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Iran Counter-Intelligence

In 2005 the US intelligence community assessed " ... with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable." The New York Times reported in November 2005 that "In mid-July, senior American intelligence officials called the leaders of the international atomic inspection agency to the top of a skyscraper overlooking the Danube in Vienna and unveiled the contents of what they said was a stolen Iranian laptop computer. The Americans flashed on a screen and spread over a conference table selections from more than a thousand pages of Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experiments, saying they showed a long effort to design a nuclear warhead." American officials, citing the need to protect their source, refused to provide details of the origins of the laptop computer beyond saying that it was obtained in mid-2004 from a "longtime contact in Iran" [a statement that could well be deceptive in one or more respect].

But in late 2007 the US intelligence community changed its assessment on Iran's nuclear weapons program. In November 2007 the new National Intelligence Estimate "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities" stated that "We judge .. with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.) Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons." The confidence with which this is stated, and the fact that it references clandestine Iranian activities that are not detectable by technical means, demonstrates that this judgetment was based on a human source.

Israel's 06 September 2007 air attack on what was believed to be a Syrian nuclear weapons plutonium production reactor was based on some human intelligence breakthrough in early 2007. In July 2007, there was a mishap at a Syrian-Iranian joint facility in Syria, killing engineers and damaging the facility, probably the result of Israeli sabotage based on this same intelligence source.

Several Iranians working for the country's nuclear research program were arrested Wednesday 10 December 2008 for leaking information to foreign countries after an Iranian news agency released the names of the workers. Tabnak, which is connected to a former commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, did not specify in its Tuesday report which foreign countries or western intelligence agencies were allegedly linked to the spying network or how many Iranian spies had been arrested in the past months. Three spies were arrested in the previous two weeks for allegedly working for Israel's Mossad intelligence agency, according to Fars News Agency.

Ali Ashtari

Ali Ashtari [age variously reported as 43 or 45 as of 2008], was identified by Iranian media as the manager of a company selling communications and security equipment to the government. Ali Ashtari was also said to be a computer and hi-tech equipment buyer for Iran's defence industry and nuclear program. Ashtari was reported to have been arrested in February 2007, and charged with trying to "create a link" between Iranian experts and Israeli agents. An Iranian judiciary statement obtained on 23 November 2008 was reported to have said that Ali Ashtari was arrested in 2006, after working with Israel's foreign intelligence agency Mossad for three years. There were no contemporaneous reports of his arrest.

Iranian state TV quoted an unnamed intelligence official as saying Ashtari "relayed sensitive information on military, defense and research centers" to Israeli intelligence officers. The material that Ashtari allegedly passed to Israeli intelligence officials also included information on Iran's Atomic Energy Organization.

Few details are available about the Ashtari case, which may have involved an effort to sabotage Iran's nuclear program. The semi-official Fars news agency reported that Mossad operatives gave Ashtari $50,000 to supply internet cables and satellite phones to "special customers" in the hope that Israel could intercept their communications. An Iranian news agency quoted an unnamed senior, Iranian counter-intelligence official saying that Ashtari had business contacts with Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation as well as "some defence and military centers". The official said that, with Mossad's help, Ashtari had supplied "defective and contaminated equipment ... [and] in some instances the application of these parts led to the defeat of the project with irreversible damage".

Ashtari confessed that he communicated with his Israeli controllers: "I received a laptop with encrypted software for fast e-mail communication," he said. "They asked me to install bugging devices in the communications equipment I provided to my clients." Ashtari went on to explain that by bugging GPS (Global Positioning System) units, Mossad agents were able to "see where that person was, know what he has and where he can be found." Ashtari told his interrogators and reporters that his business was based mostly on importing wireless communication devices from Dubai, but that "I was also doing some planning and consulting work, so [the Israelis] asked me about the communications infrastructure in Iran." The intelligence ministry's counter-espionage director, whose name was not given, said Ashtari would offer "treacherous consultation to some security and defence centers" and sought to "trap people targeted by Mossad so that the Zionist regime can contact them in due time."

