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US Indo-Pacific Command Facilities

U.S. bases in Japan and Korea remain the critical component of U.S. deterrent and rapid response strategy in Asia. U.S. military presence in the region also enables the United States to respond more rapidly and flexibly in other areas. The basic outlines of U.S. force presence in Japan and Korea will remain constant. Japanese peacetime host nation support (HNS) remains the most generous of any of America's allies around the world, averaging about $5 billion each year. Despite its severe financial crisis, Korea provides substantial support for maintenance of U.S. troops, recognizing like Japan that HNS is a critical strategic factor in the alliance.

Both nations continue to modernize their forces and have procured substantial amounts of U.S. equipment, services and weapons systems to enhance interoperability and cooperation between alliance forces. In fact, the U.S. has more equipment in common with Japan than any other ally.

After the closure of US bases in the Philippines in 1992, the United States has benefited from a series of access agreements and other arrangements with Southeast Asian partners that have supported continued U.S. military engagement. These arrangements, including port calls, repair facilities, training ranges and logistics support, have become increasingly important to the US overseas presence. For example, Singapore announced in early 1998 that its Changi Naval Station, which became operational in the year 2000, would be available to U.S. naval combatants and include a pier which can accommodate American aircraft carriers. In January 1998, the United States and the Philippines negotiated a Visiting Forces Agreement that, when ratified, will permit routine combined exercises and training, and ship visits. Thailand remains an important refueling and transit point for possible operations to neighboring trouble spots, including the Arabian Gulf. Australia has long provided key access to facilities for U.S. unilateral and combined exercises.

Although the US overseas presence in Asia serves both regional and U.S. security interests, the impact on local communities in host countries can be great. The United States understands and appreciates the sacrifices of the citizens who live near training areas or bases, and who sometimes endure noise and other inconveniences. U.S. forces work to mitigate these effects and coordinate closely with officials at both the national and local levels, and local citizens groups to reach mutually satisfactory arrangements. In Japan, for instance, U.S. forces have relocated artillery training, and when possible, carrier landing practice to alleviate the inconvenience to local residents. The United States has also worked with Japan to establish quiet hours to minimize the impact of routine air operations on local communities. In both Japan and Korea, there has been a continuing effort to address environmental issues associated with its base presence. The United States has pledged to work closely with Japanese and Korean authorities to ensure U.S. military operations are carried out with due regard for the environment and public safety. The U.S. has also made progress to return base and training-related land, to alter operational procedures in host countries in an effort to respond to local concerns, and to be better neighbors.

By mid-2003 the Pentagon was planning a broad realignment of troops in Asia that may include moving Marines out of Japan and establishing a network of small bases in countries such as Australia, Singapore and Malaysia where the US has never had a substantial military presence. The 24,000 or so US troops based with their families elsewhere in Japan would remain where they were. But the Pentagon would increase the military equipment and weaponry stored and maintained at ports in Japan and elsewhere, allowing it to cut back the number of troops based in the region but leaving it able to deploy them rapidly to conflicts in the area.

A hardened shelter is a reinforced structure made of steel, concrete, and other materials to protect military aircraft from enemy strikes.

In a letter 07 May 2024 to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro, 13 members of Congress pointed out glaring vulnerabilities in the Pacific region and demanded "immediate changes."

"American military bases in the Indo-Pacific are under threat. With its current strike capabilities, China can attack all U.S. bases in the region, targeting U.S. service members from Okinawa to those on U.S. territories of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). In fact, unclassified analysis suggests China has enough weapons to overwhelm our air and missile defenses protecting those bases. Strikes on U.S. bases could immobilize vital air assets, disrupt logistical chains, and significantly weaken our ability to respond in a conflict. Passive defenses, such as hardened aircraft shelters and dispersal of forces, may offer the most cost-effective way of strengthening our bases and improving their resilience.

"We are concerned about the alarming lack of urgency by the Department of Defense (DoD) in adopting such defensive measures. U.S. bases in the region have almost no hardened aircraft shelters compared to Chinese military bases. In addition, a DoD regulation involving World War II-era munitions is substantially delaying and driving up the costs of construction projects in Guam and CNMI aimed at building a more resilient posture for our forces to withstand Chinese attacks and continue operations. We urge immediate changes.

