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Anti-Globalization Movement of Russia (AGMR)

On 23 June 2023 the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers recently indicted by the Department of Justice who played a significant role in the Kremlin’s attempts to conduct global malign influence operations, including efforts to influence a local election in the United States. “The Kremlin continues to target a key pillar of democracy around the world — free and fair elections,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States will not tolerate threats to our democracy, and today’s action builds on the whole of government approach to protect our system of representative government, including our democratic institutions and elections processes.”

The Kremlin seeks to expand Russia’s influence by creating and exploiting societal divisions in the United States and among allies and partners; reducing confidence in democratic processes; weakening U.S. diplomatic ties; and encouraging anti-U.S. and anti-democratic political views. As part of its efforts, the Kremlin often uses social media as a tool for disseminating disinformation to confuse and mislead citizens globally and to co-opt witting U.S. persons to advance Russia’s operational and geopolitical goals.

In support of its influence operations, Russia has recruited and forged ties with people and groups around the world who are positioned to amplify and reinforce Russia’s disinformation efforts to further its goals of destabilizing democratic societies. These efforts have included using front organizations to promote connections between the Kremlin and its compatriots living abroad, to propagate disinformation, and to surreptitiously seek access to foreign officials, businesspeople, and other figures, in the United States and elsewhere, to advance Putin’s interests. Russia’s intelligence services, including the FSB, support Kremlin-directed influence operations against the United States and its allies and partners, and often recruit individuals — known as “co-optees” — leveraging these individuals to sow discord within their own and other countries.

The individuals designated are FSB officers assigned to the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight Against Terrorism (the “FSB 2nd Service”), which has worked to undermine democratic processes in the United States and other countries through a network of co-optees. These FSB officers include Ionov’s and Burlinova’s main handler and his unit chief.

Yegor Sergeyevich Popov (Popov) is an FSB 2nd Service officer who served as Ionov’s primary handler. Popov frequently communicated with Ionov to gather information related to Ionov’s foreign malign influence activities in the United States and elsewhere. Popov also often communicated with Burlinova to relay information in intelligence reports regarding her activities.

Ionov directed more than six U.S. co-conspirators, including two individuals who ran as candidates in local U.S. elections, to provide detailed information regarding the activities of several political groups, which Ionov subsequently compiled into reports for Popov and other FSB 2nd Service officers. In the Summer and Fall of 2019, Ionov and Popov communicated about a local U.S. election and Ionov’s support of a candidate, who won in the primary contest.

From as early as 2015 through at least 2022, Popov worked with Burlinova and oversaw her activities on behalf of the FSB. In 2015, Popov assisted and provided guidance to Burlinova in her travels to the United States. Popov provided Burlinova a list of U.S. citizens and proposed possible approaches to interact with them. Burlinova provided Popov evaluations of how U.S. citizens responded to presentations, and who had had positive attitudes towards Russia and were prepared to continue to collaborate with her. In 2018, Burlinova informed Popov that two individuals she identified, who resided in Europe, were running for public office, and Burlinova boasted that these were the fruits of her labor and described the developments as soft power.

Popov reported to his FSB 2nd Service unit chief Aleksei Borisovich Sukhodolov (Sukhodolov). Sukhodolov also worked with Ionov to conduct foreign malign influence operations around the world, including in the United States, Ukraine, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. Ionov directed reporting to Sukhodolov and other FSB officials of detailed information regarding the activities of several U.S. political groups. Ionov also reported on his malign influence activities to Sukhodolov, including his consulting role in a U.S. local election.

In late 2021, Sukhodolov worked with other FSB officers and a Russia-based institution to draft and submit grant applications on behalf of several FSB co-optees and their organizations and enterprises, which included Ionov and Burlinova. OFAC designated Popov and Sukhodolov pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation. On April 18, 2023, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida indicted Popov and Sukhodolov for working on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation.

