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Egypt - Intelligence and Security Agencies

Since the Nasser era, the security forces have held a controversial political role in ensuring state control over dissent and opposition. Security forces also have played a strong role in other authoritarian Arab states (such as Iraq, Syria, and Jordan), but in Egypt they are far more important than the police. In Egypt, under different Ministers of the Interior, the tactics of the security services have varied. In their unleashing to more vigorously combat the Islamist threat in the 1990s, they also demonstrated brutality and determination to control civil society actors, namely NGOs working toward democratization, or which were trying to document human rights abuses of various types. The GOE has not begun serious work on trying to transform the police and security services from instruments of power that serve and protect the regime into institutions operating in the public interest, despite official slogans to the contrary.

Mubarak's internal security apparatus, an estimated 1.4 million strong, is at least twice the size it was under Sadat. Its ubiquitous presence and monopoly of the legitimate use of armed power makes any kind of violent change of leader unlikely. While at one time, in 1973, the Egyptian military was estimated at one million and is now greatly reduced, the security forces have grown to over one million members. The entire apparatus encompasses the General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI, or Mubahath al-Dawla) under the Ministry of Interior, which principally deals with matters of internal security; the Mukhabarat al-`Amma under the President, and the Mukhabarat al-Khabiya, military intelligence under the Ministry of Defense, which also provide intelligence. In addition, the security apparatus operates special courts that hear cases related to national security threats tried under both the criminal code and other types of cases under emergency laws. These may be referred to as either National Security Courts, or the Supreme State Security Courts (Mahkamat Amn al- Dawla al-`Ulya).

The Government of Egypt's [GOE] respect for human rights is poor, and serious abuses continue in many areas. The government limited citizens' right to change their government and continued a state of emergency that has been in place almost continuously since 1967. Security forces used unwarranted lethal force and tortured and abused prisoners and detainees, in most cases with impunity. Prison and detention center conditions were poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals, in some cases for political purposes, and kept them in prolonged pretrial detention. The executive branch exercised control over and pressured the judiciary. The government's respect for freedoms of association and religion remained poor, and the government continued to restrict nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The government partially restricted freedom of expression.

The Government administration divided the functions of the police and public security among four deputy ministers of interior. The minister himself retained responsibility for state security investigations and overall organization. The deputy minister for public security oversaw sections responsible for public safety, travel, emigration, passports, port security, and criminal investigation. Responsibilities assigned to the deputy minister for special police included prison administration, the Central Security Forces, civil defense, police transport, communications, traffic, and tourism. The deputy minister for personnel affairs was responsible for police-training institutions, personnel matters for police and civilian employees, and the Policemen's Sports Association. The deputy minister for administrative and financial affairs had charge of general administration, budgets, supplies, and legal matters.

Commissioned police ranks resembled ranks in the army. The highest-ranking police officer was a major general and ranks descended only to first lieutenant. Below first lieutenant, however, was the grade known as lieutenant-chief warrant officer, followed by three descending grades of warrant officers. Enlisted police held the grades of master sergeant, sergeant, corporal, and private. Police rank insignia were the same as those used by the army, and uniforms were also similar.

In each governorate (sing. muhafazah; pl., muhafazat), a director of police commanded all police in the jurisdiction and, with the governor, was responsible for maintaining public order. Both the governor (a presidentially appointed figure) and the director of police reported to the Ministry of Interior on all security matters; the governor reported directly to the minister or to a deputy, and the director of police reported to the ministry through regular police channels. In the subdivisions of the governorate, district police commandants had authority and functions that were similar to the director at the governorate level. In urban areas, police had modern facilities and equipment, such as computers and communications equipment. In smaller, more remote villages, police had less sophisticated facilities and equipment.

The MOI controls local police forces, which operate in large cities and governorates; the SSIS, which conducts investigations; and the CSF, which maintains public order. SSIS and CSF officers are responsible for law enforcement at the national level and for providing security for infrastructure and key officials, both domestic and foreign. Single-mission law enforcement agencies, such as the Tourist and Antiquities Police and the Antinarcotics General Administration, also work at the national level.

