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Air Mobility - History

Air power leaders in the 1920s were primarily concerned with defining air power as an entity in and of itself-with the debates focused on the fundamental questions of a separate air arm and issues of bombardment, pursuit, observation, and attack aviation. Air transport was not used as an example in these arguments. The intimate linkage between airlift and ground forces was not a particularly persuasive argument for air power enthusiasts in the 1920s.

The 1928 maneuvers, between Virginia Beach and Langley Field, saw 14 bombers carrying 73,721 pounds of equipment and personnel. The report of the ACTS supply officer for the Virginia Beach maneuvers said that "War plans (made during peace) should be based on the use of bombers for transports... The transports which may be idle cannot be used for bombers in an emergency. In the future, air transport squadrons will probably be equipped with types of planes no longer suitable for use on the front." The report also suggested that either a platform be built to carry six passengers in the bomb bays of their bombers or that at least one transport to each few bombers be used.

There were 88 types of transport aircraft purchased or tested by 1930, and military air transports were in constant demand by the Air Service (as it was called until 1926). However, "there was no real theory of use. The concept of aerial transport as an element of the Air Service's tactical function had not been thought out to the point where it could be defined in terms of a definite policy with clear-cut objectives.

The chief of the Air Corps directed on 11 November 1932 the establishment of the "1st Air Transport Group (Provisional) and four (provisional) transport squadrons, one each at the Sacramento, San Antonio, Fairfield, and Middletown Air Depots." The creation of the aerial supply system focused attention on the fact that a suitable cargo airplane was not available. The depots had to rely on the Bellanca YIC-14 to carry bulky items, and it had limited capability and poor loading qualities. The need for a specifically designed transport aircraft became apparent. A 1936 staff study invited attention to the "recent demonstration in Russia where great quantities of machine guns and field pieces were successfully transported by aircraft and dropped by parachutes (also 1,800 men)." In December of 1936 General Arnold noted that, in 21 days of conflict, the Italian aviation unit had dropped 385 tons of materiel to the combat troops.

In April 1934, the secretary of war appointed former Secretary of War Newton Baker to head a board that was to survey the Army Air Corps as an agency of national defense. The board was enamored with civil aviation, especially air transport: "One of the most important recent developments in civil aviation is the production of the high speed, long range, large capacity passenger and cargo air transport . This type of airplane with certain structural changes in its design can be so constructed as to be adapted for military use.... the Army Air Corps should whenever possible use converted commercial air transport of acceptable performance for cargo and transport airplanes."

Maj Gen Benjamin Foulois, chief of the Air Corps, took strong exception to the Baker Board's conclusions concerning using existing commercial transport planes. "c. Commercial transports are not designed to carry heavy concentrated loads of bulky articles which require large openings in the fuselage for loading and unloading purposes... The military cargo airplane does not require extremely high speed and, consequently, does not need large powerful expensive power plants.... The comparison between the commercial transport and the military cargo airplane is practically identical with that between the passenger automobile and the cargo-carrying truck."

New Secretary of War Harry Woodring said in August 1937 that he saw no rationale "for buying any transports due to their high price." He directed that only 36 be purchased in 1938 and none in 1939. The money saved was to be used to buy new bombers ; transport requirements would be met by converting old bombers.

Woodring's bomber conversion concept was unworkable as illustrated by the Materiel Division's attempt to convert a damaged B-18 to test the idea. General Robins' test report was devastating. There was no emergency exit from the aircraft ; costs per airplane were $50,000 to $75,000 (more than the cost of a new cargo plane) ; weight and balance were out of kilter; and the structural integrity of the airplane was in question. General Robins concluded that "the efficient movement of supplies in time of emergency will demand an airplane designed for this purpose and the regular procurement of transport airplanes . . . is strongly recommended."

After the fall of France in the summer of 1940, substantial orders for transport aircraft were an integral part of the expansion program . In September of that year, the Air Corps ordered 545 C-47s and 200 newly designed and much more capable two-engined C-46s. In May of 1941, an additional 256 C-46s were ordered, followed in June by 100 C-53s, the militarized version of the DC-3. That same month the Air Corps also took over the orders for 61 four-engined C-54s, originally destined for civilian airlines. The following September they ordered 50 more C-53s and 70 more C-47s. All of these airplanes were originally designed as civilian passenger transports. Until virtually the end of the war, the Air Corps depended on converted passenger planes and converted bombers.

