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Military Capabilities of the People's Republic of China
19 July 2000 - House Armed Services

Testimony of Dr June Teufel Dreyer
The U.S. Response to China's Increasing Military Power:
Eleven Assumptions in Search of a Policy

 The military capabilities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are growing in almost all areas, as my colleague Richard Fisher will outline in some detail

 The administration has been quite complacent about the import of this growing military might. Its assumption seems to be that growing economic prosperity will lead to pluralism, which in turn will cause the erosion of the communist state and its replacement by a democracy. Democracies are inherently peaceful and do not fight each other. Therefore, the best course of action is to engage China. Not to engage China is equivalent to isolating China. In the words of one high-ranking administration official, "If we treat China as an enemy, it most assuredly will become one." With regard to the military specifically, other members of the administration have been dismissive of the growth in the military capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), stating that it is no match for the U.S. military.

There is a dangerous complacency in these assumptions. First, it is not certain that the PRC can continue current rates of economic growth. As is often the case with rapid economic growth, prosperity is unevenly distributed, both within communities and geographically. The increasingly uneven distribution of wealth has opened social fissures which threaten the country's stability. This is a major reason behind party/government's recent efforts to develop the western regions of the state. Additionally, the country's banking system is in precarious health. State-owned enterprises continue to operate in deficit, depleting the resources of the central treasury. Corruption, often with the collusion of party/government officials and military officers, is endemic. Efforts to restructure the economy into a healthier, more efficient producer of goods and services have foundered because of the widespread social disruptions that terminating the employment of millions of people would cause.

Second, there is no certainty that that advent of capitalism will cause the demise of the communist government. The PRC has developed a variant market Leninism that has been characterized as "bureaucrat capitalism": the state appears to have co-opted the entrepreneurs, who remain highly dependent on the bureaucracy, rather than vice-versa.

Third, even the collapse of the communist government does not guarantee the triumph of democracy. Certainly it did not in the former Soviet Union. The successor states to the USSR boast few successes in terms of protection for civil liberties.

Fourth, even if the PRC were to become a democracy, China would not necessarily become less of a threat to its neighbors. There is no charismatic leader, and the ideology of communism under which the party came to power, has been discredited. This has undermined the legitimacy of the party and its ruling group. Particularly after the demonstrations of 1989, the leadership seemed to become afraid of its own people. Partly to shore up its position, it stirred up nationalist passions---an "us versus them" mentality with regard to foreign countries. These have proved quite popular, to the extent that, when Japanese leaders visit the PRC, anti-Japanese activists have been placed under house arrest. The current autocratic government has been able to keep these nationalist sentiments in check; a democratic government would find it much more difficult to do so. People who have been educated to believe that various irredentist territories claimed by the PRC have always been part of the ancestral land have a tendency to become passionate about reclaiming them. It is quite easy to imagine, for example, a democratic China resorting to armed hostilities against India or the Philippines.

Fifth, the administration seems unwilling to internalize the security consequences of an engagement that is one-way rather than, as it should be, a mutual process. A country that is assured that another country will engage it at any cost can use this commitment to extract maximum leverage. There are minimal costs to intransigence, since the second country believes in engagement regardless of the actions of the first country. A sound policy would be grounded in the understanding that the alternative to engagement is not necessarily isolation: there are intermediate positions.

