The HHR incorporates UHF/VHF voice, the military Global Positioning System, and various UHF satellite communication capabilities. The support equipment consists of the unit-level CSEL Planning Computer, radio set adapter (HAS), and the associated software that loads specific mission data as well as crypto keys and diagnostic displays on the radio unit.

The over the horizon segment includes the unattended base station (UBS) which acts as the connection between the various satellite systems used to relay messages and location data from the HHR and the JSRC. The ground segment consists of the segmented software application that receives and transmits messages from/to the HHR through the UBS. This software can be hosted on any DII COE C2 workstation. This connectivity allows the command elements and search and rescue forces to locate and maintain communication with CSEL-equipped survivors.

The interest in a robust, CSEL-type capability began with a CINCPAC Mission Need Statement and a Joint Requirements Oversight Council validation in 1992. This interest was rejuvenated by the O'Grady shootdown in Bosnia. The Air Force, as the DoD executive agent for combat search and rescue, initiated the CSEL Program as an Acquisition Reform accelerated program to field deploy the capability as rapidly as possible. The CSEL is intended to replace the current PRC-90 and PRC-112/112B survival radios.

The program was placed under DOT&E oversight in spring 1998 in acknowledgment of the importance of the program to the joint warfighting communities, congressional interests, and the potential impact of the CSEL integration into the DoD C4I systems. Additionally, there were concerns raised during the Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint T&E regarding system performance and OT&E adequacy.

AFOTEC developed a robust plan to provide independent system assessment. The initial EOA of 25 EMD models of the radio and a part of the ground support segment supported a proposed Air Force decision to purchase 891 HHRs, in addition to the 250 radios previously committed. This EOA was conducted from April-July 1998. The assessment included data and observations from combined testing at Fort Huachuca, AZ, shipboard operations on the USS Essex; participation in JREX (a joint rescue exercise in conjunction with the Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint T&E effort); Cope Thunder exercises; and water and cold weather testing in Alaska. DOT&E observed CSEL activity in JREX, Cope Thunder, and Alaska.

The CSEL EMD configuration tested is not effective and not suitable. The tested configuration is a menu driven HHR configuration, whose current interfaces are consistently identified by field users as too complex to accommodate in a stressful combat environment. The reliability of critical two-way communication from HHR to the JSRC is low. While the radio achieved a 94 percent success rate in communication from the survivor-the Joint Search and Rescue Center-the reliability of communication from the JSRC back to the survivor/evader was only 75 percent. The radio is slow to react to menu inputs and the voice reception is often garbled and noisy. The embedded global positioning receiver in the HHR was slow and unreliable in realistic field conditions. The UBS is not reliable enough to meet the requirement for an unattended system. The UBS failure rate demonstrated in the evaluation period was approximately 25 hours. The CSEL Planning Computer and the associated radio set adapter used to load the mission specific data into the HHR is also assessed by DOT&E as inadequate and unreliable.

The evaluators identified 14 Category One system deficiencies during the course of the OA. Category One deficiencies are defined as those items, which if uncorrected, cause death, severe injury, major loss/damage to equipment or systems, and directly restrict combat/operational readiness. The 14 system deficiencies included six HHR, four ground support segments, and four UBS critical items. These system deficiencies must be corrected prior to further OT. Additionally, the assessment identified 74 Category Two deficiencies (errors in workmanship, nonconformance to specifications or technical requirements; identifies a problem for improvement or potential enhancement). Thirteen of these Category Two deficiencies have been closed as a result of program office action to initiate fixes.

Based upon the OA results, the program office has identified a number of proposed fixes to the system. In order to incorporate these proposed fixes and accommodate a congressional funding delay, the program has been restructured. This restructured program will include a delay in the scheduled IOT&E of a fully production representative system until FY02. Additionally, combat users have renewed efforts to articulate an updated concept of operations and support for the objective system.

The CSEL Program has consistently pushed for an aggressive schedule of concurrent developmental and field test activity to try and field equipment to meet an urgent user need. As a result, the hardware and software solutions have been too immature for the service users to field. Early OT involvement in the rapid development cycle and combined DT/OT have allowed the Joint Services to field test and evaluate the system, as well as identify significant issues early in development.