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| FY98 Annual Report | |||
SUITE OF INTEGRATED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES AND COMMON MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM (CMWS, AN/AAR-57) (SIIRCM/CMWS) INCLUDES: ADVANCED THREAT INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES (ATIRCM, AN/ALQ-212)
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| Army ACAT IC Program: | Prime Contractor | |
| Total Number of Systems: | 2,577 | SANDERS, a Lockheed Martin Company |
| Total Program Cost (TY$): | $2,118.23M | Major Subcontractor (CMWS-sensors) |
| Average Unit Cost (TY$): ATIRCM B-KIT CMWS B-KIT | $637K $225K | Lockheed Martin Infrared Imaging Systems Group A Contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, Northrop Grumman |
| Full-rate production: | 4QFY01 | Service Certified Y2K Compliant |
| No |
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010
The Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures (SIIRCM) Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) contributes to the Joint Vision 2010 concept of full-dimensional protection by improving individual aircraft (or ground vehicle) probability of survival against an increasing worldwide proliferation of advanced infrared (IR) guided missiles. CMWS is a software reprogrammable system intended to provide automatic passive missile detection, threat declaration, positive warning of a post launch missile that is homing on the host platform, countermeasures effectiveness assessment, false alarm suppression, and cues to other onboard systems such as expendable countermeasures dispensers. For the Army only, the ATIRCM adds active directional countermeasures via an arc lamp and laser.
The ATIRCM/CMWS design is modular to allow multiple configurations on a wide range of aircraft and other vehicles. The lead U.S. military services' lead platforms for EMD are the MH-60K (Army), the AV-8BN (Navy), and the F-16 Block 40-Close Air Support (Air Force) aircraft. Two ATIRCM jam heads are the normal configuration for most aircraft, though only one ATIRCM jam head is now currently planned for tactical helicopters.
The ATIRCM is part of the U.S. Army's SIIRCM concept of IR protection. SIIRCM also includes new development sets of IR flare decoys, the Advanced Infrared Countermeasures Munitions, and passive IR features. These features include host platform modifications such as engine exhaust/heat suppression and special coatings, intended to reduce the platform IR signature.
ATIRCM is required to demonstrate integration with the Army Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures. The Navy Integrated Defensive Electronic Counter Measures (IDECM) program is required to demonstrate integration of CMWS in the IDECM suite.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The SIIRCM/CMWS is a Joint Service, Army lead program. In January 1995, USD (A&T) approved the merger of the Army ATIRCM program with the Navy/Air Force Advanced Missile Warning System program. An IPT was formed in June 1995 to produce a Tri-Service approved ORD and an IPT coordinated TEMP in support of a 4QFY95 Milestone (MS) II decision. The program entered EMD in September 1995. The IPT formed in June 1995, produced a "fully coordinated" TEMP in late December 1995, which was immediately approved by both DTSE&E and DOT&E upon submission to OSD in April 1996. After expanding the EMD Critical Design Review process, experiencing delays in initial EMD hardware/software production, and adjusting detailed T&E planning, the Acquisition Program Baseline schedule was approved in June 1997, moving the MS III objective/threshold from February-August 2000 to March-September 2001. The ORD was changed in FY97 to include a more realistic threshold to objective range for ATIRCM effectiveness. The Joint Program Office (JPO) was relocated from ST Louis, MO to Huntsville, AL during 4QFY97 as part of a BRAC move of the Army Aviation Electronic Combat Project Office. Since the relocation, the JPO has been established and staffed as a separate Project Managers Office directly under PEO Aviation.
TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY
During the first two quarters of FY98, an IPT developed a fully coordinated TEMP update to maintain adequate T&E concepts/resources by accepting additional program schedule risk. T&E funding for the program has been reduced to free funding for other program cost growth and to keep the program executable within available funding levels. DOT&E approved a TEMP update in November 1998.
