Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access to
Information on CIA Programs and Activities (18-JUL-01,
GAO-01-975T).
Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally
comes from two select committees of Congress and the CIA's
Inspector General. GAO has broad authority to evaluate CIA
programs. In reality, however, GAO faces both legal and practical
limitations on its ability to review these programs. For example,
it has no access to certain CIA ''unvouchered'' accounts and
cannot compel its access to foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information. In addition, as a practical
matter, GAO is limited by the CIA's level of cooperation, which
has varied through the years. GAO has not actively audited the
CIA since the early 1960s, when it discontinued such work because
CIA was not providing it with sufficient access to information to
perform its mission. The issue has arisen since then from time to
time as GAO's work has required some level of access to CIA
programs and information. However, given a lack of requests from
Congress for GAO to do specific work at the CIA and its limited
resources, GAO has made a conscious decision not to further
pursue the issue. Today, GAO's dealings with the CIA are mostly
limited to requesting information that relates either to
governmentwide reviews of analyses of threats to U.S. national
security on which the CIA might have some information. The CIA
either provides GAO with the requested information, provides the
information with some restrictions, or does not provide the
information at all. In general, GAO is most successful at getting
access to CIA information when it requests threat assignments and
the CIA does not perceive GAO's audits as oversight of its
activities.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-975T
ACCNO: A01411
TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access
to Information on CIA Programs and Activities
DATE: 07/18/2001
SUBJECT: Audits
Interagency relations
Classified information
Federal intelligence agencies
******************************************************************
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GAO-01-975T
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations, and the Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on
Governmental Reform, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. Wednesday, July 18,
2001 CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Observations on GAO Access to Information on CIA
Programs and Activities
Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director Defense Capabilities
and Management
GAO- 01- 975T
Page 1 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees: We are pleased to be here
to discuss the subject of access by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
information from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Specifically, our
statement will provide some background on CIA and its oversight mechanisms,
our authority to review CIA programs, and the history and status of GAO
access to CIA information. As requested, our remarks will focus on our
relationship with the CIA and not with other intelligence agencies. Our
comments are based upon our review of historic files, our legal analysis,
and our experiences dealing with the CIA over the years.
Oversight of the CIA generally comes from two select committees of Congress
and the CIA?s Inspector General. We have broad authority to evaluate CIA
programs. In reality, however, we face both legal and practical limitations
on our ability to review these programs. For example, we have no access to
certain CIA ?unvouchered? accounts and cannot compel our access to foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information. In addition, as a
practical matter, we are limited by the CIA?s level of cooperation, which
has varied through the years. We have not actively audited the CIA since the
early 1960s, when we discontinued such work because the CIA was not
providing us with sufficient access to information to perform our mission.
The issue has arisen since then from time to time as our work has required
some level of access to CIA programs and information. However, given a lack
of requests from the Congress for us to do specific work at the CIA and our
limited resources, we have made a conscious decision not to further pursue
the issue.
Today, our dealings with the CIA are mostly limited to requesting
information that relates either to governmentwide reviews or analyses of
threats to U. S. national security on which the CIA might have some
information. The CIA either provides us with the requested information,
provides the information with some restrictions, or does not provide the
information at all. In general, we are most successful at getting access to
CIA information when we request threat assessments and the CIA does not
perceive our audits as oversight of its activities.
As you know, the General Accounting Office is the investigative arm of the
Congress and is headed by the Comptroller General of the United States-
currently David M. Walker. We support the Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and help improve the performance and Summary
Background
Page 2 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
accountability of the federal government for the American people. We examine
the use of public funds, evaluate federal programs and activities, and
provide analyses, options, recommendations, and other assistance to help the
Congress make effective oversight, policy, and funding decisions. Almost 90
percent of our staff days are in direct support of Congressional requestors,
generally on the behalf of committee chairmen or ranking members.
The U. S. Intelligence Community consists of those Executive Branch agencies
and organizations that work in concert to carry out our nation?s
intelligence activities. 1 The CIA is an Intelligence Community agency
established under the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate the
intelligence activities of several U. S. departments and agencies in the
interest of national security. Among other functions, the CIA collects,
produces, and disseminates foreign intelligence and counterintelligence;
conducts counterintelligence activities abroad; collects, produces, and
disseminates intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and
trafficking; conducts special activities approved by the President; and
conducts research, development, and procurement of technical systems and
devices.