"Many U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific remain unprotected by any hardened structures, and aircraft are often kept close to each other to facilitate maintenance and other supporting tasks. The result is that critical U.S. air assets are highly vulnerable to Chinese strikes. Unsurprisingly, in recent war games simulating a conflict with China over Taiwan, 90 percent of U.S. aircraft losses occurred on the ground, rather than from air combat. While “active defenses” such as air and missile defense systems are an important part of base and force protection, their high cost and limited numbers mean the U.S. will not be able to deploy enough of them to fully protect our bases. In order to complement active defenses and strengthen our bases, we must invest in “passive defenses,” like hardened aircraft shelters and underground bunkers, dispersal of forces across both within a base and across multiple bases, redundant logistical facilities, and rapid runway repair capabilities. Robust passive defenses can help minimize the damage of missile attacks by increasing our forces’ ability to "withstand strikes, recover quickly, and effectively continue operations.

"The U.S. Air Force has commendably incorporated many of the core tenets of passive defense into its doctrine of “Agile Combat Employment” (ACE). The concept emphasizes increasing survivability of forces through dispersal of teams to operate in a “hub-and-spoke” manner. Concepts such as ACE should be expanded upon and prioritized to harden bases against the Chinese threat, as Secretary Kendall has stated. Yet, as explained below, it is apparent that the Pentagon is not urgently pursuing needed passive defenses.

"Ongoing research by Thomas Shugart and Timothy A. Walton, analysts associated with the Center for a New American Security and Hudson Institute, respectively, paints a troubling picture of U.S. efforts to strengthen bases through the construction of hardened aircraft shelters. According to preliminary information provided by Shugart and Walton, the difference between the number of hardened aircraft shelters being built by China and the United States is staggering. Despite the grave threat to U.S. bases described above, over the last decade, it is China, not the United States, that has built more than 400 hardened aircraft shelters. During the same period, the United States built only twenty-two additional hardened shelters in the region, on U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea. Notably, there are no hardened aircraft shelters in Guam or CNMI. Hardened maintenance hangars located in Guam were not counted as hardened aircraft shelters.

"While hardened aircraft shelters do not provide complete protection from missile attacks, they do offer significantly more protection against submunitions than expedient shelters (relocatable steel shelters). They would also force China to use more force to destroy each aircraft, thereby increasing the resources required to attack our forces and, in turn, the survivability of our valuable air assets. Constructing hardened shelters for all our air assets may not be economically feasible or tactically sensible, but the fact that the number of such shelters on U.S. bases in the region has barely changed over a decade is deeply troubling.

"The limited investment into hardened aircraft shelters is a symptom of a broader problem within the DoD: we are spending hardly any money on military construction to improve base resilience in the Indo-Pacific. In FY 2024, the Pentagon will spend approximately $15.7 billion on military construction projects worldwide. Of the total, DoD will spend below 2 percent on base resilience projects in the region, less than what it spent on such projects in 2023. According to the 2024 Military Construction Appropriations Act, the Pentagon will spend $136 million on the construction of an aircraft parking ramp and aerial port facility in Guam. In CNMI, the Air Force will spend $78 million on airfield development and fuel tanks. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-122), Division A – Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. 3 Philippines, DoD will spend $35 million on an airfield development project at Basa Air Base. There appear to be no projects dedicated to base hardening for the entire region as part of FY24 funding. Meanwhile, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has identified $11 billion in priorities that were “unfunded” by the President’s Budget Request for FY25, including $3.3 billion in military construction.

"The size and nature of the unfunded priorities reflect a profound lack of seriousness in strengthening the U.S. bases closest to China and thus most vulnerable to Chinese strikes. If our bases in the Indo-Pacific lack the resilience to survive attacks and continue operating, our ability to deter China and respond quickly in the Taiwan Strait will be greatly diminished. It is essential that budget requests provided to Congress accurately reflect what our forces will need to deter and, if needed, defeat any threats against U.S. personnel. Regulatory Obstacles to Construction Another barrier to improving the resilience of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region is a DoD policy that is causing significant delays to critical construction projects in the area of responsibility of Joint Region Marianas (JRM), the DoD command that supports U.S. forces in Guam and CNMI.

