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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The M93A1 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) is intended to improve the survivability and mobility of the Army ground forces by providing increased situational awareness and information superiority to headquarters and combat maneuver elements. With the ability to provide rapid, accurate chemical and radiological contamination information to these elements, the NBCRS vehicle forms a key portion of the full-dimensional protection concept.

The mission of the lightly armored, wheeled NBCRS is to detect, identify, mark, sample, and report chemical and radiological contamination on the battlefield. The three-man NBCRS crew accomplishes these missions by using a sophisticated suite of nuclear and chemical alarms and detectors that have been integrated within the vehicle chassis. The on-board M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm allows the crew to detect chemical agent clouds as far as 5 kilometers away. The crew can perform chemical and radiological reconnaissance operations while operating in a shirtsleeve environment inside the NBCRS vehicle, even while the vehicle is operating in a contaminated area.

Because of the perceived need to quickly field a chemical reconnaissance vehicle to U.S. forces in Europe in the late 1980s, the NBCRS Non-Developmental Item (NDI) program was structured into three acquisition phases: (1) Interim System Production (ISP) phase, which provided 48 urgently-needed German-produced vehicles (designated the M93) that met many of the American requirements. As part of this phase, the German government donated an additional 60 Americanized German M93 vehicles to the U.S. government in support of Operation Desert Storm; (2) System Improvement Phase (SIP), which provided vehicles (designated the M93A1) that satisfied all American Requirements of Operational Capability; and (3) Block 1 modification phase, to upgrade many of the M93 vehicles to the M93A1 configuration.

A precursor to the M93A1 NBCRS underwent IOT&E from March-May 1994 at Ft. Bliss TX. DOT&E determined that, combined with chemical warfare agent test results from Dugway Proving Ground, UT, the test was adequate, but the vehicle was neither operationally effective, nor operationally suitable. That assessment was based on the system demonstrating chemical warfare agent detection capabilities well below the requirement, the need for an excessive amount of maintenance, and low reliability. Crew performance indicated inadequate training and/or overly complex tasks.

After integrating some improvements into the IOT&E vehicle, the Army type classified the vehicle in June 1995 as the M93A1. The Director approved the NBCRS TEMP in December 1996. This TEMP included plans for an operational limited user test (LUT) to be conducted in May 1998, as a part of Production Verification Testing at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ.

The LUT was conducted at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, by TEXCOM in May 1998. The LUT consisted of two M93A1 Block 1 configured NBCRS vehicles each completing two 96-hour scenarios at wartime operational tempo. They performed route and zone/area reconnaissance operations.

Data analysis is still in progress. Preliminary analysis of the performance of the M93A1 Block 1 vehicle during the LUT indicates a much improved chemical warfare agent detection capability. Improvements to the base vehicle configuration and improved training have enhanced crew performance. However, vehicle reliability and availability still do not meet Required Operational Capability requirements. Issues under analysis are overall system probability of detection and identification and the ability of the NBCRS to adequately mark contaminated areas.

The NBCRS Limited User Test demonstrated the need for the system vehicles to operate as part of a functioning tactical unit, including the presence of good unit leadership. Several times during the test, the vehicles reported chemical reconnaissance results that, upon reflection, were clearly inaccurate or insufficient to meet a supported unit's requirements. It is difficult to conduct tests without the unit command and control structure. A functioning unit command and control would have provided realistic environment for real-time feedback to the crews on sufficiency of their performance.

It is important that the NBCRS unit uses either the school-approved doctrine or the unit's own Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) during the test, and that the differences are understood and documented. During the NBCRS Limited User Test, the unit's SOP conflicted with school-approved doctrine. Since the test was constructed based on approved doctrine, the unit's circumvention of this doctrine affected the results of the test. Due to the short length of the test and the absence of NBCRS unit leadership, the test director had little time or influence to modify unit operating procedures.