Currently, two congressional select committees and the CIA?s Inspector
General oversee the CIA?s activities. The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence was established on May 19, 1976, to oversee the activities of
the Intelligence Community. Its counterpart in the House of Representatives
is the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, established on July
14, 1977. The CIA?s Inspector General is nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. The Office of the Inspector General was established
by statute in 1989 and conducts inspections, investigations, and audits at
headquarters and in the field. The Inspector General reports directly to the
CIA Director. In addition, the President?s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board assesses the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence
activities. Within the Board, there is an intelligence oversight committee
that prepares reports on intelligence activities that may be unlawful or
otherwise inappropriate. Finally, the Congress can charter commissions to
evaluate intelligence agencies such
1 The Intelligence Community includes the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and other offices and services within the Departments
of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, and Energy. Oversight of CIA
Activities
Page 3 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
as CIA. One such commission was the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities
of the United States Intelligence Community, which issued a report in 1996.
Generally, we have broad authority to evaluate agency programs and
investigate matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public
money. To carry out our audit responsibilities, we have a statutory right of
access to agency records. Federal agencies are required to provide us
information about their duties, powers, activities, organization, and
financial transactions. This requirement applies to all federal agencies,
including the CIA. Our access rights include the authority to file a civil
action to compel production of records, unless (a) the records relate to
activities the President has designated as foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities, (b) the records are specifically exempt from
disclosure by statute, or (c) the records would be exempt from release under
the Freedom of Information Act because they are predecisional memoranda or
law enforcement records and the President or Director of the Office of
Management and Budget certifies that disclosure of the record could be
expected to impair substantially the operations of the government.
The National Security Act of 1947 charges the CIA Director with protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In terms of
our statutory access authority, however, the law creates only one specific
exemption: the so- called ?unvouchered? accounts. The exemption pertains to
expenditures of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature that are
accounted for solely on the certification of the Director. These
transactions are subject to review by the intelligence committees.
Amendments to the law require the President to keep the intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of
the United States. The CIA has maintained that the Congress intended the
intelligence committees to be the exclusive means of oversight of the CIA,
effectively precluding oversight by us.
While we understand the role of the intelligence committees and the need to
protect intelligence sources and methods, we also believe that our
authorities are broad enough to cover the management and administrative
functions that the CIA shares with all federal agencies.
We have summarized the statutes relevant to our relationship with the CIA in
an appendix attached to this testimony. GAO?s Authority to
Review CIA Programs
Page 4 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
We have not done audit work at the CIA for almost 40 years. Currently, our
access to the CIA is limited to requests for information that relates either
to governmentwide reviews or programs for which the CIA might have relevant
information. In general, we have the most success obtaining access to CIA
information when we request threat assessments, and the CIA does not
perceive our audits as oversight of its activities.
After the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, we began
conducting financial transaction audits of vouchered expenditures of the
CIA. This effort continued into the early 1960s. In the late 1950s, we
proposed to broaden its work at the CIA to include an examination of the
efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of CIA programs. Although the CIA
Director agreed to our proposal to expand the scope of our work, he placed a
number of conditions on our access to information. Nonetheless, in October
1959, we agreed to conduct program review work with CIAimposed restrictions
on access.
Our attempt to conduct comprehensive program review work continued until May
1961, when the Comptroller General concluded that the CIA was not providing
us with sufficient access to the information necessary to conduct
comprehensive reviews of the CIA?s programs and announced plans to
discontinue audit work there. After much discussion and several exchanges of
correspondence between GAO, the CIA, and the cognizant congressional
committees, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee wrote to the
Comptroller General in July 1962 agreeing that, absent sufficient GAO access
to CIA information, GAO should withdraw from further audit activities at the
CIA. 2 Thus, in 1962, we withdrew from all audits of CIA activities.
The issue of our access has arisen periodically in the intervening years as
our work has required some level of access to CIA programs and activities.
In July 1975, Comptroller General Elmer Staats testified on our relationship
with the intelligence community and cited several cases where CIA had not
provided us with the requested information. In July 1987, Senator John Glenn
introduced a bill (S. 1458) in the 100th Congress to clarify our audit
authority to audit CIA programs and activities. In 1994, the CIA Director
sought to further limit our audit work of intelligence
2 Separate Congressional committees on intelligence were not formally
established in the Senate until 1976 and in the House until 1977. GAO?s
Access to the
CIA Has Been Limited GAO Access to CIA Has Varied Through the Years
Page 5 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
programs, including those at the Department of Defense. We responded by
writing to several key members of the Congress, citing our concerns and
seeking assistance. As a result, we and the CIA began negotiations on a
written agreement to clarify our access and relationship. Unfortunately, we
were unable to reach any agreement with CIA on this matter. Since then, GAO
has limited its pursuit of greater access because of limited demand for this
work from Congress, particularly from the intelligence committees. Given a
lack of Congressional requests and our limited resources, we have made a
conscious decision to deal with the CIA on a case- by- case basis.
