CRS Report for Congress
Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1999
Updated August 9, 1999
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
ABSTRACT
| This CRS report analyzes developments' in Middle Eastern terrorism in 1998 and the first half of 1999. It discusses Middle Eastern groups attempting to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process, those fighting to overthrow moderate, those fighting to overthrow moderate, pro-U.S. governments, and those attempting to cause the United States to withdraw its troops from Middle Eastern countries. It contains an extensive section on Saudi exile terrorist financier Usama bin Ladin and his organization. The report also analyzes the terrorist support activities of the five Middle Eastern countries on the U.S. terrorism list - Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Sudan. The report concludes with a discussion of U.S. counterterrorism policy. This report is updated annually. See also: CRS Issue Brief IB95112. Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Updated regularly, by Raphael Perl. |
Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1999
Summary
During the 1980s and the early 1990s, Iran and terrorist groups it sponsors have been responsible for the most politically significant acts of Middle Eastern terrorism. In late 1997, signs began to appear that major factions within Iran want to change Iran's image from a backer of terrorism to a constructive force in the region. Pressured by international sanctions and isolation, Sudan and Libya appear to be increasingly willing to end their support for international terrorism.The major state sponsors are, to some extent, becoming eclipsed by the radical Islamic terrorist network of exiled Saudi dissident Usama bin Ladin. The goals of bin Ladin and his cohorts are to oust pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East and gain removal of U.S. troops from the region. Bin Ladin, who is independently-financed, receives safehaven in Afghanistan and remains outspoken in support of attacks on U.S. troops and civilians worldwide. The Administration contends it has convincing evidence that bin Ladin's network was involved in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, prompting August 20 military action against his bases in Afghanistan and his indictment on November 4, 1998. The Taliban leadership of Afghanistan has constrained bin Ladin's access to outside media, but there are no firm indications that Taliban is willing to extradite or expel him.
The Arab-Israeli peace process is a longstanding major U.S. foreign policy initiative, and the Administration and Congress pay particularly close attention to terrorist groups and state sponsors that oppose the process. Islamist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have largely displaced secular, nationalist groups as the most active anti-peace process organizations. Hamas was buoyed by the release of its founder from Israeli prison in October 1997, but acts of terrorism by Hamas and its allies have declined since mid-1997, possibly because of greater anti-terrorism vigilance by the Palestinian Authority. There are no attacks against Israelis by Islamic or other groups in the run-up to Israel's May 1999 prime ministerial and parliamentary elections.
U.S. counterterrorism policy has generally been directed against state sponsors, which are readily identifiable targets. A problem for U.S. policy has been how to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism policies with those of U.S. allies. Most allied governments believe that engaging these countries diplomatically might sometimes be more effective than trying to isolate or punish them. The Administration and Congress have tended to rely more on economic and political pressure against state sponsors in an effort to make them more cautious. In 1998 and 1999, the Administration has, to some degree, attempted to reward genstures by state sponsors to distance themselves from international terrorism.
In recent years, the Administration and Congress have stepped up efforts
to directly pressure terrorists and terrorist groups. The August 20, 1998
military strikes on bin Ladin's network suggests that military action is
still considered a viable component of U.S. efforts to combat individual
terrorist groups.
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Contents
- Hizballah (Party of God)
- Hizballah's Regional Connections
- Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT's)
- Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
- U.S. Connections
- SDT's
- The Islamic Group and Jihad
- External Linkages
- SDT's
- Al-Qaida (Usama bin Ladin Network)
- World Trade Center Bombing Connections
- Kenya/Tanzania Bombings
- SDT's/August 20, 1998 Executive Order
- Blocked Assets
- The Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
- Islamic Movements in Yemen
- Radical Jewish Groups
- Kach and Kahane Chai
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
- Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine - General Command (PFLPGC)
- SDT's
- Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (PFLP)
- SDT's
- Democratic Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (DFLP)
- SDT's
- Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
- SDT's
- Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
- SDT's
- Kurdistan Workers'Party (PKK)
- The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)
- Iran
- Syria
- Libya
- Sudan
- Iraq
- Military Force
- Unilateral Economic Sanctions
- Multilateral Approaches
- Bilateral Approaches
- Selective Engagement
- The Domestic FrontUnilateral
Leftwing
and Nationalist Groups
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Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1999
Introduction
Middle Eastern terrorist groups and their state sponsors have been the focus of U.S. counter-terrorism policies for several decades. Since the 1970s, many of the major acts of terrorism against Americans and U.S. targets have been conducted by Middle Eastern groups or states. According to the State Department's report on international terrorism for 1998 (subsequently referred to as "Patterns 1998"), the August 7, 1998 simultaneous bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, believed to be the work of Usama bin Latin's network, were the most lethal terrorist attacks of the year. They killed 301 persons, including 12 Americans. Out of the 741 persons killed and 5,952 wounded in terrorist attacks worldwide during 1998 (the highest figures on record), about 40% were killed and 85% were wounded in the Kenya/Tanzania bombings. On the other hand, major anti-peace process bombings in Israel have continued to decline, and there were no bombings in Israel during the campaign period for the May 17, 1999 parliamentary and prime ministerial elections. Five out of the seven states currently on the U.S. terrorism list are Middle Eastern - Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. (The other two are Cuba and North Korea, which will not be covered in this report).
The first major section of this paper discusses individual Middle Eastern terrorist groups, which often differ in their motivations, objectives, ideologies, and levels of activity. The radical Islamic groups appear to be the most active, stating as their main objectives the overthrow of secular, pro-Western Middle Eastern governments, the derailment of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and/or the ouster of U.S. forces from the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Some groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fight for much different causes, such as the formation of separate ethnically based states or the overthrow of incumbent regimes. The table below shows the 16 Middle Eastern groups currently designated by the State Department as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO's)," pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). 2 With the exception of al-Qaida (the bin Ladin network), the listed groups were designated as FTO's on October 8, 1997. President Clinton added the bin Ladin network on August 21, 1998. (The first twelve of the groups listed were also named in President Clinton's January 23, 1995 Executive order (12947) as anti-peace process terrorist groups.)
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the designation of a group as an FTO blocks its assets in the United States and makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons to provide material support or resources to it. Executive order 12947 (see above) also bars U.S. dealings with any terrorist group members as "Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT's).
One group not designated as an FTO is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO is discussed briefly in this report because of the debate over whether or not the Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by PLO leader Yasir Arafat, is taking sufficient steps to prevent terrorism by other groups in areas under its nominal control.
Following the analysis of individual terrorist groups, Middle Eastern state sponsors are analyzed. The last section discusses major recent themes in U.S. anti-terrorism strategy.
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October 8, 1997 FTO Designation |
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| Hizballah (Party of God) | Lebanon, Shiite. Islamist. Active |
| Hamas | Palestinian Islamist. Active |
| Palestinian Islamic Jihad | Palestinian Islamist. Active |
| Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (PFLP-GC) | Nationalist Palestinian. Moderately Active |
| Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) | Marxist Palestinian. Sporadically Active |
| Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) | Marxist Palestinian. Sporadically Active |
| Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) | Nationalist Palestinian. Inactive |
| Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) | Nationalist Palestinian. Generally Inactive |
| Kach | Jewish Extremist. Sporadically active |
| Kahane Chai | Jewish Extremist. Sporadically active |
| Islamic Group | Egyptian Islamic Opposition. Active |
| Al-Jihad (Islamic Holy War) | Egyptian Islamic Opposition. Active |
| Armed Islamic Group | Algerian Islamic opposition. Active |
| People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) | Leftwing Iranian opposition.
Active |
| Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) | Kurdish, anti-Turkey. Active |
| Al-Qaida (Bin Ladin Organization) | Multinational. Afghanistan-based Islamist. Highly Active. |
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Radical Islamic Groups
Hizballah (Party of God) 3
Hizballah, founded in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics imbued with the Islamic revolutionary ideology of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, has a long record of violence against Israel and the West, especially the United States. The organization's initial goal was to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon as part of a broader region-wide Islamic republic. More recently, perhaps in recognition that such a goal may be unattainable, Hizballah has focused on trying to end Israel's control over a six to ten mile deep "security zone" in mostly Shiite Muslim-inhabited southern Lebanon. Hizballah is not known to have attempted or conducted any major terrorist attacks in 1997, 1998, or thus far in 1999. However, it has continued to conduct surveillance of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon and its personnel, according to Patterns 1998.
During the 1980s, Hizballah was a principal sponsor of anti-Western, and particularly anti-U.S., terrorism. It is known or suspected to have been involved in suicide truck bombings of the U. S. Embassy (April 1983), the U. S. Marine barracks (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18 Navy and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy annex (September 1984), all in Beirut. It also hijacked TWA Flight 847 in 1985, killing a Navy diver, Robert Stethem, who was on board, and its factions were responsible for the detention of most, if not all, U.S. and Western hostages held in Lebanon during the 1980s and early 1990s. Eighteen Americans were held hostage in Lebanon, of which three were killed. (On June 5, 1998, Hizballah's leader denied the group was linked to the Marine barracks bombing or the holding of hostages, but he said he supported the Marine bombing, the perpetrators of which have not been found.)
In the early 1990s, Hizballah demonstrated its ability to conduct terrorism far from the Middle East. In May 1999, Argentina's Supreme Court, after an official investigation, formally blamed Hizballah for the March 17, 1992 bombing of Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires. Hizballah did not claim responsibility for the attack outright, but it released a surveillance tape of the embassy, implying responsibility. In May 1998, the FBI told Argentina it believes that Hizballah, working with Iranian diplomats, was also responsible for the July 18, 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association building in Buenos Aires that left nearly 100 dead. 4 During a visit to South America in May 1998, FBI Director Louis Freeh said Hizballah is suspected of building a support network in Brazil, at the triborder area with neighboring Argentina and Paraguay. 5 In addition, Hizballah retains a terrorism infrastructure in Europe, Africa, North America, and elsewhere.
Hizballah's focus for the past few years has been on military operations against Israeli forces operating in Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon. Hizballah's several thousand fighters are increasingly adopting more conventional and more effective military attacks against Israel, resulting in greater Israeli casualties that Israel's military leaders now consider unacceptable. Hizballah's new tactics have contributed to the growing sentiment in Israel to withdraw completely from Lebanon. The new Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak (elected May 17, 1999), promised during his campaign to withdraw within one year. In June 1999, Israel's ally, the South Lebanon Army, withdrew from the enclave of Jezzine, which is just outside the security zone, in a test of Israel's prospects for withdrawl. Hizballah has threatened to use Jezzine as a launching pad for new attacks on Israeli forces, but it has not moved into the town. That threat represents Israel's principal fear - that withdrawl will enable Hizballah to advance further into south Lebanon and increase the range of its occasional shelling into northern Israel. As part of an effort to signal a willingness to renew peace talks, in July 1999 Syria reportedly began urging Hizballah to reduce its operations in southern Lebanon. It should be noted that the United States does not consider Hizballah's military operations against Israeli or Israel's proxy forces in the south Lebanon theater as terrorism, but rather as military action.
Israeli observers say they believe, although they are not certain, that Hizballah has acquired from Iran U.S. -made Stinger anti-aircraft weapons.6 If Hizballah has the weapon, it has not yet used it against Israeli aircraft, and it is not clear that Hizballah is able to maintain the weapon.
