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96-681 F

Updated September 13, 1996

Intelligence Reorganization In the 104th Congress: Prospects for A More Corporate Community<

Richard A. Best, Jr.

Analyst in National Defense

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

SUMMARY

Proposals to reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community have received considerable attention during the 104th Congress. Intensive assessments were undertaken by the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, known as the Aspin-Brown Commission, and by the House Intelligence Committee's review known as IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. The Senate Intelligence Committee also undertook extensive hearings and a number of private organizations have contributed serious assessments. Intelligence reorganization legislation has been reported by several committees.

The National Security and Armed Services Committees have expressed opposition to enhancement of the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) over the large intelligence organizations of the Department of Defense (DOD), viz. the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO, the Central Imagery Office (CIO), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Nevertheless, many observers believe that fundamental problems in the management of the Intelligence Community may require legislative remedies.

The central issue is the extent to which the Nation's various intelligence agencies should be managed more corporately. Intelligence agencies have evolved in different ways without central management; DCIs have had coordinative mechanisms since the Nixon Administration, but they have not created a corporate body with more tightly controlled budget execution, missions, procedures, products, and methods of dissemination. Some observers suggest more centralization is needed; the end of the Cold War has shifted priorities from the "hard targets" of the Soviet Union and its allies to a multitude of diffuse situations throughout the world. Secondly, they point out that although the defense budget into which intelligence spending is accommodated has been drastically reduced, intelligence spending has been cut proportionately less.

BACKGROUND

Over the years, there have been numerous proposals for greater centralization of the Intelligence Community. The DCI's authority has been gradually strengthened through a number of NSC documents, executive orders, and statutes since the Nixon Administration. The current DCI, John Deutch, has placed more emphasis on his responsibilities for the entire community than most of his predecessors who tended to focus on the management of the CIA itself and especially on the Directorate of Operations that has responsibilities for covert action. Individual agencies, however, retain their independent roles and missions; in many cases intelligence is collected and analyzed according to collection discipline, e.g., imagery, signals intelligence, human intelligence, etc. in separate administrative structures (often termed "stovepipes") that do not permit synergistic fusion of data by analysts at each level or echelon. DCIs have not had the power (nor usually the inclination) to make trade-offs among collection disciplines, especially those that involve substantial expenditures in the defense budget. Thus, some observers believe that sophisticated and expensive systems are sometimes employed to acquire information that is available from less complex systems or from open sources.

These observers believe that the DCI and the Community Management Staff (CMS) that serves as his coordinating mechanism should establish collection requirements worldwide, not just focus on maintaining an ability to concentrate resources in crises. They should, it is argued, required the maintenance of a better intelligence "base," i.e., encyclopedic knowledge of many areas and issues that can then be supplemented when necessary in crises. Further, they maintain, the DCI and the CMS should explore trade-offs among collection systems; in many cases, they seek to avoid the use of highly sophisticated and expensive collection systems (often satellites) when in reality the needed intelligence could be acquired with less costly systems (e.g., manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and human agents) or even from open and unclassified sources. The obstacles to greater efficiency and cost effectiveness, they suggest, have often been resistance by those committed to certain intelligence collection programs and an absence of effective coordination across the Intelligence Community. Proposals for reorganizations have included several different approaches to enhancing the DCI's coordinative mechanisms.

One major intelligence reorganization proposal that appears likely to be enacted is the creation of a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Combining elements of the Defense Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Central Imagery Office, NIMA would provide mapping and imagery support to both national and military consumers. According to the Conference version of the FY1997 Defense Authorization bill (H.R.3230), it would become a combat support agency of DOD, but tasking for national collection requirements would be levied by the DCI.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Aspin-Brown Commission. In its March 1996 report, the Aspin-Brown Commission made a number of recommendations to strengthen the DCI's ability to provide centralized direction of intelligence collection and analysis. Several proposals involved changing budgeting structures and processes within the executive branch (especially the enhancement of the Community Management Staff), but some would require new legislation:

Two deputy DCIs (instead of the current one) to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, one for the entire Intelligence Community and the other for day-to-day management of the CIA.

