CRS 95018: Intelligence Issues and the 104th Congress

The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to face significant challenges in adapting to the post-Cold War world. Realignments and reductions are proceeding in accordance with Executive Branch directives and authorization and appropriation legislation. The revelations of the spying of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Aldrich Ames caused many observers to question not only the community's proficiency at counterintelligence, but also the "culture" of the CIA that allowed an unsuitable employee to be retained for a number of years.

The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community was established by the FY1995 Intelligence Authorization Act. Initially led by Les Aspin, subsequently by former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the Commission investigated many aspects of the U.S. intelligence effort and issued its final report on March 1, 1996. While not advocating major reconstruction of the Intelligence Community, the Aspin/Brown Commission did call for strengthening the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The House Intelligence Committee has undertaken an in- depth study, known as IC21, Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, and announced its recommendations in March 1996 (subsequently reported as H.R. 3237). The Senate Intelligence Committee has also been reviewing Intelligence Community organization and included reorganization provisions in its version of the FY1997 intelligence authorization bill; some of which were included in the conference version. Some provisions are also included in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201).

Many observers believe that, even with reductions, too much duplication of effort among intelligence agencies persists. The DCI, John Deutch, has recommended the consolidation of imagery collection, analysis, and distribution. A National Imagery and Mapping Agency combining imagery intelligence functions with the Defense Mapping Agency will be established in FY1997.

The 104th Congress is inevitably focusing on budgetary issues. There are a number of different perspectives on levels of intelligence spending; some would spend more, believing intelligence a "force multiplier." Others argue that the current emphasis on domestic issues requires steeper reductions in intelligence budgets. Although the House Intelligence Committee originally proposed a modest increase in the President's budget submission for FY1996, authorized spending for FY1996 provided for a slight reduction from FY1995 levels. The reduction resulted in large measure from dissatisfaction with the National Reconnaissance Office's management practices. Intelligence authorization legislation for FY1997, as reported, contains small increases over the amounts requested by the Administration (although some levels may be reduced in other legislation).

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 demonstrated the value of providing military commanders adequate and timely intelligence from the expensive satellite and intercept systems that formerly served only national-level decisionmakers. The acquisition of technical systems and procedures for their employment have been closely monitored by congressional committees. Many observers believe that significantly improved systems and architectures are now in place. Several legislative initiatives have addressed concerns about the use of U.S.-supplied intelligence by the United Nations.

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Conference Report (H.Rept. 104-832) on the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 3259) was approved by both the House and Senate on September 25, 1996. It provides for a Senate confirmed Deputy DCI for Community Management and three assistant DCIs with functional responsibilities. It further strengthens authorities of the DCI for coordinating Intelligence Community efforts, although it does not go as far in that direction as was earlier envisioned.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Even though the Cold War has long been declared "over"; the U.S. Intelligence Community, according to many observers, has not been adequately realigned to deal with new international realities. The difficult process of redirecting the concentration on the East-West strategic competition has been underway since the Bush Administration, in accordance with Executive Branch and congressional initiatives.

Opinions differ as to the appropriate missions of intelligence agencies in the post-Cold War world. Some see a need for agencies to collect intelligence about a wide variety of questions relating to the Nation's international concerns, not only in regard to military and diplomatic issues, but also in such other areas as counternarcotics, international crime, economic competition, the environment, health, etc. Those supporting this view would place relatively more emphasis on the acquisition and use of "open source" information -- data collected from the media, foreign government publications, business and academic reports. Others believe such functions should be the responsibility of other parts of the government and that intelligence agencies should in general focus on sensitive military and diplomatic questions, based on the acquisition and analysis of secret information.

Beginning in the Bush Administration, a number of steps to restructure the Intelligence Community has been taken. Intelligence budgets have been significantly reduced. CIA has largely moved away from analysis of military operations and weapons systems, leaving such topics to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. In 1992 then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Woolsey undertook to reduce personnel to a level 23% lower at the end of the decade, providing for early retirements and offering opportunities for the retraining of officials whose earlier specialties do not conform to current needs. During the Clinton Administration, there has been an extensive effort to integrate the intelligence collection and analysis efforts of Washington-based agencies with the needs of the military commanders -- an especially important need in view of the "military technical revolution" that requires highly accurate surveillance capabilities for precision guided munitions. Intelligence agencies have also provided greater analyses of "non-traditional" topics; intelligence contributions to the counternarcotics effort have continued and steps have been taken to disseminate information on illegal and unethical steps by foreign corporations to compete with U.S. firms.

