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Comintern Apparatus (COMRAP)

The FBI had virtually ceased investigations of subversive and “Communist” activity after 1924. Although J. Edgar Hoover never wavered in his distrust of American Communists or their Soviet comrades, he was aware that he had no political backing or support for launching a sustained campaign of investigation and scrutiny of the CPUSA or foreign communists and subversives in the United States.

This changed with the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. With the international scene degrading, Roosevelt had become concerned with the threat of domestic subversion and fifth columnists in the United States Roosevelt made his first request for assistance on domestic subversion toHoover in 1933. In 1936 the White House instructed the FBI to provide systematic intelligence about subversive activities in the United States, particularly Nazism and Communism.

That request from Roosevelt to Hoover on August 25, 1936 was the basis for more than 40 years of investigative and proactive actions against the CPUSA and their Soviet allies. Hoover created in the mid-1930s a division for overseeing domestic intelligence that overshadowed any other peacetime effort in American history.

The United States now had a permanent, civilian investigative authority with responsibility for looking into treasonable actions by American citizens. This is significant, because prior to this a violation of law was necessary to trigger an FBI investigation. Now, under the new operating procedures, American citizens who had not violated any law could be subject to wiretapping, mail cover, and other investigative techniques by the FBI.

During the war years of 1941–45, the enemies were clearly Germany, Japan, and Italy. The focus of the FBI’s domestic security program naturally was on the activities of those nations. The American Communist Party followed obediently its directions from Moscow and were kept in line by the Comintern representative in the United States Gerhart Eisler, former husband of Soviet spy Hede Massing.

After the invasion of the USSR by Germany in June 1941, the Soviets urged the CPUSA to agitate for US intervention in the war to save the USSR. This was a reversal of position for the American Communists, who had opposed any potential intervention after the 1939 Hitler-Stalin pact.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December greeted with joy by the CPUSA, which foresaw salvation for the USSR, by the US declaration of war against Germany and Japan. From this point on, the American Communist Party engaged in what was known as the “united front” effort. This meant, at least publicly, dropping anti-American rhetoric and actions. Strikes in defense-related sectors were discouraged. However, Soviet espionage and the CPUSA’s role in supporting those activities never was suspended.

With the advent of World War II and the FBI’s attention primarily on the Axis targets in the United States and Latin America, the focus of counterintelligence shifted away from the CPUSA. However, even during the war, the FBI maintained a watch on the party and Soviet espionage.

By 1943 the FBI was beginning to sense the outlines of the Soviet espionage effort. Surveillance of Communist functionary Steve Nelson revealed the infiltration of the Manhattan project and alerted the FBI to the role that Soviet diplomats played in gathering intelligence information.

On August 7, 1943, FBI Headquarters received an anonymous typewritten letter in Russian that accused more than ten Soviet diplomats in the US of being spies. With this letter, the FBI had a predicate to take a closer look at Soviet espionage. The FBI subsequently launched a major investigation to discover the potential interrelationships of Soviet diplomats, the Communist Party of the United States, and the Communist International party, also called the "Comintern." Through the case — called COMRAP, for "Comintern Apparatus" — the FBI learned that the extent of Soviet spying was significant.

The writer accused more than ten Soviet diplomats in the U.S. of being spies, including the Soviet Vice-Consuls in San Francisco and New York and the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington — Vasilli Zubilin. The FBI passed what it had learned about Zubilin's spying to the War Department, which had primary investigative jurisdiction on the project. After the war ended, the FBI would investigate other, more serious attempts to steal U.S. A-bomb secrets.