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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

Changes to the M1A2 Abrams Tank contained in the System Enhancement Program (SEP) and "M1A2 Tank 2000" configuration are intended to improve lethality, survivability, mobility, sustainability, and increased situational awareness and command & control enhancements to provide information superiority to the dominant maneuver force. The Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle are two central components of the dominant maneuver digital force.

The mission of the M1A2 Abrams Tank is to close with and destroy enemy forces using firepower, maneuver, and shock effect. The M1A2 is being fielded to armor battalions and cavalry squadrons of the heavy force. SEP upgrades are intended to:

• Improve target detection, recognition, and identification with the addition of two 2^nd generation Forward Looking Infrareds.



• Incorporate an under armor auxiliary power unit to power the tank and sensor suites.



• Incorporate a thermal management system to provide crew and electronics cooling.



• Increase memory and processor speeds and provide full color map capability.



• Incorporate Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Embedded Battle Command (EBC) to share command & control and situational awareness with all components of the combined arms team.

Additional weight reduction measures, survivability enhancements, and safety improvements applied to the M1A2 will comprise the "M1A2 Tank 2000" configuration which will be fielded to units of the digital division beginning in FY00.

The M1A2 IOT&E was conducted from September-December 1993. Based on the results of the IOT&E, the Director determined that the M1A2 was operationally effective but not operationally suitable, and unsafe. That assessment was based on poor availability and reliability of the tank and instances of the uncommanded main gun and turret movement. FOT&E I was conducted September-October 1995 to verify corrective actions resulting from the IOT&E. This test was halted due to continued instances of uncommanded main gun and turret movements. FOT&E II in June 1996 confirmed the adequacy of the applied corrective actions and the M1A2 was assessed as both operationally effective and suitable.

The M1A2 SEP is a further upgrade to the M1A2 tank. FOT&E III is scheduled for 3QFY99, to assess the operational effectiveness and suitability of the M1A2 SEP.

No operational tests were conducted this year. The Director has not approved the M1A2 TEMP Update, which addresses the M1A2 SEP, because it does not adequately address how the digital C2 component of the tank, FBCB2 EBC, will be tested and evaluated. FOT&E III is planned to be conducted without digital C2 in conjunction with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System-A3 IOT&E. As a key component of the M1A2 SEP upgrade, a requirement remains for an adequate operational test of the M1A2 SEP with EBC digital C2. DOT&E continues to work closely with the Army to resolve this remaining TEMP issue.

The contractor completed contractor testing on the SEP prototypes in July. Three M1A2 SEPs were turned over to the government in July to commence government DT.

As noted above, the issue of when and how the M1A2 SEP with digital C2 will undergo T&E remains to be resolved. The Army's current approach is to conduct this evaluation in conjunction with the FBCB2 IOT&E scheduled for October 1999. While this approach is potentially feasible, it is problematic. EBC will not be integrated into the M1A2 SEP until after FOT&E III in July 1999. Successful integration of EBC in time for participation in the FBCB2 IOT&E will be a high-risk effort. If not integrated in time for this event, an additional operational test will be needed for a complete assessment of the M1A2 SEP. The development of EBC software remains of particular interest because the software is being developed as a Horizontal Technical Integration Program and will be provided to the M1A2 program for integration. Successful integration of EBC is the highest technical risk area for the M1A2 SEP.

The primary problem encountered to date with SEP peculiar components has involved the Under Armor Auxiliary Power Unit (UAAPU). The majority of hardware failures encountered during contractor testing were with the UAAPU. The program is currently redesigning elements of UAAPU to fix identified problems. Other SEP upgrade efforts are progressing satisfactorily.