Evolutionary changes, however, do not satisfy critics who believe that wholesale reform or restructuring of the Intelligence Community is necessary. Prescriptions for change vary, but some believe that dramatic reductions in intelligence funding are well advised and that the bureaucratic "culture" of the Community, and especially CIA, needs to be significantly altered. For many, the need for major changes was brought home by the controversy surrounding the spying of CIA official Aldrich Ames -- and the long time required to identify him. Ames compromised a large number of CIA operations in the former Soviet Union and his information led to the deaths of several officials who had provided information to the United States. Woolsey reprimanded some senior CIA officials, and the CIA has taken a number of steps to ensure that its officers are more carefully scrutinized. Both the House and Senate intelligence committees issued reports in 1994 sharply criticizing CIA's counterintelligence effort and the absence of effective cooperation between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Although the Administration established new counterintelligence boards and enhanced the FBI's role through a Presidential Decision Directive in May 1994 and the FY1995 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 103-359) provided for more extensive background investigation of intelligence personnel, many observers remained concerned that all the problems revealed by the Ames affair may not have been solved. The current DCI, John Deutch, has acted swiftly to discipline officials who did not keep congressional intelligence committees informed of CIA knowledge of human-rights violators in Guatemala.

A Presidential Decision Directive signed by President Clinton in 1995 established three major priorities for the Intelligence Community. First is intelligence support to military forces during operations. "If we have to stand down Iraqi aggression in the Gulf or stand for democracy in Haiti, our military commanders must have prompt, thorough intelligence to fully inform their decisions and maximize the security of our troops." Next come economic and military intelligence about countries hostile to the United States. Third is intelligence about specific trans-national threats to U.S. security, such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, illicit trade practices and environmental issues of great gravity. Some observers express concern that giving the highest emphasis to tactical military intelligence may eventually distort programmatic and funding priorities away from broader "national" concerns.

The House Republican Contract with America, as embodied in H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act, originally called for the United States to provide intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to a formal agreement between the President and the U.N. Secretary General. After a January 19th hearing to determine what procedures are currently being used to provide U.S. intelligence to the U.N., the House Intelligence Committee amended the bill to require the President to establish guidelines for providing such intelligence and to make semiannual reports on intelligence forwarded to the U.N. to the appropriate congressional committees. The legislation, as amended, subsequently passed the House. Senator Snowe introduced separate legislation (S. 420) limiting intelligence support for peacekeeping. The Foreign Relations Authorization bill for FYs 1996 and 1997 (H.R. 1561), vetoed by the President, would have required specific reports regarding the provision of intelligence to the U.N. The Conference version of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 3259) contains provisions requiring presidential certification that U.N. procedures to protect intelligence have been implemented and mandating periodic reports to congressional committees. (For background on intelligence support to peacekeeping operations, see Richard A. Best, Jr., Peacekeeping: Intelligence Requirements, CRS Report 94-394F, May 6, 1994.)

Intelligence issues are, of course, closely related to both defense and foreign policy matters. Decisions to reshape the military forces or to realign national security policies will heavily influence requirements for intelligence support. Although many uncertainties exist regarding U.S. national security policy in the post-Cold War world, there are a number of intelligence concerns that have been considered by the 104th Congress.

Intelligence Reorganization. The Intelligence Community is complex, consisting not only of CIA, DIA, NSA, intelligence branches of the military services, and organizations dealing with satellite reconnaissance, but also includes a number of smaller agencies and offices in other Federal Departments such as State, Justice and Treasury. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of proposals for organizational restructuring. Many of these proposals have aimed at simplification and reducing duplication. After study, however, many observers have concluded that radical centralization under the DCI is impractical because of the close relationship between various intelligence efforts and operational military forces. In the 102nd Congress, the two intelligence committees held extensive hearings, but did not ultimately recommend fundamental reorganization. The FY1993 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 102-496), however, did provide a statutory basis for the duties of the DCI vis-.-vis the various intelligence agencies (including overseeing the preparation of the budgets of intelligence agencies), defined the "intelligence community," and prescribed the duties of the Secretary of Defense regarding the functioning of the two DOD organizations responsible for the important (and costly) satellite programs, the Central Imagery Office (CIO) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

