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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

Two important components of the Army's Battle Command System and the Battlefield Digitization effort are the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) program and the Tactical Internet (TI). FBCB2 is a digital, battle command information system that is intended to provide commanders, leaders, and soldiers-from brigade to individual soldier and across all the Battlefield Functional Areas-improved command and control and enhanced situational awareness information. FBCB2 consists primarily of software, but will also include a ruggedized computer for those users and platforms without an existing computer system. Systems with existing computers that are able to host FBCB2 software will receive the Embedded Battle Command (EBC) software, a subset of FBCB2; embedded systems include the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the M1A2 SEP ABRAMS Tank, and the Army Tactical Command and Control Systems. FBCB2's primary functions are to send and receive automatic position-location reports derived from its interface with the Global Positioning System, and to send and receive command and control message traffic via digital over-the-air radio transmissions. The TI is the network of radios and routers that provide the linkages to connect the myriad FBCB2 platforms (both vertically and horizontally) across the combined-arms force. The TI consists of the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System, the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, and the Internet Controller router.

FBCB2 and the TI perform as a network within brigade-sized and smaller units. At the Brigade and Battalion Tactical Operations Centers, the TI interfaces with the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS), an ethernet-based local area network of computers representing the functional areas of intelligence, maneuver, air defense, combat service support, and fire support. This interface permits information collected and disseminated via the ATCCS systems to be rapidly passed through the TI to FBCB2 computers. Likewise, the position reports of individual and unit locations are passed upwards through the FBCB2 and TI into the ATCCS systems for dissemination throughout the force. The FBCB2 and TI help provide information superiority to the dominant maneuver force. The basis for these new operational concepts in Joint Vision 2010 is improved command and control.

The Army initiated the Force XXI Battlefield Digitization program in 1994, with the intent to proliferate and integrate digital communications and information management technologies across the combined-arms spectrum. The Army's efforts have been demonstrated in a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs). The central hypothesis throughout Digitization experimentation has been: "If information age, battle-command capabilities and connectivity exist across all battlefield operating systems, then increases in lethality, survivability, and optempo will be achieved." The first AWE to examine FBCB2 was Task Force XXI, conducted June 1996-March 1997, with the culminating event at the National Training Center.

The Task Force XXI AWE equipped a brigade from the 4th Infantry Division with FBCB2 (Applique) hardware and software on most of its 800-plus vehicles. The brigade trained with the new digital equipment, among dozens of other initiatives, for about eight months, then deployed to the National Training Center for a series of force-on-force battles with a live opposing force. Due to immaturity of the FBCB2 and the TI, the degree of digital connectivity achieved during the Task Force XXI AWE was very low, not sufficient to meet the premise of the central hypothesis and also not suitable for tactical operations. The immaturity also impacted the training readiness of the unit and the development of digital tactics, techniques, and procedures. In spite of these challenges, the digitized brigade performed similarly to the non-digitized baseline brigades at the NTC, a result that, with follow-on constructive modeling, the Army used to support continued program acceleration. A conditional Milestone I/II decision for FBCB2 was made in July 1997; the actual decision to proceed to a full Milestone II decision is pending the completion and approval of the FBCB2 TEMP. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the ORD in August 1998.

Two tests focused on the FBCB2 and the TI were conducted in FY98. Developmental Test-1 (DT-1) was conducted from May-June 1998 at Ft. Huachuca, AZ, to examine system performance and readiness for the subsequent LUT. DT-1 employed 61 FBCB2-equipped nodes, including 14 mobile platforms.

The LUT was conducted August 3-21, 1998, at Ft. Hood, TX, with a Battalion Task Force equipped with FBCB2. An OPFOR and passive electronic warfare were included to operationally stress the unit's employment of FBCB2. The purpose of the LUT was to confirm that fixes to problems identified during the TF XXI AWE were in place, and to verify that the new TI architecture provides for improved digital and voice communications. Additionally, whether a redesigned TI architecture is sufficiently "scalable" to support brigade and division operations was also to be examined.