Sixth, if the statement that if the United States treats the PRC like an enemy, it will surely become one, is true, then the converse should be true as well. In fact, the PRC does regard the United States not only as an enemy but as the enemy. Military journals and newspapers regularly discuss scenarios in which the PLA engages "a technologically superior" foe that could be only the United States. Quite comfortable with the Cold War geopolitical balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, the PRC was greatly discomfited by a situation in which there was only one superpower---the United States---and became more so when the United States marshaled international support to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. In Beijing's view, the one remaining superpower had chosen the role of international bully, and would have to be countered. This determination was reinforced when the United States launched a relief effort to counter the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. The Chinese media expressed outrage that so-called humanitarian considerations could be used as a pretext for violating the sovereign right of state to do whatever it wished within its own borders, and explicitly drew parallels about what this precedent might portend for an American response against Chinese actions in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Proponents of People's War pointed out that the Serbian people had not broken under heavy U.S. bombing attacks and neither would the Chinese people. Others pointed out that if the PRC wished to prevail against the United States, it would have to acquire comparable weapons systems. A third group argued that this was precisely what the Americans wanted: they had consciously lured the Soviet Union into an arms race that had forced the Soviet state into bankruptcy and collapse, and hoped to do the same to the PRC. The correct strategy for China was to develop a select few weapons that targeted American weaknesses; they therefore advocated asymmetric warfare. None argued that it is necessary to engage the superpower or to accommodate to its wishes, even temporarily.

Seventh, to say that China is no match for the United States military is to misstate the question. It is likely that in a global confrontation between the United States and the People's Republic of China, America's technological superiority and more resilient economic system would enable the U.S. to prevail. But Beijing has no current intention of confronting the United States on a global scale. It wishes only to deter Washington in a regional context---to ensure that American military might does not prevent it from taking over territories it regards as belonging to China.

Hence, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would initially engage not U.S. forces but those of regional neighbors with whom it has territorial disputes---mainly, but not limited to, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Here, its chances of prevailing militarily are much better. China has by far the largest military in the region; only Japan and Taiwan have technologically superior equipment. In the case of Taiwan, this technological edge is eroding rapidly. Even were its technological superiority massive, its qualitative superiority could be eroded by the massively larger numbers of weapons and manpower of the PLA. In the case of Japan, there is a serious internal debate about whether Article Nine of the country's constitution would allow it to fight, even when attacked.

The United States has close ties with many of these countries, which include a Mutual Security Treaty with Japan and a commitment to provide Taiwan with defensive arms under the Taiwan Relations Act of April 1979. We also have a long-standing relationship with the government of the Philippines, and a strong commitment both to stability in the region and to keeping the sea lanes open. Inevitably, there would be pressure on Washington to become involved.

The American military would thus be confronting China on its home turf. Moreover, as a global power, the United States has other interests to protect. At the moment, these other interests are focused on the Middle East, but also include the successor states of the former Soviet empire as well as problems in Africa and Latin America. Having downsized considerably since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military is already stretched very thin to defend American interests and commitments. There is a real question of what resources we could bring to bear in a confrontation in East Asia.

China would also seek to control the public relations aspects of any confrontation. They would portray the PRC's victim as the aggressor. The official media already excoriate Taiwan as a "troublemaker" and describe Japan as in the grip of a dangerous trend back toward pre-World War II militarism. They regularly remind the United States public that the U.S. has agreed that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of it, conveniently glossing over the fact that

(a)   the United States has never defined what it means by one China

(b)  the U.S. has consistently maintained that the cross-Strait issue must not be solved by the use of force.

Since the American public is unaware of these subtleties, there would be considerable confusion. China has already reminded Americans on several occasions that it possesses nuclear weapons, and asked them if they would be willing to trade Los Angeles or San Francisco for Taiwan.

Beijing has also commissioned a formidable number of studies purporting to prove that the territories it claims have always been part of the ancestral land. Already regularly released selectively by the official mainland media, they would be promulgated globally in time of confrontation. Relevant domestic laws would also be widely disseminated. A case in point is legislation passed by China's National People's Congress in 1992 that unilaterally annexed all disputed territories, regardless of whether the PRC actually occupied any of them, would be widely disseminated as well. The same law asserted China's right to "adopt all necessary measures to prevent and stop the harmful passage of vessels through its territorial waters."