DCI Deutch in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on Dec. 19, 1995, indicated his belief that the DCI has most of the legal authorities needed to coordinate Intelligence Community activities. He argued that intelligence activities and their execution must be integrated into the joint military command structure and thus removing responsibility for intelligence programs from DOD would be ill-advised. Deutch did indicate an interest in securing enhanced authority to review tactical intelligence, to concur in the appointment of intelligence agency heads in DOD, and to approve reprogrammings of intelligence dollars. Such changes, admittedly not fundamental to the organization of the Intelligence Community, have nonetheless been viewed with concern by some in DOD and in the Congress.

The Commission on Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, mandated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1995 and headed by the late Les Aspin and subsequently by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, spent a year investigating virtually all aspects of the U.S. intelligence effort. The Commission's final report, issued on March 1, 1996, underscored the need for a highly capable Intelligence Community in the post-Cold War world. It included recommendations for two deputy DCIs (one for CIA and the other for the entire Intelligence Community), greater authority for the DCI to manage financial and personnel resources of national agencies outside the CIA, and special provisions to allow early retirements of personnel whose talents no longer meet current requirements.

In the 104th Congress, the House Intelligence Committee also initiated a comprehensive review, known as IC21, Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, to determine how intelligence should be shaped for the 21st century. A bill incorporating IC21 proposals (H.R. 3237) was introduced in April 1996. A Senate counterpart (S. 1593), had been introduced in March to address the future organization of the Intelligence Community. However, the Senate version of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill (S. 1718) incorporated intelligence reorganization provisions. None of these bills, however, was limited to the Aspin/Brown Commission's recommendations. The Administration has also initiated steps to enhance the authority of the DCI and other reorganization measures that do not require statutory changes. Although there is disagreement on the extent of the need for additional statutory legislation, a number of proposals have received widespread support:

The DCI should devote greater attention to community-wide issues and should have greater influence in the selection of heads of all intelligence agencies;

The DCI should have greater authority to establish collection and production priorities and to be consulted on the reprogramming of funds among national intelligence agencies;

There should be additional deputy DCIs, at least one of whom would have responsibilities beyond the CIA;

Intelligence personnel resources need to be realigned and there may be a need for special provisions to encourage early retirements.

Recommendations focused on improving the ability of the DCI to manage the Intelligence Community more effectively. Some have recommended that the DCI should have a deputy for day-to-day operations of the CIA and another to concentrate on the Intelligence Community as a whole. All envision increasing the authority of the DCI in designating heads of intelligence agencies outside the CIA. There have been differences of approach to means of giving the DCI a greater degree of authority over the entire Intelligence Community budget. Both the Aspin/Brown Commission and the House Committee would have provided the DCI with somewhat greater budgetary review powers and greater latitude in reprogramming funds and transferring personnel from one agency to another. Senate bill S. 1718, as originally introduced, would have given the DCI authority to "direct and oversee the allocation, allotment, obligation, and expenditure of funds" of CIA, NSA, the NRO, and the planned National Imagery and Mapping Agency. These efforts drew strong opposition from those concerned with the Defense Department's control of its component agencies.

The Commission recommended providing one-time authority for agency heads to offer buy-outs of personnel whose qualifications do not match current requirements; the original Senate bill would have provided the DCI with temporary authority to downsize intelligence agencies. IC21 recommended separating CIA's Operations Directorate, to be renamed the Clandestine Services, from the rest of CIA. The Commission and the original Senate bill would have created a National Assessments Center, separate from CIA, for all-source analysis whereas IC21 would return National Intelligence Officers to the CIA.

Intelligence authorization legislation passed by the Senate would make the total intelligence budget public and establish assistant DCI's (to be confirmed by the Senate) for collection, analysis and production, and administration and a CIA general counsel who would also be confirmed by the Senate. The legislation would also require that the DCI be consulted in the appointment of heads of intelligence agencies besides the CIA (although recommended appointments could still go forward without his concurrence as long as his non-concurrence was noted), and give him statutory authority to set intelligence collection priorities and to review all intelligence budgets.