Hizballah also is increasingly focused on political activities in Lebanon. Hizballah may be positioning itself to survive if there is a peace agreement between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. Hizballah holds nine seats in Lebanon's 128 seat National Assembly. Hizballah has not accepted any Cabinet positions, but it does meet with members of Lebanon's other sects and factions, including traditionally dominant Christians, whom it previously shunned. Other reports indicate that Hizballah is increasingly involving itself in the tourism businesses as a means of earning revenue and softening its terrorist image, and it continues to provide social services for poor Lebanese not adequately served by the government.
Hizballah's Broader Connections. Hizballah maintains active connections with like- minded groups. In October 1997, Hizballah publicly admitted training Hamas militants in Lebanon. 7 Saudi and Bahraini investigations of anti-regime unrest have revealed the existence of local chapters of Hizballah composed of radical Shiite Muslims, many of whom have studied in Iran's theological seminaries and received terrorist training in Lebanon. Saudi officials apparently believe that one such organization in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Hizballah, was responsible for the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex for U.S. military personnel, near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 8 A similar organization in Kuwait, "Kuwaiti Hizballah," in 1996 allegedly assisted its allies in Bahrain by smuggling weapons to Bahrain, according to Patterns 1996. According to Patterns of 1998, in November 1998 Bahraini authorities uncovered an alleged bomb plot which it blamed on persons linked to Bahraini and Lebanese Hizballah.
A wide variety of press reporting indicates that Iranian diplomats posted in Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, and elsewhere abroad provide logistical or other support to Hizballah's foreign cells. Some of these diplomats were holders of the U.S. Embassy hostages in Tehran during 1979-81. 9 Then Secretary of State Christopher said on May 21, 1996 that Iran gives Hizballah about $100 million per year. Patterns 1998 says Iran, which backs Hizballah with several hundred of Revolutionary Guards stationed in Lebanon, continues to give Hizballah substantial amounts of weapons, explosives, and organizational aid as well. However, Iran reportedly wants Hizballah to become more self-sufficient financially and, according to recent Patterns reports, Hizballah might occasionally conduct operations not approved by Tehran. Syria also permits Iran to supply weapons to Hizballah through the international airport in Damascus.
Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT's). 10 According to President Clinton's January 23, 1995 Executive order (12947) on Middle Eastern terrorism, a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT) is a person found to pose a significant risk of distrupting the Middle East peace process, or to have materially supported acts of violence toward that end. Under the Executive order, the designation means that any dealings (contributions, financial transactions) between a U.S. person and the SDT are prohibited. Hizballah's Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah has been named an SDT. Nasrallah, who is about 40 and has led Hizballah since 1993, was re-elected by Hizballah on July 29, 1998 to head the organization for another three years. Other Hizballah figures named as SDT's are: Imad Mughniyah, the 36 year old Hizballah intelligence officer and alleged holder of some Western hostages in the 1980s; Shaykh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the 62 year old senior Shiite cleric and leading spiritual figure of Hizballah; and Subhi Tufayli, the 52 year old former Hizballah spiritual figure of Hizballah; and Subhi Tufayli, the 52 year old former Hizballah Secretary General who leads a radical breakaway faction of Hizballah members in Lebanon. Tufayli's followers clashed with the Lebanese army in later January 1998.
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad 11 are Sunni Islamist Palestinian groups based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas, which was formed by Muslim Brotherhood activists during the Palestinian uprising (intifadah) in 1978, received a significant political boost in October 1997 when its founder, Saykh Ahmad Yassin, was released from prison by Israel (see box on Yassin). The charismatic Yassin serves as a bridge between Hamas' two main components - the radicals that conduct terrorist attacks (primarily through a cladestine wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades), and the more pragmatic elements affiliated with Hamas' social services, charity, and educational institutions.
Some Hamas leaders, including Yassin, appear to be increasingly open to accomodating to Arafat's leadership of the Palestinian Authority, although they believe Arafat is too eager to compromise with Israel. Along with three other Hamas leaders, Yassin attended an April 1999 meeting of the PLO, called to discuss whether or not to declare a Palestinian state. It was the first time senior Hamas leaders have attended a formal PLO gathering. Although he attended the meeting, Yassin used the occasion to call for continued armed resistance to Israel. On July 7, 1999, Yassin said that Ehud Barak, who became Israel's Prime Minister the day earlier on a platform of reinvigorating the peace process, and a "bloody history," who would be little different than his more hardline predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. Yassin's previous incitements against Israel caused the Palestinian Authority to place him under house arrest during the last two months of 1998.
Hamas reportedly receives funding from wealthy private benefactors in the Persian Gulf monarchies, and U.S. officials say, from residents of the United States and Western Europe. Many individual donors appear to believe their contributions go to charitable activities for poor Palestinians served by Hamas' social services network, and are not being used for terrorism.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which was formed in 1979 and remains almost purely a guerrilla organization, appears internally united in its opposition to territorial or political compromise with Israel. U.S. officials say Palestinian Islamic Jihad is politically closer to Iran than is Hamas, although both groups are said by the State Department to receive funds (several million dollars per year), and possibly military training, from Iran. PIJ has its headquarters in Syria, and has a closely monitored and controlled presence in Jordan. PIJ receives some aid from Syria as well, according to Patterns 1998.
Palestinian support for the radical Islamic groups appears to be holding steady and remains relatively low. Patterns 1998, as have previous Patterns reports, characterizes Hamas' strength as "an unknown number of hardcore member [and] tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers," and PIJ's strength as "unknown." An independent poll conducted in Palestinian-controlled areas in January 1999 gives Hamas the support of about 11% of Palestinians in the self-rule areas, roughly the same as in previous yeares. 12 PIJ, which does not operate openly, registers the support of about 2.5%, also about the same as in recent years.
Hamas and PIJ have not targeted the United States or Americans directly, although Americans have died in attacks by these groups, along with Israelis and often the bombers themselves. Five out of the 65 killed in a series of four Hamas/PIJ bombings in Israel during February-March, 1996 were American citizens. These bombings had the apparent effect of shifting public opinion toward Benjamin Netanyahu in Israeli national elections on May 29, 1996, possibly proving decisive in his election victory as Prime Minister over then Labor Party leader Shimon Peres. Neither group conducted major attacks in the run-up to the May 1999 Israeli elections, although they did carry out attacks in an attempt to derail the negotiation and implementation of the October 23, 1998 Israeli-Palestinian Wye River Memorandum. The major recent attacks by Hamas/PIJ include the following:
- An August 27, 1998 bombing in Tel Aviv injured about 20 people. Shaykh Yassin said Hamas had nothing to do with the attack, although it came one day after Yassin said Hamas would attack Israel in retaliation for the August 20, 1998 U.S. missile strikes on the bin Latin network.
- On October 19, 1998, a Hamas militant conducted a grenade attack on a bus station in Beersheva, wounding about 67, many of whom were Israeli soldiers. The suspect in the attack subsequently confessed to a September 1998 grenade attack on an army post in Hebron and to the fatal stabbing of an elderly Rabbi, also in Hebron, in late August 1998. The Beersheva attack led to a temporary halt to Palestinian-Israel talks at the Wye River planation.
- On October 29, 1998, in the Gaza strip, an Israeli military jeep intercepted a Hamas suicide bomber as he was about to drive an explosives-packed car into an Israeli school bus. One Israeli soldier was killed, along with the bomber. Palestinian security forces subsequently placed Yassin under house arrest, and it arrested other Hamas leaders.
- On November 6, 1998, PIJ suicide bombers injured 24 with a car bomb near a crowded Jerusalem marketplace. The two bombers were killed. PIJ claimed responsibility and threatened additional attacks to block implementation of the Wye River Memorandum.
The United States has blocked the assets of some alleged Hamas/PIJ leaders, using the authority of President Clinton's January 23, 1995 Executive order on Middle East terrorism. As of the end of 1998, a total of about $656,000 in Hamas assets in the United States (mostly real estate) were blocked, as were PIJ bank accounts totaling about $18,000. PIJ leader Shallah had control over these PIJ accounts. 15
SDT's. Several Hamas and PIJ activists have been named as SDT's. They include PIJ leader Ramadan Abdullah Shallah ; PIJ ideologist Abd al-Aziz Awda; alleged U.S. fundraiser for Hamas, Musa Abu Marzuq ; another alleged U.S. fundraiser for Hamas, Mohammad Salah; and Hamas founder Shaykh Ahmad Yassin.
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Shaykh Ahmad YassinIsrael arrested Yassin in 1989 and sentenced him to life imprisonment for allegedly issuing orders to kidnap and kill two Israeli soldiers, Israel released him from prison in October 1997 under a compromise with Jordan, and he returned to his home in Gaza. The deal followed a failed Israeli attempt to assassinate another Hamas leader, Khalid Mishal, in Amman. In the past, Yassin has advocated the establishment of an Islamic state in all of what was British-mandate Palestine. During February-June 1998, Yassin visited several Arab and Islamic countries, raising money and vowing that military operations against Israel would continue until all of what was Palestine is liberated. Interspersed with medical treatment in Egypt, Yassin was received at high levels in Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Iran, and Syria. He reportedly received $50 million to 300 million in financial pledges from Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Kuwait said it would allow Hamas to open an office there. In Syria, he was permitted to meet with leaders of other anti-peace process groups. Israel allowed Yassin to return to Gaza after his tour. He is in frail health. Source: Abu Toameh, Khaled. The Sheikh's Progress. The Jerusalem Report, July 20, 1998; Palestine Facts website. |
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The Islamic Group and Al-Jihad
Egypt appears to be gaining the upper hand in its battle against the opposition Islamic Group and its ally, al-Jihad, 16 groups that have proved resilient over a long period of time. They formed in the early 1970s as offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, which opted to work within the political system after being crushed by former President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Both seek to replace Egypt's pro-Western, secular government with an Islamic state. In a sign of Egypt's counterterrorism progress, Patterns 1998 says that, in 1998, the number of deaths from terrorist-related incidents in Egypt fell to its lowest level since 1992. There have been no major attacks in Egypt since the Islamic Group's conduct of the most lethal terrorist attack ever in Egypt - the November 17, 1997 attack on tourists in the Valley of the Kings; near Luxor. The gunmen in that attack killed 58 tourists and wounded 26 others, and themselves committed suicide or were killed by Egyptian security forces. The Luxor militants left at the scene a leaflet calling for the release from prison of the spiritual leader of both groups, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman.Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, the 61 year old blind cleric who was acquitted in 1984 of inciting Sadat's assassination, is in a medical detention facility in Missouri following his October 1995 conviction for planning terrorist conspiracies in the New York area. 17 Like bin Ladin, Abd al-Rahman had recruited Arab volunteers for the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and his two sons reportedly have been in or around Afghanistan since the war ended in 1989. Several of his associates who were convicted for the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing fought on behalf of the Afghan rebels or raised money for them.
