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Military

 DOT&E Director, Operational Test & Evaluation  
FY98 Annual Report
FY98 Annual Report

B-2 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL BOMBER


Air Force ACAT IC Program: Prime Contractor
Total Number of Systems:21Northrop Grumman
Total Program Cost (TY$):$44,300M 
Average Unit Cost (TY$):$2,114MService Certified Y2K Compliant
Full-rate production:N/AYes

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The B-2 Spirit bomber is an all-wing, two-crew aircraft, designed for worldwide conventional and nuclear weapon delivery missions. Four F-118-GE-110 turbofan engines propel the B-2 bomber. The aircraft has twin side-by-side weapon bays, capable of carrying a total of approximately 44,000 pounds of weapons. The B-2 incorporates technologies that provide low observable (LO) characteristics; i.e., low radar cross-section, as well as low infrared, visual, and acoustic signatures. Avionics include a multi-mode radar, Global Positioning System (GPS), a Defensive Management System (DMS) for radar warning functions, and a terrain following/terrain avoidance system.

The aircraft was delivered in three different configurations with incremental increases in capabilities. The initial version (Block 10) was intended primarily for training. All Block 10 aircraft have been returned to the factory for upgrade to later configurations. An interim Block 20 configuration reached IOC in April 1997. Block 20 aircraft have a nuclear weapon delivery capability as well as a near-precision guided bomb capability called GPS-Aided Targeting System/GPS-Aided Munition (GATS/GAM). GAM consists of either a 2,000-lb Mk-84 bomb or a 4,700-lb GBU-113 bomb equipped with a guidance package controlled by a GPS-aided inertial navigation system. The production line is currently converting Block 10 and Block 20 aircraft into the Block 30 configuration and delivering them to Whiteman AFB, MO. Block 30 is capable of carrying and delivering additional types of conventional weapons including the GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).

Essential to the Joint Vision 2010 tenants of dominant maneuver and precision engagement is the unique capability of the B-2 to project power rapidly, precisely, and globally. The B-2's range and ability to penetrate defended airspace make a critical contribution to global power projection. The B-2 is designed to bring massive firepower ready to bear anywhere on the globe contributing to the concept of dominant maneuver. The B-2 builds on the technological innovations and advancements of weapon delivery accuracy and low observable technologies, enhancing the operational concept of precision engagement.

The B-2 mission critical systems, including the aircraft software, are all Y2K compliant with one exception-the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) is scheduled to be compliant by December 1998. All non-mission critical program components needed in year 2000 are in renovation or removal and will be completed as required.


BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Operational testing of the B-2 was initiated in 1989 within a combined DT&E/IOT&E program carried out at Edwards AFB, CA. The primary IOT&E activity consisted of system assessments made by dedicated IOT&E test team pilots during operationally realistic DT&E flights. In addition, a series of test flights were conducted against individual threat systems and an integrated air defense system to evaluate survivability. The only dedicated IOT&E missions consisted of eleven Integrated Sorties carried out prior to delivery of each block aircraft for the operational squadron. Two Integrated Sorties of a test aircraft (configured to represent a Block 10 aircraft) were flown in October 1993, and five Block 20 Integrated Sorties were conducted in April and May 1996. A total of four Integrated Sorties were flown with the Block 30 configuration in June 1997. During IOT&E, a total of 54 sorties and 372 flight hours were flown.

The B-2 was added to the Annual T&E Oversight List for Live Fire Test and Evaluation in May 1995. DOT&E determined that the requirements of Section 2366, Title 10, U.S. Code applied only if the program expected to proceed beyond low-rate production, which it did not. Accordingly, no waiver from full-up live fire system testing or alternative plan is required for the foreseeable future.


TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY

The B-2 IOT&E test program at Edwards AFB ended June 30, 1997 due to a lack of funding availability, rendering several important subsystems without completed development. Although all B-2 COIs were answered, some areas required additional testing. These areas included mission planning, LO maintainability, environmental control system, deployability, and survivability. Residual test requirements are being completed during FOT&E by the Air Combat Command (ACC) operational wing at Whiteman AFB. The final Block 30 IOT&E Report was delivered to DOT&E in December 1997. FOT&E on Block 20 and 30 aircraft began in April 1996 and will be completed in December 1998. Operational commitments by the bomb wing and delivery schedules for improvements may prevent evaluation of all deferred or untested areas by the completion of Phase I. ACC will continue to evaluate and/or determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of the B-2 weapon system in support of combat operations during force development evaluation (FDE), starting in January 1999.

The Air Force is conducting a LFT&E program that relies heavily on modeling and simulation. Ballistic testing was limited to coupon tests conducted to evaluate LO degradation from projectile penetration of materials and support for development of techniques for battle damage repair.

TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT

With the exception of the items noted below, assessment of the B-2 is complete. DOT&E's assessment is based on observation and analyses of Block 30 Integrated Sorties and discussions with test force and operating bomb wing personnel.

The B-2 Block 30 capabilities required by the user's Operational Requirements Document (ORD) were only partially demonstrated in IOT&E through actual tests. The evaluation of some capabilities (e.g., Deployability) and measures of effectiveness (e.g., Sortie Generation Rate) were based on the test team's subjective judgments and/or use of models. In addition, the immaturity of some systems on the Block 30 aircraft precluded a successful evaluation of some measures of effectiveness and performance. Despite limitations, DOT&E regards the IOT&E testing as adequate to assess the effectiveness and suitability of the Block 30 B-2.

Five Critical Operational Issues (COIs) were evaluated during IOT&E:

  • Rapid Strike


  • Sustained Operations


  • Mission Survivability


  • Weapons Effectiveness


  • Reliability, Maintainability, and Deployability

Rapid Strike: AFOTEC assessed this area as meeting user requirements for pre-planned missions only. Limitations of rapid strike capability result from immaturity of the Mission Planning System, which consists of the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) combined with a Common Low Observable Autorouter and B-2 unique software. Rapid strike capabilities are also impacted by the time allotted to generate and launch the B-2. These times do not meet requirements due to the LO repair time (discussed below).

DOT&E assesses this area as still only adequate for pre-planned missions. B-2 AFMSS performance remains a critical issue. Testing of the B-2 AFMSS planning software is continuing at Whiteman AFB. Although several improvements have been made to the AFMSS, it remains short of meeting ORD requirements at this time. Since the start of FOT&E, mission planning time has been steadily improving. The Air Force expects additional software updates in February 1999 to enable the system to meet its original functional requirements, although the mission planning times may still be excessive. A FOT&E generation exercise in April 1998 showed a potential for the operating wing to generate B-2 aircraft in somewhat less time than predicted during IOT&E.

Sustained Operations: AFOTEC assessed this area as not meeting user requirements. LO materials on the B-2 required high amounts of maintenance and had a time-consuming repair process with long cure times. This reduced the amount of time that aircraft were available for operational use, which kept Mission Capable Rates below the requirement. These problems increase the amount of time it takes to prepare the B-2 for its next combat flight, potentially reducing the number of sorties that could be flown in a given period. During IOT&E, the B-2 was rated incapable of achieving the required Sortie Generation Rate due to unreliability and difficulty in maintaining the aircraft's LO system. The ability to sustain combat operations in a deployed environment was also rated a problem due to the instances cited above.

DOT&E's assessment in this area during the past year of FOT&E showed little improvement. The B-2 community has developed a comprehensive plan to test and install new and improved low observable materials, improve repair processes, reduce cure times, and develop new diagnostic tools that are designed to allow the B-2 to meet operational requirements. However, none of these improvements have reached the operational unit.

Mission Survivability: AFOTEC assessed the B-2 as being survivable against the projected threat on the assumption that appropriate mission planning, force packaging, and tactics are employed. DOT&E concurs with the Air Force's assessment but notes that these capabilities have yet to be delivered and tested fully.

