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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

JAVELIN ANTITANK MISSILE

Army ACAT ID Program:		Prime Contractor
Total Number of Systems:	4,348 CLUs 28,453 missiles	Texas Instruments/Lockheed Martin Joint Venture
Total Program Cost (TY$):	$3618M
Average CLU Cost (TY$): Average Missile Cost (TY$):	$162K $78K	Service Certified Y2K Compliant
Full-rate production:	3QFY97	No

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The Javelin is a manportable, fire-and-forget, antitank missile employed by dismounted infantry to defeat current and future threat armored combat vehicles. It is replacing the Dragon system in the Army and the Marine Corps.

The Javelin consists of a missile in a disposable launch tube and a reusable Command Launch Unit (CLU) with a trigger mechanism and day/night sighting device for surveillance, target acquisition, and built-in test capabilities. The missile locks on to the target before launch using an infrared focal plane array and on-board processing, which also maintains target track and guides the missile to the target after launch. A full-up system weighs 49.5 pounds. A Field Tactical Trainer (FTT) that emulates tactical CLU and missile capabilities, plays a dual role of the training device for gunners learning to use the Javelin system and as the test range scoring device charged with crediting kills in force-on-force training scenarios. The more rudimentary Basic Skills Trainer is also available as a training device.

The Javelin contributes to Joint Vision 2010 as a tactical precision engagement system that enhances the Army's dominant maneuver capabilities in the ground battle.

A January 1978 Anti-armor Mission Need Statement identified the deficiencies of the Army's current manportable anti-armor weapon-the Dragon. The Joint Service Operational Requirements Document for the Javelin was approved in 1986 and amended in 1988. The contract for Javelin EMD was awarded in 1989. The IOT&E, which was completed in December 1993, resulted in the conclusion that the Javelin was effective, but required further assessment for suitability, necessitating follow-on testing in the form of a Limited User Test (LUT) beginning in April 1996. LRIP was approved by the DAB in July 1994. There are several Javelin enhanced producibility program (EPP) changes that are being incorporated into the system to enhance producibility and reduce cost. Only LRIP versions of the Javelin CLU and missile have been fielded to date, but ultimately LRIP and EPP versions of both the CLU and missile will be fielded. The full-rate production decision, Milestone (MS) III, was made May 13, 1997.

LFT&E started in November 1995 and was completed in October 1996. It consisted of three progressive phases that challenged the Javelin against current and emerging tank threats. Phase A was comprised of a large series of shots to determine the missile's capability to penetrate rolled homogeneous armor and to more fully understand its ability to create behind-armor debris immediately upon penetration. Phase B tested the missile's ability to penetrate shotline targets representing an advanced threat tank, and Phase C constituted the full-scale, full-up LFT&E phase.

Three operational tests were conducted with DOT&E encouragement: (1) a LUT that resulted in a number of system improvements, especially in reliability and availability; (2) a MILES Paring and Operational Lock-on Test that enabled comparison of the entire end-to-end engagement sequence between the tactical system and the FTT, depicting how well the FTT met its requirement to replicate the tactical system; and (3) a Confirmatory Test that demonstrated performance of the EPP version of the missile early enough to influence the MS III decision and reduce the scope of follow-on tests.

The LUT consisted of three events: (1) Situational Tactical Exercises, which were limited force-on-force engagements; (2) Live Fire Exercises, which consisted of six explosive warhead shots; and (3) Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System Pairing and Operational Lock-on Trials, which compared the ability of the Javelin field tactical trainer to replicate the tactical system. Missile reliability problems caused a temporary halt in the firing program. Three failed-launch situations occurred early on, requiring fixes before the Army could complete the LUT in June 1996.

Several reliability and availability performance thresholds for the Javelin CLU, missile and training devices were defined relative to System Maturity; i.e., MS III plus three years. Testing to address these requirements, primarily developmental in nature, is ongoing. Related data are also being extracted from gunner training periods and dedicated training exercises.

Future testing will be required to evaluate the new Javelin warhead, the Advanced Main Charge Warhead- Full Caliber, and the introduction of new tracking software, the Lethality Improvement Tracker Enhancement, both presently planned to be cut into production at the end of FY99. Flight-testing against threat Automated Protection Systems (aboard armor vehicles and designed to detect and destroy incoming missiles) is pending until such systems are available for testing.

