The CH-60 is an ARMY UH-60L Blackhawk airframe incorporating Navy Seahawk marinized GE T-700 engines, folding rotorhead and tail pylon, transmission/drive train, and flight controls. The CH-60 will share, in part, with the Navy SH-60R helicopter a "common cockpit" which consists of multi-functional displays, keysets, and a complex client-server based tactical data processing system. The CH-60 avionics will include: (1) dual UHF/VHF transceivers; (2) inertial, Doppler, and Global Positioning System navigation; (3) night vision device-compatible heads-up displays; and (4) a ground proximity warning system. The aircraft will have provisions installed to incorporate a future CSAR mission kit consisting of tactical moving maps, FLIR with a laser range finder/designator, crew-served side suppression weapons, HELLFIRE missiles, forward firing guns/rockets, and an integrated self defense system.

Combined compliance testing (CT), developmental testing (DT), and operational testing (OT) was conducted from November 1997-January 1998 at Sikorsky's Stratford, Conn., facility and with the Combat Stores Ship, USS Saturn, 30 miles south of Long Island, NY. Each flight had either a DT or OT co-pilot and a Sikorsky test pilot during the 45 hours flown. The OT portions of the tests were conducted in accordance with a DOT&E approved test plan as an early OA and supported a June 1998 LRIP decision for initial production lots of the CH-60.

Neither approved nor signature-ready ORD or TEMP documents were available during the November 1997-January 1998 OA period. Therefore, the assessment was conducted using then-available draft documents augmented by HC and Helicopter Combat Support Special (HCS) mission criteria, the latter for Combat SAR (CSAR) and SWS applications. HCS missions could not be directly evaluated for the CH-60 because weapons and self-protect systems will not be available until FY02 for OT&E. Although flight hours and ground access to the CH-60 prototype aircraft were limited; the assessment found the CH-60 to be potentially operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable for the HC mission. Due to the commonality of predecessor H-60 variants, the assessment was bolstered by historical data from Army and Navy files, where applicable. DOT&E concurred with the OTA's assessment. Primary deficiencies noted during the assessment were categorized as: (1) insufficient fuel capacity without use of auxiliary tanks to meet specified range requirements in the ORD for amphibious SAR and plane guard SAR; (2) structural deficiencies which would preclude more stringent landing and deck handling requirements aboard small decked combatants; and (3) incompatibility of the internal roller-based cargo handling system.

Suitable internal and external auxiliary fuel tank designs are currently in use by Army and Air Force H-60 variants. If the use of auxiliary tanks is permitted by the ORD, SAR range requirements will be met.

Landing gear designed to withstand aircraft sink rates of up to ten or more feet per second could be required to land on smaller decked combatants, according to initial dynamic interface calculations. While the SH-60B/F aircraft landing gear is designed to withstand these sink rates, the CH-60 prototype landing gear is designed to only withstand aircraft sink rates of up to eight feet per second. If not corrected, restrictive sea state/wind conditions will be imposed for CH-60 operations that involve landing on small decked combatants.

The 29-foot separation between the forward main landing gear and the aft tail wheel will also preclude or constrain landing operations aboard some of the smaller deck combatants. The DOT&E-approved TEMP includes dynamic interface testing and analysis onboard the most restrictive classes of these vessels in order to identify suitable safety restrictions.

The internal roller-based cargo handling system is not compatible with the cargo pallets currently used throughout the Navy. Design modifications are necessary to correct this deficiency and should not impose excessive weight or strength penalties. Additionally, the Navy should review/clarify the necessity of imposing palletized cargo "tie-down" requirements for weight and cost penalties.