On 30 June 2008 an Iran court sentenced Ali Ashtaria to death after the court convicted him of spying on the country's military and nuclear program for Israel. The court found that Ashtari had been paid by the Mossad secret service and had caused "irreparable damage".

Ali Ashtari was executed by hanging on 17 November 2008 after admitting he worked for Israel. The head of the counterespionage department of Iran's intelligence ministry said: "We want to show that a new battle with the enemy's intelligence services has begun." An official explained "Not every spy is executed in Iran and we do not announce the execution of a spy. The ministry announced Ashtari's execution for some purposes. We wanted to show that we are in a new and more serious intelligence war with the enemy (Israel)". It was the first known conviction of an alleged Israeli agent in Iran in almost a decade. In 2000, Iranian authorities arrested 10 Jews, convicted them of spying for Israel and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from four to 13 years. An appeals court later reduced their sentences under international pressure and eventually freed them.

Mohammad Hoseyn / Hossein Mousavian

Mohammad Hoseyn / Hossein Mousavian was Iran's ambassador to Germany in the early 1990s, and later deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Iran's chief delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moussavian was said to be very close to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and also close to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. During the second term of Khatami's presidency from 2001 to 2005, Moussavian was the second ranking official in Iran's National Security Council, the office in charge of nuclear negotiations, just under chief negotiator Hassan Rowhani. Moussavian was the team member in charge of negotiation with the European Union. After being dismissed from his position by Ahmadinejad, Mousavian was particularly vocal in criticising Ahmadinejad's diplomatic posture.

On 02 May 2007, Iranian authorities arrested Mousavian. On 09 May 2007, Iranian Government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham said that the arrest of former member of Iran's nuclear negotiation team Hossein Moussavian had nothing to do with nuclear issue. "Moussavian's arrest is not specially linked with the nuclear issue because the intelligence organ is in charge of dealing with the security affairs," said Elham in his weekly press briefing.

After spending a week behind bars, and paying a huge bail, Mousavian was eventually freed without being charged.

Mousavian was later faced with three charges: passing classified information to foreigners, "spying, keeping confidential documents" and "propagating against the ruling system." On 14 November 2007, IRNA reported that Minister of Intelligence Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejeie said that Moussavian had passed information to foreigners, including the UK Embassy. He termed it "contrary to national interest" ... Ejeie told IRNA on the sidelines of Majlis session that "His wrongdoing is clear and proved from Information Ministry's point of view ... From our point of view his wrongdoing is proved. The judge, however, might not accept our view. Anyhow, he has been notified of his charge, that is providing the UK Embassy with data contrary to national country." Asked about the rumors that there had been influences in case of Moussavian, Ejeie said the president and government have not had any influence in Moussavian's case and not even a single contact had been made with the judge responsible for the case.

Judiciary Force spokesman Alireza Jamshidi announced on 27 November 2007 that the court had cleared Mousavian of charges of spying and being in possession of classified documents. Mousavian was found guilty of anti-system propaganda, though the court decided to suspend sentencing. The same court that cleared him of those charges found him guilty of anti-system propaganda but decided to suspend sentencing.

Following harsh protests by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the office of hardline Tehran prosecutor Saeid Mortazavi overruled the initial dropping of the espionage charges by the judiciary, saying that, owing to "legal errors" the investigation should continue. "The Tehran prosecutor quashed the non-prosecution writ issued for Hossein Moussavian concerning security crimes and ordered that the prosecution go on," the official IRNA news agency reported. Ahmadinejad said that Moussavian had held at least 15 sessions with "aliens" -- giving classified nuclear information to the British embassy in Tehran -- and demanded that the contents be made public.

In April 2008 an Iranian court gave a two-year suspended sentence to Mousavian, who was convicted of breaching national security. He was also barred from holding any government office for the next five years. Some observers believed this was all part of an effort by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's faction to portray anyone who has been involved with trying to improve relations with the West as betraying Iranian interests. Mousavian's case is a continuation of the conflict between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani over the conduct of nuclear policy.