Chinese analysts have also taken note of the American aversion to casualties in any confrontation. United States' media discussions of the repercussions in the U.S. of the sight of the body of an American serviceman being dragged through the streets of Somalia are regularly alluded to in Chinese military journals and newspapers. So as well was the concern of the U.S. military to avoid casualties in the confrontation over Kosovo. Chinese commentators have also asserted that, because Washington did not intervene when the Russian military mounted an offensive against Chechnya, it would not intervene in a confrontation with China over disputed territories. There is no discussion of the differences between the Chechnya situation and the varying legal and security claims involved in the PRC's irredentist claims vice those pertaining to Chechnya. The analysts' conclusion is that if the PLA can inflict some casualties on U.S. forces, American public opinion will demand that the troops be brought home.

The Chinese are making sure that they can inflict such casualties. For example, the Sovremenny-class destroyers recently purchased from the Soviet Union, were originally designed as aircraft-carrier killers. Aircraft carriers were precisely the platforms the United States sent into the area near the Taiwan Strait when, in early 1996, it appeared that the PLA might be contemplating an invasion. The Sovremennys are equipped with Sunburn SS-N-22 (Moskit) missiles. The Moskits are reportedly designed to carry nuclear warheads equal to 120,000 tons of TNT, which would make them six times as powerful as the atomic bomb used against Hiroshima. Even with non-nuclear warheads, the Moskits are very menacing weapons, traveling at two and a half times the speed of sound, skimming along the water in a low flight pattern that is hard to detect, and capable of agile end-maneuvers to throw off defenses. American military sources have stated that the Moskit is possibly the most lethal anti-ship weapon in the world, and that the U.S. navy has nothing that can stop it. The navy's Phalanx system can detect the Moskit, but has about two and a half seconds to calculate a fire solution, which is not enough time to stop the 750-pound warhead from hitting its target. The PRC is developing an over-the-horizon capability for its cruise missiles that could strike American ships, and an air-to-air refueling capability that will extend the range of its military aircraft.

Eighth, that because the Chinese military is no match for the American military, the Chinese military will not fight. Chinese officers have told me that PLA officers believe that they can successfully engage U.S. forces. Their assertions are reinforced by articles in PLA newspapers and journals. Hence it may be that, contrary to the administration's assertions, the Chinese will not be deterred from attack.

Ninth, that because starting a war would disrupt economic growth in the PRC, its leaders will not resort to force. Chinese leaders have stated that recovering lost territories is a matter of national honor, and that a setback in economic growth, which they are convinced would be temporary, is a price they are willing to pay. The PRC's membership in the World Trade Organization and other international trade groups or lack thereof will make little difference. Expanded trade with China has been presented as a way for the United States to modify the PRC's behavior. Instead, the exact opposite has happened. Such actions as Beijing's decision to buy Airbus passenger planes from Europe rather than Boeing jets from the U.S. in punishment for Washington's criticisms of its behavior have generated strong lobbying efforts on Washington from corporate America. China has succeeded in using the lure of its market to modify American behavior. While large Western corporations argue that business decisions should not be influenced by other considerations, Beijing feels strongly otherwise: the tens of billions of dollars that Taiwan companies have invested on the mainland notwithstanding, Chinese leaders recently warned that they may apply various sanctions to corporations whose heads do not support the unification of Taiwan with the mainland.

Tenth, China can be engaged as a strategic partner. The assumption seems to be that by treating China as a friend, its behavior can be modified in ways that are more compatible with American values. The nearly five years that the strategic partnership has been administration policy have seen the PRC's nuclear proliferation to Pakistan and perhaps Libya and Iraq and the theft of nuclear secrets from American laboratories. President Clinton at first declared the level of proof regarding the transfer of ring magnets to Pakistan insufficient; when it became undeniable, he accepted the Chinese government's explanation that it knew nothing of the transfer and did not levy sanctions. The administration has also been loath to accept the findings of the bipartisan Cox Committee report on military/commercial concerns with the PRC.