Observers skeptical of the need for broad legislation pointed to existing authority of the DCI to coordinate collection and analysis taskings of national intelligence agencies, to allocate management responsibilities, and to be consulted on senior appointments. Some argued that these authorities have never been fully exercised by a succession of DCIs more concerned with the internal workings of the CIA. Still others suggested that the determination to emphasize centralized management of the Intelligence Community reflects an outmoded approach to organizational relationships, especially at a time when intelligence will be needed on a wide variety of subjects for a multitude of post-Cold War purposes.

Although establishment of a National Imagery and Mapping Agency and several other innovations were included in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act, the intelligence authorization conference became the vehicle for legislative action this year. (See Richard A. Best, Jr., Intelligence Reorganization in the 104th Congress: Prospects for a More Corporate Community, CRS Report 96-681F, September 13, 1996.) The Conference Report provided a number of significant innovations. There would be an additional four positions that would require Senate confirmation, viz. a Deputy Director DCI for Community Management and Assistant DCIs for Collection, Analysis and Production, and for Administration. The DCI would gain greater authorities for reviewing intelligence programs within DOD and would have to be consulted on the appointment of heads of intelligence agencies. Special attention was also given to improving cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Intelligence Budgets. Intelligence spending has inevitably been an issue. The House version of the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 1655), passed on Sept. 13, 1995, contained a 1.3% increase over the Administration's overall request. The Senate, concerned with financial management practices in the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), made significant reductions in that agency's budget. After conference, the version of H.R. 1655 provided for an overall decrease in intelligence spending, to incorporate reductions in the NRO's budget. Amounts authorized in H.R. 1655, which became law on January 6, 1996, are lower than the President's request and FY1995 levels, as a result of reductions in the NRO's budget, although some increases in other areas were accommodated, including a 4% increase in tactical intelligence funding. (For FY1997 actions see below, FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Bills.)

Almost all of the intelligence budget is subsumed within Defense Department appropriations bills, with specific intelligence agency or program funding levels not made public (although they are available to all Members). Reductions in overall defense spending place downward pressures on intelligence spending (theoretically, intelligence could be "fenced," but, in the real world of budgetary negotiations, intelligence will almost surely have to absorb its share of defense cuts). Intelligence spending has been authorized in two categories: national programs for Washington-level policymakers and tactical programs for military commanders. The House Intelligence Committee handles both; the Senate Intelligence Committee handles national programs while tactical programs are overseen by the Senate Armed Services Committee (although the Senate Intelligence Committee has informal input). Requesting a review of budget categories, the Senate Intelligence Committee has noted that "advances in technology have made the former definitions of "national" and "tactical" less meaningful to the budget process." (S.Rept. 104-97, p. 4.)

The Administration has proposed a third category, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), that would include some programs formerly in either the national or tactical categories. The introduction of the JMIP complicated consideration of FY1996 intelligence budget proposals, especially by the Senate where jurisdiction is divided between the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees. For FY1996, it was agreed that the Senate Armed Services Committee would authorize JMIP, but that a staff working group would be established to recommend how authorization responsibilities should apply to specific categories and activities. The Conference Report on the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill would give the DCI statutory authority to participate in the development of both JMIP and TIARA budgets.

Recent congresses have looked into the question of making the intelligence budget public, but no legislation on the question was enacted in the 103rd Congress. (See Richard A. Best, Jr. and Elizabeth B. Bazan, Intelligence Spending: Should Total Amounts Be Made Public?, CRS Report 94-261F.) Clinton Administration intelligence officials have indicated a willingness to make public a single total figure for intelligence spending, if a detailed breakdown could be precluded. The Senate version of the FY1997 Authorization bill includes a provision making public aggregate amounts appropriated for "all intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government." The House, however, voted down such an initiative on May 22, 1996 and none was included in the Conference Report.