With their spiritual mentor no longer accessible, the Islamic Group and al-Jihad have succumbed to improved Egyptian security tactics, coupled with limited amnesties and other efforts to blunt popular support for the Islamists. Over the past year, Egypt has also persuaded a number of governments, including Azerbaijan, Kuwait, the Central Asian states, the United Arab Emirates, and Uruguay to extradite to Egypt suspected terrorists from the two groups. In November 1998, some Islamic Group leaders in jail in Egypt said they would abandon terrorist operations there. However, al-Jihad said it would continue fighting, and some doubt the sincerity or authority of the Islamic Group pronouncement. The exiled leaders of the two groups, who generally reject any compromise, have gravitated to bin Ladin's headquarters in Afghanistan and have essentially become his lieutenants (see below). Some reports suggest that al-Jihad might have acquired some chemical and biological weapons capability. 18
The Islamic Group recruits and builds support openly in poor neighborhoods in Cairo, Alexandria and throughout southern Egypt, running social service programs and distributing charity. Its militant wing conducts attacks against local security officials, banks, Western tourists, Egyptian Coptic Christians, and other perceived symbols of Western culture and foreign influence. Previously, the Islamic Group has attempted to assassinate high ranking officials, killing, for example, the People's Assembly Speaker in October 1990 and wounding the Minister of Information in April 1993. Al-Jihad has operated only clandestinely, focusing almost exclusively on assassinating high ranking Egyptian officials. Al-Jihad was responsible for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981. A reborn version of the group claimed responsibility for the August 1993 bombing in Cairo in which Egypt's Interior Minister (Zaki Badr) was wounded, as well as a November 1993 car bomb attempt against then-Prime Minister Atif Sidky.
External Linkages. Sources of external aid for both groups are not precisely known. However, Patterns 1998, as it has in previous years, cites Egyptian government assertions that Iran, Sudan, and militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan (bin Ladin) support the groups. Of these sources, bin Ladin has become an increasingly significant patron of the Egyptian groups. Several followers of Shaykh Abd al-Rahman, some of whom were convicted in the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, fought on behalf of the Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan or raised money for that cause. Ayman al-Zawahri, the 48 year-old operational leader of the reborn Jihad faction "Vanguards of Conquest," and Rifa'i al-Taha, the 45 year-old guerrilla leader of the Islamic Group, are believed to be with bin Ladin in Afghanistan. Zawahiri was convicted in Egypt for participation in the Sadat assassination, 19 and Taha is said to be the Islamic Group's link to Iran. Both Egyptian terrorists signed bin Ladin's pronouncements in February and May 1998 declaring a holy war (jihad) against U.S. civilian and military personnel in the Middle East. In a July 9, 1998 press interview, Zawahiri said the "only alternative" for Muslims is to declare a jihad against America and Israel. 20 On June 17, 1999 , Zawahiri was indicted by a U.S. grand jury for alleged involvement in the August 7, 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Another Islamic Group leader, who might also be associated with bin Ladin, is Mustafa Hamza. Hamza, who is about 41, has been implicated in the Sadat assassination and the attempted assassination of Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995. 21 Some reports suggest Hamza, possible acting with the approval of bin Ladin, might have ordered the Luxor attack. 22 Two Egyptians arrested in Britain in July 1999 for the Kenya/Tanzania bombings (see below) are also wanted in Egypt for allegedly planning terrorist attacks as members of al-Jihad.
SDT's. The following Egyptian Islamist figures have been named as SDT's: Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman (see above); al-Zawahiri (see above); Taha (see above) Abbud al-Zumar, leader of the remnants of the original Jihad who is serving a 40 year sentence in Egypt; Talat Qasim, 42, a propaganda leader of the Islamic Group; and Muhammad Shawqui Islambouli, 44, the brother of the lead gunman in the Sadat assassination. Islambouli, a military leader of the Islamic Group, also is believed to be associated with bin Ladin in Afghanistan.
Al-Qaida (Usama bin Ladin Network)
Over the past five years, the network of Usama bin Ladin has evolved from a regional threat to U.S. allies to a global threat to U.S. national security interests. Al Qaida ("the military base") is the name of the terrorist network founded by bin Ladin in 1990. The Saudi dissident helped recruit and fund many of the Arab volunteers for the Afghan conflict and eventually brought those volunteers into his far-flung and diverse radical Islamist organization. Reflecting its low level of early activity, al Qaida was not discussed in U.S. government reports until Patterns 1993. That report said that several thousand non-Afghan Muslims fought in the war against the Soviets and the Afghan Communist government during 1979 to 1992. 23 Although bin Ladin and his subordinates receive safehaven in Afghanistan, al-Qaida does not appear to be a surrogate or proxy of any state.
Bin Ladin's network has been connected to a number of acts of terrorism. Bin Ladin has claimed responsibility for the December 1992 attempted bombings against 100 U.S. servicemen in Yemen - there to support U.N. relief operations in Somalia. In a November 1996 press interview, he said that his loyalists fought against U.S. forces in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) and he claims to have provided weapons for anti-U.S. militia operations there in October 1993. The four Saudi nationals who confessed to the November 13, 1995 bombing of a U.S. military training facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, admitted on Saudi television to being inspired by bin Ladin and other Islamic radicals; three of them were veterans of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Patterns 1997 said that members of bin Ladin's organization might have aided the Islamic Group assissination attack against Egyptian President Mubarak during his visit to Ethiopia in June 1995.
World Trade Center Bombing Connections. There is no direct evidence that bin Ladin was involved in the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. However, bin Ladin appears to have had contacts with some of those involved in that and related plots. Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, who was convicted in September 1996 of conspiracy to bomb U.S. airliners in Asia (a Phillipines Air flight that killed a Japanese traveler) and, in November 1997, for masterminding the Trade Center bombing, at one time resided at a guest house in Pakistan owned by bin Ladin. Bin Ladin publicly denies knowing Yusuf personally but bin Ladin calls Yusuf's associate, WaliKhan Amin Shah, a "friend." Shah was arrested in the Phillipines in 1995 for an aborted plot, hatched in conjunction with Yusuf, to assassinate the Pope. 24 CNN reported August 25, 1998 that Yusuf and Khan also plotted, at bin Ladin's behest, to assassinate President Clinton during his November 1994 trip to Manila. The New York Times reported on July 8, 1999 that, in the mid-1990s, bin Ladin visited an associate in Qatar, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, who was also wanted by the United States for alleged involvement in ramzi Ahmad Yusuf's airline bomb plots. The report adds that Qatari officials might have warned Mohammad in advance of an FBI attempt in early 1996 to arrest him in Qatar; 25 he remains at large.
Bin Ladin and Sahykh Umar Abd al-Rahman (see section above) - another key World Trade Center bombing figure - both recruited fighters for the Afghan conflict, but it is not clear that they had any direct contact with each other in Afghanistan. The two also had close connections to the Islamic government of Sudan, although Abd al-Rahman left Sudan in 1990, before bin Ladin relocated there. However, the observation that top operational commanders of Abd al-Rahman's Egyptian Islamist organizations (Ayman al-Zawahiri and Rifa'I Taha, among others) have now gravitated to bin Ladin's al-Qaida umbrella could suggest that relations between bin Ladin and Abd al-Rahman were closer than previously believed, and that some contact might remain despite Abd al-Rahman's incarceration.
Further supporting evidence for a close relationship is derived from their recruiting activities in the United States. According to an August 20, 1998 U.S. Defense Department fact sheet, bin Ladin financed U.S.-based recruiting centers for the Afghan war, as well as centers in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Abd al-Rahman recruited volunteers for the Afghan war through similar centers in the United States. Before the Trade Center bombing, some of Abd al-Rahman's aides reportedly had personal contact with bin Ladin associates in the Unites States. 26 Although their recruiting presence has raised questions as to whether or not the United States gave bin Ladin or Abd al-Rahman assistance during the Afghan war, the Central Intelligence Agency has told CRS that it found no evidence that the Agency provided any direct assistance to either of them. The U.S. assistance program for the anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan focused primarily on indigenous Afghan mujahedin and not Arab volunteers such as those sponsored by bin Ladin or Abd al-Rahman.
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Usama bin LadinIn 1991, bin Ladin relocated to Sudan with the approval of Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF) leader Hasan al-Turabi. There, in concert with NIF leaders, he built a network of businesses, including an Islamic bank, an import-export firm, and firms that exported agricultural products. An engineer by training, bin Ladin also used his family connections in the construction business to help Sudan build roads and airport facilities. The businesses in Sudan, some of which apparently are still operating, enabled him to offer safehaven and employment in Sudan to al-Qaida members, promoting their involvement in radical Islamic movements in their countries of origin (especially Egypt) as well as anti-U.S. terrorism. He reportedly has some business interests in Yemen as well and is believed to have assets invested in European and Asian firs. Bin Ladin has said publicly that, while he was in Sudan, there were a few assassination attempts against him. Saudi Arabia revoked his citizenship in 1994 and his family disavowed him, although some of his brothers reportedly have maintained contact with him. He has no formal role in the operations of the Bin Laden Construction group, which continues to receive contracts from the Saudi government and from other Arab countries. He also founded a London-based group, the Advisory and Reform Committee, that distributed literature against the Saudi regime. In May 1996, Sudan expelled him, and he returned to Afghanistan, under protection of the dominant Taliban movement. On June 7, 1999, bin Ladin was placed on the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted List," and a $5 million reward is offered for his capture. Bin Ladin is estimated to have about $300 million in personal financial assets with which he funds his network of as many as 3,000 Islamic militants. Al-Qaida cells have been identified or suspected in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, other parts of Africa, Malaysia, the Phillipines, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, the United Kingdom, and allegedly inside the United States itself. Sources: State Department Factsheet: Usama bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier. August 1996; ABC News Nightline. June 10, 1998; Defense Department factsheet, August 20, 1998; conversations with U.S. counter-terrorism officials. |
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Kenya/Tanzania Bombings. Bin Ladin's anti-U.S. agenda, his organizational capabilities, and his recent threats led to immediate speculation that he was involved in the August 7, 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 301 and injured over 5,000. The bombings came after a six month period in which bin Ladin had isued repeated and open threats against U.S. civilians and interests worldwide. On August 20, 1998, the United States launched cruise missiles on bin Ladin's training camps near Khost, in eastern Afghanistan, based on what U.S. officials called "convincing evidence" of the complicity of his network in the bombings. U. S. officials add that the bombings were intended to disrupt planning for a new attack. For their alleged role in the bombings, eight alleged members of al-Qaida have been arrested and another nine, including bin Ladin, were indicted but remain at large. Those captured apparently have provided significant amounts of information on al-Qaida to U.S. and other investigators. Bin Ladin's indictment also accuses him of the killing of U.S. military personnel in Somalia (1993) and Saudi Arabia (1995).
Since the bombings and retaliatory strikes, the Taliban leadership has tried to dissociate itself from bin Ladin by asserting that he is no longer its guest. However, Taliban officials admit that he is in an area of Afghanistan that the movement controls. The Taliban failure to expel or extradite him - coupled with reports in 1998 and 1999 that bin Ladin was planning new attacks against U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf, Africa and elsewhere - has caused the State Department to name Afghanistan , in May 1997, 1998, and 1999 as "not cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorist efforts." The designation, made pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, bars sales of Munitions List items to Afghanistan. The only other countries so designated are the seven countries on the terrorism list itself. On July 6, 1999, President Clinton, citing Taliban's continued harboring of bin Ladin, increased U.S. pressure by imposing a ban on U.S. trade with areas of Afghanistan under Taliban control, a freeze on Taliban assets in the United States, and a prohibition on contributions to Taliban by U.S. citizens. On July 9, 1999, the United States said it is willing to negotiate with the Taliban leadership to bring bin Ladin to justice, but the following day Taliban leaders said that they would not extradite bin Ladin.