"Unexploded ordnances and discarded military munitions are still found on construction sites in Guam and CNMI and for decades, military construction on the islands followed the “Recognize, Retreat, Report” (RRR) procedures for dealing with such ordnances: call 911, cordon off the area, and coordinate with police and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units to pick up and remove the items from the site. Since World War II, tens of thousands of munitions have been removed under RRR procedures during construction in Guam and CNMI with no documented case of explosion or injury, and civilian construction in Guam and CNMI continues to be conducted following RRR procedures.

"However, in 2010, the DoD replaced RRR with “Munitions and Explosives of Concern” (MEC) procedures for military construction in Guam and CNMI. The military leadership at JRM recently informed the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party that the transition to and use of MEC procedures have added substantial cost and time to urgent construction projects, including those at Andersen Air Force Base and Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz, both located in Guam. JRM leadership also stated that delayed construction has increased operational risk for conducting major combat operations in the region and adversely affected our posture in the Pacific.

"The safety of our service members and their families is obviously of the utmost importance, but based on a decades-long record of safe removal under RRR, it is not clear that the onerous MEC procedures are necessary. In light of this, the DoD’s refusal to exempt critical military construction in Guam and CNMI from the burdensome MEC procedures – despite JRM’s assessment that they are impeding urgent projects to strengthen our bases and create a more resilient posture – is confounding.

"Secretary Kendall stated in February, “I bring us to the most pacing challenge that we have ever faced, China, China, China. Ladies and gentlemen, we are out of time. We are out of time. We are out of time.” We agree. Construction projects that strengthen our bases and increase their resilience may take years to complete. Onerous regulations, such as MEC procedures, that hamper these efforts must be fundamentally changed, if not removed. The time to act is now.

"To better understand these issues and explore your proposed solutions, we respectfully request that you provide written responses to the following questions no later than May 29, 2024:

• 1. What steps have you taken to incorporate and enhance passive defenses to protect our bases and forces in the Indo-Pacific, including in Alaska, American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, Hawaii, Minor Outlying Islands, and allied and partner territory?
• 2. What plans do you have to create hardened aircraft shelters, underground bunkers, and other hardened facilities to protect aircraft, equipment, and forces operating out of U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific? a. What additional hardened infrastructure, reconstitution, camouflage, concealment, and deception projects and programs could enhance the passive defenses of U.S. critical assets and forces in the Indo-Pacific?
• 3. Do you plan to request additional funding for base resilience construction projects, including hardened aircraft shelters, underground bunkers, and dispersed and/or redundant facilities? If so, please explain.
• 4. Has the Department assessed options to increase efficiency and speed for executing military construction so that such critical projects do not take years to complete?
• 5. Will you grant JRM an exemption from following MEC procedures for military construction? a. Will you implement RRR procedures as the baseline for military construction throughout the Indo-Pacific?
• 6. The Pentagon accurately classified the PRC as the “pacing challenge.” However, with INDOPACOM acknowledging many unfunded projects, why does the Department’s budget not reflect its rhetoric on the PRC?

"We appreciate your attention to these matters and look forward to a prompt response."

The United States has been ramping up its Indo-Pacific region air bases to ensure they are protected against attack, a spokesperson for the U.S. Pacific Air Forces told VOA 14 January 2025, amid concerns over vulnerabilities they face in countries such as Japan, the Philippines and South Korea against potential Chinese strikes. “While we are continually improving our theater posture, warfighting advantage and integration with allied and partners, Pacific Air Forces stands ready every day to respond to anything that poses a threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the spokesperson said. “We continue to invest in infrastructure and technology to enhance the resilience and survivability of our bases and facilities across the theater, including hardening airfields and buildings while investing in advanced security systems to protect our personnel and assets,” the spokesperson told VOA.