Imagery. In his confirmation hearings, DCI Deutch expressed an intention to consolidate imagery collection, analysis, and distribution efforts. On November 28, 1995 the Administration announced an agreement "in concept" to create a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) as part of the Defense Department by October 1996. The new agency will consolidate imagery and mapping resources, including the Defense Mapping Agency (with some 7,000 employees), the Central Imagery Office, and the National Photographic Intelligence Center (which has been part of CIA) and NRO resources that have been dedicated to imagery exploitation and dissemination. (The NRO will continue to develop and operate satellites.) The DCI and the Secretary of Defense believe that a single, streamlined agency could best exploit the variety of imagery now available and effectively serve both national and DOD customers. Some observers, including Members of Congress, express concern, however, that under the new arrangement national requirements may come to be subordinated to military commanders. The FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act requested that Congress have an opportunity to study detailed plans for NIMA prior to implementation and discussions of the issue between the Administration and the intelligence committees are continuing. The FY1997 Defense Authorization Act established NIMA as a combat support agency of the Department of Defense with significant national missions.

Legislation relating to the National Reconnaissance Office was a source of controversy during the FY1996 authorization process. Despite a strong minority dissent, the House significantly redistributed funds requested for the NRO and, according to press reports, favored a new generation of small satellites or "smallsats." Subsequent press accounts indicated that the NRO had earlier amassed some $1 billion in unspent funds. Sizable reductions in appropriations for the NRO -- in addition to the redistribution approved in the House-passed intelligence authorization bill -- are reportedly included in the FY1996 defense appropriation bill and the Senate version of the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization bill was adjusted accordingly. Senator Kerrey, the Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has raised the possibility that reductions will result in cuts to important satellite programs or in extensions into future years. The Conference Committee on the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization bill addressed the question and included provisions for careful consideration of satellite collection architecture options. In late February 1996, DCI Deutch removed the Director of the NRO, Jeffrey Harris. Harris was replaced by Keith Hall, who had led the Community Management Staff, who will serve as the NRO's acting Director. According to June 1996 press accounts, a panel of experts who were requested by the DCI to review future satellite programs has endorsed the acquisition of smaller satellites. Although they may have less capabilities than larger platforms, their lower costs could permit more to be obtained for use in contingencies.

Intelligence for Military Commanders. The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 was a watershed for the U.S. Intelligence Community. The vital importance of highly accurate intelligence to precision bombing campaigns was amply demonstrated as was the effective tactical use of intelligence from "national" systems such as satellites. At the same time, major problems arose in the effort to disseminate intelligence to all the military "customers." Growing tactical requirements for imagery in particular as well as lack of compatibility among the communications systems of the military services overloaded the extant communications systems. In response, Congress and the Intelligence Community have acted to procure additional reconnaissance and communications equipment and have encouraged organizational changes to facilitate the transmission of intelligence data between tactical levels and Washington-area agencies. (See Richard A. Best, Jr., Intelligence Implications of the Military Technical Revolution, CRS Report 95-560F; Intelligence Technology in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, CRS Report 93-686F; Peacekeeping: Intelligence Requirements, CRS Report 94-394F.) This process is far from complete, however, and resource constraints may complicate efforts to implement the "lessons learned" from Desert Storm. Experience in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia will be evaluated to determine if new technologies and organizations are being effectively used. There is debate, in particular, about different strategies for acquiring an adequate airborne intelligence capability, given competing demands for unmanned aerial vehicles, upgrades of existing aircraft, and the need to install state of the art surveillance equipment. There is also concern among some observers that current efforts to improve tactical intelligence may ultimately degrade coverage of national issues.

Covert Actions. In P.L. 102-88, August 14, 1991, Congress revised reporting regulations for covert actions in response to concerns arising from the Iran-Contra affair. This legislation required the President to sign a finding authorizing each covert action and that the two intelligence committees (or, under exceptional conditions, to a smaller group of congressional leaders) be advised of the finding prior to initiation of a covert action or, if necessary, afterwards "in a timely manner." Although some Members would require that every finding be conveyed to Congress prior to initiation of a covert action, differences in this area have not been a major source of controversy in recent years. Nevertheless, many observers argue that CIA's Directorate of Operations requires major reform. In part, they argue the need for better counterintelligence and accountability within the operations directorate that was slow to detect the activities of Mr. Ames. Some also consider that the Intelligence Community's approach to covert action still reflects a Cold War mentality and that the need to work with new non-governmental actors in a variety of different areas requires approaches and personnel different from those used to penetrate the Soviet security apparatus. There is criticism of any contacts with, and payments to, foreign informants who may be involved with human rights abuses. There has always been a number of observers who believe that covert actions are inherently contrary to the Nation's democratic ideals and are now unnecessary given the absence of threats from another superpower.

