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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) supports dominant maneuver of joint forces through its contribution of a synoptic battlefield view to operational maneuver commanders. The system's required ability to perform battlefield surveillance, battle management for both air and land component forces, and indication and warning functions provide the capability for JSTARS to contribute to the Joint Vision 2010 concept of information superiority of U.S. and combined forces. The JSTARS system is intended to meet the operational need for locating, classifying, and supporting precision engagement of time-sensitive moving and stationary targets.

The JSTARS system consists of an Air Force E-8C aircraft and Army ground stations connected via data link. The E-8C is a remanufactured version Boeing 707. The basic airframe of the 25 to 30 years old aircraft has been extensively refurbished and updated with the JSTARS radar system, communications gear, data link capability, 18 primary mission workstations, and air refueling capability. The Air Force has chosen to retain the existing basic aircraft engines, flight control, fuel, and hydraulic systems. The JSTARS system brings to the battlefield the technical capability to perform surveillance through interleaved high resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR), moving target indicator, and the computer capability to integrate battlefield and geographic information into a near real-time picture of the ground battle.

The ground station receives, processes, and displays JSTARS radar imagery that is transmitted down from the E-8C. The evolution of the Army ground station has progressed from two versions (light and medium) of the earlier Ground Station Module (GSM) to the currently funded Common Ground Station (CGS). The CGS is a High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) mounted system. The system is required to demonstrate the necessary computer workstations, communications equipment, and data link capability to integrate with the JSTARS, intelligence networks, and national level information sources to provide the Army ground elements the capability to prosecute both air and land engagement of time-sensitive targets. JSTARS is also required to support the intelligence preparation for the dynamic battlefield.

A Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E) was scheduled to start in November 1995 and proceed through mid-1996. However, due to operational tasking in support of OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR, the system was evaluated during the operational deployment supporting the forces in Bosnia. While the opportunity to assess the system in an operational context was valuable, it presented critical limitations to the scope of the evaluation. The system was only able to demonstrate limited capability to support joint forces target attack and battle management due to the nature of the air tasking. The E-8C did not meet its overall suitability requirements during the deployment. Without significant corrective action, the system is unsuitable to support high operational tempo conflict. Based on this activity, DOT&E assessed the system as unsuitable to support high operational tempo conflict. Because of these shortfalls and issues unresolved in MOT&E, OSD directed FOT&E for the E-8C. This FOT&E is under the oversight of DOT&E.

The GSM program was granted approval for LRIP of 12 medium units to be mounted on standard five-ton trucks. Prior to the decision, a Limited User Test of the Medium GSM (MGSM) was conducted. The MGSMs were subsequently fielded with contingency forces and used as training equipment. The Army also approved the LRIP of ten light GSMs (HMMWV mounted) following completion of a Force Developmental Test and Evaluation in September 1994. The IOT&E for the CGS was scheduled to start in November 1997.

An updated TEMP for JSTARS identified the unresolved operational issues and the deficiencies discovered during Operation Joint Endeavor. The Air Force conducted regression testing during field and training exercises, operational deployments, technical tests, and the CGS IOT&E, to address the relevant issues and deficiencies. This regression test was conducted from March 1997-April 1998. The primary focus of the Air Force Regression Testing was on the operational suitability of the E-8C aircraft, including the first interim software upgrade. Effectiveness evaluation was a secondary consideration.

The Air Force has also begun several program upgrades to the E-8C radar to improve its capabilities.

The CGS IOT&E was conducted at Fort Huachuca, AZ, from March 15-April 13, 1998. The test was scheduled to start in November 1997, but was delayed because of interface problems with ASAS.

The IOT&E consisted of two test phases: a live flight phase and a simulation phase. The first phase was intended to collect data on the operational effectiveness and suitability of the system but due to the limited number of hours of operation, the second phase was needed to exclusively collect data on the system's suitability. During the live flight phase, CGS operators used radar imagery from a JSTARS E-8C aircraft to complete surveillance and targeting taskings. The taskings required the CGS operators to detect, locate, track, and identify various ground targets throughout southeastern Arizona. The taskings were representative of how the CGS would operate in wartime. They were developed by experienced Army intelligence officers and based on Army doctrine. The targets were representative of the targets that JSTARS is expected to locate and track during actual operations. There were eight missions, each approximately five hours in duration, in which the E-8C provided imagery to the CGSs.

