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Federal Police of Argentina
Policía Federal Argentina

The Federal Police of Argentina (Policía Federal Argentina) has jurisdiction for maintaining law and order in the national capital and preventing and investigating federal crimes in the provinces. Other federal police authorities include the Airport Security Police (Policía de Seguridad Aeroportuaria), the National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional, responsible for border patrol), and the Coast Guard of Argentina (Prefectura Naval Argentina).

All federal security and police forces fall under the authority of the Ministerio de Seguridad (Ministry of Security). Additionally, each province and the City of Buenos Aires have their own police force under the control of the corresponding provincial security authority. The Federal Police is an armed civil force that carries out the functions of security and judicial police derived from the police power responsibilities assigned to the federal government.

The Ministry of Interior was the principal governmental body charged with the maintenance of domestic peace. In keeping with the Alfonsin government's concern regarding the abuses committed by the previous military government, the post of undersecretary for human rights was created within the ministry after the submission in 1984 of the CONADEP report and the dissolution of the commission that prepared it. The ministry was also charged with handling relations between the federal government and the provinces.

The principal law enforcement agency in Argentine was the Federal Police, which was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. Federal security forces have the authority to conduct internal investigations into alleged abuses and to fire individuals who have allegedly committed a human rights violation. The federal government can also file complaints with the federal courts, and provincial governments can do the same for provincial security forces. Members of security forces convicted of a crime were subject to stiff penalties. Generally authorities administratively suspended officers accused of wrongdoing until their investigations were completed. Authorities investigated and in some cases detained, prosecuted, and convicted the officers involved.

The federal Police of the 1960s was a highly professional police agency composed of experiened and dedicated officers and agents, whoare attempting to doa capable police job under extremely difficult conditions. The Federal Police had been forced to limit and curtail many basic police operations, due largely to serious shortages of manpower, facilities and modern police equipment. The tremendous growth of population in the Federal Capital, together with social, political and economic developments throughout the country, created a multitude of new problems for the Federal Police.

These problems are further intensified by increased threats to the country's internal security and a rapidly rising crime rate. Although police officials were generally aware of these problems and what needs to be done toward their solutions, they had not been provided with even the minimal facilities and equipment needed for their solution. In trying to keep up, the police had been forced to resort to partial and piecemeal solutions which have proven far from adequate. This failure on the part of the government to provide financial backing and supportfor police efforts resulted in a steady lessening of police effectiveness, which reached alarming proportions and could be a serious factor in the country's internal security situation. Mob violence and illegal strikes in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires area were an increasing problem in the 1960s which were of concern to police officials. Federal Police officials stated that rioters appear to be getting more aggressive and offered more resistance than in the past. This situation required effective application of force so as to prevent serious injuries to persons involvedd and prohibit the creation of martyrs for propaganda purposes.

It appeared that the Communists and Castroites had no great political strength at that time except insofar as they might be able to act in conjunction with Peronist elements. During 1964-1965, Peronist labor leaders sought to foment public repudiation of and discontent with the lllia administration through a concerted program of strikes and mass demonstrations. They hoped to make capital of their sponsorship of the working-class interests. The government, through a combination of conciliatory measures, maintenance of law and order and avoidance of violent repression was able to hold on. Non-Peronist labor elements declined to support the campaign and Peronist support weakened.

Sporadic incidents of political violence — including kidnappings and bombings—continued to occur under the Alfonsin presidency but in no manner came close to the levels reached during the previous decade. Almost all the incidents were believed to have been carried out by right-wing organizations. Because they were no longer supported by the government, the perpetrators of the paramilitary actions were described by Tróccoli as "idle hands." Their targets tended to be the same kinds of people — including students; politicians; and labor, church, and political activists — who were subjected to persecution during the previous military government. The individuals who prepared the CONADEP report were regularly subjected to death threats, and some of their homes were bombed. In early 1985 the ministry's undersecretary, Raül Galván, maintained that the actions, which attempted to establish a climate of "intimidation and fear," sought to "test the strength of democracy."

Due to the difficulties encountered in recruiting new police and civilial personnel, low salaries and other problems, there was a tendency in the 1960s to assign trained police officers and agents to various administrative and service activities at the expense of actual wlice operations like patrol and criminal investigation. The relatively low police salaries had also not been conducive to the recruitment of the best quality of personnel for the police service.

In 1985 no estimates were available on the size of the Federal Police force, which maintained its headquarters in Buenos Aires, but it was believed to have decreased somewhat from the 22,000 personnel it incorporated when Alfonsin took office. The Federal Police were responsible for law enforcement in the Federal District as well as for conducting investigations related to violations of federal laws in the provinces. In addition to the Federal Police, each province maintained its own police force. The largest of the provincial forces was that of Buenos Aires, which was estimated to have as many as 18,000 personnel in 1983. Argentine cities and municipalities also maintained their own smaller police forces for traffic control and investigations of minor crimes.

In accordance with plans formed shortly before Alfonsin's election, Minister Troccoli announced in mid-1985 that the government had organized and trained an elite antiterrorist police corps composed of elements of the Federal Police and of "important sectors of all the security forces." The force was believed to be prepared to respond to the presence of increasing right-wing terrorism and attempts to destabilize the civilian government. The broad-ranging mission assigned the new force was "the defense of the constitutional order."

Despite reorganization, a large percentage of Federal Police resources are devoted to public order, internal security, and administrative functions, leaving fewer resources to patrol the streets and fight crime. This is a result of both actual taskings (demonstration activity) and institutional attitudes. The redeployment of policemen away from banks and back to street corners is believed to have contributed to an increase in bank robberies (along with more cash in circulation) after 2005. Checkpoints are a favorite, but ineffective, crime fighting tactic. Follow-up investigations are limited due to lack of resources and an overwhelming number of complaints. Both Federal and Provincial Police are often unmotivated to pursue criminals due to a dysfunctional judicial system that operates in slow motion and sets many offenders free (including repeat offenders).

According to the National Law on Arms and Explosives and its regulatory Decree 395/1975, police forces are considered legitimate users of weapons classified as war weapons and ammunition not specifically listed as weapons for civil use. These weapons include nonportable arms; automatic portable arms; launching arms; semiautomatic arms fed with magazines, like rifles; and submachine guns derived from military weapons larger than .22 LR, with the exception of arms specifically determined by the Ministry of Defense. These weapons may be used only by members of the police force while carrying out their duties.

Weapons acquired for national and provincial police marked with a shield or numbering identifying the entity owning the weapon are considered war weapons for the exclusive use of police forces. The National Registry of Arms, an agency under the Ministry of Defense, is in charge of keeping records of purchases, transfers, and sales of war weapons. All war weapons must be identified, and the police force must report the inventory of such weapons and any changes thereof.

The authorization to carry war weapons is issued by the National Registry of Arms with prior approval of the head of the police force after considering the personal and professional background of the police officer. The authorization to carry equipment classified as a war weapon also allows its legitimate user to keep it under his or her control; use it for the specific purpose it was authorized for; transport it with the proper documentation; obtain training and practice in special authorized facilities; acquire and maintain its ammunition; and acquire spare parts for the repair and recharging of ammunition.



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