Currently, the CIA responds to our requests for information in three ways:
it provides the information, it provides the information or a part of it
with some restriction, or it does not provide the information at all.
Examples of each of these three situations, based on the experiences of our
audit staff in selected reviews in recent years, are listed below.
Sometimes the CIA straightforwardly fulfills our requests for briefings or
reports related to threat assessments. This is especially true when we ask
for threat briefings or the CIA?s assessments or opinions on an issue not
involving CIA operations.
For our review of the State Department?s Anthrax Vaccination Program for
the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees,
we requested a meeting to discuss the CIA?s perspective on a recent threat
assessment of chemical and biological threats to U. S. interests overseas.
The CIA agreed with our request, provided a meeting within 2 weeks, and
followed up with a written statement.
While we were reviewing U. S. assistance to the Haitian justice system and
national police on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations and House
International Relations Committees, we requested a meeting to discuss the
Haitian justice system. The CIA agreed with our request and met with our
audit team within 3 weeks of our request.
For our review of chemical and biological terrorist threats for the House
Armed Services Committee, and subcommittees of the House Government Reform
Committee and the House Veterans Affairs Committee, we requested meetings
with CIA analysts on their threat assessments on chemical and biological
weapons. The CIA cooperated and gave us access to documents and analysts.
Current Access Falls Into
Three Categories
Page 6 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
On several of our reviews of counterdrug programs for the House Government
Reform Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee we requested CIA
assessments on the drug threat and international activities. The CIA has
provided us with detailed briefings on drug cultivation, production, and
trafficking activities in advance of our field work overseas.
During our reviews of Balkan security issues and the Dayton Peace Accords
for the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, we asked the CIA for threat assessments relevant to our review
objectives. The CIA provided us with appropriate briefings and agreed to
provide one of our staff members with access to regular intelligence
reports.
In some instances, the CIA provides information with certain access
restrictions or discusses an issue with us without providing detailed data
or documentation.
During our evaluation of equal employment opportunity and disciplinary
actions for a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Post Office and
Civil Service, the CIA provided us with limited access to information. CIA
officials allowed us to review their personnel regulations and take notes,
but they did not allow us to review personnel folders on individual
disciplinary actions. This was in contrast to the National Security Agency
and Defense Intelligence Agency, which gave us full access to personnel
folders on individual terminations and disciplinary actions.
For our review of the Department of Defense?s efforts to address the
growing risk to U. S. electronic systems from high- powered radio frequency
weapons for the Joint Economic Committee, the CIA limited our access to one
meeting. Although the technology associated with such systems was discussed
at the meeting, the CIA did not provide any documentation on research being
conducted by foreign nations.
On some of our audits related to national security issues, the CIA
provides us with limited access to its written threat assessments and
analyses, such as National Intelligence Estimates. However, the CIA
restricts our access to reading the documents and taking notes at the CIA or
other locations. Examples include our readings of National Intelligence
Estimates related to our ongoing work evaluating federal programs to combat
terrorism.
In other cases, the CIA simply denies us access to the information we
requested. The CIA?s refusals are not related to the classification level of
Page 7 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
the material. Many of our staff have the high- level security clearances and
accesses needed to review intelligence information. But the CIA considers
our requests as having some implication of oversight and denies us access.
For our evaluation of national intelligence estimates regarding missile
threats for the House National Security Committee, the CIA refused to meet
with us to discuss the general process and criteria for producing such
estimates or the specific estimates we were reviewing. In addition,
officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy told us that
CIA had asked them not to cooperate with us.
During our examination of overseas arrests of terrorists for the House
Armed Services Committee and a subcommittee of the House Government Reform
Committee, the CIA refused to meet with us to discuss intelligence issues
related to such arrests. The CIA?s actions were in contrast to those of two
other departments that provided us full access to their staff and files.
On our review of classified computer systems in the federal government for
a subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee, we requested basic
information on the number and nature of such systems. The CIA did not
provide us with the information, claiming that they would not be able to
participate in the review because the type of information is under the
purview of congressional entities charged with overseeing the Intelligence
Community.
For our review of the policies and procedures used by the Executive Office
of the President to acquire and safeguard classified intelligence
information, done for the House Rules Committee, we asked to review CIA
forms documenting that personnel had been granted appropriate clearances.
