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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The AN/ALR-67 (v)3 Advanced Special Receiver (ASR) contributes to full-dimensional protection by improving individual aircraft probability of survival through improved aircrew situational awareness of the radar-guided threat environment.

ASR is a radar warning receiver (RWR) intended to supersede the AN/ALR-67E(v)2 and provides extended capabilities in detection and processing of air defense threat radar of the mid-1990s and beyond. It functions cooperatively with the onboard suppression and defensive systems (high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM), countermeasure dispensers, and radio frequency (RF) jammer) via data exchanged over the EW multiplex bus and the HARM data bus. The (v)3 ASR is applicable to the F/A-18C/D/E/F, while the (v)4 ASR will be applicable to the F-14A/B upgrade, F-14D, and AV-8B (when/if funded). The (v)3 ASR differs from (v)4 only in the housing of one Weapon Replaceable Assembly (WRA-V) which was split into two portions to alleviate structural limitations to the F/A-18 tail. Except for WRA-V and new brackets required for antennas and additional wiring, the bulk of ASR hardware is a form and fit replacement for AN/ALR-67E(v)2 hardware. ASR provides an order of magnitude increase in processing power. ASR collection categories include (1) high band pulse (2-40 GHz); (2) high band continuous wave; (3) low band pulse less than 2 GHz; and (4) millimeter wave MMW (28-40 GHz). ASR provides signal detection, direction finding, and identification of RF and MMW threat emitters including scanning, pulse-Doppler and continuous wave tracking, acquisition and early warning radar, and missile guidance. The Low Band Integrated Array in the ASR was not changed from the ALR-67E(v)2. The software re-programmable threat library user data file (UDF) development and maintenance process and infrastructure for the ASR is intended to support improved operational timeliness of UDF updates (i.e., tactical reprogramming).

The ASR is a Navy program that achieved Milestone II in 2QFY87. At the present time the ASR program for the F/A-18 is planned and funded to proceed through OPEVAL to Milestone III production.

Congressional concern over the Navy acquisition strategy for the ASR resulted in two special reporting requirements. The first was met when an EOA by COMOPTEVFOR in October 1994 following DT-IIB, and the December 1994 DOT&E-approved TEMP helped support a required USD (A&T) March 17, 1995 report on the soundness of the ASR acquisition strategy.

The second special requirement was for a pre-LRIP report that included: (1) a certification by DOT&E that ASR is potentially operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable and ready to enter LRIP; (2) a comprehensive report by the COMOPTEVFOR and the Navy on the test objectives and results of DT/OT test flights; and (3) a certification by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) that, ASR is ready to enter LRIP. This was achieved in 2QFY98.

Testing revealed deficiencies that required additional DT/OT testing at ACETEF in FY96 due to immaturity of the ASR system and its integration in the F/A-18C/D. The Navy restructured the ASR program with an 18-month schedule extension. An extensive DT with OT assist was begun, consisting of several complementary/parallel test events/flights conducted by the operational test director, with OT aircraft, at China Lake, CA. Supplementary to the China Lake test events, the ASR was deployed to the NATO Exercise Trial Mace IX in early 1QFY98. This deployment provided an opportunity to validate ASR performance in an open-air environment against some blue/gray emitters that are not available in the U.S. T&E infrastructure except as hardware in the loop (HITL) or ISTF simulations. At the completion of DT with OT Assist, a determination was made by the program director that ASR hardware/software had sufficiently matured to enter combined DT/OT phase of testing.

OT-IIA began in 1QFY98 and was conducted in accordance with a DOT&E test plan. OT-IIA included combined DT/OT open air testing at China Lake, CA. ISTF testing of ASR resumed 2QFY98 at the ACETEF facility. Open air OT was carried out in an operationally realistic environment utilizing a broad range of threat emitters, both airborne and ground, that spanned the frequency range of ASR. Simulated surface threats were deployed and operated in a doctrinally realistic fashion. Airborne threat aircraft flew operationally realistic engagement scenarios. ASR-equipped aircraft flew operational missions to include combat air patrol and self escort strike. Operational missions were flown with varying rules of engagement while emphasis was placed on defending hostile fighters and surface-to-air-threats. Incomplete intelligence briefs and the addition of supplementary threat resources served to add additional realism to the tests.

At the completion of OT-IIA, a determination was made that ASR was potentially operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable. Subsequently, ASR was considered ready to enter IOT&E, OPEVAL phase. Operational Test-IIB of ASR formally began on June 3, 1998. DOT&E staff is currently monitoring OT-IIB. Results from OT-IIB will support a decision to authorize entrance into MS III production and fielding of ASR.

Based on results from the combined DT/OT completed on January 15, 1998 alone, ASR was not operationally effective or suitable. The OT-IIA ASR system-under-tests hardware and software configuration was frozen in October 1997. Since that time, the development team had continued to resolve the system performance deficiencies through changes in the Operational Flight Program (OFP) software. DOT&E reviewed the results of DT flight tests through April 1998 that used the newest OFP. The DOT&E assessment was sufficient progress had been made towards improvement to warrant a determination of potentially operationally effective and suitable. The detailed Navy and COMOPTEVFOR OT-IIA report (classified) dated April 16, 1998, identified COIs, most notably "Threat Identification" for which improvement was recommended prior to commencement of OPEVAL OT-IIB. DOT&E's assessment was in general concurrence with COMOPTEVFOR's recommendations and relative priority. The program office subsequently provided data indicating improvements in those areas highlighted in the COTF report, which DOT&E is reviewing.

DOT&E submitted a letter to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of all the congressional defense committees in accordance with Section 8050A of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1995 (Public Law No. 103-335). ASR was potentially operationally effective and suitable and ready to enter LRIP.