In its current state, the B-2's DMS is operationally unsatisfactory. Problems include inaccurate information, a cluttered display, and an excessive workload to operate the system. The DMS is supposed to identify and locate unknown threats that occur during a mission; however it fails to provide the aircrew with timely, concise threat indications in all circumstances. Operational software, which corrected a number of DMS deficiencies found during IOT&E, completed testing in April 1998 and is now installed. Additional software changes are scheduled to be available in 2000. These software changes are intended to provide capabilities that are useful but less than expected in the original defensive system design. The DMS does have one useful function, in that it provides the aircrew with information on known threat locations included in computer files prior to the mission. However, costly upgrades for new computer processors are required if the DMS is to meet original expectations. Presently, there is no funding or current plan to enhance the B-2 with expensive upgrades.

Weapons Effectiveness: Testing of the B-2 indicates that all requirements for carriage and release of nuclear and conventional weapons have been demonstrated. Accuracy requirements have been met for nearly all conditions. During IOT&E and FOT&E, a total of forty JDAM MK-84 (2,000-pound warhead) and BLU-109 (penetrating warhead) weapons have been successfully delivered, with a high percentage of the weapons obtaining required accuracy. DOT&E notes, however, that total weapon delivery rate for the B-2, will depend on attainable Mission Capable Rates and Sortie Generation Rates. The B-2's weapon delivery accuracy partially compensates for shortfalls in Sortie Generation Rate and deployability (see below).

Reliability, Maintainability, and Deployability: AFOTEC rated this area as not meeting user requirements because the reliability of the LO system was unsatisfactory and the maintenance effort to sustain the aircraft (all systems) was excessive. The most significant limitation is LO maintainability. A large number of B-2 LO unscheduled maintenance events, combined with the lengthy time and excessive manpower required to repair LO discrepancies, reduces aircraft availability. Additionally, the curing of LO materials is a major determinant of the time it takes to complete LO maintenance action. These materials consist of sealants to fill gaps between panels, tapes to cover joints, and adhesives.

B-2 deployability also failed to meet requirements. The B-2 must be able to deploy to forward locations to reduce transit times and achieve a high sortie rate. The capability to deploy the B-2 was not demonstrated in IOT&E. The test team cited numerous obstacles to deployment, including the requirements for extensive support equipment, the need to protect the aircraft from rain intrusion, and a requirement for environmentally controlled shelters for use during LO maintenance at deployed sites.

Since the completion of IOT&E, the B-2 has deployed overseas twice. During both deployments the B-2 demonstrated the ability to achieve the required sortie generation rate. Significant information was obtained to assist in the eventual deployment of a full squadron of B-2s. Additionally, LO process and material improvements are having a positive effect on sustained operations. Aircraft were flown across the radar cross-section range during the deployment and redeployment phases, to determine the impact of deployability and long duration sorties on the LO robustness of the aircraft. Results showed no significant LO degradation.

In regards to deployable aircraft shelters, ACC has provided the Systems Program Office with requirements to proceed to initial deployable shelter buy. Initial acquisition is awaiting required funding reprogramming action.

LFT&E: Through an agreement with the Air Force for LFT&E, a vulnerability analysis was planned in the B-2 TEMP to understand the B-2's capability of surviving its intended wartime environment. Due to funding constraints, the B-2 program office was unable to complete the analysis, however, the Air Force believes sufficient analysis has been completed to identify B-2 vulnerabilities. DOT&E will review the information and provide recommendations for additional testing or analysis if required.

Overall Assessment: At this time, the B-2 is considered potentially effective if development and operational testing for immature subsystems is completed satisfactorily. Final assessment of the B-2's effectiveness and suitability will require additional OT&E. Many challenges remain to be met in the areas of LO maintenance, DMS, AFMSS performance, and deployability. These developments are unlikely to be completed during the remaining period of FOT&E and FDE or before the Full Operational Capability date of 3QFY99.


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