On 5 June 1941, the AAC established the Air Corps Ferrying Command (ACFC) retroactive to 29 May, under the direct jurisdiction of the chief of Air Corps. The mission statement was fairly broad : "Move aircraft by air from factories to such terminals as may be directed by the chief of Air Corps," and "maintain such ferrying service as may be required to meet specific situations." But in 1941 the concept of air transport as one of the principal channels of supply for the military forces in the field had not been fully grasped. Probably no one then foresaw that a network of long-range transport routes, supporting the daily movement of hundreds of tons of supplies and thousands of passengers, would spread over the world.

On 20 June 1942 General Arnold directed the creation of the Air Transport Command (ATC). It was responsible for ferrying all aircraft within and outside the United States, the air transportation of people, materiel, and mail for all War Department agencies (except for troop carrier operations). It started operations with 11,000 people and nearly 1,000 transports. When the war ended, ATC had over 200,000 people and some 3,700 airplanes.

The troop carriers in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) operated very differently than did those in the Mediterranean and European theaters. The war in the Pacific was different in execution and in geography. In the vast majority of cases, troop carriers were involved in logistical airlift. There were very few paratroop assaults, but the troop carriers became the supply and resupply lifeline of the forces they supported and they provided the mobility that became a hallmark of the ground and tactical air forces in the Pacific. The forces in the Pacific were dependent on aerial logistics to a degree never required in the European theater.

MacArthur recognized that air transportation was indispensable to his theater. He told the War Department in September of 1942 : "Air transport is the only efficient means of supply because of necessity of convoying against enemy naval activity, absence of docks, unloading and loading facilities, small amounts of shipping available and total lack of road and rail communications in theater of operations."

The SWPA theater had two Troop Carrier Wings for theater airlift (the 54th TCW and the 322d TCW), similar to that in Europe, one to perform traditional troop carrier operations and one to support the needs of, the theater US air components . At least 40 percent of the airlift capability would be reserved to flying between main bases on relatively routine runs, while up to 60 percent could be used to fly into forward operating bases/areas.

The largest and most ambitious airlift operation of the war was the aerial resupply of China and Maj General Claire L. Chennault’s 14th Air Force after Japan had cut off water and land access. Known as “flying the Hump” because of the need for the flights from India to fly over the dangerous Himalayan mountains, C-46s, C-47s, B-24s, and later, C-54s, moved more than 650,000 tons of supplies in just over three years. During World War II in the United States, the cultural differences between strategic intertheater airlift and tactical intratheater airlift were apparent. The Air Transport Command (ATC) handled strategic airlift, from continental United States (CONUS) to theater or from one theater to another. The Troop Carrier Command (TCC) handled tactical airlift within the theater in support of combat operations. This separation into two commands, ATC and TCC, led to the perception that ATC performed rear area ‘airline’ type missions and TCC performed combat missions. ATC and TCC values differed in terms of force protection. Troop carrier units accepted combat losses as part of the mission, accepting risk in order to directly support the warfighter.

After World War II, the Military Airlift Transportation Service (MATS) was formed in 1948, centralizing command and control of all Air Force and Navy strategic airlift. The Air Force did not make its tactical airlift part of MATS. Tactical forces remained under the control of theater commanders. Through the mid-1960s, strategic airlift under MATS and air refueling under SAC were focused more on the SAC mission than combat preparation. Tactical airlift forces opposed integration with strategic airlift using arguments that tactical crews were culturally more in concert with the Army units they supported.

During the Vietnam War, MATS argued that it had some of the same airframes as the troop carrier units in Tactical Air Command (TAC) and that its missions spanned from air drop to global nuclear support and therefore MATS and TAC airlifters should be united. TAC continued to argue for separation in support of highly specialized training and the inherent trust between supported units and airlifters found in tactical elements.

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) (which was the new name for MATS since 1966) was designated as a specified command and received all airlift assets, both strategic and tactical in 1977. In 1992, General McPeak reorganized the USAF. Mobility assets became part of Air Mobility Command [AMC], except for C-130s, which were assigned to Air Combat Command (ACC) until 1997.