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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The Joint Air-to-Surface StandOff Missile (JASSM) is a precision engagement weapon that integrates the standoff delivery accuracy and effectiveness required to kill critical enemy targets with the necessary technologies to ensure high missile survivability. This precision engagement capability will enable joint U.S. and combined allied forces to conduct sustained and synchronized operations from dispersed locations to ensure dominant maneuver.

The JASSM Missile System is an Acquisition Category 1D effort to develop a survivable precision cruise missile capable of launch from outside area defenses to kill hard, medium-hardened, soft, and area type targets. The weapon is required to attack both fixed and relocatable targets. The threshold integration aircraft are the F-16 and B-52. Although carrier operability remains a key performance parameter, the Navy F/A-18 E/F has been redesignated as an objective platform. The schedule for integration onto the F/A-18 E/F will be determined by the Navy.

The Key Performance Parameters for the system are: Missile Mission Effectiveness (expressed as a mission level measure of overall ability to kill a defined target set), Missile Range, and Carrier Operability. The program office developmental concept subordinates all other operational requirements to potential contractor performance/cost trade-offs to achieve the best value weapon for the service users. These cost-performance trades are to be defined through continued and open interaction between the service users, the program office, the OTAs, and the prime contractor. The program requires the contractor to deliver a fully warranted, full-up round for less than $700 thousand each (BY 95$).

Initially, the program entertained proposals from seven contractors. The build-up to the release of the request for industry proposal was a period of intense interaction between the contractors and the government team. This open interaction and continued aggressive competition in performance and cost assessment are the keystones of the program office strategy. The final competition phase was between two participants in a Program Definition-Risk Reduction phase. The prime contractor finalists were Lockheed Martin and McDonnell. Lockheed Martin was selected as the winning contractor in April 1998. The program is now in EMD.

The Air Force and Navy jointly directed an updated Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) study to determine the relative value of JASSM versus a proposed variant of the Navy StandOff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response Plus (SLAM-ER+). The results of this AOA substantiated the need for continued development of both the JASSM and SLAM-ER programs in order to meet both service mission needs. The results of the AOA substantiated the continued Air Force requirement for JASSM.

DOT&E, AFOTEC, OPTEVFOR, the program office, and the contractor teams are formulating a mutually acceptable strategy that: (1) incorporates early OT involvement; (2) makes early and continued use of modeling and simulation to gain T&E efficiencies; (3) takes advantage of existing and planned developmental test activity to reduce the operational test matrix; and (4) incorporates operational units into the OT&E strategy to allow the Services to field an early operational capability.

DOT&E and the service OTAs have been especially active in defining the scope of the overall combined test strategy and assessing the program for opportunities to accelerate OT&E and LFT&E through integrated DT/OT events, where prudent. This effort has been supported by the JASSM Program Director and the service test agencies. A key facet of the Program Director's test strategy is that there will be no government-led developmental T&E of the system. The contractor is responsible for planning the execution of the DT phase of the program. While the government has identified test support activity, the overall developmental test responsibility resides with the prime contractor. This contractor program supports combined developmental and operational test demands, and eventually leads into independent government IOT&E. This high level of early OT&E interaction with the developer is in response to the program office's desire to maximize OT participation in the combined phases in an effort to satisfy OT&E objectives as early as possible.

DOT&E, AFOTEC, and OPTEVFOR completed an EOA of the weapon system, targeting support and T&E assets. The Program Office and Lockheed Martin cooperated in gathering the required information to successfully complete the effort.

DOT&E and the Air Force reached agreement on a strategy for a test-based JASSM OT&E/LFT&E program. This strategy is included in the current TEMP update. The data sources include sled tests against various targets, warhead arena tests, flying test bed data, and missile flight tests against a cross-section of representative target types in varying scenarios. The testing will also evaluate the ability of the intelligence system to support targeting of the weapon.

The bulk of this years effort has been captive seeker characterizations and warhead sled testing. The seeker testing, via flying test bed sorties, has collected data on representative target types in varying weather and clutter environments. The tests were conducted in Utah (mountain/snow) and White Sands Missile Range, NM (desert backgrounds and actual target presentations). Warhead sled testing has gathered data on warhead penetration capability, fuse function, and explosive fill evaluations.

DOT&E, AFOTEC, and OPTEVFOR collaborated in execution of the EOA of the system. The OA investigated: (1) potential operational effectiveness and suitability, (2) potential program voids that might influence the weapon's ability to achieve requirements; (3) documentation; (4) program support of OT&E; and (5) modeling and simulation/software processes. Based upon the review of both data and documentation, the system is potentially effective and potentially suitable. However, there are three areas of concern: (1) the ability of the system to meet its requirement to be carrier/shipboard operable; (2) the availability of software maturity data; and (3) the validation of required modeling tools for OT&E.

First, the carrier operability concerns encompass the electromagnetic compatibility, catapult and arrestment robustness, container size, and mission planning compatibility. The program office is cooperating with DOT&E and OPTEVFOR to pursue the required follow-on evaluation activity to ensure articulation of a definitive set of evaluation criteria and an adequate evaluation of these issues.

Second, there were difficulties in performing a software evaluation. Because the weapon system development concept is totally reliant on contractor development supported by a system warranty agreement, the program management viewpoint is that a government review of the contractor's progress in software maturity and metrics is not required. DOT&E and the service OTAs maintain that an understanding of software maturity is critical in assessing the readiness for OT&E as well as validation and accreditation of the modeling tools that simulate the missile performance. This issue is receiving adequate management attention.

Third, the Modular Effectiveness Vulnerability Assessment (MEVA) model is a critical tool in the evaluation of the weapon currently under development and verification. MEVA is the model that will be used to assess the weapon effects of the warhead penetration in hard targets. The ability of the model to accurately predict weapon effects is undemonstrated. The ability of the model to accurately predict weapons effects is being validated and is a high priority for both the program office and the operational test community. The results of an early sled test against a challenging section of hard-target mass failed to correlate with the pre-shot prediction of the expected damage. The validation and accreditation of this modeling tool is a high priority for both the program office and the operational test community.

Although it is too early to draw conclusions regarding the lethality issues, recent sled testing indicates that the warhead does not break up after penetration of hardened concrete targets. The explosive fill appears to have satisfactory lethality characteristics. This sled test initially indicated fuse anomalies. These anomalies have been attributed to a faulty test procedure through post-test data analysis.

JASSM is an acquisition reform program with no classical government developmental testing. The program progresses directly from contractor testing to OT&E. This acquisition reform initiative presented several challenges for the JASSM program strategy. The accelerated pace of activity required to meet the program director's schedule mandated aggressive early involvement on the part of the operational test community. Involvement before the actual Request for Proposal stage of the program was essential in laying the foundation for a constructive strategy that involved combined contractor DT and operational test data collection activity. The program has been especially active in fostering early interaction. The level of contractor involvement in supporting OT&E data collection, the utility and validity of contractor data, and the early inclusion of operational tester participation in combined DT/OT all receive continued attention by the program office, prime contractor and the operational test community. The streamlined nature of the JASSM program requires that continued emphasis be placed on early involvement, combined DT/OT, and enhanced modeling and simulation use.