The FBCB2 software (version 2.1a) tested during both the DT and the LUT was missing several critical capabilities called for in the ORD requirement. These capabilities are scheduled to be provided in a future software upgrade prior to FY99 testing, and will be discussed later in this assessment. Nonetheless, FBCB2 system performance during both DT-1 and the LUT represented a significant improvement over that observed during the Task Force XXI AWE. The friendly situational awareness information provided by FBCB2 was generally accurate and timely, and the improved system stability permitted soldiers to employ FBCB2 information during the execution of their missions. The stability also permitted the test unit to achieve a higher state of training than that of the Task Force XXI unit, and further the refinement of digital Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

Data collected for the TI during the 1997 Task Force XXI AWE indicated that the command-and-control message completion rate and speed-of-service was inadequate to support tactical operations. LUT results demonstrated significant improvements over AWE results: Command-and-control message completion rates increased from approximately 30-80 percent, and speed-of-service was improved from approximately three minutes to less than four seconds. Situational Awareness message completion rates rose from 25 to nearly 65 percent, and speed of service decreased from approximately one minute to less than eight seconds. Whether these results are "scalable" from a battalion task force to a brigade task force was another goal of the LUT evaluation. Although the "scalability" evaluation is incomplete, and may not be supported by the data available from the LUT, there are observed trends that indicate situation awareness message completion rates and speed-of-service were degraded as the number of transmitting platforms increased during this battalion-level test.

Qualitative information indicates that the use of FBCB2 assists commanders in control of maneuver, and synchronization of combat power. An example of this during the LUT occurred when two companies successfully performed a passage of lines over difficult terrain, a feat that the battalion commander stated he would not have attempted without FBCB2. Other observations indicate that FBCB2 permits commanders to focus more of their time on actually commanding, as less time is required to track positions and movement. Soldiers also have been positive about FBCB2, and although they recognize the system's immaturity, they feel it enhances their performance. Perhaps the most telling comment on the progress made since the AWE came from the brigade commander shortly after the LUT: he stated that although FBCB2 has a long way to go to meet the objective requirements, if he were directed to go to war today, he would want to go equipped with FBCB2.

In spite of the significant improvements observed during the FY98 testing for FBCB2, the current state of FBCB2 capabilities is interim, with a number of critical enhancements necessary to achieve an effective and suitable capability that is ready for fielding. These include a robust network management capability to monitor the network's health and respond to identified problems, interoperability with Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (particularly with the Maneuver Control System), and the ability to allow rapid reestablishment of digital communication in the event a task organization change is required. All of these capabilities are to be incorporated in software version 3.1, which is scheduled for delivery in the summer of 1999. DOT&E considers these capabilities essential for the Developmental Test 2, the FDTE and the IOT&E, scheduled for July, August, and October 1999, respectively.

The Army has made great strides this past year in the FBCB2 program, and although this program is high risk and on a very aggressive schedule, they believe they are on track for an October 1999 IOT&E. We believe that implementing the remaining improvements will be an even greater challenge than the progress achieved since Task Force XXI. Furthermore, we are concerned that the streamlined "spiral development" process the Army is employing to meet the near-term goal of a Digital Division by the end of FY00 may result in expediencies that aren't in the best long-term interest of the Battlefield Digitization effort. Based on our experience, Information-Technology systems are often complicated, fragile in the tactical environment, and require well-trained operators and maintainers, skills that are difficult to maintain and may require extensive contractor support. We also believe that the proliferation of situational awareness information across the friendly forces will result in increased emphasis on information warfare by our potential adversaries, and added challenges for the security and network management of FBCB2. The current focus on FBCB2's contribution in heavy-division operations may leave unanswered issues regarding scenarios that may be more likely, such as Bosnia-type stability operations. Additionally, scenarios that may be more challenging to the Tactical Internet, such as operations in urban terrain or terrain with heavy foliage must be examined. Finally, we are interested in the Army's plan for how a force equipped with FBCB2 will interface with analog forces (Active Army, Reserve Army, National Guard, Joint, and Coalition forces) on the future battlefield. All of these issues must be addressed, and challenges resolved, before FBCB2 can be assessed as operationally effective and suitable.