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Thailand - Intelligence and Security

Local police in Thailand have spent decades perfecting a public persona that emphasizes their corruption and cruelty.

In July 2017, Thailand’s security commission approved a reform plan aimed at improving the government's intelligence work by consolidating work of a network of 27 agencies. The reality in 2016 was that seven Thai intelligence agencies - the NIA, the secret service of the Army, Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence Service of the Air Force, the secret service of the Supreme Command Center, the Special Branch Bureau and the headquarters of the National Security commands - mostly work independently.

Thailand is a constitutional monarchy that was considered a functioning democracy until military leaders overthrew the democratically-elected government in September 2006 and declared martial law. Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, with King Maha Vajiralongkorn Bodindradebayavarangkun (Rama X) as head of state. The government is under the rule of a junta-led National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). The Royal Thai Police (RTP) and the Royal Thai Armed Forces share responsibility for law enforcement and the maintenance of order within the country. The police report to the Office of the Prime Minister; the armed forces report to the Ministry of Defense. The Border Patrol Police have special authority and responsibility in border areas to combat insurgent movements. While more authority has been returned to civilian authorities following the election, they still do not maintain full control over the security forces.

Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings by the government or its agents; forced disappearance by or on behalf of the government; torture by government officials; arbitrary arrest and detention by government authorities; political prisoners; political interference in the judiciary; censorship, website blocking, and criminal libel laws; interference with the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association including harassment and occasional violence against human rights activists and government critics; refoulement of refugees facing threats to their life or freedom; restrictions on political participation; significant acts of corruption; and forced child labor.

In July 2015, leaked internal documents belonging to Milan-based Hacking Team revealed that a number of government agencies in Thailand bought spyware from them between 2012 and 2014. Those agencies included the Royal Thai Police, the National Security Council, the Royal Thai Army, and the Department of Corrections under the Ministry of Justice. Correspondence between National Security Council and Hacking Team revealed that the Thai intelligence wanted the ability to eavesdrop on popular messaging programs, especially Line, Skype, and WhatsApp.

At least 1,600 officials have been listed as spooks belonging to seven Thai agencies: National Intelligence Directorate, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, Supreme Command Headquarters' Intelligence, Special Branch Police and National Security Command Headquarters. They are supposed to coordinate and work together under the umbrella of the Intelligence Coordinating and Operation Command Centre. But most operate in isolation, which has hampered their ability to verify intelligence and strategise common action plans.

Thailand needs new corps of intelligence officials who have a broader knowledge of their country and of events abroad, especially of neighboring countries. Such officials must also be able to draw up recommendations that help decision-makers adopt wise policies that are deliverable.

The new National Intelligence Strategy (2015-22), approved by the Cabinet, put forward these guidelines. The strategy is mandatory for all government agencies in planning their intelligence gathering and analysis in the next seven years.

The National Intelligence Strategy (2015-22), which was approved by the Cabinet, states that “Thailand needs new corps of intelligence officials who have a broader knowledge of their country and of events abroad, especially of neighbouring countries.” Recruiting such persons is going to be difficult as the education system is focused on delivering propaganda and “leaders” are not known for accepting advice that challenges the tropes and shibboleths of the royalist state. The strategy acknowledges this with “old priorities,” with “those related to monarchy, the separatist movement in southern Thailand, political division in Thailand … and threats from extremists.” The last category is something new. Thailand used to have a naive view that it did not have enemies and it is never the target of any group.

Internal conflict continued in the ethnic Malay-Muslim-majority southernmost provinces. Frequent attacks by suspected insurgents and government security operations stoked tension between the local ethnic Malay-Muslim and ethnic Thai-Buddhist communities. An Emergency Decree in effect in the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla provides military, police, and some civilian authorities significant powers to restrict some basic rights and delegates certain internal security powers to the armed forces. The decree also provides security forces broad immunity from prosecution. Moreover, martial law – imposed in 2006 – remained in effect and significantly empowered security forces in the southernmost provinces.

Thailand’s borders are relatively porous, and information sharing within Thailand and with neighboring countries is limited. The market in fraudulent documents remained active despite government efforts to crack down on criminal counterfeit networks. Beginning in 2016, Thailand began to collect and analyze API/PNR data on commercial flights at all international airports. As of late 2018, Thailand’s immigration system is reported to be real-time connected with INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database.

In April 2001, National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) established ThaiCERT as an electronic discussion forum among experts, governmental agencies, and the private sector on cyber security. ThaiCert, a five-year plan, provides online services of the computer emergency response team with up-to-date bulletin/announcements on outbreaks of viruses, new security threats, a cybersecurity laboratory, and training courses.

News reports appearing in early 2020 indicate that Thailand was a customer of Crypto AG, a Swiss company secretly owned by the US CIA and West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) that manufactured compromised encryption machines. Use of the devices may have allowed its coded messages to be deciphered.