The Chinese government's encouragement of demonstrators' attacks on the American embassy in Beijing in retaliation for the accidental U.S. bombing of its embassy in Belgrade is hardly the action of a strategic partner. Nor is Beijing's current effort to cause a rift in U.S. relations with its European allies over the issue of National Missile Defense. The Clinton administration has worked hard to encourage the restoration of military- to- military relationships with the PRC, which Beijing suspended after the embassy bombing in Belgrade. It has argued that it is more conducive to peace and stability to become familiar with the Chinese military than to be ignorant of its procedures and ways of thought. Yet it opposes a provision of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act that would facilitate military-to-military contacts with the Taiwan military, even though the Taiwan Relations Act mandates a role for the U.S. in defense of the island.

Eleventh, that the way to treat information that contradicts these optimistic assumptions is to either suppress it or distort it. As an example of suppression, in February 2000, the Department of Defense produced a report indicating that Taiwan was far more vulnerable to attack than previously recognized, and that the isolation of its military was causing further technological shortfalls. Because the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to supply Taiwan with such defensive weapons as are necessary to maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, the implication of the Pentagon report was that additional weapons sales would be necessary. Instead, the administration stamped the report "secret" and essentially tried to bury it. News of the study was leaked to the Washington Post in late March.

As for distortion, the manipulation of the annual report to Congress pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act is a case in point. The release of the Fiscal Year 1999 report was held up for over a month; when finally issued, a Section I had been inserted which bore tangential relation to the rest of the report but which softened its message. The release of the Fiscal Year 2000 report was delayed nearly two months and contained peculiar passages, such as one noting that "three-quarters of Taiwan's 400+ fighters are fourth generation aircraft.PRC [150] fourth-generation aircraft constitute only about 4 percent of the fighter force." The percentages are irrelevant: one fights with absolute numbers, not percentages of airplanes. The study also assumes that all fourth-generation fighter planes are equal. In fact, 130 of Taiwan's 400 planes are Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDFs), a plane that has been described as essentially a toy: it can carry either ordnance or fuel, but not meaningful amounts of both. Taiwanese have given the acronym another meaning, "I Don't Fly." Also included in the Department of Defense's count are several dozen less complex F-5Es that remain in service. By contrast, the Chinese Air Force's Soviet-designed Su-27s and, perhaps, Su-30s, are highly capable planes. American air force officers describe the Su-30 as more a match for the F-22 that the U.S. is currently developing than for the F-16s in the Taiwan air force's inventory. Reports indicate that China plans to build up to 200 Su-27s and acquire up to 50 Su-30s. Nor does the Department of Defense report deal with the possibility that the massive numbers of less capable fighters possessed by the mainland air force will overcome by attrition the technologically superior planes of the Taiwan air force. Finally, the report contains a section on the PLA "acquiring standoff weapons which could be used in a preemptive strike against Taiwan." The word "pre-emptive" implies a Taiwan plan to attack the mainland. It is highly unlikely that tiny Taiwan, with the U.S. supplying it with defensive weapons only, would launch an attack on the mainland. Hence, one must regard as suspect the implication, with no explanation as to how or why, that it is planning to.

In conclusion, the administration has sought to deny or minimize the import of indications that the government of the People's Republic of China is making steady advances in the modernization of its military and regards the United States as its enemy. Its efforts to cultivate better relations with the Beijing leadership in the absence of reciprocal gestures from that group signals both to Beijing and to America's allies that Washington is weak and unwilling to enforce its security concerns in Asia. This can only embolden the Chinese leadership.

There is no certainty that the PRC will grow into a major power in the foreseeable future. Its economic restructuring plan has proceeded in fits and starts, since there are high social costs involved in carrying it out. Corruption is endemic in the system, eroding support for the leadership as well as economic efficiency. The ability of party/government to extract compliance from the citizenry has declined. And already-serious environmental problems continue to worsen.

Nonetheless, Chinese leaders' threats on matters of sovereignty and irredentism must be taken seriously. It is possible that they are bluffing. But American policy must take into account the possibility that they are not. The administration's tendency to deny or suppress information on the growing military threat from the PRC in the name of the healing power of the invisible hand of economic growth is the real threat to U.S. national security.

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