Ali Reza Asgari

The first sign of a campaign against high-ranking Iranian officers came on 07 February 2007 with the discovery that Ali Reza Asgari, former commander of the Revolutionary Guard's elite Quds Force in Lebanon and deputy defence minister, had vanished, apparently during a trip to Istanbul. The Sunday Times claimed that "[a]t least 10 close members of his family had to flee the country" with Asgari, including sons, daughters and daughters in law. However, on 13 March 2008 people claiming to be Asgari's wife, daughters, sons, and brother held a press conference denying he defected.

The defection of Iranian general Ali Reza Ashgari, who took part in founding Hezbollah, was a grievous blow to Hezbollah. Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's (Pasdarans) corps in Lebanon for ten years between 1982-92, Asghari knew more than almost anybody in Tehran about the Lebanese Shi'ite movement. In fact, he helped to found it with the former Iranian interior minister Ali Akbar Mochtachemi.

Said to be sore form a poor relationship with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that stemmed from their involvement in Iraq in the 1980s, Asgari was willing to offer the Central Intelligence Agency valuable information. After taking refuge in the US, Ashgari reportedly gave American and Israeli intelligence a complete rundown on the establishment of Hezbollah sleeper cells around the world.

The assassination of Imad Mugniyah, the Hezbollah terrorist, in Damascus in February 2008 was probably a result of this defection. In 1992 Mugniyah's men blew up the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people, and in July 1994, a suicide bomber struck the offices of a Jewish community organization in Buenos Aires, killing 85.

In March 2007 it was revealed that Colonel Amir Muhammed Shirazi, another high-ranking Revolutionary Guard officer, had disappeared, probably in Iraq. A third Iranian general is also reported to be missing, reportedly the head of the Revolutionary Guard in the Persian Gulf. Some sources named him as Brigadier General Muhammed Soltani, but his identity could not be initially confirmed.

Two Arabic newspapers claimed on Friday 06 February 2008 that Ali Reza Asgari supplied intelligence for Israel's 06 September 2007 air attack on what is believed to be a Syrian military installation. According to Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jareeda, Israeli jets received their attack coordinates from retired General Ali Reza Asgari. Saudi newspaper Al-Vatan also claimed that American jets from Iraq were spotted circling the Syrian border during the attack. Asgari is also credited by some with having provided the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies with critical new intelligence on Iran's nuclear weapons programs. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear programs, released in December 2007, claimed on the basis of defector information - some presume from Asgari -- that a key segment of the nuclear weapons had been shut down. Asgari was also said to have told his interrogators that Iran was working to enrich uranium by using laser isotope separation in a special facility in Natanz. Other sources, said to have reason to know about such things, doubted this claim by Ronen Bergman [Senior Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Yedioth Ahronoth].

On 19 March 2009 Hans Ruehle, former chief of the planning staff of the German Defense Ministry, reported in the Swiss daily Neue Zuercher Zeitung that Ali Reza Asghari, a retired general in Iran's Revolutionary Guards and a former deputy defense minister, "changed sides" in February 2007 and provided considerable information to the West on Iran's nuclear program. "The biggest surprise, however, was his assertion that Iran was financing a secret nuclear project of Syria and North Korea," Ruehle wrote. "No one in the American intelligence scene had heard anything of it. And the Israelis who were immediately informed also were completely unaware." But a US counterproliferation official denied that Iran funded the Syrian site. "There is strong reason to believe that only two countries were involved in building the Syrian covert nuclear reactor at Al Kibar - Syria and North Korea." Ruehle reported that US and Israeli intelligence had detected North Korean ship deliveries of construction supplies to Syria starting in 2002, and US satellites had imaged the construction as early as 2003. But they regarded the work as nothing unusual. Ruehle reported that Israel sent a 12-man commando unit in two helicopters to the site in August 2007 to take photographs and soil samples.