Despite Taliban's professed distance from him, bin Ladin, as recently as June 10, 1999, told journalists that he wants to incite Muslims to purge U.S. and Israeli influence from Islamic lands. U.S. officials also are concerned that bin Ladin's network is acquiring potent military capabilities. About 200 U.S. shoulder-held anti-aircraft weapons ("Stingers") are still at large in Afghanistan, and, because of bin Ladin's financial resources, it is highly likely he has acquired some of them. U.S. officials say bin Ladin's fighters have experimented with chemical weapons and might have tried to purchase nuclear materials in the early 1990s, possibly in concert with Iran and Sudan. 27 From those comments, it is reasonable to assume that bin Ladin's organization has at least a rudimentary chemical weapons capability.
SDT's/August 20, 1998 Executive Order. President Clinton's August 20, 1998 Executive order amends an earlier January 23, 1995 Executive order (12947) by naming al-Qaida and its aliases (the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, the Islamic Salvation Foundation, and the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites), as a terrorist group. The amendment names bin Ladin as an SDT, along with Rifai al-Taha, of the Islamic Group (see above) and another associate, Abu Hafs al-Masri (aka Mohammad Atef). Atef was indicted along with bin Ladin on November 4, 1998 for the Kenya/Tanzania bombings. The effect of the order is to ban financial U.S. financial transactions with bin Ladin's organization and allows U.S. law enforcement to freeze any bin Ladin assets in the United States that can be identified.
Blocked Assets. Under the amended Executive order, the United States blocked about $23.7 million in bank accounts held by Saleh Idris, the Saudi owner of a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. In concert with the strikes on bin Ladin's headquarters on August 20, 1998, the United States struck the plant in Sudan on the grounds that it was producing chemical weapons, possible for use by bin Ladin's organization. In May 1999, the United States unblocked the assets in response to a lawsuit by Indris in which he claimed he had not been named as an SDT and therefore his assets could not be frozen. The United States did not publicly back away from its assertion that Idris has contacts with bin Ladin or that the Sudanese plant was producing some chemical weapons agents, 28 although observers viewed the assets release as an admission that the U.S. judgement of the plant was erroneous. Aside from this case, no assets linked to bin Ladin, in the United States or elsewhere, have been frozen.
U.S. officials say they are encouraging other governments to help dismantle bin Ladin's financial empire, although accomplishing that objective has been difficult. Bin Ladin appears to have a reservoir of support in the Gulf states, including his homeland of Saudi Arabia, which presumably have the most to fear from his crusade against the United States and the Saudi government. In early July 1999, according to the New York Times, U.S. officials visited the United Arab Emirates to persuade the government there to prohibit the Islamic Bank in Dubai (one of the Emirates) from handling money for bin Ladin. 29 That and other press reports suggest that a number of wealthy Persian Gulf businessman continue to donate to bin Ladin's cause. One report says bin Ladin may have received $50 million from Saudi donors until the Saudi government uncovered and topped the donations. 30 ABC News reported on July 9, 1999 that Saudi officials recently stopped a prominent Saudi banker, Khalid bin Mahfuz, from contributing money to bin Ladin.
The Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
The Armed Islamic Group (GIA, after its initials in French) is the most radical of Islamic factions fighting to establish an Islamic state in Algeria, but the GIA is highly fragmented. 31 Unlike radical Islamic groups in other countries, the GIA does not have an authoritative religious figure who can hold its various factions together and arbitrate disputes within the organization. Composed partly of Algerian Islamic guerrillas who fought in Afghanistan, the GIA formed as a breakaway faction of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1992, after the regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections on fears of an FIS victory. According to Patterns 1998, the GIA has killed over 100 expatriates in Algeria (mostly Europeans) since 1992, but, in a possible indication of regime counterterrorism success, no foreigners were killed in 1998. In another demonstration of regime success, the militant wing of the FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army, said in June 1999 it would permanently abandon armed struggle against the government. It had been observing a ceasefire since October 1997.
Over the past two years, the GIA has conducted a campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in their areas of operations, in an effort to intimidate rival groups and to demonstrate that the government lacks control over the country. The GIA conducted its most lethal terrorist attack on December 31, 1997, when it killed 400 Algerian civilians in a town 150 miles southwest of Algiers, according to Patterns 1997. The massacres represent one of the world's most serious domestic terrorist threats, although there are allegations that renegade elements of the regime's security forces and other opposition groups have also conducted civilian massacres, according to the U.S. officials. The GIA attacks on civilians also contributed to a reported major split in the group in September 1998 - a faction calling itself the "Group for Call and Combat" split from the GIA, saying it would target only regime security forces, not civilian. One press report said that this breakaway faction might have ties to Usama bin Ladin. 32
The GIA has undertaken operations outside Algeria. It hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994. The group might also have been responsible for a bombing of the Paris subway system on December 3, 1996, which killed four and wounded more than 80.
Patterns 1998 repeats previous descriptions of the GIA's strength as probably between several hundred to several thousand. The organization receives financial and logistical aid from Algerian expatriates, many of whom reside in Western Europe. As has Egypt, Algeria has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting the GIA from training camps in Sudan. Most observers believe that Iranian and Sudanese aid to the GIA has probably not been decisive in the GIA's development or its activities. In addition, moves toward rapprochement between Sudan and Algeria suggest that Algeria no longer considers Khartoum substantially involved in Algerian terrorism.
Islamic Movements in Yemen
No Yemeni organization has been designated an FTO by the State Department but, over the past year, a radical Islamic movement has emerged in Yemen. In December 1998, a group calling itself the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army kidnapped sixteen tourists. Three British and one Australian tourist were killed during the December 29, 1998 rescue attempt by Yemeni security forces; the rest were rescued. Little is known about the group, but it advocates the imposition of Islamic law in Yemen and the lifting of international sanctions against Iraq, and opposes the use of Yemeni ports and bases by U.S. other Western countries. A United Kingdom-based cleric linked to the group, Abu Hamza al-Masri fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and on behalf of the Muslims in Bosnia. The FBI is investigating whether or not al-Masri and his associates in Yemen have any liniks to bin Ladin. Confirmation of such linkages could prompt the United States and Britain to cancel plans to use Yemen's port of Aden as a ship and air refueling station. 33
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Radical Jewish Groups
Kach and Kahane Chai
Kach was founded by the radical Rabbi Meir Kahane, who was assassinated in the United States in 1990 34; Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives) was founded by Kahane's son, Binyamin, following his father's assassination. The two movements seek to expel all Arabs from Israel and expand Israel's boundaries to include the occupied territories and parts of Jordan. They also want strict implementation of Jewish law in Israel. To try to accomplish these goals, the two groups have organized protests against the Israeli government, and threatened Palestinians in Hebron and the West Bank. On March 13, 1994, the Israeli Cabinet declared both to be terrorist organizations under a 1948 Terrorism Law. The declaration came after the groups publicly stated their support for a Feb. 25, 1994 attack on a Hebron mosque by a radical Jewish settler, Baruch Golstein, himself a Kach affiliate and an immigrant from the United States. The attack killed 29 worshipers and wounded about 150. The groups, many members of which live in Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, organize protests against the Israeli government and also harass and threaten Palestinians.
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was killed by an Israeli extremist in November 1995, but the assassin, Yigal Amir, and his two accomplices were not formal members of Kach or Kahane Chai. They have been identified with a loose extremist grouping calling itself Eyal, although there might be some connections between Eyal members and those of Kach and Kahane Chai. Patterns 1998 repeats previous assertions that the numerical strength of Kach and Kahane Chai are unknown and that they receive support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.
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Left wing and Nationalist Groups
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
As part of its peace agreements with and commitments to Israel, the PLO has formally renounced the use of terrorism. The PLO has not been named an FTO by the State Department and Patterns 1996 was the first Patterns report to exclude the PLO from its analysis of terrorist organizations. The PLO is discussed in this CRS report because of the debate in Congress and among observers over whether or not the PLO, as the power behind the Palestinian Authority (PA), is taking sufficient steps to prevent Hamas and PIJ from conducting terrorist attacks against Israelis.
Patterns 1998, as well as Administration reports to Congress, 35 credits the PA with preventing several planned terrorist attacks, including a planned Hamas double suicide attack in September 1998. In March 1999, then Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu thanked Yasir Arafat for averting a planned Hamas attack in central Israel. Patterns 1998 states the Administration view that the PA needs to undertake greater anti-terrorism efforts, alone and in concert with Israel.
Critics, including many in Congress, maintain that PA anti-terrorism efforts are still not acceptable. Some analysts believe that Arafat preferes accommodation with Hamas to aggressive efforts to root out Hamas' terrorism infrastructure. 36 In February 1999, Israel told U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that the PA had not fulfilled some of its security obligations under the October 23, 1998 Wye River Memorandum between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel cited the insufficient cooperation as the primary reason behind Israel's decision in December 1998 to suspend implementation of its obligations under the Wye accords, although some attribute the decision to then Prime Minister Netanyahu's fear that ceding territory would cause a backlash from hardliners in his own coalition. According to Israel's letter to Annan, the PA had failed to enact a law outlawing terrorist organizations or to construct a mechanism for eliminating unauthorized weapons and explosives in areas under PA control.
Critics and sympathizers of the PLO agree that it has evolved substantially since Yasir Arafat rode his Fatah guerrilla organizations to the chairmanship of the organization in 1969. After Fatah/PLO and other Palestinian guerrillas were forced out of Jordan in 1970 and 1971, cross border attacks on Israel became difficult, and some PLO components resorted to international terrorism. In September 1972, eight terrorists reportedly linked to Fatah seized the dormitory of Israeli athletes at the Olympics in Munich; eleven Israeli athletes were killed in that incident. In the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, international efforts to promote Arab-Israeli peace caused Arafat to limit terrorist attacks largely to targets within Israel, Lebanon, and the occupied territories. In 1988, Arafat renounced the use of terrorism as part of an effort to initiate an official dialogue with the United States. The dialogue lasted until 1990, when Arafat refused to denounce an attempted by a small PLO-affiliated organization, the Palestine Liberation Front, on a Tel Aviv beach (see below). The dialogue resumed subsequent to the September 1993 mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO.
Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)
Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian army, formed the PFLP-GC in October 1968 as a breakaway faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, see below), which he considered too willing to compromise with Israel. He also believed that a conventional military arm was needed to complement terrorist operations. Jibril's several hundred guerrillas fight Israeli forces in southern Lebanon alongside Hizballah, but Patterns 1998 does not attribute any significant terrorist attacks to the PFLP-GC in 1998, and the group does not appear to have conducted any terrorist attacks thus far in 1999. In the past, the PFLP-G-C has experimented with unconventional terrorist tactics such as motorized hang gliders, which it has successfully used to cross the Israeli border from Lebanon.
