Intelligence

Chapter 3 - Recent Intelligence Lessons

Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins and DIO

The Inquiry became aware of the concerns of Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins about the operation of the Defence Intelligence Organisation. Some of the matters he raised are addressed elsewhere in this report. Here we focus on issues concerning Indonesia and East Timor.

The Inquiry made several attempts to interview Lieutenant Colonel Collins. Lieutenant Colonel Collins declined to be interviewed because neither the Inquiry, nor the Army, was in a position to agree to his condition that expenses for his senior and junior counsel be met. The Inquiry was prepared for Lieutenant Colonel Collins to be accompanied by lawyers - though it is noted that no other person appearing before the Inquiry asked to be so accompanied - but the Inquiry was not able to meet any costs for his lawyers.

The Chief of Army advised the Inquiry that Lieutenant Colonel Collins was authorised to visit Canberra at Army expense for the purpose of attending the Inquiry but the Army was not able to meet any expenses for accompanying counsel. After several exchanges, lawyers for Lieutenant Colonel Collins advised on 16 June that he would not attend the Inquiry. Nevertheless the Inquiry was able to address many issues of concern to him, including those in his letter of 18 March 2004 to the Prime Minister.

Lieutenant Colonel Collins has asserted that intelligence assessments on East Timor of the Defence Intelligence Organisation in 1998 and 1999 were influenced by DIO's perception of a pro-Indonesian Australian Government policy and by direction from the Department of Defence. This matter was investigated by the then Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Mr Blick, who concluded in May 2003 that this assertion did not stand up to objective scrutiny. Mr Blick was unable to find evidence of a systemic or institutional bias in DIO assessments. He commented that "the overall picture throughout the period is of conscientious attempts to analyse what was going on and come to rational conclusions about where that might lead."

The Inquiry received no evidence to support the conclusion of Captain Martin Toohey RANR, in the Report of Investigation - Redress of Grievance submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins that "a pro-Jakarta lobby exists in DIO, which distorts intelligence estimates to the extent those estimates are heavily driven by Government policy... in other words DIO reports what the Government wants to hear."

The Inquiry looked at all assessments on Indonesia produced by DIO (and by ONA) from 1998 to May 2004. The Inquiry found no evidence of pro-Jakarta or pro-Indonesian assessments.

The present situation in ONA and DIO is that there is no evidence of any pressure on either organisation, or pressure within either organisation, to produce pro-Indonesian assessments or to tone down any criticism of Indonesia. It is clear that analysts are free to call the situation as they see it and that their assessments reflect a robust approach to Australia's interests.

In view of recent media comments about DIO, the Inquiry notes that it found no evidence whatsoever that the current Director of DIO, Mr Frank Lewincamp, has exerted pressure of any kind on his analysts to reach particular conclusions or that he expected analysts to report what the government might be presumed to have wanted to hear. On the contrary, it is evident that while Mr Lewincamp tests analysts' views through vigorous internal debate, he encourages analysts to think freely, to express different and robust opinions, to reach conclusions irrespective of government policy and to be prepared to take prudent risks in their assessments.

Lieutenant Colonel Collins has alleged that a DIO senior officer or senior officers deliberately withheld, for a short period in December 1999, access by Australian forces in East Timor, as part of INTERFET, to a classified intelligence database. The then Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Mr Blick, investigated this matter and concluded in May 2003 that there was no policy decision to withdraw such access. The Secretary of the Department of Defence, Mr RC Smith, and the Chief of the Defence Force, General PJ Cosgrove, advised publicly on 21 April 2004 that the brief and temporary loss of access to one database on one of the communications systems resulted from technical problems and not from a deliberate policy decision. General Cosgrove has also pointed out that Australian forces in East Timor were not reliant for intelligence solely on that database and that intelligence, including DIO product, was sent via a number of channels to Australian forces. Since the current Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Mr Carnell, is looking again at this matter the Inquiry did not make any separate investigation.

The Inquiry has examined the Intelligence Estimate of the situation in East Timor completed by Headquarters Australian Theatre on 8 July 1998 and forwarded to DIO at that time. The Estimate stated that the contact officer was Lieutenant Colonel Collins. There can be no doubt that this is a significant (31-page) work of analysis. There can also be no doubt that this intelligence estimate raised difficulties for DIO and the Department of Defence because it discussed matters which were well beyond and outside the scope of an intelligence assessment. The estimate included, for example, comments on domestic Australian political developments, including a state election, disparaging comments on policies pursued both by Labor and by Coalition Governments, and comments on matters far removed from the subject of East Timor such as Wik/native title and greenhouse gases. There is nothing improper about querying existing policy - indeed, in all organisations this should be welcomed and encouraged, and there should be more of it. However, an intelligence estimate intended to guide those preparing forces for combat is hardly the place to do so. Across the Australian Defence Force or the Australian Public Service there is not a single, agreed procedure on how to query policy, though some departments do specify procedures, but the most direct and forthright is a combination of written and oral submission to senior officers and or the responsible minister, rather than comment in an intelligence estimate. In short, the valuable material in the estimate was weakened by the inclusion of much that was not relevant to an intelligence estimate.

In its concluding core element the estimate envisaged four potential scenarios for East Timor - (A) Breakdown of Dialogue heading to Further Unrest and ABRI Reaction, (B) Autonomy imposed by Indonesia, (C) Agreed limited autonomy and (D) Independence. The estimate assessed (A) as the most likely outcome and (D) as the least likely. Although in the event the estimate did not prove to be a fully accurate prediction of what actually transpired, the core of the estimate was a very useful assessment. It is unfortunate that the estimate was not prepared in a way which would have made it more useful to DIO and to the Commander Australian Theatre. It is also unfortunate that there was not a more substantial exchange with Lieutenant Colonel Collins at the time which might have led to his assessment being prepared in a form which would have made it more valuable. The Defence Department and DIO correctly and promptly pointed out in writing to Headquarters Australian Theatre their concerns with the estimate but it is not apparent whether Headquarters Australian Theatre made these concerns abundantly clear to Lieutenant Colonel Collins.