The Air Force was authorized with “$916.6 million to improve logistics, maintenance capabilities and prepositioning of equipment, munitions, fuel and material in the Indo-Pacific” through the fiscal 2024 Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the spokesperson added. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative is a set of defense priorities set up in 2021 by Congress to support U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific, primarily to counter China.

If left unfortified, the U.S. air power in the region would be significantly reduced compared to China’s, according to the report, Concrete Sky: Air Based Hardening in the Western Pacific. The report, released 05 January 2025 by the Hudson Institute, claimed that U.S. aircraft at allied Indo-Pacific country bases could suffer major losses from Chinese attacks unless those bases are fortified. One of the reasons, according to the report, is that the U.S. is lagging behind China in the number of shelters that could hide and protect the aircraft from attacks.

China more than doubled the number of aircraft shelters since the early 2010s, having more than 3,000, according to the report. Across 134 Chinese air bases located within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, China has more than 650 hardened aircraft shelters and nearly 2,000 nonhardened individual aircraft shelters. In comparison, the U.S. has added two hardened shelters and 41 nonhardened ones within 1,000 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait and outside South Korea since the 2010s, the report said. This means if a war breaks out over Taiwan, U.S. aircraft could suffer more damage than China’s if they attacked each other’s bases in the region, which would prevent U.S. air operation for a duration of time, said analysts.

According to Kelly Grieco, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center’s Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program, attacks on U.S. bases in the Pacific region, including Japan could “prevent the U.S. Air Force from conducting fighter operations for about the first 12 days of a conflict from U.S. bases in Japan.” Grieco continued, based on her own report published by the Stimson Center, that Chinese missiles could also take out runways and aerial refueling tankers, rendering them unusable for over a month at U.S. bases in Japan and for over half a week at U.S. military bases in Guam and other Pacific locations. “It’s not possible to harden a runway or taxiway” that is exposed as an easy target to destroy, disabling aircraft from taking off, she said. This begs the question of whether it is worth investing in hardening facilities, she added.

The Hudson Institute report said within the 1,000 nautical miles of Taiwan, China has added 20 runways and 49 taxiways since the 2010s while the U.S. added one runway and one taxiway. Among U.S. air bases in the allied countries of Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, those in the Philippines are the least protected, Timothy Walton, one of the authors of the Hudson report, told VOA. “In Japan, Kadena and Misawa Air Bases are the most fortified U.S. bases, while the remainder are largely unfortified,” said Walton, a senior fellow at Hudson’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology. “In the Republic of Korea, the two U.S. Air Force bases, Osan and Kunsan, are hardened. Airfields in the Philippines are unhardened,” he said.

Grieco said the U.S. would mostly rely on its bases in Japan, Guam and other Pacific locations as South Korea would “restrict the use of U.S. bases in its territory in a Taiwan contingency out of concern about North Korean aggression and to avoid a rupture with Beijing.”

Steven Rudder, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and former commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, said, “When you look at the number of aircraft in the Asia Pacific, I am not sure that the ability to harden every single aircraft parking space would be as effective as a distributed force.”

Bruce Bennett, a senior defense researcher at Rand Corporation, said dispersing airfields are important against nuclear strikes. Against conventional warhead missiles, shelters are “key to the protection,” said Bennett. “But if there’s a nuclear threat, you’ve got to have different airfields” as alternative locations to park and land aircraft and to provide logistic support such as fueling, maintenance and repair, he said.

Bennett added the disparity in the number of aircraft shelters between the China and U.S. seems to stem from U.S. air superiority. “What the U.S. Air Force tends to perceive is that we’ve got the ability to deal with the Chinese air force in an air-to-air combat,” where China traditionally felt it would lose air-to-air combat against the U.S. and therefore wants to take U.S. aircraft on the ground before engaging in air while sheltering theirs heavily on the ground, Bennett said.

“The question becomes, as the Chinese aircraft get better and as they start fielding fifth-generation fighter, will the U.S. need the ability to attack Chinese airfields with conventional weapons? I don’t think the Defense Department has considered it as one of important tasks,” Bennett said.