In early 1995 controversy arose over charges that a Guatemalan military official who had received payments from the CIA had been involved in the 1990 murder of a U.S. citizen residing in Guatemala. DCI Deutch acknowledged in September 1995 that CIA officials had failed to keep congressional intelligence committees "fully and currently informed as required by law" regarding their knowledge of events in Guatemala. At the same time, the DCI announced that two officials of the Directorate of Operations who had been responsible for Agency efforts in Guatemala had been asked to retire and that disciplinary actions had been taken against several others. CIA activities in Guatemala are discussed in K. Larry Storrs, Guatemala and Allegations of Improper CIA. State and Defense Department Activities, CRS Report 95-690F, June 7, 1995. In late June 1996 the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) issued a report reviewing the Intelligence Community's involvement in Guatemala. The IOB found that CIA had not kept Congress fully and currently informed of its activities in Guatemala. Further, the IOB criticized previous failures by CIA to evaluate human intelligence sources on the basis of their human rights records thus maintaining contacts with Guatemalan officials with "egregious" human rights records.

In August 1996 media reports that cocaine had been sold in the 1980s by CIA assets associated with the Nicaraguan Contras have led to widespread demands for investigation. The CIA Inspector General and both intelligence committees have undertaken reviews of the charges.

Open Source Intelligence. The disparate challenges of the post-Cold War world will mean that analysts will have to depend much more on publicly available information, e.g., newspapers, journals, and radio and television than was the case when the principal targets were the military forces of enemy superpowers. Intelligence agencies are unlikely to have the resources to acquire and analyze secret information on every region and topic that might at some point affect the national interest; they must be able to utilize information that has already been made public in one form or another. The proper acquisition, storage, retrieval, and exploitation of open source intelligence may require new organizational elements in the Intelligence Community as well as new forms of analysis. Some observers question the extent to which this effort should be concentrated in the Intelligence Community instead of other Executive Branch agencies or the Library of Congress.

Cooperation between Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies. Concern with international narcotics trafficking and illegal banking practices (as revealed in the BCCI and BNL cases) has led to calls for closer cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Intelligence agencies have capabilities to monitor many aspects of narcotics production and transportation, and procedures have been put in place pursuant to statutory authority and executive orders to facilitate exchanges of information between the two communities. This trend is a recognized exception to longstanding practice and statutory provisions that have kept the two communities separate out of concern that excessive power could be concentrated in agencies using "police-state" methods.

Using information from intelligence sources in legal proceedings continues to present serious administrative and legal difficulties stemming in large measure from the different goals and procedures of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Intelligence agencies are used to monitoring developments over a long period of time and employ methods necessary to protect vital national security interests. Law enforcement agencies focus more often on a specific case that will lead to arrests and trials; their methods are precisely specified and undergo careful judicial scrutiny to ensure compliance with constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) of 1980 established methods for the use of classified information in criminal cases, requirements for sharing evidence with defense attorneys, and avoiding infringements of defendants' rights continues to complicate any use of information from intelligence agencies in criminal cases. The Executive Branch is reviewing the situation; Congress may choose to assess the need for additional legislation and to oversee the evolving relationship. (See Richard A. Best, Jr. Intelligence Agencies' Information Support to Law Enforcement, CRS Report 95-1204F, Dec. 12, 1995.) The Conference Report on the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill would authorize intelligence agencies, at the request of law enforcement agencies, to collect information outside the United States about non-U.S. persons. Currently, only information obtained in the course of collection efforts against national security targets can be forwarded to law enforcement agencies.

A number of centers have been established to facilitate intelligence support to the counternarcotics effort, e.g., the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) in Texas and the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Although managed by the Justice Department, NDIC has been funded through DOD appropriations and has been criticized for duplicating the work of EPIC and for its location far from the headquarters of both intelligence and law enforcement agencies. As noted below, the Conference Report on the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill includes funds for NDIC with the stipulation that "the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the Center."

