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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
	FY98 Annual Report

In accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 139, paragraph (b)(3), the Director, OT&E is the principle senior management official in the DoD responsible to "monitor and review all operational test and evaluation in the Department of Defense." This includes the OT&E on smaller, non-major acquisition systems. Although several non-major systems such as those directly affecting major systems and those specifically directed by Congress are under direct oversight of DOT&E, the OT&E of most non-major systems are controlled by the Service OTAs. A review of the Services' operational test and evaluation activities that supported acquisition decisions on non-major weapon systems is summarized in this section.

The Service OTAs are responsible for OT&E on hundreds of small programs. Army OPTEC is currently working on 409 ACAT III or below and the Navy OPTEVFOR retains 251. Air Force AFOTEC retains 71 ACAT III programs under their cognizance. This is in addition to the numerous ACAT III and IV programs that are managed by the Air Force's Air Combat Command Air Mobility Command and Air Warfare Center. None of the Service OTAs are adequately funded for this work. With priority often going to the higher profile major acquisitions, the OTAs must balance many competing demands for very scarce resources. Summary charts of the OT&E activities conducted by the services on non-major weapon systems that specifically supported full-rate production acquisition decisions during FY98 are listed at the end of this section.

These small programs represent some of the best examples of integrated T&E demonstrating very effective processes to more rapidly field new military equipment. Often these processes are aggressive applications of the Secretary's themes we have urged now for three years--early involvement by the operational testers, combining DT with OT, and combining testing and training. We are using successful examples from smaller programs to encourage the larger major system acquisitions to take advantage of the benefits of these themes.

One area that lends itself to effective integration of the OT&E themes applied to small program OT&E, is development and evaluation of Special Operations Forces (SOF) equipment. Typically the SOF requirements for small programs are managed directly by SOCOM Program Managers and Program Executive Officers under the SOCOM Acquisition Executive. These developers are closely aligned with their combat users, the SOCOM test and evaluation directorate, and the Service OTAs. This efficient and closely tied SOF program strategy is illustrated by the innovative and integrated test program executed by the Naval Special Warfare Rigid Inflatable Boat (NSW RIB) Program and the MK-5 Special Operations Craft (SOC).

The NSW RIB is a lightweight, high-speed craft used for short-range insertion and extraction of SOF personnel in low-to-medium threat environments. It is 36 feet long, and replaces a variety of conventional 24 to 33 foot boats used by USN Special Boat Units. It is C-130 air transportable and can carry eight SOF mission personnel and a crew of three.

A highly successful acquisition program, the NSW RIB was delivered to the combat teams in just over two years from program initiation to first unit equipped. The program strategy used commercial boat building experience and practices. The operational requirements of the NSW RIB were all met or exceeded during the combined DT/OT. Top speed exceeded objective by 15 percent (46 kts demonstrated, 40 kts objective); cruise speed exceeded objective by 3 percent (33 kts demonstrated, 32 kts objective); range exceeded objective by 15 percent (200 nm demonstrated, 175 objective); reliability was slightly better (91 percent demonstrated, 90 percent required); and availability exceeded objective by 9 percent (99 percent demonstrated, 90 percent objective).

While it is too early to make final logistical and O&M comparisons of the NSW RIB to the existing boats, reliability has been much better than for the older craft. This leads SOCOM to expect the overall parts and maintenance costs to be lower than for the existing craft. O&M training is performed the same as with the older craft. Preventive maintenance actions are comparable to the older units. The IOC units are exhibiting simplified support and cheaper parts costs due to the COTS components in engines and propulsion systems. Overall the Navy and SOCOM are satisfied enough with the program to be actively considering a reduction of the deployment logistical support kit size for the craft.

This program is a model of the benefits to be achieved by early involvement by operational testers (OPTEVFOR in this case), combined DT and OT, and close ties with the combat units that will be called upon to employ and support the system.

Early testing was done with close teamwork between OPTEVFOR and the combat users to maximize the perspectives of each. Prototypes from competing vendors were developed and tested all the way to acceptance trials and final source selection. The early testing with contractor prototypes was so operational in nature that the OT&E was completed in the source-selection phase before a production contract was let. The testing was so operationally realistic that normal classical TECHEVAL and OPEVAL were canceled entirely.

The NSW RIB testing covered 10,000 nautical miles, in hot and cold, rough and calm extremes, with five SEAL insertion missions, and C-130, C-141, and C-5 flight tests. There were no deficiencies and all operational issues were satisfied.

The MK-5 Special Operations Craft (SOC) system provides medium range insertion and extraction for special operations forces in a low to medium threat environment. This 52 ton, 82 foot craft also supports a limited coastal patrol and interdiction capability. The Naval Special Warfare Command mission needs statement was approved in February 1992, followed by the formal operational requirements document (ORD) in March 1993. The combined developmental and early operational test phases of the program commenced on three test articles in February 1994. The final phase of the OPEVAL was conducted in the fall of 1995.

The craft was evaluated against 17 thresholds representing safety, speed, seaworthiness, mission effectiveness, and supportability. The system met all criteria, and exceeded expectations in eight performance areas.

The initial life cycle cost estimate for the program budgeted $2 million for the combined DT/OT effort. Due to an aggressive combined evaluation strategy, the program cost for the T&E was $881 thousand. This saving of $1.1 million was due to efficiencies gained in test conduct and location, as well as extensive support from the Naval Special Warfare squadrons. Large major system acquisitions would do well to follow the examples from the NSW RIB and MK-5 programs.

The following is a summary of the OT&E activities conducted by the Services on non-major weapon systems as they supported full-rate production acquisition decisions during FY98.