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FY98 Annual Report |
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM (CSSCS)
Army ACAT IC Program: | Prime Contractor | |
Total Number of Systems: | 1,651 | TRW, Inc. |
Total Program Cost (TY$): | $309.3M | |
Average Unit Cost (TY$): | $78K | Service Certified Y2K Compliant |
Full-rate production: | 1QFY99 (?) | Yes |
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010
The Combat Service Support and Control System (CSSCS) will become an integral part of Joint Vision 2010 and its concept of focused logistics support. Focused Logistics requires systems that are responsive, flexible, and precise. The CSSCS, the combat service support component of the Army Battle Command System, is a computer software system designed to assist commanders and their staffs in the planning and execution of logistics operations. Combat service support commanders and their staffs currently participate in force-level planning and decision making using a time and manpower intensive manual process. They now must manually gather, correlate, and analyze volumes of technical data from units and the Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS). The CSSCS will enhance current capabilities by automatically extracting and managing the information needed by commanders to sustain and reconstitute the force. CSSCS software tools maintain combat information, generate reports and orders, and provide analytical tools to support commanders and their staffs from maneuver brigade through echelons above corps. Commanders at each echelon can tailor the amount of information tracked within their organization. The primary communication means are fiber-optic local-area networks interconnected by the Mobile Subscriber Equipment.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The CSSCS Program Office was chartered in 1988. The program was designated an Acquisition Category IC program in 1989. The CSSCS program is following an evolutionary development concept. The current software is the third of five planned versions. The CSSCS completed an Early User Test and Evaluation in 1992 and Limited User Tests in 1993. These tests supported the evolutionary development efforts.
OPTEC conducted the first CSSCS IOT&E at Fort Hood, TX, in 1994. The CSSCS performance in the IOT&E was inadequate to proceed to an acquisition decision. The primary shortfalls were data entry, information accuracy, and network management.
OPTEC conducted the CSSCS IOT&E II at Fort Hood, TX in 1996. DOT&E analysis of IOT&E II showed that CSSCS did not maintain consistent and accurate data bases system-wide that met the user's operational needs. Potential causes of the inconsistent and inaccurate data bases included inherent system problems, data collection shortfalls, delayed or incomplete messages, interoperability shortfalls, and insufficient system-level training and procedures. However, in June and July 1997, an Integrated Process Team's review of the IOT&E II results could not establish conclusively the cause(s) of the inconsistencies. Consequently in August 1997, the Army requested that DOT&E delay the final evaluation report until the concerns could be adequately addressed.
TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY
The Army executed a series of tests under the auspices of the Data Accuracy Test Program to address concerns about CSSCS performance. The Data Accuracy Test Program, initiated in February 1998, was designed to address three fundamental concerns: (1) maintaining accurate, operational databases, (2) interoperability, and (3) sufficiency of collective training. To date, the Data Accuracy Test has completed three events:
- Logistics Exercise
Testing was in accordance with the approved TEMP.
TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT
Analyses of the results from the Data Accuracy Test Program indicate that CSSCS workstations met their technical and design requirements. The system successfully executed collective operations, generated reports and orders, and provided analytical support. However, CSSCS did not demonstrate the ability to maintain accurate data bases in free-play tests and provided only limited utility in operational scenarios. The higher echelons (Division and Corps) experience more benefits from the current CSSCS tools and information. Until the STAMISs and unit reports are integrated into the operations, operators at brigade will experience increased workloads because they must manually enter information updates received either verbally or as written reports. The brigades also desire updates more frequently than the four hours intervals used in recent exercises. Providing more frequent updates is difficult without an automated capability for generating the information inputs from the lower echelon units. For comparison, many units typically update databases two times daily with the current manual system.
The demonstrated reliability and maintainability of CSSCS indicate that the logistics concept is adequate. No human factors or interoperability problems were identified that would affect the operators' ability to complete their mission. The training program prepared operators to operate the individual workstations; however training did not prepare the unit to operationally deploy CSSCS workstations as a system. The training package is inadequate to sustain unit proficiency after the system is fielded.
LESSONS LEARNED
Digitization essentially makes the computer a weapon system for the commander. As with any weapon system, effective commanders must: (1) invest the time to understand how the information systems work; (2) explore the information products they can provide; (3) recognize symptoms of failures; and (4) learn how to "fight the system."
Simulations for logistics activity and other command and control systems in development (e.g. CSSCS) are not mature. These simulations are crucial for training and maintaining operator and unit proficiency. The Army must continue to improve these force-on-force and logistics simulations to provide realistic environments for training both commanders and staffs.
Successful testing and deployment of information systems require the gaining unit be sufficiently familiar with the system operations to establish internal procedures and doctrine. At the operational test readiness review prior to operational testing, the operational unit should certify that:
- Detailed procedures and doctrine have been established for integrating and operating the information system.
- Both individual and unit training is complete and adequate.
NEWSLETTER
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