Program test activity has mostly been centered on Test and Measurement (T&M) for the past year. Supporting system development and some aspects of the M&S effort are also dependent on the prime contractor's system design process and hardware deliveries. T&M, conducted in and around Sander's Nashua, NH facilities, at Eglin AFB and at White Sands Missile Range, has continued to gather both instrumented ground truth and prototype sensor views of environmental, threat, and false alarm data. T&M collection events planned during the year slipped to the end of FY98 due to CMWS sensor availability, OFP development difficulties, and cost of the T&M effort.
Some multi-spectral test and evaluation limitations can only be overcome through iterative (i.e., model, test, model) M&S in conjunction with DT/OT events that construct and validate an end to end OPEVAL environment. The approved TEMP T&E concept for the CMWS included a sensor-in-the-loop Hardware-in-the-Loop (HITL) capability with $2.5 million of program funds budgeted for that purpose. The Program Office conducted a survey of existing HITL capabilities, with the Fort Worth, TX AFEWES facility selected for CMWS HITL testing. Minimal testing has been done to date due to delayed hardware deliveries and Operational Flight Profile (OFP) software development.
HITL capabilities are essential in providing an assessment of the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the ATIRCM/CMWS system. Live fire and drone requirements have been reduced from nearly 400 to 175 events by developing new T&E concepts. Without a properly validated and verified HITL, DOT&E does not believe the M&S methodologies developed by the program office will be valid.
In August 1998, ATIRCM/CMWS sensor production difficulties, OFP development delays, and other EMD issues resulted in a Program Office decision to stretch the test program by three to five months to allow further systems maturity and development of software to support the HITL and other M&S activities. The new schedule allows: (1) the PM to solve EMD delays; (2) delivery of a more robust OFP for M&S with the HITL; and (3) more coordinated DT/OT testing.
TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT
In October 1997, the JPO identified a substantial funding shortfall adversely impacting on the T&E resources approved in the MS II TEMP. Delays in completing the system design and initial EMD hardware deliveries resulted in a program re-baseline and subsequent delays in completing T&E related events. Most notably this has contributed to delays in the development of necessary and challenging modeling and simulation. Aircraft integration schedules are also major T&E drivers potentially at risk due to EMD delivery performance. The additional program schedule risk accepted by the Program Office in this TEMP update is attributable to a reduction in available T&E resources (QF-4 drone targets, test instrumentation packages, spare threat missiles and missile telemetry kits, etc.) to absolutely bare minimums. Mitigating features of the test design and M&S efforts are intended to help control scarce test resources. The Program's schedule is tight with little allowance for developmental delays. If expenditure of resources exceeds the bare minimum rates anticipated, the test program will be forced to halt: (1) pending identification of the problem: (2) procurement of additional funding sources; and (3) time required for the procurement and build-up of replacement test resources to complete the minimum adequate IOT&E identified in the TEMP update.
To reduce risk and cost to the program, DOT&E agreed to a test strategy that utilized the Aerial Cable Facility (ACF) at the White Sands Missile Range for all rotary wing live missile firing events. The JPO is investigating using other ranges for a portion of the missile firing events to further reduce cost, but the impact to the test strategy has yet to be assessed. DOT&E believes that use of the ACF is central to an adequate and suitable test program.
Modeling and simulation are critical elements of the test and evaluation program because the extensive matrix of potential missile-aircraft interactions to be evaluated would require a substantial increase in the number of test firings and the M&S will be used to examine many of those interactions. However, an August 1998 slip in the program schedule caused by continued EMD hardware development difficulties has adversely impacted software deliveries essential to the M&S effort. The aggressive continuum of M&S intended to support development, hardware (and software) in the loop testing, open air range testing, installed equipment testing, and OPEVAL of the system is dependent upon timely delivery of OFP and system hardware. Continued delays in contractor furnished EMD hardware/software will impact the test program significantly.
The operational configuration for tactical helicopters calls for only one ATIRCM jam head on the top of the platform behind the rotor and two jam heads for transports and large helicopters. The operational consequences of a single jam head needs to be assessed to ensure adequate defensive protection exists when the single jam head is masked due to the aircraft fuselage and during tactical employment of host platforms.
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