A federal grand jury in Tampa, Florida, on April 18, 2023 returned a superseding indictment charging four U.S. citizens and three Russian nationals with working on behalf of the Russian government and in conjunction with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to conduct a multi-year foreign malign influence campaign in the United States. Among other conduct, the superseding indictment alleges that the Russian defendants recruited, funded and directed U.S. political groups to act as unregistered illegal agents of the Russian government and sow discord and spread pro-Russian propaganda; the indicted intelligence officers, in particular, participated in covertly funding and directing candidates for local office within the United States.

According to the superseding indictment returned in the Middle District of Florida, Aleksandr Viktorovich Ionov, a resident of Moscow, was the founder and president of the Anti-Globalization Movement of Russia (AGMR), an organization headquartered in Moscow, Russia, and funded by the Russian government. Ionov allegedly utilized AGMR to carry out Russia’s malign influence campaign. Ionov’s influence efforts were allegedly directed and supervised by Moscow-based FSB officers, including indicted defendants Aleksey Borisovich Sukhodolov and Yegor Sergeyevich Popov.

“The prosecution of this criminal conduct is essential to protecting the American public when foreign governments seek to inject themselves into the American political process,” said U.S. Attorney Roger B. Handberg for the Middle District of Florida. “We thank our partners at the FBI for their tireless investigation of these events and their commitment to ensure justice is done.”

Among other illegal activities, the superseding indictment alleges that Ionov, Sukhodolov and Popov conspired to directly and substantially influence democratic elections in the United States by clandestinely funding and directing the political campaign of a particular candidate for local office in St. Petersburg, Florida, in 2019. For instance, the superseding indictment alleges that Popov expressly referred to this effort on behalf of the FSB as “our election campaign,” and Ionov referring to the candidate as the “candidate whom we supervise.” Ionov and Popov allegedly intended that this election interference plot would extend beyond the 2019 local election cycle in St. Petersburg, and subsequently discussed that the “USA Presidential election” was the FSB’s “main topic of the year.”

Moreover, from at least November 2014 until July 2022, Ionov allegedly engaged in a years-long foreign malign influence campaign targeting the United States. As a part of the campaign, Ionov allegedly recruited members of political groups within the United States, including the African People’s Socialist Party and the Uhuru Movement (collectively, the APSP) in Florida, Black Hammer in Georgia and a political group in California (referred to in the superseding indictment as U.S. Political Group 3), to participate in the influence campaign and act as agents of Russia in the United States.

One focus of Ionov’s alleged influence operation was to create the appearance of American popular support for Russia’s annexation of territories in Ukraine. For example, in May 2020, Ionov allegedly sent a request he stated was from “Russia, the Donetsk People’s Republic” – an apparent reference to a Russian-occupied region in eastern Ukraine – to Yeshitela and members of other U.S. political groups to make statements in support of the independence of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, a Russian-backed breakaway state in eastern Ukraine. Ionov later allegedly touted to the FSB that Yeshitela’s video-recorded statement of support was the first time that “American nonprofit organizations congratulated citizens” of the occupied region.

Ionov’s use of the APSP to promote Russian propaganda relating to Ukraine allegedly continued after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On the day Russia invaded Ukraine, Feb. 24, 2022, Ionov allegedly emailed Nevel an “URGENT MESSAGE” which contained pro-Russian talking points in support of the invasion. Thereafter, throughout March 2022, the APSP repeatedly hosted Ionov via video conference to discuss the war, during which Ionov falsely stated that anyone who supported Ukraine also supported Naziism and white supremacy, and Yeshitela and another APSP member allegedly made statements of solidarity with the Russian government.

Ionov, Sukhodolov, Popov, Yeshitela, Hess, Nevel and Romain are charged with conspiring to have U.S. citizens act as illegal agents of the Russian government within the United States without providing prior notification to the Attorney General, as required by law. If convicted, they each face a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Yeshitela, Hess and Nevel are also charged with acting as agents of Russia within the United States without such prior notification. If convicted, they each face a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. If convicted, a federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.