Probably because of Jibril's service in the Syrian military and to maintain pressure on Israel's northern border, Syria remains the chief backer of the PFLP-GC, providing it with logistical and military support, and hosting its headquarters in Damascus. Since the late 1980s, the PFLP-GC has built a close relationship with Iran, and received Iranian financial assistance. There have been persistent reports that Iran approached the PFLP-GC to bomb a U.S. passenger jet in retaliation for the July 3, 1988 U. S. downing of an Iranian passenger airplane. The PFLP-GC allegedly pursued such an operation and abandoned it or, according to other speculation, handed off the operation to Libya in what became a successful effort to bomb Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988. 37 Patterns 1998 drops the assertion of previous Patterns reports that the PFLP-GC receives financial support from Libya.
SDT's. Jibril, who is the 61, and his deputy, Talal Muhammad Naji (about 68), have been named as SDT's.
Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (PFLP)
The PFLP's opposition to Arafat and to eventual peace with Israel appears to be weakening. The PFLP opposed the Palestinians' decision to join the Madrid peace process and suspended its participation in the PLO after the September 1993 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles. Since then, in apparent recognition of Arafat's growing stature and popularity among Palestinians, the PFLP has had intermittent talks with the PA and, in August 1999, the group held reconciliation talks with Arafat in Cairo. Both sides deemed the talks successful, although differences remain over the degree to which the Palestinians should compromise with Israel. At the same time, the PFLP retains some ties to Hamas and other staunch Arafat opponents and it continues to denounce the October 1998 Wye River Memorandum as too conciliatory to Israel and as a vehicle for Arafat to crack down on his Palestinian critics. Patterns 1998 repeats previous estimates of the PFLP's strength as about 800, and says that the group receives most of its financial and military assistance from Syria and Libya. The PFLP is based in Damascus and it reportedly has training facilities in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.
The PFLP is a Marxist-Leninist organization founded by Habash in December 1967, following the Arab defeat in the war with Israel that year. The PFLP was active in international terrorism during the late 1960s and the 1970s, and, on September 6, 1970, PFLP guerrillas simultaneously hijacked three airliners. Since the late 1970s, the group has primarily attacked Israelis inside Israel and the occupied territories. It is suspected of a June 9, 1996 killing of an Israeli and a dual U.S./Israeli citizen as well as a December 11, 1996 killing of an Israeli settler and her son. Patterns 1998 does not attribute any terrorist attacks to the organization in 1998, and there have not been reports in 1999 of attacks by the group.
SDT's. PFLP Secretary-General George Habash is the only PFLP leader named as an SDT. Habash, who is about 72 years old, suffered a stroke in 1992 and is expected to step down soon. He reportedly wants the next PFLP leader to be based inside the Palestinian-controlled areas. One name mentioned as his possible successor is Ahmad Qatamish, a prominent PFLP leader released from prison in Israel in 1998. 38
Democratic Front For The Liberation Of Palestine (DFLP) 39
The DFLP, another extreme leftist organization, split from the PFLP in 1969. The DFLP subsequently became one of the earliest Palestinian groups to take the public position that the destruction of Israel need not be the Palestinians' ultimate goal. However, it wanted to set stringent conditions for Palestinian participation in the October 1991 Madrid peace conference and suspended its participation in the PLO following the September 1993 Israel-PLO accords. Like the PFLP, the DFLP expressed readiness to take part in final status talks with Israel as a means of testing whether or not Israel would permit a Palestinian state. In February 1999, the DFLP was ousted from a Damascus-based alliance of hardline groups (the Alliance of Palestinian Forces) after Hawatmeh shook hands with Israeli President Ezer Weizman at the funeral of Jordan's King Husayn.
When it has used terrorism, the DFLP historically has attacked within Israel or territory under Israeli control. Its most noted attack was the May 1974 takeover of a school in Maalot, in northern Israel, in which 27 schoolchildren were killed and 134 people wounded. Since 1988, it has been involved in small-scale border raids into Israel and attacks on Israeli soldiers, officials, and civilians in Israel and the occupied territories, but it also carries out occasional guerilla operations in southern Lebanon. Patterns reports estimate the total strength (for all major factions) of the DFLP at about 500. The DFLP receives financial and military assistance from Syria, where it is headquartered. Patterns 1997 indicated that the group no longer receives assistance from Libya.
SDT's. Hawatmeh, who is about 66 years old, has been named an SDT.
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
The PLF has become less active to the point at which Israel no longer considers it a major terrorist threat. The group's last major attack was a failed raid on the Israeli resort town of Eilat in May 1992. The leader of the most prominent PLF faction, Abu Abbas (real name, Muhammad Zaydun), opposed the PLO's decision to support the October 1991 Madrid peace conference, but he now supports the PA and says "armed struggle" should be used only if the peace process fails. In April 1996, he voted to amend the PLO Charter to eliminate clauses calling for Israel's destruction. In April 1998, Israel allowed him to relocate to the Gaza Strip from Baghdad, although the PLF maintains an office in the Iraqi capital and receives Iraqi support. The FLF has also received Libyan support "in the past," according to Patterns 1998.
During its period of terrorist activity, the PLF conducted attacks with significance out of proportion to its small size ("at least 50 members," according to Patterns 1998). Its most well-known attack was the October 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, in which the group murdered disabled U.S. citizens Leon Klinghoffer and held the other passengers hostage for two days. Abu Abbas and his team surrendered to Egyptian forces in exchange for a promise of safe passage. They were apprehended at a NATO airbase in Italy after U.S. aircraft forces down the Egyptian airliner flying them to safehaven. Abbas, who was not on board the Achille Lauro during the hijacking, was released by the Italian government but later sentenced in absentia. (A warrant for his arrest is outstanding in Italy). The four other hijackers were convicted and sentenced in Italy. On May 30, 1990, the PLF unsuccessfully attempted a seaborne landing, from Libya, on a Tel Aviv beach. Arafat refused to condemn the raid and, as a consequence, the United States broke off its dialogue with the PLO, which had begun in 1988.
Abu Abbas founded the PLF in 1976 after his failed attempt to gain control of the PFLP-GC. Serving then as Ahmad Jibril's representative in Lebanon, Abbas opposed Syria's military intervention in Lebanon that year; Jibril supported it. Abbas subsequently aligned the PLF with Arafat's PLO, moving in 1983 from Damascus to Tunisia, where the PLO was headquartered. The PLF was expelled (to Baghdad) after the Achille Lauro incident.
SDT's. Abu Abbas, who was born in 1948, has been named as an SDT. Inspired by the Cuban revolution and the Vietcong, he underwent guerrilla training in the Soviet Union. 40 According to Administration officials, in 1996 the Justice Department dropped a warrant for his arrest because it believed there was insufficient evidence against him. On April 30, 1996, the Senate voted 99-0 on a resolution (S.Res.253) seeking Abbas' detention and extradition to the United States.
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
The international terrorist threat posed by the Abu Nidal Organization has receded because of Abu Nidal's reported health problems (leukemia and a heart condition), internal splits, friction with state sponsors, and clashes with Arafat loyalists. However, it still has several hundred members plus militiamen in Lebanon, and Abu Nidal has apparently rebuilt his relations with Iraq's Saddam Husayn. The ANO has not attacked Western targets since the later 1980s, although it reportedly targeted radical Islamic opponents of the Egyptian government during Abu Nidal's 1998 stay in Cairo. 41 During the 1970s and 1980s, the ANO carried out over 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 people. One of its most well-known operations was a December 27, 1985 attack on airports in Rome and Vienna, in which 18 died and 111 were injured. One month earlier, ANO members hijacked Egypt Air 648, resulting in the deaths of 60 people. On September 6, 1986, ANO gunmen killed 22 at a synagogue in Istanbul. The group is suspected of assassinating top Arafat aids in Tunis in 1991.
Also known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, the ANO was created in 1974 when Abu Nidal (real name, Sabri al-Banna), then Arafat's representative in Iraq, came to believe that Arafat was willing to compromise with Israel. U.S. pressure contributed to Iraq's decision to expel Abu Nidal in November 1983. Syria, his next destination, expelled Abu Nidal and most of his fighters in 1987 after Syria came under international scrutiny for Syria's failed attempt to blow up an Israeli airliner in 1986. Abu Nidal left his next home, Libya, in April 1998, after infighting with pro-Arafat members wrenched the organization. He relocated to Cairo, where he stayed until later 1998, when more infighting caused his presence in Egypt to become public, and therefore a public relation problem for Egypt. His return to Iraq has fed suspicions, but no hard evidence, that Abu Nidal is planning to revive his international terrorist operation on behalf of Baghdad. 42
SDT's. Abu Nidal, who was born in 1937 in Jaffa (part of what is now Israel), is the only ANO member named an SDT. He faces no legal charges in the United States, according to an ABC News report of August 25, 1998, but he is wanted in Britain and Italy.
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Other Non-Islamist Organizations
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 43
The PKK established in 1974, is a Marxist-Leninist group composed of 10,000 to 15,000 Kurdish fighters seeking to establish an independent, Marxist state in southeastern Turkey, where there is a predominantly Kurdish population. The PKK generally targets government forces and civilians in eastern Turkey, but it has operated elsewhere in the country and attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in several Western European cities in 1993 and 1995. The PKK suffered a major setback in October 1998 when Turkish military and diplomatic pressure forced Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and close PKK bases in Syria and areas of Lebanon under Syrian control. Ocalan sought refuge in several countries, but Turkey captured and tried him. On June 29, 1999, a Turkish court sentenced him to death for treason and the murder of about 30,000 Turks since 1974. Ocalan, who is about 50, still has avenues of appeal remaining, and his supporters have begun to escalate their battle against Turkish forces in an effort to get his sentence commuted. At his trial, in a possible attempt to avoid a death sentence, Ocalan offered to help broker a permanent settlement between the Turkish government and rebel Kurds. In early August 1999, he called on his supporters to cease armed operations against the Turkish government. The United States sides with Turkey in viewing the PKK as a terrorist organization, but it, like many European countries, wants to see a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
Abdullah Ocalan is not named as an SDT. He was a student in political science at Ankara University during 1966-78, where he formed his ideas on Kurdish nationalism.44
The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)
The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), the largest organization within a broader National Council of Resistance (NCR), has leftwing roots but, unlike the PKK, it is not composed of an ethnic minority. It is working to try to overthrow the clerical regime in Iran, just as it previously sought to bring down the Shah of Iran. Despite its leftist past, the group now asserts that it is committed to free markets and democracy, should it achieve power in Iran, and it publicly supports the Arab-Israeli peace process and the rights of Iran's minorities.
The State Department's longstanding mistrust of the group is based on the group's killing of several U.S. military officers and civilians during the struggle against the Shah, its support for the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, its authoritarian internal structure and former Marxist doctrine, and its use of Iraq as base for its several thousand strong military wing, the National Liberation Army. The State Department named the PMOI an FTO because of its attacks on Iranian diplomatic facilities and its anti-regime operations inside Iran. Its attacks in Iran sometimes result in the deaths of Iranian civilians, although the group does not appear to purposely target civilians. Most recently, the group claimed responsibility for the April 10, 1999 assassination in Tehran of a senior Iranian military officer. Citing PMOI attacks such as that one, Patterns 1998 says that Iran's claim that it is a victim of terrorism has some merti. On June 1999, a U.S. federal appeals court upheld the PMOI's designation as an FTO, following a PMOI legal challenge to that designation. Some Members of Congress questioned the State Department's designation of the group and many Members support the group as a potential alternative to the current regime in Tehran.