The CIA declined our request, advising us that type of information we were
seeking came under the purview of congressional entities charged with
overseeing the intelligence community.
Our access to CIA information and programs has been limited by both legal
and practical factors. Through the years our access has varied and we have
not done detailed audit work at CIA since the early 1960s. Today, our access
is generally limited to obtaining information on threat assessments when the
CIA does not perceives our audits as oversight of its activities. We foresee
no major change in our current access without substantial support from
Congress- the requestor of the vast majority of our work. Congressional
impetus for change would have to include the Conclusion
Page 8 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
support of the intelligence committees, who have generally not requested GAO
reviews or evaluations of CIA activities. With such support, we could
evaluate some of the basic management functions at CIA that we now evaluate
throughout the federal government.
This concludes our testimony. We would be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment
For future questions about this testimony, please contact Henry L. Hinton,
Jr., Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-
4300. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Stephen
L. Caldwell, James Reid, and David Hancock.
Page 9 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
The following statutory provisions give GAO broad authority to review agency
programs and activities:
31 U. S. C. 712: GAO has the responsibility and authority for
investigating matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and use of
public money, and for investigating and reporting to either House of
Congress or appropriate congressional committees.
31 U. S. C. 717: GAO is authorized to evaluate the results of programs and
activities of federal agencies. Reviews are based upon the initiative of the
Comptroller General, an order from either House of Congress, or a request
from a committee with jurisdiction.
31 U. S. C. 3523: This provision authorizes GAO to audit financial
transactions of each agency, except as specifically provided by law.
31 U. S. C. 3524: This section authorizes GAO to audit unvouchered
accounts (i. e., those accounted for solely on the certificate of an
executive branch official). The President may exempt sensitive foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence transactions. CIA expenditures on
objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature under 50 U. S.
C. 403j( b) are also exempt. Transactions in these categories may be
reviewed by the intelligence committees.
31 U. S. C. 716: GAO has a broad right of access to agency records.
Subsection 716( a) requires agencies to give GAO information it requires
about the ?duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial
transactions of the agency.? This provision gives GAO a generally
unrestricted right of access to agency records. GAO in turn is required to
maintain the same level of confidentiality for the information as is
required of the head of the agency from which it is obtained.
Section 716 also gives GAO the authority to enforce its requests for
records by filing a civil action in federal district court. Under the
enforcement provisions in 31 U. S. C. 716( d)( 1), GAO is precluded from
bringing a civil action to compel the production of a record if:
1. the record relates to activities the President designates as foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence (see Executive Order No. 12333, defining
these terms); Appendix I: Legal Framework for GAO and
CIA GAO?s Audit Authority
GAO?s Access- toRecords Authority
Page 10 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
2. the record is specifically exempted from disclosure to GAO by statute; or
3. the President or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
certifies to the Comptroller General and Congress that a record could be
withheld under the Freedom of Information Act exemptions in 5 U. S. C. 552(
b)( 5) or (7) (relating to deliberative process and law enforcement
information, respectively), and that disclosure of the information
reasonably could be expected to impair substantially the operations of the
government.
Although these exceptions do not restrict GAO?s basic rights of access
under 31 U. S. C. 716( a), they do limit GAO?s ability to compel the
production of particular records through a court action.
The CIA has broad authority to protect intelligence- related information but
must keep the intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the
intelligence activities of the United States.
50 U. S. C. 403- 3( c)( 6) and 403g: Section 403- 3 requires the Director
of the CIA to protect ?intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure?.? Section 403g exempts the CIA from laws ?which require the
publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official
titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. With the
exception of unvouchered expenditures, CIA?s disclosure of information to
GAO would be an authorized and proper disclosure under 31 U. S. C. 716( a).
50 U. S. C. 403j: The CIA has broad discretion to use appropriated funds
for various purposes (e. g., personal services, transportation, printing and
binding, and purchases of firearms) without regard to laws and regulations
relating to the expenditure of government funds. The statute also authorizes
the Director to establish an unvouchered account for objects of a
confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature. We recognize that the
CIA?s unvouchered account authority constitutes an exception to GAO?s audit
and access authority, but this account deals with only a portion of CIA?s
funding activities.
50 U. S. C. 413: This section provides a method for maintaining
congressional oversight over intelligence activities within the executive
branch. The statute requires the President to ensure that the intelligence
committees (the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
Relevant CIA
Legislation
Page 11 GAO- 01- 975T GAO Access to CIA
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) are kept fully and currently
informed of U. S. intelligence activities.
(350098)
*** End of document. ***
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