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Dirección General de Inteligencia del Ejército
Directorate General of Army Intelligence

Army Intelligence, including a G-2 within the Army General Staff and a Military Intelligence Collection Center (CRIM), with several small units all over the country and formerly known as Army Intelligence Battalion 601 (Batallón de Inteligencia 601). Jefatura II Inteligencia is to advise and assist the DEMG and higher commands in all aspects related to the field of intelligence, drive dependent items and exercise functional control over the remaining integral elements of Army Intelligence, under delegated authority, to meet the needs of different levels planning driving and facilitate driving Force.

Among the military intelligence agencies, the Army Intelligence Battalion 601 was a paradigm of the military involvement in domestic intelligence. This suffered a significant enhancement during the period of the fight against subversion, the so called "dirty war". The violation of human rigths during that period of military government (1976-1983) increased the fears of them. With Argentina's return to democracy in 1983 there was general consensus about the need to rethink the role of the armed forces.

In October 1975, and in accordance with the provisions of Directive No. 404/75 Commanding General Army, the Armed Forces took over so-called "anti-subversion" operations throughout the national territory, with the Army wielding the primary responsibility for this, counting For this purpose the support of the Navy and Air Force (responsible for the jurisdictions under their command) and the subordination of all federal security forces or provincial.

In this context, the country was divided into four operational zones (Zones 1, 2, 3 and 5, structured each on pre-existing jurisdictions of the respective Corps of the Army I, II, III and V). In this scheme (in which each zone was divided in turn into sub-areas, and these areas and sub-areas), each headquarters or command regional was "responsible" for the repressive action under its jurisdiction. The military zoning went into effect after the date stated, and so both the information on jurisdictions and controls is only valid from October 1975, this division is maintained as a general criterion of geographic organization of the list, also considering that those who had begun CCD operate above date They continued to function integrated into the new command structure.

Army Intelligence Battalion 601 played a key role in the systematic plan of physical elimination of people who opposed the last military dictatorship. The building of the former 601 Battalion of Army Intelligence is a beautiful French-style building located on the corner of Callao and Viamonte. This was the skull in which it worked the brain that intervened in the Condor Plan, planned extermination, organized the coup in mid-1980 in Bolivia that enthroned an ephemeral drug trafficker dictatorship and military intervention in Central America in an attempt to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, the Sandinista revolution emerged. Moreover, in the decade of the 1950s was hidden there embalmed body of Eva Peron, which was kidnapped at gunpoint in the building of the CGT.

César Milani was Head of Army Inteligence since 2007, leading the Directorate General of Army Intelligence. He was promoted in June 2012 to head the Army. Amid much controversy for his performance during the military dictatorship, the Senate approved his promotion to the rank of lieutenant general. The opposition and human rights organizations rejected his promotion.

The Directorate General of Army Intelligence included a situation room where espionage was made against opposition leaders and journalists. About 150 people, who carry out analysis on topics or certain geographical areas, although many agents moved according to the missions entrusted to it and did not have a permanent job in the work unit. The scenery of the so-called Situation Room consisted of desks, computers, phones and plasmas.

The experience of the Malvinas showed that military intelligence was not prepared to address tactical issues. In 2008 a process of transformation of the Military Intelligence of the Argentine army was initiated. This faced a deep conviction for cultural change involving a new archetype on their concept of employment and modernization in all its dimensions, to achieve an agile, efficient tool and useful to a Force in action according to the demands of the field Modern fighter, and a dual criteria in regard to support compatriots natural disasters.

The ultimate expression of combat intelligence area was the 601 Combat Intelligence Battalion, an organization that was consolidated in this period by completion of specialized staff in different skills and intelligence procedures and technology requiring their companies to implement operations in different support elements of different fitness for combat. To achieve the objective of implement the combat area, they developed the following capabilities:

• Human production: the organization, equipment and training intelligence patrols to operate in the depth of the battlefield without being detected, in conditions of isolation and technical means advanced to enable it to your country mobility, obtain information transmitted to the element of intelligence in support of the Commander.
• Electronic production: the organization, equipment and training of electronic collection groups on the battlefield, with the ability to detect, interpret and transmit the presence of radio emissions by communication receivers of the latest generation fit to detect, interpret and provide early warning of of troop movements in the battlefield, using advanced electronic sensors and radar technology and digital technology.
• Air production: by organization, equipment and training groups obtained retaining equipped with drone platforms, developing intelligence.
• Geospatial production: organizing groups obtaining the ability technique to collect data, to work with sensors providing the geographical and meteorological information essential to operational Commanders.

Information Management requires turning the information produced by these different capacities to deploy in the field for fighters. This should be received by an organization comprising that would be enabled, through multimedia platforms, to present the Commander in concrete form and the degree of abstraction necessary for driving military operations. In that sense do, they organized, equipped and instructed integration centers intelligence with skills required to provide the necessary and sustained support to Commander's operations.