The PMOI is led by Masud and Maryam Rajavi. Masud, the PMOI Secretary General, leads the PMOI's military forces based in Iraq. His wife Maryam is the organization's choice to become interim preside3nt of Iran if it were to take power. Both are now based in Iraq, near the border with Iran. Neither has been named an SDT.
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Middle Eastern State Sponsors
The five Middle Eastern countries on the list, like the groups they reportedly sponsor, have differed in their objectives. Iran has supported terrorist groups that promote anti-Western, radical Islamic ideology and oppose the Arab-Israeli peace process. Syria is led by an authoritarian nationalist and secular government that appears to support terrorism as a lever against Israel and other neighbors, including Turkey and Jordan. Sudan has harbored radical Islamic groups that are fighting to overthrow the secular, pro-Western government of Egypt, which has often been at odds with Sudan's Islamic regime. Iraq has used terrorism mostly to strike at people or institutions that contributed to its defeat in the Gulf war or that implement international sanctions against Iraq. The following sections analyze the five Middle Eastern state sponsors of terrorism
Iran 48
Patterns of 1998 drops the formulation used in several prior years' reports that Iran is "the most active" state sponsor of international terrorism. The softening of the report's characterization suggest that the Administration believes Khatemi and his allies genuinely resent Iran's reputation as a "terrorist state" and appear to want to further erode Iran's isolation. In another apparent signal to Iran, Patterns 1998 cited PMOI attacks on Iranian officials as justification for Iran's claim that is a victim of terrorism.
At the same time, although no major terrorist attacks have been linked to Iran since Khatemi took office in August 1997, Iran continues its material support for the terrorist groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process. Iran also has been accused of regional governments of sponsoring assassinations of anti-Shiite Muslim clerics in Tajikistan and Pakistan. Khatemi, as well as more hardline Iranian leaders, have expressed public support for Hamas and Hizballah in what Iran calls their struggle against Israeli occupation, and Shaykh Yassin was warmly received by Iranian leaders, including Khatemi, during his visit to Tehran in May 1998. Along with most other Iranian officials, Khatemi publicly denounced the October 23, 1998 Israeli-Palestinian Wye River Memorandum as one-sided in Israel's favor. Khatemi's public statements might be intended to defuse criticism from his opponenets who believe he will sell out the principles of the Islamic revolution.
There have been a number of developments in cases of past incidents of Iranian- sponsored terrorism since the April 1997 verdict by a German court the Iran's leaders approved terrorist operations directed against Iranian dissidents abroad. 49 In March and August 1998, U.S. courts awarded compensation to U.S. victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism and their families. Other U.S. victims and their families, including former U.S. hostage in Lebanon Terry Anderson, have filed similar suits against Iran. Among unresolved hostage cases, Iran has continued to deny Israeli allegations that Iran knows the fate of Israeli pilot Ron Arad, who was downed over Lebanon in 1986 by a pro-Iranian militia and is the only missing Israeli not known to be dead.
Khatemi's accession to power has not led to a complete resolution of the late Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 death sentence against author Salman Rushdie. Khomeini issued the death sentence because he deemed Rushdie's novel, "The Satanic Verses," blasphemous. Iranian leaders, including Khatemi, maintain that, because Ayatollah Khomeini is no longer alive, they cannot lift the sentence. In September 1998, Iran pledged to Britain's satisfaction that it would not implement the sentence; the two countries subsequently upgraded their relations to the ambassadorial level. However, Iran's government has not required private Iranian group (with links to the regime), the 15th Khordad Foundation, to withdraw its offer of $2.8 million for the murder of Rushdie.
A key question is whether Iran is determined by the United States and Saudi Arabia to have been directly involved in the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Most press reports indicate that the Saudis believe that Iran had a role in the bombing, working through dissident Saudi Shiites. However, neither the FBI nor the Saudi investigators have released any final conclusions. Saudi Arabia has an interest in blaming outside powers for the bombing but it does not want to derail its warming relations with Khatemi and his government, which took office well after the bombing. In general, Iranian support for radical Islamic movements in the Gulf states has declined under Khatemi's tenure, although Bahrain continues to accuse Iran of harboring Bahraini dissidents. ( For further information, see CRS Issue Brief 93113. Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations. Updated regularly, by Alfred Prados.)
Syria 50
Despite its position on the terrorism list, the United States has relatively normal relations with Syria, and most forms of U.S. trade with and investment in Syria are permitted. The United States has full diplomatic relations with Damascus, and U.S. officials are actively looking for opportunities to restart Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations in the aftermath of the election of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The negotiations were formally suspended by Israel in March 1996 following Hamas/PIJ bombings in Israel. Most experts agree that a peace treaty with Israel would facilitate Syria's removal from the terrorist list. In July 1999, apparently as part of an effort to signal Israeli Prime Minister Ehurd Barak that it wants to restart negotiations, Syria reportedly encouraged terrorist groups in areas under its controlto abandon armed struggle against Israel. The State Department said the reported Syrian move, if true, "certainly wouldn't hurt" Syria's efforts to achieve removal from the terrorism list. 51
Patterns 1998 repeats its assertions of the past few years that Syrian officials have not been directly involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks since 1986. The report also credits Syria with participating in the five-country April 1996 understandings to limit civilian damage from Israeli-Hizballa fighting in southern Lebanon. As noted above, in October 1998, Syria expelled PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and his followers from Syrian-controlled territory, although the move resulted from Turkish pressure and not necessarily a unilateral Syrian desire to sever relations with the PKK.
Other actions cast doubt on whether or not Syria has permanently abandoned the use of terrorism as a lever in its foreign policy. Damascus has not acted to stop anti-Israel attacks by Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern Lebanon, and it allows these groups safehaven in Syria. Syrian officials not only permit but also address meetings of these groups to reaffirm a commitment to continued armed struggle against Israel. Suggesting that preserving its alliance with Iran is one Syrian motivation, Syria allows Iran to resupply Hizballah through the Damascus airport, and has allowed visiting Iranian officials to meet with anti-peace process terrorist organizations based in Syria. On the other hand, Syria sometimes acts to restrain actions of these groups that might bring Syria into direct conflict with Israel.
Some observers have alleged that Syria had foreknowledge of the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. 52 These allegations are based largely on the unexplained death of one of the suspects, Jafar Shuwaykat, while he was in Syrian custody. Saudi investigators reportedly believe that equipment for that bomb resembles that used by Hizballah and was brought into Saudi Arabia from Lebanon, via Syria and Jordan.
Libya 53
The April 5, 1999 handover of the two suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (December 21, 1988), apparently has made Libya a strong candidate for removal from the terrorist list. 54 The Pan Am attack killed 259 people aboard plus 11 on the ground. Three U.N. Security Council resolutions - 731 of January 21, 1992; 748, of March 31, 1992; and 883, of November 11, 1993 - called on Libya to turn over the two Libyan intelligence agents ( Abd al-Basit Ali al-Meghrahi and Al Amin Khalifah Fhimah) indicted by the United States and the United Kingdom for the Pan Am 103 bombing, and to help resolve the related case of UTA Flight 772 (see below). These resolutions prohibited air travel into and out of Libya or arms transfers to that counry (Resolution 748); and froze Libyan assets and prohibited the sale to Libya of petroleum-related equipment (Resolution 883). In accordance with U.N. Resolution 1192 (August 27, 1998), following the handover of the two to the Netherlands, where they will be tried under Scottish law, these international sanctions were suspended but not terminated. On the grounds that it is too soon to judge Libyan cooperation with the trial and whether or not Libya has permanently ceased supporting international terrorism, the United States has maintained its unilateral sanctions and, thus far, opposed a permanent lifting of the international sanctions. However, in a signal of U.S. appreciation of Libya's apparent moderation, in June 1999 a U.S. official met with a Libyan diplomat for the first time since 1981.
Libya followed up the handover with two more initiatives designed to end its international isolation. In March 1999, a French court convicted six Libyans, in absentia, for the 1989 bombing of a French airliner, UTA Flight 772, over Niger. One of them is Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's brother-in-law and intelligence operative, Muhammad Sanusi. Although it never submitted the suspects for trial or openly acknowledged responsibility, in July 1999 Libya paid compensation to the families of the 171 victims of the bombing, which included seven U.S. citizens. In July 1999, Britain restored diplomatic relations with Libya after it agreed to cooperate with the investigation of the 1984 fatal shooting of a British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, outside Libya's embassy in London. British investigators believe a member of Libya's embassy staff shot her while firing on Libyan dissidents demonstrating outside the embassy.
In what some construe as part of the effort to soften its international image, Libya also has tried to mediate an end to conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and within Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, some believe Libya is trying to extend its influence in Africa rather than broker peace, and some in Congress assert that Libya continues to arm rebel groups in Africa, such as the Revolutionary United Fron in Sierra Leone. 55
In 1999, Libya also began to distance itself publicly from groups opposed to the Arab-Israeli peace process. It expelled Abu Nidal Organization in 1998. However, Libya continues to give some financial assistance to PIJ and the PFLP-GC, according to Patterns 1998.
Sudan 56
Like some of the other terrorism list states, Sudan is trying to change its international image. In August 1994, Sudan turned over the terrorist Carlos (Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez) to France. In May 1996, it asked bin Ladin to leave Sudan, although some of his followers and businesses remained, according to Patterns 1998, and bin Ladin remained in contact with Sudan's Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi. Sudan strenuously denied that the pharmaceutical plant attacked by the United States on August 20, 1998 (the al-Shifa plant) was involved in producing chemical agents for bin Ladin. It requested, but did not receive, a U.N. investigation of the plant that Sudan said would prove its denials. In May 1999, Sudan told the United States it would sign a U.N. convention on the suppression of terrorism and related anti-terrorism conventions. 57 Since later 1998, Sudan has also turned to a measure of political reform - following independent parties to operate openly, inviting back opposition leaders, and meeting with exiled opponents to map out a new political consensus - to promote an image of moderation.
Despite its attempts to appear cooperative, Sudan still gives safehaven to members of Abu Nidal Organization, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iranian-backed Hizballah. Both President Umar Hassan al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi warmly welcomed Shaykh Yassin when he visited in May 1998, and formally allowed him to open a Hamas office in Khartoum. Sudan also hosts militants from the Egyptian opposition Islamic Group and al-Jihad orgnaizations, which are increasingly affiliated with bin Ladin. Sudan has refused to comply with three U.N. Security Council resolution (1044 of January 31, 1996; 1054, of April 26, 1996, and 1070 of August 16, 1996) demanding it extradite the three Islamic Groups suspects in the June 1995 assassination attempt against President Mubarak.