The DCI would have to concur in appointments of heads of "national" intelligence organizations in DOD (NSA, CIO, and the NRO) and would be consulted about other Intelligence Community appointments.

A Senior Intelligence Service would be created under the overall management of the DCI.

Senate. In early March 1996, legislation (S.1593) was introduced in the Senate that included most of the Aspin-Brown Commission's recommendations. The following month, however, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill (S.1718) that also contained substantive intelligence reorganization provisions. The accompanying report (S.Rept.104-258) agreed with many of the recommendations of the Commission but stated that the Committee "believes, however, that the [Aspin-]Brown Commission did not go far enough in providing the Director of Central Intelligence with both the necessary authority and the necessary support structure to ensure improved efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in the U.S. Intelligence Community." Section 707 of S.1718 would provide the DCI with a greater role in the development of budgets for defense intelligence activities and would give him the authority to "direct and oversee the allocation, allotment, obligation, and expenditure of funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the national intelligence programs, projects, and activities" of CIA, NSA, the NRO, and NIMA. The bill would also create an Assistant DCI for Collection who would provide guidance and direction for the procurement and operation of national intelligence collection systems and formulate plans and budgets for national collection activities. An Assistant DCI for Analysis and Production would be created to establish priorities and standards of analysis and production and monitor the allocation of resources for analysis and production. An Assistant DCI for Administration would be responsible for personnel management and an Intelligence Community Senior Executive Service would be created. In addition, the DCI would have to concur in the appointment of the director of NSA, the NRO, and NIMA and would be consulted prior to the appointment of other intelligence agency heads.

S.1718, which was reported by the Intelligence Committee on April 30, 1996, received a skeptical reception when it was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). The Armed Services Committee's report (S.Rept.104-277) noted that there had been "lengthy and detailed negotiations in an attempt to resolve issues of disagreement." (p.1) SASC expressed concern that S.1718 would shift a significant degree of authority from the Pentagon to the DCI "especially in the area of budget formulation and execution." Accordingly, SASC proposed an amendment that would enhance the DCI's community-wide role although not to the extent proposed by the Intelligence Committee. The SASC amendment would strike provisions allowing the DCI to transfer funds and personnel among intelligence agencies as well as provisions to manage and expend funds of DOD agencies. It would give the DCI authority to establish national collection priorities, but leave DOD with final authority for Defense intelligence activities. Appointments to DOD intelligence agencies would be recommended to the President after concurrence by the DCI had been sought (and the President would be advised of any non-concurrence).

The FY1997 Defense Authorization bill (H.R.3230), as reported by the Conference Committee on July 30, 1996, included provisions requiring that the DCI be consulted in appointments of heads of defense intelligence agencies. If the DCI does not concur in an appointment of an individual, the Secretary of Defense could nonetheless forward the recommendation to the President but the DCI's non-concurrence would have to be noted. In addition, the bill included provisions to establish NIMA as a combat support agency of DOD.

House. The House version of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R.3259) contains no intelligence reorganization provisions. Separate legislation, the Intelligence Community Act, H.R.3237, was reported by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on June 13, 1996. Based on the IC21 Study, the Intelligence Community Act would establish a Deputy DCI for Community Management (in addition to the currently existing Deputy DCI). The Deputy for Community Management would manage the Community Management Staff and perform other community-wide functions, including the management of personnel, resources, and requirements. He would also have responsibility for a newly created Infrastructure Support Office that would be charged with administrative, personnel, and logistical duties that affect more than one intelligence agency. The DCI would have the power to transfer funds (up to a limit of 5% of the program element affected) with or without the approval of the losing program manager. Clandestine human intelligence (humint) collection by DOD would be transferred to the DCI.

