; (3) other electro-optical seeker upgrades; (4) increased probability of kill against hardened targets for increased system lethality; (5) improved guidance navigation unit with an integrated Global Positioning System and Inertial Navigation System; and (6) improved user interfaces for mission planning and launch aircraft.

SLAM is a fielded system with proven combat performance in Operation Desert Storm and Bosnia, while SLAM-ER is intended to provide incremental improvements, particularly in terms of range and penetrating lethality. SLAM-ER entered EMD after a Milestone (MS) IV/II decision in 2QFY95. In December 1996, ASN (RDA) decided to procure the FY96 buy of SLAM in the SLAM-ER configuration, avoiding $35 million in future retrofit costs. The LRIP 1 decision was made in April 1997 with LRIP 2 made in April 1998. These two production decisions total over 100 missiles. MS III and Full-Rate Production decisions are planned for FY99; IOC is planned for CY99.

The LFT&E strategy in the 1996 OSD-approved TEMP, specified three data sources for LFT&E: (1) confined volume testing at the Nevada Test Site (completed in early FY97); (2) three arena tests of warhead fragmentation (completed in FY98); and (3) four sled tests of warhead penetration (completed in FY98).

OT-IIA Phase I consisted of three DT/OT live firings from May-July 1998. Conducted at the China Lake Range Complex, all the weapons lacked warheads for range safety constraints but were fully instrumented. All three shots were successful and were conducted against representative/realistic target surrogates. OT-IIA Phase 2 consisted of five OT shots beginning in August 1998. One end-to-end, live warhead shot test was conducted during a scheduled SINKEX at Roosevelt Roads, PR. The missile failed to hit the target because of a fault in the firing checklist.

Three LFT&E arena tests were conducted at China Lake, CA, in early FY98 using Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual methodology ("Testing and Data Reduction Procedures for High-Explosive Munitions," Rev 2, May 8, 1989). In accordance with JMEM methodology, in separate tests, two warheads were emplaced horizontally within the test arena (one with lugwell up, the other with it down) and one vertically. Celotex bundles captured the warhead fragments and electronic instrumentation recorded ballistic parameters of the fragments so as to permit a characterization of the fragmentation pattern and examination of individual fragment characteristics. All test objectives were met, and the data have been reduced.

Five LFT&E sled tests were conducted at China Lake in mid- to late FY98, to assess the penetration and fuzing performance of live warheads mounted in simulated missiles. The first three tests demonstrated the ability of the missile to perforate and fuze on a concrete block wall, threshold reinforced concrete bunker wall, and reinforced concrete bunker door, respectively. A fueled F-4 Phantom, placed behind the bunker door of the third sled track test, was completely destroyed. For the fourth sled shot, the Navy, with DOT&E approval, conducted the test against a reinforced concrete target of objective thickness rather than threshold thickness as required by the LFT&E strategy (the objective target is thicker than the threshold target). When the test objectives were not met due to a test-induced anomaly, the event was repeated and was successful.

On August 9, 1998, an attempt was made by the Fleet to fire a SLAM-ER missile against EX-TURNER, a SINKEX target. The missile failed to hit the target. At this time, there may be a data void in regard to SLAM-ER lethality against threat surface ships, which are objective rather than threshold targets.

As of mid-September 1998, VX-9, the squadron responsible for the OT phase, stopped test on the SLAM-ER and two other weapons systems, due to manning and aircraft parts issues. Captive carry and carrier suitability was conducted in early October 1998. OT resumed in November 1998 and continues toward final resolution.

SLAM-ER has demonstrated all the characteristics of a weapon that will be both effective and suitable for fleet use. The final determination has been delayed because of the stop test by VX 9. One major improvement provided by SLAM-ER is the titanium warhead, which will provide a much needed penetration capability to this standoff precision weapon. Sled testing during development of the redesigned warhead has demonstrated successful penetration and fusing against the threat requirement. Although blast overpressures observed in the SLAM-ER warhead chamber tests were somewhat below predictions, the fragments and blast generated by the warhead are expected to be lethal within the hardened targets. Extended range and simplified mission planning of the SLAM-ER have already been demonstrated.

An important deficiency of the existing system is the pilot/seeker's inability to target specific critical areas, or nodes of the target. Upgrades to the seeker software are intended to improve this limitation in the OPEVAL version of the missile with an automatic targeting system being a planned product improvement. Testing will continue to focus on improvements to the existing seeker/data link system. Planned IOT&E for SLAM-ER includes combined DT/OT, and is considered adequate to determine all critical operational and LFT&E issues.

The Navy is currently preparing their Live Fire detailed test and evaluation report. From preliminary analysis, live fire testing indicates that the SLAM-ER has the potential to perforate its intended threshold bunker targets, fuze properly, and severely damage or destroy the contents of the bunkers. The DOT&E LFT&E lethality evaluation will be provided to Congress prior to the MS III decision (most likely in mid-FY99).

Test Design, Conduct, Procedures and Equipment are deficient in several areas. Live fire of an All-Up-Round SLAM on an overland range can not be conducted due to range safety constraints. Missiles must have self-destruct mechanisms included in the telemetry (TM) package that is installed in place of the warhead. As a result, end to end testing of overland warhead shots can not be included in the test strategy. To capture end to end performance, testing is accomplished in segments. The results are then collated into a comprehensive evaluation combining the necessary elements of an operational flight. Live shots with TM packages that test launch, cruise, target acquisition, and accuracy are allied with warhead penetration and lethality analysis and testing conducted using the supersonic sled facility at NAWCWPN China Lake.

Test Resources and hardware have been used in an efficient and innovative fashion. SLAM-ER needed a facility to measure the blast overpressure effects of the warhead in a large confined volume. The solution was to conduct the test in an access tunnel formally used for underground nuclear testing at the Nevada Nuclear Test Range, NV. This facility provides unique resources for underground conventional weapons testing. Another example involved conducting a sled test against a target more challenging than the system's nominal threshold requirement. This led to a better understanding of the warhead's capability at the edge of its performance envelope.