Intelligence and Bosnia. The Intelligence Community has devoted considerable resources to Bosnia and other Balkan states since the breakup of Yugoslavia beginning in mid-1991. According to press reports, intelligence is collected by satellites, manned aircraft and UAVs. DCI Deutch has testified that an intelligence task force on Bosnia has been in existence for over 4 years and is operational 20-24 hours per day. Precise, targeting data was a vital aspect of the NATO bombing campaign that began in late August 1995.

The Dayton Agreement, signed on Dec. 14, 1995, that established a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia places heavy demands on the U.S. Intelligence Community. Although there is good overhead photographic coverage of the region, intelligence agencies will be challenged to acquire warning of potential attacks on IFOR by small units or to sense changes in the political acceptability of IFOR to various local elements. There is, nonetheless, a widespread belief that many of the technical difficulties that hindered intelligence support in Desert Storm have been effectively dealt with.

In April 1996, press accounts revealed that in 1994 the United States refrained from objecting to the transhipment of Iranian weapons through Croatia to Bosnia (despite a U.N. arms embargo). Both intelligence committees are investigating whether any U.S. intelligence personnel were involved in facilitating such shipments and whether there might have been a requirement for a covert action finding.

On July 24, 1996 the Director of DIA, CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee regarding conditions in Bosnia. There was agreement that provisions in the Dayton Agreement regarding adherence to the cease-fire and separation of forces have been effectively implemented, but grave concerns were expressed regarding prospects for renewed hostilities should IFOR be withdrawn at the end of 1996. General Patrick Hughes, the DIA Director, stated: "Given the fact that the strategic goals of the main political protagonists have not changed, continued international engagement and pressure, over some period of time, will be required to proceed with the work of trying to establish a viable Bosnian state. Without such continued engagement, it is in my opinion, likely the former warring factions will turn once again to violent conflict in an attempt to achieve their aims."

Analysis: Strategic Missile Threats

In November 1995 the Intelligence Community produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 95-19) dealing with missile threats to North America in the next fifteen years. As the conclusions of the NIE quickly became controversial, with some observers charging that it was politicized (see General Accounting Office, Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of Certain National Intelligence Estimates, August, 1996), the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act (section 1311) would mandate a review of the assumptions and conclusions of that NIE by a panel of independent, non- government experts. (In part, this proposal is modeled upon an 1976 review of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives by a group of outside experts known as Team B, in addition to an Intelligence Community group known as Team A.)

FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Bills (H.R. 3259/S. 1718)

The House version of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 3259), that passed by the House on May 22, 1996 would have approved funding levels 3.9% above the amounts requested by the President; NFIP programs would receive a 6.3% increase over amounts appropriated in FY1996. H.R. 3259 would authorize funds ($32 million) for the National Drug Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania that remains part of the Department of Justice in an attempt to provide better intelligence support to the counternarcotics effort. Floor amendments aimed at reducing authorized spending levels were defeated along with a proposal to make total intelligence budgets public. An amendment was adopted to preclude use of American journalists as intelligence agents (except when specifically authorized by the President in emergency situations).

The Senate version of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization bill (S. 1718), passed by the Senate on September 17, 1996, would have provided for a 1% increase in the Administration's request for national intelligence. Title VII of the bill includes significant reorganization provisions. It would establish three Assistant DCIs (for Analysis and Production, Collection, and Administration, each of which would have Community-wide responsibilities. CIA's general counsel would have to be confirmed by the Senate. The DCI would participate in the development of all intelligence budgets. NIMA would have specific national imagery collection responsibilities. The version that passed the Senate did not go as far as Chairman Specter would have preferred, but contains a number of provisions enhancing the community-wide authority of the DCI. House conferees, however, may prefer to defer reorganization provisions to another year rather than accept the compromise measures that received Senate support.

The Conference Report provides for a Senate confirmed Deputy DCI for Community Management and three Assistant DCIs to be confirmed by the Senate (along with CIA's General Counsel) and provides funding at levels slightly higher than the original Administration request. It forbids the use of U.S. journalists as intelligence paid agents or assets (although the President can waive the prohibition in specific cases). It mandates annual unclassified reports on intelligence and studies on government efforts at counterproliferation and the future of intelligence collection. The legislation establishes an enhanced role for the DCI in management and budget matters of the entire Community even as it did not go as far as had been originally advocated by the Aspin Brown Commission and other observers.