There are two requirements for missile reliability that remain under test. At MS III, missile reliability was to be 0.82 and at System Maturity (MS III plus three years), 0.92. The ongoing Javelin System Maturity Evaluation includes results from EPP production reliability verification, maintenance, and production validation testing; LRIP missile quality verification and stockpile reliability program (SRP) testing; and field use and demonstrations by units to which the LRIP system has been issued.

The PM developed an innovative and creative approach to SRP testing. Minimum SRP testing requirements call for a random selection of one missile a month from the stockpile to be tested for reliability on a test stand. On two occasions the PM elected to randomly select 30 and 24 missiles respectively from the stockpile to be tactically carried by soldiers prior to employing the missiles against real targets. Fifty-four different gunners (soldiers) had the opportunity engage a real target after carrying the missile 6-12 kilometers in a tactical environment.

The Javelin system has been adequately tested in accordance with the OSD-approved TEMP, and has been declared operationally effective, suitable and lethal (DOT&E B-LRIP Report, April 1997). Unresolved suitability issues concern only those specific reliability and availability requirements prescribed for System Maturity (MS III plus 3 years). These System Maturity requirements include:

• Training device reliability.



• LRIP CLU reliability and availability.



• EPP CLU reliability and availability.



• Missile round reliability.

The PM chose a more challenging approach to SRP testing and as a result gained very credible test data that makes the excellent performance of Javelin all that more impressive. During the SRP testing cited in Test and Evaluation Activity section above, 51 targets were hit out of 54 attempts and only one of the 54 attempts was a reliability failure. The insights gleaned from the reliability data offered by this type of test along with the realistic training opportunities for soldiers are far more valuable than the insights to be gleaned from test stand reliability data. Overall estimates (including numerous early failures that could be rationally discounted if the current trends of success continue) are favorable relative to the requirement of 0.92 missile reliability at system maturity. LRIP and EPP versions of the missile have exhibited long runs of success of late. Of 84 missiles fired in 1998 (all configurations), only one has failed, likely indicative of improved production line quality. Considering only missiles fired in 1998, a calculation of missile reliability shows a point estimate 0f 0.988 with more than 99 percent confidence that the true reliability of the missile population represented the missiles fired in 1998, meets or exceeds the system maturity requirement.

Results from either operational or live fire testing generated several changes to the Javelin. One of the more notable examples was the Power Distribution Assembly (PDA). During the first phase of the LFT&E, it was discovered that the main charge in the warhead in the tandem configuration was achieving about 100 mm less rolled homogeneous armor penetration than expected. Analysis revealed that the deficiency was caused by a combination of a slightly thicker PDA bulkhead in the EPP design, coupled with a second production source for the main charge liner which had used a slightly different manufacturing process. The thickness of the PDA bulkhead was reduced and the expected penetration was subsequently realized.

Tactics and doctrine can be initially developed by simulation, but live experience is necessary to mold them into viable tactics, techniques and procedures. For example, the ability to distinguish friend or foe becomes very difficult at greater ranges. Situational awareness and command and control measures were inadequate to preclude the engagement of "friendlies" during the Javelin IOT&E. The "man-in-the-loop" variable provided the insights that simulation could not yield.

Simulation cannot replace testing. Although simulation has helped, all findings listed in this section were discovered on live tests.

Vigilant monitoring of OT&E test events is essential to ensure an appropriate amount of realism is maintained during the test. During the Javelin IOT&E, the gunners participating in the live firing events were being aided by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) located in the firing positions for range safety purposes. In addition, the scheduled Identification, Friend or Foe target discrimination trials in the Javelin IOT&E would have been less real without some intervention in that the trials would have been conducted solely by SMEs instead of soldier/gunners.

Always anticipate updating models and simulations after live testing. LFT&E pre-shot predictions overstated the penetration of the Javelin warhead against targets protected by Explosive Reactive Armor. The cause was the overestimation of two aspects of tandem warhead performance. After live testing, appropriate corrections were made to input data of the penetration model before Javelin's lethality was computed.

Requirements should be formally reviewed periodically. Javelin requirements were written in 1988 and never updated. One requirement, the probability of kill given an engagement opportunity (PK(EO)), did not take into account selected human factors and new technology that the contractor would include in the Javelin. Once all of the contributing factors into the calculation of the PK(EO) were applied, the result was much lower than the requirement but good enough to determine the system effective given the newly understood human factors and the availability/reliability of system components.