The Block II Upgrade entered EMD in FY93, and building on the Block I Baseline includes major avionics modifications. The Navy plans to install this upgrade in former SH-60B, SH-60F or HH-60H airframes that have undergone "remanufacture" in the H-60 Service Life Extension Program, the resultant aircraft to be designated a SH-60R.

The Hellfire missile Integration Program Upgrade to the SH-60B and HH-60H was designated for LFT&E in March 1995. Extensive ballistic testing was conducted on the H-60 series of helicopters during development and later under the Joint Live Fire program. The LFT&E Alternative Plan for the SH-60B and HH-60H included an evaluation of the vulnerability of these variants based on these past tests, but did not include the SH-60R. The SH-60R variant was specifically identified as a covered upgrade in January 1998 and requires an approved alternative plan.

OT&E field activity did not took place in FY98; however development and contractor/government lab testing of the ALFS and MMR was conducted. A Test and Evaluation Planning Working Group and a Modeling and Simulation Working Group continued their efforts to update the January 1994 TEMP to reflect recent programmatic changes and consolidated test schedules.

ALFS DT has been fully combined with SH-60R DT. Initially, 77 flight hours of dedicated ALFS testing and 89 flight hours of SH-60R-ALFS testing were planned. This year those requirements were reviewed and it was determined that a total of 89 flight test hours could be used to satisfy both requirements, thus saving 77 flight test hours. The near-term OT plans call for ALFS OT-IIA to be tested concurrently with the SH-60R OT-IIA. At this point there will be one TEMP and one test plan covering both systems. It is expected that this consolidation will be completed in FY99.

The Navy completed the SH-60B and HH-60H vulnerability evaluation and DOT&E is currently reviewing it. Efforts on the SH-60R are just starting. The draft Alternative Plan for the SH-60R includes a review of the aircraft modifications to determine whether they have the potential to significantly change the aircraft vulnerability and whether any additional testing will be required.

Although the airframe itself is not new, the SH-60R program poses considerable risk due to: (1) the reliability problems with ALFS; (2) higher than expected false alarm rates on the Advanced Radar Detection and Discrimination (ARPDD) program of the MMR; (3) additional modes of the MMR that have not yet been developed or tested; and (4) incorporation of a new cockpit that will be common to the CH-60. The program manager has been very forthcoming in reporting these difficulties and is working hard to resolve them. Adequate test assets and aircraft configurations are planned, and detailed reviews of the CT, DT, and OT schedules and time requirements are being conducted.