Review of the Intelligence Community Act by the House National Security Committee (HNSC) resulted in proposals for significant modification (as reflected in H.Rept.104-620, Part 2). HNSC expressed concern about "sudden comprehensive restructuring of the intelligence community in the face of an unpredictable international environment" and argued that incremental change is "the more prudent course." It would retain the two deputy DCIs proposed by the House Intelligence Committee; the Deputy DCI for Community Management would coordinate community-wide resources and requirements as well as research and development. The Community Management Staff would perform budget execution review of the NFIP, but could only recommend to agency comptrollers that funding be withheld if program managers were not complying with DCI guidance. The HNSC was not prepared to authorize the DCI to transfer funds without the approval of the affected program manager. NIMA would be established as a combat support agency. HNSC would encourage greater cooperation in humint collection between DOD and the CIA, but would not transfer responsibilities from DOD.

Clinton Administration. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on April 24, 1996, DCI Deutch described his close working relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John White, and their efforts to manage intelligence resources in a more corporate manner for national as well as joint and tactical programs. He indicated that the Administration proposed to increase the number of deputy DCIs from one to three, one as principal deputy, one for community matters, and one for day-to-day management of the CIA. He further indicated that the Administration wanted the DCI to have a role appointing senior intelligence officials in agencies other than the CIA. Deutch made the Administration's strong support for NIMA apparent, suggesting to some that inclusion of NIMA would be essential to Administration support for any reorganization legislation.

Subsequently, Deputy Secretary White testified to the House Intelligence Committee and the House National Security Committee in regard to the Intelligence Community Act, H.R.3237. He strongly supported NIMA, but expressed clear opposition to the proposal to allow the DCI to transfer funds from DOD programs without the approval of the Secretary of Defense. He also opposed the transfer of DOD humint collection to the CIA and to the creation of a deputy DCI for Community Management: "it would establish a management function over Defense organizations now under the direction, control and authority of the Secretary of Defense."

Prospects in the 104th Congress. The Conference Report on the FY1997 Defense Authorization bill, H.R.3230, with its establishment of NIMA, was passed by the House on August 1, 1996 and the Senate on September 10, 1996. It is expected to be signed by the President. In the remaining months of the 104th Congress, Congress will address intelligence authorization legislation for FY1997; it is uncertain whether that bill will contain intelligence reorganization provisions. The House passed its version, without reorganization provisions, on May 22, 1996; the Senate's version, S.1718, which does contain reorganization provisions, has not yet received floor consideration. Although the House Committee's Intelligence Community Act may never be considered on the floor, an eventual conference on the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill could address reorganization proposals. Given the short amount of time that Congress will be in session during the rest of 1996 and differences among Members, and especially between Intelligence and Armed Services/National Security Committees, passage could nevertheless prove difficult.

Despite the uncertain prospects for intelligence reorganization legislation, observers point out that both international realities and technology have irrevocably changed and that budgetary pressures are likely to increase. These changed conditions, they argue, ultimately have organizational ramifications that may need legislative authority. Whether the time has come and sufficient consensus exists to legislate organizational changes is a question that Members may wish to consider.

In the 104th Congress, it seems possible that some reorganization proposals, in addition to NIMA might be enacted, but their scope may be limited to the establishment of one or two additional Senate-confirmed deputy DCIs and an enhanced--but still essentially advisory--role for the DCI in the appointment of heads of intelligence agencies outside the CIA.

Arguments in favor of such provisions (probably to be included in authorization legislation):

A deputy DCI for Community Management would have greater influence by virtue of presidential appointment and Senate confirmation; he or she would be more successful in encouraging the kinds of trade-offs between collection disciplines that would best serve both military and national consumers and be most efficient;

The prerogatives of the Secretary of Defense to manage resources authorized and appropriated for DOD would not be significantly infringed;

Appropriate collection priorities, consistent data transmission standards, and sufficient communications links need to be established community-wide; achieving such steps does not require vesting the DCI with "line authority" over DOD agencies.

Arguments against enacting such provisions in the 104th Congress include:

The extent of possible reform provisions under serious consideration is woefully inadequate to the need for much greater centralization of intelligence activities; it would be better to wait for an opportunity for more comprehensive reorganization package could be enacted;

[Alternatively,] Intelligence reorganization is unnecessary; the executive branch has adequate authorities to make any necessary changes;

Even the likely proposed changes could jeopardize the necessary control of DOD intelligence agencies by the Secretary of Defense.