Partly in response to Sudan's harboring of terrorists, the United States closed its Embassy in Khartoum in February 1996, although diplomatic relations were not broken. The U.S. Ambassador to Sudan has since worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya. On the basis of Sudan's support for terrorism, its efforts to destabilize its neighbors, and its poor human rights record, on November 3, 1997, President Clinton banned U.S. trade with and investment in Sudan.
Iraq 58
U.S.-Iraq differences over Iraq's regional ambitions and its record of compliance with cease fire requirements will probably keep Iraq on the terrorism list as long as Saddam Husayn remains in power. Observers are virtually unanimous in assessing Iraq's record of compliance with its postwar obligations as poor, and its human rights record as abysmal. However, international pressure on Iraq on these broader issues appears to have constrained Iraq's ability to use terrorism. Patterns 1998 reports that Iraq is rebuilding its intelligence network, and adds that Iraqi agents were planning a terrorist attack in October 1998 against the Prague-based Radio Free Iraq service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. No attack occurred. The service represents a U.S.-funded effort to discredit Saddam Husayn's regime.
Like Radio Free Iraq, most Iraqi targets have been identified with Iraq's past humiliations or efforts to enforce international sanctions on Iraq. It organized a failed assassination plot against former President Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait. Since 1991, it has sporadically attacked international relief workers in northern Iraq. It might have been responsible for the killing of Iraqi dissidents in Jordan over the past few years.
Iraq has been less concerned with supporting anti-peace process Palestinian groups. Since December 1998, Baghdad has hosted Abu Nidal, although his organization is relatively inactive and Abu Nidal himself is believed to be undergoing medical treatment there. As a lever in its relations with Iran, Iraq continues to host the Iranian opposition PMOI, and the PMOI's army, the National Liberation Army (NLA) has bases in Iraq, near the border with Iran. However, Iraq apparently has reduced support for the group as Iraq's relations with Tehran have improved over the past two years.
|
IN THE UNITED STATES (AS OF END 1998) |
|
|
|
|
| IRAN (added to list January 19,1984) | $22.5 million, consisting of blocked
diplomatic property and related accounts. |
| IRAQ (on list at inception, December 29, 1979, removed March 1982, restored to list September 13, 1990) | $2.2 billion, primarily blocked bank deposits
in U.S. Includes $540 million blocked in U.S. banks' foreign branches,
and $211 million
transferred to a U.N. escrow account. |
| SYRIA (placed on list at inception, December 29, 1979) | $51 million in liabilities of U.S. banking
and non-banking institutions to Syrian institutions
(not blocked). |
| SUDAN (added to list August 12, 1993) | $17.3 million in blocked
bank deposits. Includes $400,000in U.S. banks' foreign branches. |
| LIBYA (placed on list at inception, December 29, 1979) | $951.3 million, primarily blocked bank deposits. Includes $1.1 million blocked in U.S. banks' foreign branches |
Source: 1998 Annual Report to Congress on Assets in the United States
Belonging
to Terrorist Countries or International Terrorist Organizations.
Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury. January
1999.
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There is no universally agreed strategy, either within the United States or between the United States and its Middle Eastern and European allies, for countering Middle Eastern terrorism. Some advocate options that pressure terrorist groups and state sponsors, although success often depends on bilateral, multilateral, or international cooperation with U.S. efforts. Others believe that engagement with terrorism state sponsors and U.S. efforts to address terrorists' grievances are more effective in reducing terrorism over the long term. In recent years, the United States has leaned more toward pressure than engagement. However, there are some signs that the United States, without dropping its policy of refusing to make concessions to terrorists, now sees a larger role for diplomacy in its policy mixture.
There are some signs that Congress might not be satisfied with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. Section 591 of the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations law (P.L. 105-277) created a ten member "National Commission on Terrorism" to review progress on anti-terrorism. Although the law creating the commission was signed October 21, 1998, the Commission has not yet begun its deliberations because all its members have not yet been appointed. Controversy derailed one appointee when some groups protested that he condoned the actions of some terrorist groups. 59
An exhaustive discussion of U.S. efforts to combat Middle Eastern terrorism is beyond the scope of this paper, but the following sections highlight key themes in U.S. efforts to counter Middle Eastern terrorism. 60
Military Force
The Administration and Congress appear to believe that unilateral military force can still be an effective tool against Middle Eastern terrorism. Although the U.S. allies have often been the victims of Middle Eastern terrorism, they continue to maintain that military retaliation could inspire a cycle of attack and reaction that might be difficult to control. On some occasions, U.S. allies have provided some logistic and diplomatic support for U.S. retaliatory attacks. The U.S. military actions against terrorists have almost always enjoyed strong congressional support.Major U.S. attacks have taken place in retaliation for terrorist acts sponsored by Libya and Iraq, as well as those allegedly sponsored by the bin Ladin network. On April 15, 1986, the United States sent about 100 U.S. aircraft to bomb military installations in Libya. The attack was in retaliation for the April 2, 1986 bombing of a Berlin nightclub in which 2 U.S. military personnel were killed, and in which Libya was implicated. On June 26, 1993, the United States fired cruise missiles at the headquarters in Baghdad of the Iraqi intelligence Service, which allegedly sponsored a failed assassination plot against former President George Bush during his Apr. 14-1, 1993 visit to Kuwait. (Other U.S. retaliation against Iraq since 1991 has been prompted by Iraqi violations of ceasefire terms not related to terrorism.) The August 20, 1998 cruise missile strikes against the bin Ladin network represented a U.S. strike against a group, not a state sponsor. As noted above, the United States simultaneously struck the al- Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan on the grounds that it was allegedly contributing to chemical weapons manufacture for bin Ladin.
U.S. military has had mixed success. Libya was quiescent just after the 1986 U.S. strike, but it apparently returned to the use of terrorism in the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 and the UTA bombing in 1989. Since the 1933 strike, Iraq has avoided terrorist attacks against high profile U.S. targets, but it has continued to defy U.N. efforts to clear up remaining questions about its past weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The airstrikes against bin Ladin did not prompt the Taliban leadership to extradite or expel him from Afghanistan, although the strikes apparently did contribute to Taliban moves to exercise tighter control over his activities and movements in Afghanistan.
Unilateral Economic Sanctions
The United States has been willing to apply economic sanctions unilaterally to state sponsors of terrorism, even though there is substantial disagreement among experts about their effectiveness. The listing of a country as a state sponsor of terrorism alone triggers a wide range of U.S. economic sanctions. Countries on the list are prohibited from receiving U.S. foreign aid, Export-Import Bank guarantees, and sales of items on the U.S. Munitions Control List. U.S. exports to terrorism list countries are subject to strict licensing requirements that generally prohibit exports of items that can have military applications, such as advanced sensing, computation, or transportation equipment. 61 Foreign aid appropriations bills over the past several years have barred any direct or indirect assistance to most states on the terrorism list. As shown in the table above, the United States also tries to maintain some leverage over terrorism list states and groups by blocking some of their assets in the United States.Placement on the U.S. terrorism list does not automatically trigger a total ban on trade with the United States. However, a U.S. trade ban is in effect for every Middle Eastern terrorism list state, except Syria, under separate Executive orders. On July 7, 1999, President Clinton imposed a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan, and impounded Taliban's U.S.-based assets, because of Taliban's refusal to extradite or expel bin Ladin. Even though Taliban controls 90% of Afghan territory, the United States does not recognize Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, which explains why the trade ban was not formally imposed on the country of Afghanistan.
It does not appear that unilateral U.S. economic sanctions, by themselves, force major changes in the behavior of state sponsors of terrorism. Major U.S. allies did not join the U.S. trade ban imposed on Iran in May 1995 and the move did not, in itself, measurably alter Iran's objectionable behavior. On the other hand, virtually all Middle Eastern terrorism list states have publicly protested their inclusion on the list and other U.S. sanctions, suggesting that these sanctions are hurting politically and /or economically. Three years after being included on the terrorism list, Sudan expelled Usama bin Ladin from that country. U.S. officials assert that U.S. sanctions, even if unilateral, have made some terrorism state sponsors "think twice" about promoting terrorism.
To encourage efforts at moderation, in April 1999 the Administration announced that it would permit, on a case-by-case basis, commercial sales of U.S. food and medical products to Libya, Sudan and Iran. All three have recently shown some signs of greater cooperation with the international community or internal reform.
Multilateral Approaches
In concert with U. S. unilateral sanctions, the United States has sought to develop multilateral approaches to combating Middle Eastern terrorism, recognizing that U.S. allies still prefer dialogue and economic engagement with terrorism sponsors to policies of isolation and economic sanctions. In May 1998, in exchange for a waiver of sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172), the United States obtained pledges from the European Union (EU) and Russia of greater anti-terrorism cooperation with the United States. This agreement has been implemented through greater exchanges of information, joint efforts to counter terrorist fundraising, and the development of improved export controls on explosives and conventions against nuclear terrorism. 62 On May 25, 1998, the EU countries agreed on a "code of conduct" to curb arms sales to states that might use the arms to support terrorism. However, the code is not legally binding on the EU member governments. 63The United States also has organized international meetings to forge greater multilateral cooperation on terrorism, although progress and implementation of agreed measures have been slow. In the wake of February and March 1996 suicide bombings in Israel, conducted by groups believed supported by Iran, President Clinton convened a March 13-14, 1996 "Summit of Peacemakers" in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.
Bilateral Approaches
The United States has tried to aid some governments facing opposition from groups that conduct acts of terrorism. The Administration has sought to rein in the radical pro-Iranian Hizballah organization in Lebanon by providing military and law enforcement assistance to the government of Lebanon, including sales of 800 U.S. excess armored personnel carriers. The United States also has provided non-lethal aid, such as excess trucks and equipment, to PA security forces in an effort to strengthen them against the opposition Hamas and PIJ. Several Middle East countries, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey, receive anti-terrorism assistance through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program run by the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in which the United States provides training in airport security, explosives detection, and crisis management.The Administration has also tried to encourage better "on the ground" cooperation with governments in the region. In February 1995, Pakistan cooperated with U.S. law enforcement agents in capturing, in Pakistan, Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf (see above). At the time of his capture in June 1997, the State Department said Pakistan was helpful in the search for Mir Aimal Kansi, who was sought in connection with the Jan. 25, 1993 shooting outside CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Two CIA employees were killed and three were wounded in that attack. (On January 23, 1998, Kansi was sentenced to death for the crime.) The Pakistani press has also reported that U.S. law enforcement teams have been in Pakistan, near the Afghan border, to gather information or conduct operations against bin Ladin.
On occasion, allies of the United States, probably for internal political or foreign policy reasons, have appeared reluctant to cooperate with U.S. efforts to capture terrorists. In 1985 Egypt gave safe passage to the hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro; it offered them safe passage in return for their ending the hijacking. In April 1995, according to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia did not attempt to detain a known terrorist when a plane, on which he was believed to be a passenger, landed in Saudi Arabia. The terrorist is believed to be Imad Mughniyah, a Hizballah leader who reputedly held some of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon. 64 The Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, and Attorney General Janet Reno, have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of Saudi cooperation with the FBI investigation of the Khobar Towers bombing, although press reports in mid 1999 suggested that cooperation has improved recently.