The internal security forces have very low pay and recruiting standards - lower than the regular forces. According to observers, there is widespread petty corruption in the police force, especially below senior levels. The government claimed to investigate corruption and other instances of police malfeasance using a nontransparent internal affairs mechanism, but it failed to investigate many credible allegations of torture and mistreatment by police and security forces. Courts convicted at least five police officers in murder cases and three in torture cases.

The security forces operated under a central chain of command and were considered generally effective in combating crime and terrorism and maintaining public order. There was no systematic prosecution of security personnel who committed human rights abuses.

In Egypt for well over a decade, the United States Department of State has documented that torture and other forms of inhumane treatment are routine. These reports make clear that terrorism suspects in the custody of the intelligence services are particularly vulnerable to such treatment. For example, in its 2001 report, the State Department noted that "[i]n combating terrorism, the security forces continued to mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention." The report noted that "[t]orture takes place in SSIS [State Security Investigations Services] offices, including its headquarters in Cairo, and at CSF [Central Security Forces] camps. Torture victims usually are taken to an SSIS office, where they are handcuffed, blindfolded, and questioned about their associations religious beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to extract information, coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter others from similar activities."

Torture and police brutality in Egypt are endemic and widespread. The police use brutal methods mostly against common criminals to extract confessions, but also against demonstrators, certain political prisoners and unfortunate bystanders. There is evidence of torture in Egypt dating back to the times of the Pharaohs. NGOs estimate there are literally hundreds of torture incidents every day in Cairo police stations alone. Egyptians are bombarded with consistent news reports of police brutality, ranging from high profile incidents such as accidental but lethal police shootings in Salamut and Aswan that sparked riots, to reports of police officers shooting civilians following disputes over traffic tickets. In November 2008 alone, there were two incidents of off-duty police officers shooting and killing civilians over petty disputes.

Observers attribute police brutality to poor training, understaffing and official sanction. Some speculate that officers routinely resort to brutality because of pressure from their superiors to solve crimes. Most officers think solving crimes justifies brutal interrogation methods, and some policemen believe that Islamic law sanctions torture. A culture of judicial impunity for police officers enables continued brutality. Police officers feel they are above the law and protected by the public prosecutor. Some attribute police brutality against common criminals, including the use of electric shocks, to the problem of demoralized officers facing long hours and their own economic problems. The police will even beat lawyers who enter police stations to defend their clients.

The government has stopped denying that torture exists and has taken some steps to address the problem. However, the Interior Ministry lacks the political will to take substantive action to change the culture of police brutality. Following alleged standing orders from the Interior Ministry between 2000 and 2006 for the police to shoot, beat and humiliate judges in order to undermine judicial independence, the GOE made a political decision in 2007 to allow the courts to sentence police officers to short prison terms. The 2007 Imad El-Kebir case as a turning point in influencing the government to permit the sentencing of police officers. A court sentenced two police officers to three years in prison in November 2007 for assaulting and sodomizing bus driver Imad El-Kebir. The case gained notoriety after a cell phone video recording of the torture was posted on YouTube.

In two news programs in 2007 on an Australian TV station, former CIA agency official Bob Baer made it clear that the U.S. Government knows of the widespread torture in Egypt and in fact considers that knowledge in decisions to send individuals to Egypt. When asked if there was any doubt someone would be tortured if he were to return to Egypt, Mr. Baer answered, ''Oh, absolutely no doubt at all. If you send them to Egypt, it might as well-it is tantamount to condemning them to death.'' In another part of the program, Mr. Baer stated, regarding sending people overseas, ''If you never want to hear from them again, send them to Egypt. That is pretty much the rule.'' When asked again when someone is rendered to Egypt, ''Is there any doubt that they are going be tortured?'' Mr. Baer said, ''Oh, absolutely, no doubt at all.''