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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) is a "smart" artillery submunition designed for precision engagement of self-propelled howitzers as well as other lightly armored vehicles. By destroying the enemy's self-propelled counterfire capability, SADARM contributes to full-dimensional protection. Denying the enemy's use of self-propelled howitzers better enables friendly forces to move at will and dominate maneuver.

SADARM is designed to attack and kill lightly armored vehicles. Each 155-millimeter (mm) howitzer round delivers two submunitions. Once dispensed, the submunition deploys a parachute-like deceleration device. At a predetermined distance from the ground, the submunition ejects the deceleration device and deploys another device to stabilize and rotate the submunition. As the submunition falls and rotates, it searches the ground with a millimeter wave sensor (both active and passive) and an infrared sensor array. Using the sensors and detection logic, the submunition is designed to detect countermeasured targets in a variety of climates. If the sensors detect a target, the submunition fires an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) at the target. If no target is detected the submunition is designed to self-destruct.

The Army is pursuing a SADARM product improvement (PI) as part of a cost reduction program. The PI is to increase SADARM's effectiveness by increasing the detection area and potentially using a new EFP design. Two alternative EFP designs are being considered. The PI will be cut into the current production line. According to the current strategy, the SADARM PI will make up at least 90 percent of the total SADARM buy.

SADARM is currently in low-rate production. Prior to the low-rate production decision in 1993, SADARM was experiencing poor reliability. The Army conducted an extensive failure analysis and program review. In 1994, 13 projectiles (26 submunitions) scored 11 hits at a range of approximately 15 kilometers. However, there were still problems at the longest ranges as well as collision problems. Based on these results and the restructured program (to include more extensive testing), the defense acquisition board (DAB) allowed the program to enter low-rate production in March 1995. The DAB delegated the full-rate production decision to the Army contingent on achieving uncountermeasured and countermeasured exit criteria.

Early in 1996, the Army began the first tests of the low-rate production articles. In March and April 1996, the Army conducted tests at Yuma Proving Ground to confirm fixes for the collision problems. There were eight hits with nine rounds (18 submunitions) fired at 18 km, close to the longest range. This exceeded the exit criterion for the test and no collisions were observed.

In 1997, there were a number of critical technical tests at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona (May and June) and Ft. Greely, AK (August-September) to test SADARM's capabilities in a variety of countermeasures and environments. The weather varied from rain to sun to snow. All of the tactical rounds were fired at 15 km. These technical tests incorporated operational considerations, such as a realistic target array and countermeasures, as validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Both offensive (foliage) and defensive (nets and berms) countermeasures were included in the tests. The arrays contained real vehicles as well as validated simulators. Other real targets (lightly armored vehicles as well as one tank) surrounded the validated threat array. Hits on the real vehicles will be used to assess lethality in the live fire test and evaluation. These technical tests are an integral part of DOT&E's operational assessment.

In July 1997, the Army conducted a first article test at approximately 18 km to demonstrate system reliability at longer ranges. Four of eleven rounds (36 percent) failed to dispense submunitions. One of these rounds fell six kilometers short of the target. The short round failure was fixed by increasing the number of threads between the base and the round body. The other three failures were due to an incompatibility between the SADARM round and the electronic fuze. Because of these failures and one in 1998, the Army decided to field SADARM only with the mechanical fuze, but the Army will continue to investigate this incompatibility. Based on 37 submunitions, the 18-km submunition reliability was estimated to be 0.51. The requirement is 0.80.

SADARM operational, reliability, and live fire tests were conducted in 1998. The operational test was conducted at Ft. Greely, AK, in August. The DIA validated array was nearly identical to the defensive array used in the Ft. Greely technical tests. All of the target vehicles were real. All five missions of 24 rounds each (120 total) were fired at 19.4 kilometers. The Army validated this as a likely range for the operational test scenario. Besides range, the other major difference between the operational and technical tests was firing procedures and thus accuracy. Soldiers generated the inputs and calculated the ballistic solutions using equipment, software, and methods representative of what would be available when SADARM is fielded. The SADARM system did not get the required number of kills for the test environment.

There were also two reliability tests. Of 15 rounds fired, one round did not dispense. The reliability was scored as 0.44 (11/25). Three submunitions will be scored when more data is available.

Because of changes in the design and production process of the warhead liner, additional LFT&E warhead qualification and characterization tests were conducted in FY98, including two shots to assess any degradation in penetration performance due to the use of sandbags as ballistic countermeasures. Also, the 1997 technical tests at Yuma Proving Ground and Ft. Greely provided lethality data for about 30 impacts on a variety of threat vehicles, including the 2S3 and 2S1 SPHs, T-72 tank, BMP-2 and BMP-1 fighting vehicles, ACRV, MTLB, BTR-70, and BRDM. Finally, a seven-shot tower test against 2S3 SPHs and a T-72 tank was conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, in mid-FY98. Three shots were against operating 2S3s, two against a 2S3 ballistic hull and turret loaded with some fuel and live ammunition, and two against the T-72. All test objectives were met. Although the IOT firings were not included in the SADARM LFT&E strategy, the impacts on real IOT targets provide valid supplementary data for the live fire assessment.

Based on the results of the IOT in August 1998, the system is not effective. Earlier technical testing in 1997 of controlled firings demonstrated that a reliable submunition over the target could engage and destroy targets in a variety of conditions with realistic countermeasures. However, these controlled firing were not operationally realistic. For example, during technical tests, ballistic solutions were calculated using wind conditions in the threat target area. In combat, troops will not know wind conditions in the threat area. During the IOT, meteorological conditions close to the guns were used to calculate the ballistic solution.

The submunition is required to have a reliability of 0.80 for all ranges. Prior to the reliability growth tests, the submunition reliability at 15 km was 0.73. The submunition reliability demonstrated at 18 km is 0.44. Despite several tests and configuration changes, the reliability at the longest ranges has decreased since July 1997. The Army has not reported on its updated plans for reliability growth tests. The round is not compatible with the currently fielded electronic fuze, but is compatible with the fielded mechanical fuze. Accordingly, as tested, SADARM is not operationally suitable.

Although the lethality assessment has not been completed, there are no indications that the SADARM warhead has any meaningful lethality shortcomings, given that it strikes its target.

Overall, SADARM is not operationally effective. It clearly did not meet the DAB established countermeasured exit criterion. The factors currently being assessed for the difference between the successful DT and the poor OT results are (1) submunition reliability at long ranges, (2) countermeasures, and (3) target area winds. The IOT firing range was 19 km; the technical tests were conducted at 15 km, where there may be better reliability. As stated previously, the reliability at the longer ranges needed for counterfire is 0.44. The requirement is 0.80. The OT countermeasures were validated as threat representative by DIA and actual threat equipment was used in the operational test. Winds in the target area caused some submunitions to miss the target. The SADARM ballistic solution attempts to compensate for winds.

The SADARM IOT and LFT programs were robust and integrated a variety of actual threat vehicles into target arrays. The result was a five-fold increase in the number of data points available to support the live fire evaluation over what would have been available from only the dedicated tower test.