During the simulation test phase, a simulator was used to emulate the radar information received from an E-8C aircraft radar, thus eliminating the need to fly the aircraft. The simulation provided JSTARS radar imagery of southwest Asia and was based on the common teaching scenario of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. The scenario was reminiscent of OPERATION DESERT STORM. This test phase was conducted over 96 continuous hours.

The limited operations in Bosnia during OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR were not conducive to resolving the COIs relating to operational effectiveness of JSTARS during combat. During the Bosnia deployment in the winter of 1996, there were no large-scale movements of opposing forces; consequently, the ground situation was fairly static. Furthermore, mountainous terrain and poor weather conditions posed significant operational challenges and severely limited the ability of JSTARS to provide intelligence information. In addition, target attack missions were not executed during the operations in Bosnia, and there was no opportunity to use JSTARS for battlefield management.

The evaluation during Operation Joint Endeavor did identify modifications, fixes, and future testing requirements that must be accomplished to fully integrate the capabilities of JSTARS into the forces of the United States Air Force and Army. Operation Joint Endeavor also revealed that several operational sub-issues must be resolved before Air Force and Army commanders and units fully understand, use, and realize the capabilities of JSTARS.

Most of the unresolved operational issues and deficiencies were tested and evaluated during the E-8C regression test. The operational suitability of the E-8C aircraft has improved; however, serious concerns remain.

Although the interim software release was implemented and contributed to the improvement of the system's stability, deficiencies continue to exist. For example, software problems contributed to the Programmable Signal Processor to stop information processing on average once every hour while the E-8 is on station during missions. This failure mode keeps the radar from processing targets. Although this failure mode is correctable in-flight within one to two minutes, other software deficiencies also hamper operations. Software maintenance is costly, requiring a high-level of continued contractor support. An operational certification process should be developed to fully test and evaluate future software releases. Finally, the software evaluated during the regression test was not Y2K compliant. However, the software release currently in the next phase of testing has been certified Y2K compliant and is under evaluation at this time.

The remanufactured 707 airframes, especially the engines and air cycle machine, continue to be a maintenance burden and require considerable manpower and resources. The mission reliability rate and ground fix rate did not meet the user's criteria during the regression testing. The remanufacturing of the 30-year-old airframes has resulted in cost overruns and schedule delays in delivery from the contractor. Also, OT&E on the JSTARS Integrated Maintenance Information System (JIMIS) should be conducted when the automated maintenance system is ready for use. The regression test did validate and demonstrate the JSTARS maintenance concept. Proper contractor involvement and a more mature supply system were also demonstrated. While the regression test data indicate that there are still shortfalls in meeting suitability objectives and thresholds in 12 of 15 quantitative measures, the trend in seven of ten areas common to both MOT&E and regression testing was positive.

The airlift support requirement to deploy JSTARS appears unattainable. This requirement is currently under review by the combat commands.

The E-8 regression test provided very little quantitative data on the system's ability to support battle management. DOT&E is continuing to assess the qualitative information available from the AFOTEC regression testing, ASCIET 97, and several major operational exercises, to determine the demonstrated effectiveness of the system for both battle management and target attack support.

The CGS IOT&E revealed serious operational shortfalls in effectiveness and suitability of the CGS.

The capability of the CGS to detect, track, and identify targets to support surveillance and targeting missions was far below the criteria associated with the COIs approved in the TEMP. The doctrine, training, tactics, techniques, and procedures for CGS operations were not adequate for operational effectiveness. The benefit of including other sensor feeds in the CGS was not proven, and the CGS could not effectively use the SAR imagery received from the E-8. Operational effectiveness may also have been hampered by immature or artificially constrained coordination procedures between Army ground operators and Air Force/Army E-8C operators of the JSTARS system. This procedural immaturity has resulted in a reassessment of the test construct for air-to-ground system interaction in the follow-on system evaluation.

The reliability, availability, and maintainability of the CGS did not meet operational requirements and significantly degraded effectiveness. The CGS software and hardware failed often. Interface problems continue to exist, especially with the Surveillance and Control Data Link. The maintenance concept of having operators repair 90 percent of the system failures is unrealistic, and it is likely that the system will require considerable contractor maintenance support in the future.

The IOT&E tested only a subset of the operational capabilities proposed for the CGS. Numerous upgrades are planned. These upgrades, along with the deficiencies identified from the CGS IOT&E, must be operationally tested to determine if they will be operationally effective and suitable in combat. A rigorous operational test program must be developed by the Army and approved in an updated TEMP.

DOT&E will maintain oversight of the system, including approving the subsequent operational tests in the TEMP and individual test plans.