The Administration and Congress have sometimes taken steps to try to compel other governments' cooperation with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. On June 21, 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), enabling U.S. law enforcement authorities to capture suspected terrorists by force from foreign countries that refuse to cooperate in their extradition. 65 Congress, in reaction to press reports about the Mughniyah incident, included a provision (Section 330) in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-132) prohibiting the sale of arms to any country that the President certifies to Congress is not cooperating fully with U. S. antiterrorism efforts. Since the law was enacted in April 1996, the seven terrorism list countries, along with Afghanistan, have been designated as not cooperative. Sections 325 and 326 of that law amend the Foreign Assistance Act by requiring the President to withhold U.S. foreign assistance to any government that provides assistance or lethal military aid to any terrorism list country. In April 1999, three Russian entities were sanctioned under this provision for providing anti-tank weaponry to Syria.
Selective Engagement
According to recent Patterns reports, it is the policy of the United States to apply maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists. However, the United States does conduct diplomacy with some state sponsors and countries that have influence on them, in order to curb state support for terrorism. The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran, Iraq, or Libya, but it does have diplomatic relations with Sudan and Syria. The United States has engaged Syria in the Arab-Israeli peace process and has not moved to expand U.S. sanctions or persuade U.S. allies to impose sanctions on Syria. The United States has allowed U.S. private investment in Syria's oil and other industries to expand. As a by-product of its participation in the peace process, Syria conducts a dialogue with the United States on terrorism, and U.S. officials have occasionally expressed a measure of satisfaction with what they describe as declining Syrian support for terrorism and cooperation in resolving some specific terrorism cases.
Since early1998, the United States has sought to draw Iran into an official dialogue. However, Iran has not accepted the U.S. offer of dialogue because of factional infighting between Khatemi and his opponents. The United States held an official meeting with a Libyan official in June 1999, shortly after Libya handed over the two Pan Am 103 suspects. The United States also has said it is willing to negotiate with the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan some mechanism for brining bin Ladin to justice. The United States has not sought dialogue with Iraq; terrorism appears to be the least of the differences between the United States and Iraq.
The Domestic Front
The February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as well as Israeli allegations that month that Hamas was receiving funding and direction from Arab residents in the United States, placed greater focus in the Administration and Congress on domestic efforts to combat Middle Eastern terrorist groups. The Trade Center bombing exposed the vulnerability of the United States to Middle Eastern-inspired terrorism as did no other event previously. The bombing also sparked much academic research and law enforcement investigation into the activities of radical Muslims in the United States and alleged fundraising in the United States for Middle East terrorism.
U.S. responses to these trends were contained in President Clinton's January 23, 1995, Executive order on Middle Eastern terrorism, and in several provisions of the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Some of the new measures, particularly those dealing with immigration and investigative powers, have drawn substantial criticism from U.S. civil liberties groups, which fear excessive intrusions by law enforcement authorities. These groups also have said that the prohibition on donations to groups allegedly involved in terrorism infringes free speech. Some Arab-American organizations have complained that U.S. residents and citizens of Arab descent are being unfairly branded by suspicions of terrorist involvement. Citing the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, some critics maintain that U.S. experts prematurely accuse Arab and Muslim groups of terrorist acts. For further information on domestic responses to terrorism, see: CRS
IB95112. Terrorism, the Future, and U. S. Foreign Policy. Updated regularly,
by Raphael Perl.
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FOOTNOTES:
- Each year, under the provisions of Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C 24050(j)), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, provides Congress with a list of countries that support international terrorism.
- Fifteen other groups not considered Middle East-related were also designated as FTO's in the original October 8, 1997 designations. In most cases, the FTO's have several different aliases. For a complete list of these alternate names, see U.S. Department of the Treasury. Office of Foreign Assets Control. Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions.
- For other names under which Hizballa or the other groups discussed in this paper operate, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions.
- FBI Ties Iran to Argentine Bombing in '94. Washington Post, August 8, 1998.
- Diderich, Joelle. FBI Suspects Hizbollah Network in S. America. Reuters, May 13, 1998.
- Israel Says Hizbollah May Have Stinger Missiles. Reuters, May 18, 1997.
- Hizbollah Says Training Hamas Militants in Lebanon. Reuters, October 3, 1997.
- Conversations with Saudi and U.S. officials during 1996-97.
- Iran Hostage Takers Now Hold Key Posts. Newsday Wire Service, printed in Roanoke Times and World News. Sept. 8, 1994. P. A11.
- The list of SDT's is contained in the Office of Foreign Assets Control factsheet "Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions."
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad should not be confused with Islamic Jihad, which is a name often used by elements of Hizballah in the conduct of terrorist or military operations, or with al-Jihad, the Egyptian group which is sometimes called Egyptian Islamic Jihad or Egyptian Jihad.
- The poll was commissioned by the International Republican Institute, and conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, in Nablus.
- Emerson, Steven. Islamic Terror: From Midwest to Mideast. Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1995.
- Islamic Jihad in Florida. Washington Times, editorial, November 10, 1995.
- These figures are contained in the 1998 Annual Report to Congress on Assets in the United States Belonging to Terrorist Countries or International Terrorist Organizations. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury. January 1999.
- A faction of the Jihad operates under the name "Vanguards of Conquest."
- For more information, see Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman and His Followers, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report 93-709, July 28, 1993. This report includes information about Abd al-Rahman's entry into and immigration status in the United States.
- Islamic Jihad Claims To Have Toxic Weapons. Washington Times, April 21, 1999.
- Egypt's Most Wanted. The Estimate, December 19, 1997. P.8.
- Egypt Jihad Leader Threatens US Mideast Interests. Reuters, July 9, 1998.
- Ibid.
- Switzerland Receives Luxor Massacre Report. Reuters, July 5, 1999.
- Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993. Released April 1994. P.4.
- ABC News interview with bin Ladin. Nightline, June 10, 1998.
- Risen, James and Benjamin Weiser. U.S. Officials Say Aid for Terrorists Came Through Two Persian Gulf Nations. New York Times, July 8, 1999.
- U.S. Sees Links in Brooklyn To World Terrorist Network. New York Times, October 22, 1998.
- Weisner, Benjamin. U.S. Says Bin Laden Aide Tried to Get Nuclear Material. New York Times, September 26, 1998. Loeb, Vernon. U.S. Unfreezes Assets of Saudi Who Owned Plant Bombed in Sudan. Washington Post, May 4, 1999.
- Loeb, Vernon. U.S. Unfreezes Assets of Saudi Who Owned Plant Bombed in Sudan. Washington Post. May 4, 1999.
- Risen, James and Benjamin Weisner. U.S. Officials Say Aid for Terrorists Came Through Two Persian Gulf Nations. New York Times, July 8, 1999.
- Arab Businessmen Donate Millions to Aid Bin Laden. Baltimore Sun, July 7, 1999.
- For more information, see CRS Report 98-219F. Algeria: Developments andDilemmas, by Carol Migdalovitz, updated August 18, 1998.
- Bin Laden Advised Algeria's radical GIA-Radio. Reuters, February 15, 1999.
- McGregory, Daniel. Terror in Yemen Imperils Port Deal. London Times, January 6, 1999.
- El Sayyid Nosair, a radical Islamist associated with Shaykh Abd al-Rahman and others involved in the World Trade Center bombing, was convicted of weapons possesion for the attack on Kahane, but not the murder itself.
- These reports are submitted in accordance with Section 804(b) of the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 (Title VIII of P.L. 101-246, as amended) and Section 604(b)(1) of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 (Title VI of P.L.104-107). The latest report was issued November 20, 1997.
- Schenker, David. Arafat Vs. The "Terrorist Infrastructure": A Status Report. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Peacewatch 191, December 10, 1998.
- Closing In on the Pan Am Bombers. U.S.News and World Report, May 22, 1989. P.23.
- Jordan's al-Majd Reports on PFLP's Congress, Next Leader. FBIS-NES-98-180, June 29, 1998.
- The DFLP has splintered into factions, but the one headed by Nayif Hawatmeh dominates the organization and is the one discussed in this paper.
- Holmes, Paul. Achille Lauro Mastermind Looks Back at 50. Reuters, June 24, 1998.
- Risen, James. A Much-Shunned Terrorist Is Said to Find Haven in Iraq. New York Times, January 27, 1999.
- Ibid.
- For more information on the PKK, see Turkey's Kurdish Imbroglio and U.S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz, CRS Report 94-267, Mar. 18, 1994. The PKK is distinct from Iranian and Iraqi Kurdish organizations which the State Department does not consider terrorist and which, in the case of Iraqi Kurds, benefit from U.S. support.
- Interview with Abdullah Ocalan by Michael Gunter. Middle East Quarterly, June 1998.
- Along with Cuba and North Korea, these countries have been designated by the Secretary of State, under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) as having repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism.
- Slavin, Barbara. Libya May Be Taken Off Terrorism List. USA Today, July 8, 1999. Removal from the list requires advance certification to the House International Relations Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate Banking Committee that the country has ceased support for international terrorism and pledges to continue doing so.
- The countries currently on this non-cooperative list are already ineligible for such purchases under other statutes or U.S. decisions.
- For further information, see CRS Issue Brief IB93033. Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy. Updated regularly, by Kenneth Katzman.
- For further information on the German terrorism case, see CRS Report 97-463F, Iran:Implications of Germany's Terrorism Trial. April 17, 1997, by Kenneth Katzman. 6 p.
- For further information on Syria and its support for terrorist groups, see Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred Prados, CRS Issue Brief 92075 (updated regularly).
- Mideast-USA-Syria-2 Washington. Reuters report on statements by State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin. July 19, 1999.
- Friedman, Thomas. A Saudi-Iranian Schmooze. New York Times (editorial), May 1, 1997. P.A35.
- For further information on Libya and its involvement in terrorism, see Libya, by Clyde Mark, CRS Issue Brief 93109 (updated regularly).
- Slavin, Barbara. Libya May Be Taken Off Terrorist List. USA Today, July 8, 1999.
- Libya Must Fulfill All Requirements to Have Sanctions Lifted. USIS Washington File, July 22, 1999.
- For further information see CRS Issue Brief IB98043. Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy. Updated regularly, by Theodros S. Dagne.
- Goshko, John. Sudan to Sign Anti-Terrorism Accords and Join Chemical Warfare Ban. Washington Post, May 22, 1999.
- For further information on Iraq, see Issue Brief IB92117, Iraqi Compliance With Ceasefire Agreements, updated regularly, by Kenneth Katzman.
- Goodstein, Laurie. Gephardt Bows to Jews' Anger Over a Nominee. New York Times, July 9, 1999
- An extended discussion of U.S. counter-terrorism policy, policy options, and legislation is provided by CRS Issue Brief 95112. Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Updated regularly, by Raphael Perl
- The above list of sanctions are under the following authorities: Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended [P.L.96-72;50 U.S.C. app. 2405 (j)]; Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended [P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2780]; and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L.87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371]
- Patterns 1998. P. V.
- Plan Still Lets Rogue States Buy Arms. Associated Press, May 26, 1998.
- Hizballah Denies Mughniyah on Board Plane. FBIS-NES-95-079. Apr. 25, 1995. P. 44
- Policy on Terror Suspects Overseas. Washington Post, February 5, 1997
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