FY1997 Defense Department Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201)

Intelligence issues have also been considered in the context of defense authorization legislation for FY1997. Senate floor debate on June 26th described considerable differences between the approaches of the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, especially in regard to the proper extent of control that the DCI should have over intelligence personnel and activities in DOD agencies.

The Defense Authorization Act that was signed by the President on September 23, 1996 establishes NIMA as a combat support agency with significant national missions. The Act also requires that the Secretary of Defense seek the DCI's concurrence in appointments of heads of DOD intelligence agencies. The Secretary of Defense can still recommend such appointments without the DCI's concurrence, but the President will have to be advised of the DCI's non-concurrence.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 104-93, H.R. 1655
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. Introduced May 17, 1995; referred to Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Reported to House June 14, 1995. Floor debate, Sept. 13, 1995. Passed House, amended, Sept. 13, 1995. Conference Report (H.Rept. 104-427) adopted by House and Senate, Dec. 21, 1995. Signed into law Jan. 6, 1996.

H.R. 3237 (Combest)
Intelligence Community Act. Introduced April 15, 1996 and referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on National Security. Reported by the Intelligence Committee, June 13, 1996 (H.Rept. 104-620, Part 1); reported (amended) by the National Security Committee, July 23, 1996 (H.Rept. 104-620, Part 2).

H.R. 3259 (Combest)
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. Introduced April 17, 1996 and referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Reported by the Intelligence Committee, May 14, 1996 (H.Rept. 104-578, Part 1). Passed House, May 22, 1996. Conference Report completed, Sept. 24, 1996. Passed House (voice vote), Sept. 25, 1996.

H.R. 3392 (Conyers)
Requires a separate, unclassified statement of the aggregate intelligence budget. Introduced May 6, 1996 and referred to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

S. 420 (Snowe)
Limits funding of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Introduced Feb. 15, 1995; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations.

S. 1593 (Specter)
Amends the National Security Act of 1947 to provide for the appointment of two deputy DCIs and to strengthen the authority of the DCI over elements of the Intelligence Community. Introduced March 6, 1996 and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence.

S. 1718 (Specter)
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. Original bill reported April 30, 1996 (S.Rept. 104-258). Passed, amended, September 17, 1996 (passed version substituted for all after the enacting clause of H.R. 3259 which was then passed).

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

U.S. Commission on the Role and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, March 1, 1996.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, H.Rept. 104-138, Part 2, July 19, 1995.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Staff Study, April 9, 1996.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Pursuant to Clause 1(d) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.Rept. 103-879, Dec. 23, 1994. [A review of the Committee's work during the 103rd Congress.]

-----104th Congress, 1st Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, National Security Revitalization Act, H.Rept. 104-18, Part III, Feb. 3, 1995.

-----Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, H.Rept. 104-138, Part 1, June 14, 1995.

----- Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Conference Report, H. Rept. 104-427, Dec. 20, 1995.

-----104th Congress, 2d Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, H.Rept. 104-578, Part 1, May 14, 1996.

----- Intelligence Community Act, H.Rept. 104-620, Part 1, June 13, 1996.

----- Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Conference Report, H. Rept. 104-832, Sept. 24, 1996.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on National Security, Intelligence Security Act, H.Rept. 104-620, Part 2, July 23, 1996.

U.S. Congress, Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd session, Committee on Government Affairs, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, S.Rept. 104-337, July 29, 1996.

U.S. Congress, Senate, 104th Congress, 1st session, Select Committee on Intelligence, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1996 for the Intelligence Activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 104-97, June 14, 1995.

-----Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997 for the Intelligence Activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, S.Rept. 104-258, April 30, 1996.

U.S. Congress, 104th Congress, 2nd session, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997 for Intelligence and Intelligence- Related Activities of the United States Government, S.Rept. 104-277, June 6, 1996.

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Intelligence Spending: Should Total Amounts Be Made Public?, by Richard A. Best, Jr. and Elizabeth B. Bazan. Mar. 22, 1994. 39 p. CRS Report 94-261F.

---- Intelligence Reorganization in the 104th Congress: Prospects for a More Corporate Community, by Richard A. Best, Jr. September 13, 1996. 6 p. CRS Report 96-681F.

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Intelligence

95018: Intelligence Issues and the 104th Congress

Updated September 26, 1996

CONTENTS